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2.1. The Erosiac Thesis and Perfection in Republic II
2.2. Plato’s Late Alternative: Overflowing
Superabundance as Projective Motivation
2.3. Divine Agape and the Open View of God in
Christian Theology
2.4. The Judeo-Christian Heritage of Projective
Motivation
3. Arendt on Creative Work
4. Levinas on Superabundant Will and Volitional
Generosity
4.1. The Agapic Revelation of Alterity

................. 16406$

CNTS

05-23-07 10:54:38

PS

287
287
289
289
292
296
300
303
307
308

PAGE x

Contents

xi

4.2. The Projective Structure of Metaphysical Desire
4.3. Levinas on the Will
5. The General Structure of Projective Motivation

309
315
318

10 Radical Evil and Projective Strength of Will
1. Why Eudaimonism Misses Virtue and Vice in Their
Most Radical Forms
1.1. Aristotle’s Apollonian View of Virtue as a
‘‘Mean’’
1.2. From Vice as Ignorance and Akrasia to Radical
Evil
2. Toward an Existential Theory of Radical Evil: Six
Forms of Volitional Hatred
2.1. Sadistic Cruelty
2.2. Fanatical Cruelty and Motive Switches
2.3. Malicious Anger
2.4. Envy, Superiority, and Spite
2.5. Malevolence, Torture, and the Will to
Misappropriation
2.6. Demonic Autonomy
3. Aquinas and Kierkegaard on Evil: A Response to
MacIntyre
4. Projective Strength of Will versus Enkrateia
4.1. Kierkegaard and Kupperman on Character
4.2. Roberts’s Analysis

326

11 Scotus and Kant: The Moral Will and Its Limits
1. The Medieval Shift away from Eudaimonism: Scotus
and the Moral Will
1.1. From Aquinas to Scotus: Kent on Virtues of the
Will
1.2. Scotus on the Will to Justice
2. Kant and the Projective Motive of Duty
2.1. From Scotus to Kant
2.2. Kant and the Will’s Highest Function
2.3. The Limits of Deontic Projection: Kant’s False
Dichotomy and Practical Identities
3. Projective Willing and Libertarian Freedom
3.1. Projective Motivation Is Not Necessarily
Libertarian
3.2. Allison and Ameriks on Freedom in Kant’s
Practical Philosophy

371

................. 16406$

CNTS

05-23-07 10:54:38

PS

326
326
330
332
337
339
346
350
357
362
363
366
366
368

371
372
376
384
384
386
400
406
406
409

PAGE xi

xii

Contents

12 Existential Psychology and Intrinsic Motivation: Deci,
Maslow, and Frankl
1. Twentieth-Century Psychological Theories of
Motivation
2. From Drive Theories to Intrinsic Motivation
3. An Existential Reinterpretation of Intrinsic Motivation
4. Maslow’s Eudaimonism
5. Frankl’s Existential Will to Meaning
5.1. Meaning as a By-Product of Self-Transcending
Devotion
5.2. The Alterity of Values to Which the Will
Responds
6. How Caring Benefits the Agent: Frankfurt on Means
and Ends
7. Self-Esteem as By-Product
8. Willed Carelessness: Emily Fox Gordon’s Case
9. Willed Inferiority: Sartre
13 Caring, Aretaic Commitment, and Existential Resolve
1. Frankfurtian Care as Projective Motivation
1.1. Care and Self-Unification over Time
1.2. Caring Involves Reflexive Volitional Attitudes
1.3. Caring Is Based on Volitional Commitment
1.4. Volitional Love as Nonappetitive Motivation
2. Aretaic Commitment and Backward-Looking
Considerations
2.1. The Concept of Commitment
2.2. MacIntyre and Aretaic Commitment
2.3. Williams against Consequentialism
2.4. Anderson, Frankfurt, and the Priority of the
Object
2.5. Blustein on Commitment
14 An Existential Objectivist Account of What Is Worth Caring
About
1. Existential Objectivism
2. Caring and the Good in Recent Political Philosophy
3. Three Initial Reasons for Objectivism
3.1. Caring about the Worth of Our Cares
3.2. The Intersubjective Intelligibility and
Criticizability of Cares
3.3. Goods Internal to Practices are Worth Caring
About

................. 16406$

CNTS

05-23-07 10:54:38

PS

418
418
422
428
432
436
436
440
443
449
452
455
458
459
460
462
464
468
472
472
474
475
478
482
487
488
490
494
495
497
498

PAGE xii

Contents

xiii

4. Frankfurtian Arguments for Subjectivism and
Objectivist Rebuttals
4.1. Two Kinds of Importance
4.2. The Nygrenian Fallacy
4.3. The Rejection of Strict Proportionalism: Wolf ’s
Analysis
4.4. Does Optionality Entail Subjectivity?
4.5. Does Essential Particularity Entail Subjectivity?
Raz’s Analysis
4.6. Do Objectivist Values Lack Noncircular
Grounds?
5. The Reciprocal Relation between Value Insight and
Volitional Resolve
6. Toward a Taxonomy of Significant Grounds for Caring

500
500
503
505
509
513
519
523
527

Conclusion
The Danger of Willfulness Revisited

539

Notes

547

Glossary of Definitions, Technical Terms, and Abbreviations

657

Bibliography

665

Index

691

................. 16406$

CNTS

05-23-07 10:54:38

PS

PAGE xiii

................. 16406$

CNTS

05-23-07 10:54:38

PS

PAGE xiv

Acknowledgments

The main ideas for this project grew out of the first half of my 1998
dissertation, which was titled Self and Will and directed by Karl Ameriks at
the University of Notre Dame. However, less than a third of this book has
any parallel in my Ph.D. thesis, so Karl is certainly not to blame for any
problems. Although my argument is closely related to Kant’s critique of the
eudaimonist view that happiness is the proper function of human reason
(and thus of human nature generally), the historical analyses and my theory
of projective motivation go beyond anything found in Kant, and so the
great German deontologist is the subject of only one episode in this story.
Still, Karl’s criticisms and advice were an indispensable help in formulating
some of the initial ideas for this theory.
Among so many others who provided encouragement and questions, I
want to single out for special thanks David Solomon, Fred Dallmayr, and
Stephen Watson. The discussions of Kant, virtue ethics, and Levinas owe a
great deal to their insights—and indeed, my conception of the will can be
regarded as a development and expansion of Levinas’s notion of metaphysical desire. In addition, my intellectual debts to Alasdair MacIntyre are too
enormous and obvious to need stating. Though he must disagree with much
of this work, I hope to have added in some small way to the new dialogue
among traditions that he started. The other great debt in this work, as in
much of what I have published, is to Harry Frankfurt. Here I can only
repeat MacIntyre’s refrain that constructive criticism of a philosopher’s
work is the greatest compliment one can pay.
Although this book does not discuss Kierkegaard at any length, the inspiration of countless Kierkegaard scholars stands behind it. In particular,
I would like to express special appreciation to Edward Mooney, who has
helped through the years in too many ways to name, including many valuable suggestions on how to make this work more readable. MacIntyre was
right when he wrote that giving can never be equally reciprocal and we can
only hope to pass on to others in the future the great benefits of generosity
that we have received. It is also a pleasure to thank my colleague Merold
xv

................. 16406$

$ACK

05-23-07 10:54:39

PS
PAGE xv

xvi

Acknowledgments

Westphal, who has provided advice on this work and helpful comments
and support throughout my years at Fordham University. In this respect,
he is like virtually all my colleagues at Fordham, who have seen strengths
rather than weaknesses in my own philosophical pluralism. It is a high
honor to serve with such a faculty.
I would also like to thank Helen Tartar and Nicholas Frankovich of
Fordham University Press for their encouragement and patience. Copyediting this work was a two-year process involving enormous labor by Gill
Kent, to whom I am enormously appreciative. This book also could not
have been finished without the help of my research assistant, Scott O’Leary.
Thanks also to Kyle Hubbard for his work on the index.
Now to my institutional debts. The main work on the manuscript of
this book began during the summer of 2001 with the aid of a Fordham
Faculty summer fellowship and continued with the help of one course reduction from our standard 3/3 load during the fall of 2002. The project
also benefited from the opportunity to teach seminars on moral psychology
at both the graduate and undergraduate level. Finally, chapters 13 and 14,
which were initially conceived as part of a new book project on autonomy,
were completed during the first weeks of an NEH Summer Fellowship in
June of 2004.
In truth, however, the ultimate source of this book lies much earlier in
my biography. Although its terminology reveals a Heideggerian pedigree,
the idea expressed by the term ‘‘projective motivation’’ was with me long
before I read any philosophy. I have hung onto it, perhaps out of a spirit
of resistance, through twenty years of studying and teaching a philosophical
canon in which few of the greatest authors recognize self-motivational phenomena. In short, I acquired my idea of the will from the literary masterpieces of Tolkien and Donaldson, which I read in high school. This book
is a testament to their view of the great powers and dangers of the human
spirit. I also saw the striving will at work in my parents and grandparents,
who in their own ways each exhibited great volitional strength.
But my greatest debt of all—one that transcends all these others—is to
my wife Robin, without whom there would be not only no book but probably no author either. In addition to all her love and support, she has also
read most of the manuscript for grammar and typos. In her career, Robin
gives new meaning to the biblical phrase, ‘‘Wonderful Counselor.’’ In mothering our two wonderful children, she reveals the true meaning of commitment. I was drawn to Princeton University Press after college by interests
in Kierkegaard, Jung, and the Bollingen Series, but I found Robin there
instead. Thank goodness I learned enough from Kierkegaard not to make
his mistake! We are the choices we make, and not all of mine have been
good, but something gave me the grace to get the most important one right.

................. 16406$

$ACK

05-23-07 10:54:39

PS

PAGE xvi

Preface
The Project of an Existential Theory of Personhood

The Issue
Although it remains popular among educated readers of the general public,
enthusiasm for the existentialist approach to personhood has been declining
in academic philosophical literature since the late 1970s. In analytic philosophy, metaphysical writings on personal identity over time have dismissed
existentialist contributions on the complex temporality of selfhood as obfuscation. Likewise, mainstream metaphysical authors have a new semantics
for possibility, necessity, and essential properties; as a result, they have difficulty in making sense of the existentialist claim that for persons, ‘‘existence
precedes essence,’’ unless this is read just as a rather confusing way of saying
that we enjoy some sort of libertarian freedom. Few grasp that the existentialist objection to ‘‘personal essences’’ is a rejection of theories such as
Molinism, Leibnizian monads, Kantian noumenal character, and Aristotelian teleology, all of which the existentialist views as inaccurate forms of
determinism about human choice and motivation.
Moreover, since the development of contemporary modal logic, debates
about the metaphysics of free will have been rewritten in a language relative
to which older existentialist writings on freedom may seem outdated. Debates on whether moral responsibility for particular actions and omissions
requires any sort of libertarian freedom, as existentialists commonly held,
have also become much more complex since Harry Frankfurt’s 1969 presentation of putative counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Yet these debates hardly ever touch on the crucial question for
existentialists: namely, what kind of freedom is required for responsibility
for our own personality, character, and overall direction in life? This crucial
question is addressed today only indirectly, as part of the theory of autonomy. Among neo-Kantians, compatibilist theories of autonomy have gained
xvii
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popularity, while their neo-Aristotelian critics often regard existentialism as
the last gasp of enlightenment individuality. Iris Murdoch accuses existentialism of reducing the person to a bare point of freedom; Alasdair MacIntyre describes the existential self as an isolated, solipsistic, ghostly, and
arbitrary free will. And this critique is fair against Sartre’s model of the
‘‘for-itself ’’ of consciousness, which ignores both social and natural constraints on the development of our identities and becomes what Michael
Sandel calls a totally unencumbered self ‘‘dispossessed’’ of its ends.1
Developments in feminist ethics and recent Continental philosophy have
reinforced this criticism, arguing that persons are essentially social beings
who can understand themselves or even develop a ‘‘self ’’ only in terms of
their relations to others, including shared values, norms, and relationships
of ‘‘care’’ that define the sphere of activities in which they conduct their
lives. In pragmatism and some forms of radical hermeneutics, the notion of
personhood itself is treated simply as a social convention or device we
require as an underpinning for our moral and legal language games or as
a convenient metaphysical fiction needed to maintain our shared ‘‘public
conception’’ of justice.2 In other deconstructive accounts, subjectivity remains, but not as a property of ‘‘the self ’’ and only as an ineffable ‘‘freedom’’ that relates to the world but not to itself.3
Thus, in analytic and Continental moral psychology, existentialism has
become passé. It is also widely regarded as having little relevance for contemporary philosophy of mind, which in recent decades has focused on
whether the intentionality of mental states is something more than the tendency to produce various kinds of behavior and whether the sentience that
computers would have to enjoy to count as conscious beings is irreducible
to physical properties of brain states. This debate is today largely about
whether any form of nonreductive physicalism will work, giving us mental
states that are conceptually distinct from brain states but without having to
tolerate any nonphysical level of reality (other than sets). The few writers
on mind (such as Daniel Dennett and Owen Flanagan) who extend their
analysis of consciousness to a conception of will and freedom generally
advocate a naturalistic account of these phenomena, ignoring classical existentialist objections against such reductionism.
But here, as elsewhere, the existential tradition is ignored only at one’s
peril. Sartre’s most central point about human consciousness, deriving from
ideas going back through Husserl and Fichte to Kant, is that it involves
prereflective awareness of itself as subject of intentional states rather than
as an object. Yet this insight and its implications for models of selfawareness seem to be virtually unknown in contemporary Anglo-American
philosophy of mind. Leading authors in this tradition, from Paul Churchland to William Lycan to David Armstrong, defend an introspective or
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xix

reflective theory of awareness without even realizing that they need to rebut
Sartre’s rather devastating criticism of such theories. Their approach is thus
an anachronism that can be respected in the analytic world only because its
practitioners are ignorant of a whole tradition of thought that refuted this
approach over fifty years ago. Whether we accept the phenomenological
tradition’s entire understanding of consciousness or not, relative to its insights today’s leading introspective theories of sentience must seem obviously or even trivially mistaken. This should be something of an
embarrassment to contemporary analytic philosophy of mind.
Likewise, psychological theory ought not to dismiss existentialism out
of hand as having too voluntaristic a conception of human motivational
powers. For theories of motivation in empirical psychology are influenced
by the history of moral philosophy, in which the dominant debate today is
between a range of neo-Humean positions according to which all motivation terminates in desires we simply acquire naturally or accidentally, and
neo-Kantian views according to which some motivation ultimately stems
from a choice to follow impartial rational judgments. These extremes leave
no room for the rich picture of self-motivational capacities that existentialist writers explored (even if it was never systematically explained). Part of
the goal of this book is to begin this systematic explanation, filling a large
gap in the existential tradition.
Bringing Existentialism Back into Contemporary Debates
Evidently then, a philosopher who hopes to demonstrate the contemporary
relevance of existentialism has his work cut out for him. He needs to develop a conception of personhood that is recognizably existentialist—or
similar in key ways to the self as described by writers such as Kierkegaard,
Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre—but which takes into account the last fifty
years of developments in the many different areas of philosophy that directly affect our understanding of what it is to be a person. Pursuing this
goal requires work on several different fronts in order to bring ideas from
the existentialist tradition back into contemporary debates. Thus my larger
agenda is to develop a revised existential account of personhood covering
at least the following ten areas:
1. the lived experience of freedom and the development of morally significant character;
2. an account of individuality and freedom compatible with the
narrative structure of our identity and our social nature as agents who
hold one another morally responsible and who use language in ways
involving implicit validity claims of several kinds;
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3. the role of the will in shaping the ethos of a person, and the
capacities of human motivation;
4. the concepts of autonomy and authenticity, and related intrapersonal or reflexive aspects of the will;
5. the freedom-conditions on moral responsibility for actions,
decisions, and character;
6. the notion of essence, objectionable forms of ‘‘essentialism’’
about individual persons, and in what sense there could be an ‘‘essence’’ of personhood;
7. the relationship between self-consciousness and willing in the
structure of the self;
8. the arrow of time, our knowledge of modality, and their relation to libertarian freedom;
9. a deliberative conception of democracy that is appropriate to
the existential self;
10. the function of faith in God, or personal relationship with
the divine in the development of a self, and the related existential
problem of evil.
Of course, this is an ambitious program. But a unified, consistent account that could speak to both contemporary analytic and Continental literature in these ten areas could restore existentialism to the prominence
that it deserves by addressing the main metaphysical and moral questions
of philosophical anthropology. The result will be a more sophisticated existentialism that can be presented in today’s terms as a serious challenge to
current dogmas in metaphysics and moral psychology and be defended
against the ascendant naturalistic, Humean, rationalistic, compatibilist, or
pragmatist alternatives. This conception of personhood will in turn provide
new and better bases for ethics, the foundations of political philosophy,
and perhaps even theology.
With the invaluable help of Anthony Rudd as coeditor, I have made a
start on this agenda in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre. Essays by several scholars
in this collection address areas 1 and 2 in the foregoing list by clarifying
Kierkegaard’s existentialist conception of personhood in relation to themes
in contemporary moral philosophy. My own essay, ‘‘Towards an Existential
Virtue Ethics,’’ sketches out an existentialist account of our experience of
freedom and defends the deep connection between ethical obligation and
authentic willing. This essay also goes some way toward explaining the idea
that the social and individual sides of human experience are equiprimordial:
Although human persons are essentially social beings with nonvoluntary
relations to others, it is also essential to their personhood that they develop
a volitional relation to themselves, which is manifested in their ‘‘work’’ on their
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own motivational character. This intrapersonal dimension of personhood
is not simply derivative from or reducible to the interpersonal dimensions.
Thus the existentialist emphasis on the individuality of human personhood is
defended. Human persons are essentially social, but each person also essentially transcends her sociality and can change her acquired character. This
does not conflict with the promising idea that a basis for ethics can be
found in our social constitution.
This Book and Subsequent Steps
Will as Commitment and Resolve represents the next and most complex step in
renewing the existentialist tradition. Focusing on the most influential historical accounts of motivation, along with some attention to closely related
questions in moral theory and religion, this book lays the groundwork for
all the subsequent steps. In particular, without an adequate conception of
willing, one cannot get to the root of long-standing dilemmas concerning
freedom of the will or understand the freedom required for the full range
of moral responsibility. The idea of willing as a self-motivating process is
also required to make sense of personal autonomy, authenticity, and various
forms of inauthenticity or ‘‘bad faith’’ that have concerned classical existentialists. The content of normative ethics also depends in crucial ways on
starting from the right conception of the will.
Of course, the nature of the will and its relationship to human motivation is an enormous topic, and I focus only on those aspects of a theory of
will and motivation that will be most important for these later steps. Tasks
4 and 5 require focusing directly on autonomy and especially on Frankfurt’s
claim that persons are distinguished by their capacity to be concerned about
and ‘‘identify with’’ or ‘‘alienate’’ their own first-order motives for acting.
A full understanding of autonomy and authenticity depends on making
sense of this great Frankfurtian insight; but Frankfurt’s own approaches to
explaining it all fail, because they never adequately distinguish volitional
states with agent-authority from ordinary desires, which do not come with
agent-authority built in. Frankfurt’s phenomenological investigation of how
we adopt and pursue reflexive goals concerning our own motivational character sheds light on the existentialist picture of selfhood, but only the existential tradition has the resources to make sense of Frankfurt’s notion of
volitional ‘‘identification,’’ and his closely related notion of volitional ‘‘caring.’’ I will argue that when we take a stand for or against particular dispositions, desires, and emotions as possible motives for acting, this can best be
explained in terms of the notion of projective motivation developed in the
present book. So Will as Commitment and Resolve is, among other things, a
prolegomena to my next book on volitional identification and autonomy.
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The analyses of caring and commitment come first, in the final chapters of
Will as Commitment and Resolve, because they are conceptually more basic.
As later books will, I hope, show, an existential phenomenology of the
will and autonomy also has interesting implications in many other areas. In
the philosophy of mind, I will argue that the forms of self-consciousness
unique to human beings cannot be understood without reference to our
volitional self-relations. In normative ethics, I will argue that an agapē ethics
cannot adequately be formulated without an existential account of willing.
When it is rightly conceived, such an ethics will prove superior to other
leading utilitarian, deontological, and neo-Aristotelian approaches. In political philosophy, I will argue that the deliberative account of legitimate democracy, which we find both in the republican tradition in America and in
Continental discourse ethics, requires that individual citizens be much more
than Hobbesian agents. In fact, it requires that they have the kind of motivational capacities described in this work, that they be existential agents as
well as rational beings. These arguments will provide further support for
the overall coherence of the new existentialist picture.
The Analytic-Phenomenological Method
Finally, since I blend ideas from different philosophical traditions and historical periods, a brief explanation of my method may be in order. Although I employ many of the same analytical and historical tools as do
others writing on my topics, my method is also broadly speaking phenomenological. Although this is not generally in the foreground of my discussion, it
becomes important at some crucial junctures in the argument.
In general, by a phenomenological approach I mean one that distinguishes between the primary phenomena to be explained in some area of
philosophy and the rival theoretical explanations that construe these phenomena in different ways. The phenomenological approach presumes that
we usually can discern, however imperfectly, some important phenomena
that serve as paradigm cases or fixed points of reference for analyzing a
particular problem or concept. This evidence or experience functions as an
initial clue or proleptic outline of the concept at issue.4 The task of theoretical explanation is then to provide as convincing an account of these phenomena and their grounds of possibility as can be given, where what counts
as ‘‘convincing’’ is itself guided by the shape of the phenomena that present themselves
more or less clearly in common human experience. Thus the first aim of
theoretical explanation is to follow where the phenomena lead rather than
to make them fit the mold of a metaphysics to which one is antecedently
committed. This principle, which corresponds both to Husserlian eidetic
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science and to the Habermasian communicative ideal of reaching conclusions based solely on the force of the better argument alone, is important in my
case for deciphering how we can even begin to analyze concepts such as the
will, volitional identification, and freedom.
Of course I am aware that objections have been raised against this principle and the phenomenological method in general. Let me mention and
briefly respond to three such objections.
A. The Hermeneutic Objection
The ‘‘phenomena themselves’’ are never pure givens; our reception of them
is mediated by a host of unexamined presuppositions (some of them theoretical and even metaphysical), which vary both culturally and historically—and it could not be otherwise for beings like us.
B. The Linguistic Objection
Our evaluation of whether an explanation meets, satisfactorily accounts for,
or (in older lingo) adequately saves the phenomena is always mediated by
linguistic structures whose implications exceed our capacity to make them
certain beforehand in reflection and which also vary over time.
C. The Underdetermination Objection
Two theories may save all the phenomena equally well, leaving us to decide
between them on other criteria.
In my view, the caveats expressed by A and B show only that judging an
explanation’s convincingness according to the pure phenomenological approach (or philosophical ‘‘strict science’’ in Husserl’s sense) is always a
counterfactual ideal, not that we should not try to approximate this ideal as
best we can, nor that we have no ways to tell when we have done a better
or worse job at approximating it. We cannot spell out a method that could
be rationally agreed on in advance to resolve disputes about the content,
relevance, and reliability of our phenomena between parties in different
traditions and cultures; but the process of spelling out rival descriptions
usually reveals differences in quality of interpretation that would be apparent to neutral observers—were there any—which are therefore usually also
apparent to honest and self-critical although situated observers like ourselves and our interlocutors. And the problem that we cannot ever be entirely neutral observers is itself revealing for several issues in philosophical

................. 16406$

PREF

05-23-07 10:54:44

PS

PAGE xxiii

xxiv

Preface

anthropology and epistemology. In other words, objections A and B themselves reveal some transcendental conditions of our experience that provide
useful information for philosophical anthropology in their own right (for
example, that we are not so situated that we cannot even realize that we are
situated, and so on).
Objection C poses different problems, but for the most part, the difficulty to which it refers becomes serious only in the philosophy of science
and the philosophy of physics in particular; in moral philosophy and philosophical anthropology we never get theories that clearly save all the most
relevant and reliable phenomena and so we never get ones that do so equally
well. The problem is more one of a phronetic judgment between incomplete
accounts with different and still-imperfect virtues. There is no solution for
this other than continuing the debate for indefinitely many further rounds.
Thus qualified, the method I follow can still bear valuable fruit if it is
done well.
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Introduction

How far from both muscular heroism and from the soulfully tragic
spirit of unselfishness that unctuously adds its little offering to the
sponge cake at a kaffee klatsch is the plain, simple fact that a man
has given himself completely to something he finds worth living for.1
1. The Heroic Will
Like many of key terms in philosophy, the word ‘‘will’’ is used in many
different ways, and it has a complex etymology (connected to willa in Old
English and voluntas in Latin). In his attempt to bring this term back into
psychotherapy, the psychologist Irwin Yalom lists several prominent senses
of ‘‘willing’’:
It is the mental agency that transforms awareness and knowledge into
action, it is the bridge between desire and act. It is the mental state
that precedes action (Aristotle). It is the mental ‘‘organ of the future’’—just as memory is the organ of the past (Arendt). It is the
power of spontaneously beginning a series of successive things (Kant).
It is the seat of volition, the ‘‘responsible mover’’ within (Farber). It
is the ‘‘decisive factor in translating equilibrium into a process of
change . . . an act occurring between insight and action which is
experienced as effort or determination’’ (Wheelis). . . . It is a force
composed of both power and desire. . . . To this psychological construct, we assign the label, ‘‘will,’’ and to its function, ‘‘willing.’’2
It is clear that the different theorists Yalom cites here are not offering
explanations of the same item in our experience, and this is why any philosophical analysis of willing must first fix the basic sense(s) or concept(s)
that it hopes to explain. Otherwise we will be trying to combine or decide
3
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between apparently conflicting explanations that are really shooting at different explananda, or targets of analysis.
This book is about the will in what can loosely be called its ‘‘heroic’’
sense, as committed striving or passionate resolve. ‘‘Willing’’ in this ordinary language or prephilosophical sense is commonly associated with perseverance and even inflexibility. My younger daughter once opened a fortune
cookie containing the message: ‘‘You have an iron will, which helps you
succeed in everything.’’ However, the kind of willing that existentialism
considers central to personhood is certainly not limited to contexts of battle
or world-historic struggles or grappling with great adversaries. Volitional
heroism is not primarily exemplified by the warrior-kings of archaic societies (or their poetically enlarged literary representations). Instead, my
existential account regards strength of will as the backbone of every distinctively human life, however outwardly humble. In its most primordial sense,
volition is personal resolve, or choice that is motivated by the agent’s selfassertive commitment to final goals and ends.3 The will admired in our
heroes is a kind of striving toward ends that involves committing the agent’s
whole self to the task. Although it is really an ongoing activity, we sometimes also call this striving will a state of firm resolve.
There are two other closely related ways of glossing the basic concept
of willing that is the target of my analysis or the phenomenon that my
existential theory purports to explain better than rival accounts. The striving will is that in us through which we, rather than the forces which surround us on every side, play an active role in forming our own character
and thus in shaping our own destiny. It is also, as Kant saw, the capacity to
pursue ends for something beyond the satisfactions that they promise to
bring us when reached. The person who exercises her will in discovering
and pursuing a meaningful life need not hold, with Beowulf, that ‘‘renown’’
or recognition from one’s compatriots is the highest end of life. But her
will is appropriately called ‘‘heroic’’ if it recognizes and responds to values
that make goals worth pursuing, even when these transcend the productvalue of the goal once achieved or realized—for such devotion to an end
or goal is not conditioned simply by the value and chances of success.4 In
this sense, heroic willing is what Kierkegaard called ‘‘infinite passion.’’5 The
common notion of ‘‘strength of will’’ is directly related to this original
sense of the word: our will is our capacity to face adversity and struggle to
overcome obstacles in pursuit of a worthwhile goal—even when there is
little real hope of success and probably no poet to eulogize it.
These notions of determination or sustained effort remain the primary
sense of ‘‘willing’’ for most people working or writing outside of legal,
psychoanalytic, and philosophical contexts. They are widespread in modern
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novels by many authors who seem to be genealogically unrelated to existential philosophy. J. R. R. Tolkien, for example, was much concerned with
striving will. In his discussion of the tenth-century fragmentary poem The
Battle of Maldon, Tolkien notes that as the English lost the battle to the
Vikings, the English commander’s retainer gave voice to the deepest value
in his tradition:
as he prepares to die in the last desperate stand, [he] utters the famous
words, a summing up of the heroic code. . . . ‘‘Will shall be sterner,
heart the bolder, spirit the greater, as our strength lessens.’’ It is here
implied, as is indeed probable, that these words were not ‘‘original,’’
but an ancient and honoured expression of the heroic will.6
Likewise, in his famous Beowulf essay, Tolkien emphasizes W. P. Ker’s
idea that in Norse mythology, the forces of Chaos and the profane represented by the monsters must win in the end, ‘‘but the gods, who are defeated, think that defeat no refutation.’’7 The Norse solution to the
problem of evil and chaos is what Kierkegaard called ‘‘infinite resignation’’:
perseverance despite the certainty that ‘‘all men, and all their works shall
die.’’8 In the face of defeat without salvation from the God beyond time,
the Norse honor code finds ‘‘a potent but terrible solution in naked will
and courage.’’9 The same idea makes its way into the professor’s own epic
narrative. In The Lord of the Rings, as Frodo and Sam near Mount Doom but
seem certain to perish before reaching their goal, Tolkien tells us: ‘‘But even
as hope died in Sam, or seemed to die, it was turned to a new strength.
Sam’s plain hobbit-face grew stern, almost grim, as the will hardened in
him.’’10
Even today, almost every reader of this passage is likely to understand
what Tolkien meant, for this sense of ‘‘willing’’ as dedicated striving toward
a crucial goal (which moves us in a way quite unlike all bodily inclinations
and natural yearnings) is both individually recognizable in some of our own
experiences and collectively recognized in our mixed cultural heritage(s) as
essential for a person to have ‘‘character’’ and to be capable of virtue. It is
also closely related to the idea of commitment: as W. H. Auden notes in
his essay on Tolkien’s trilogy, ‘‘Once he had chosen, Frodo is absolutely
committed.’’11 As Stanley Hauerwas argues, ‘‘the idea of character in its
most paradigmatic [i.e., moral] usage indicates what a man can decide to be
as opposed to what a man is naturally.’’12 ‘‘Character’’ in this autonomous
or volitional sense suggests a certain strength of will and continuity in identity-defining commitments, whatever the agent’s less voluntary personality
traits may be: ‘‘when we speak of a man as ‘having character,’ we are more
apt to be thinking of something like integrity, incorruptibility, or consistency.’’13 To have volitional character is what I have called a proto-virtue: it is
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a constitutive prerequisite both of virtuous character and at least of great
vices.14
Yet in the history of Western philosophy, this most crucial sense of the
‘‘will’’ as the source of autonomous or identity-forming motivation has
never been fully understood. Rather, it has for the most part been systematically excluded or truncated within theories of motivation deriving mainly
from ancient Greek conceptions of the desire for happiness. In contemporary theories of action, if it is recognized at all, volition is usually construed
simply as a kind of mental act or decision by which we form intentions.
This interpretation usefully distinguishes volition from the prior motives
that do not themselves constitute intentional purposes, but it has obscured
the older tradition according to which will plays a motivational role, striving to carry out decisions about specific actions. Will in the striving sense
also concerns how we acquire our most important or governing ends in
life—that is, those final goals whose personal and collective significance has
the deepest importance for us, defining who we are or what we stand for in
the most uncompromising way. Whether or not it involves libertarian freedom, this process of setting our ultimate ends or defining our ultimate
concerns cannot plausibly be pictured as a discrete act of choice among
clearly predefined options nor as a simple act of decision in which we form
an intention to pursue some final end. Rather, ‘‘decision’’ in this customary
sense presupposes prior motives that it does not change, including some
ultimate ends. The development, setting, or definition of these ends is a
distinct process of agency that has no widely recognized label in contemporary action theory.
Striving in the executive sense (trying to act on intentions) is recognized
as corresponding to a distinct sense of ‘‘will’’ even by antimetaphysical positivists like Gilbert Ryle, who rejects the concept of ‘‘will’’ as a myth of
the Cartesian soul. Ryle has to acknowledge that in addition to ordinary
distinctions between ‘‘voluntary’’ and ‘‘involuntary,’’ we have the experience
of ‘‘nerving or bracing ourselves to do something,’’15 or making an ‘‘effort
of will.’’ Given his determination to eliminate ‘‘will’’ as a form of agency or
operation distinct from other mental or bodily acts, Ryle tries to explain
such efforts as merely patterns of attention, such as being focused on the
mission at hand. He insists that:
it is no part of the definition of resoluteness or of irresoluteness that
a resolution should actually have been formed. A resolute man may
firmly resist temptations to abandon or postpone his task, though he
never went through a prefatory ritual-process of making up his mind
to complete it. But naturally such a man will be disposed to perform
any vows which he has made to others or to himself.16
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Of course a strong-willed person need not literally make vows to himself
or perform other ritual speech-acts to cajole himself into action. But, pace
Ryle, this hardly means that resoluteness is a state that just happens to a
person rather than an active undertaking of her agency. Nor does the fact
that one may backslide on a resolve entail that it involves no distinctively
volitional element: efforts of striving will do not by definition succeed in
the way that deciding entails an intention.17
In existential literature, this crucial form of ‘‘willing’’ was extended to
end-setting and conceived as a kind of resolve or determination of the
whole self. Fichte described it as ‘‘ ‘self-positing activity,’ a subject’s ‘taking
itself ’ to be in relation to, or directed towards [an] . . . object or goal,’’18
and even claimed that this ‘‘practical striving of the I’’ was the basis of
human consciousness of the world.19 Beyond sensibly determined inclinations, this ‘‘pure will has an original (moral) determinancy of its own.’’20
As the existential psychologist Yalom writes, the word ‘‘will’’ has rich connotations precisely because ‘‘it conveys determination and commitment,’’
most paradigmatically in the form of promises.21 In the work of Yalom’s
predecessor, Viktor Frankl, willing is conceived as a process by which we
take up tasks and purposes whose pursuit is intrinsically valuable or meaningful to beings like us. In so doing, we find that our lives acquire meaning
for us or personal significance that is essential for healthy and mature
agency.
Following Frankl, I argue that the kind of will that distinguishes persons
is not simply the capacity to form an intention or to make a choice between
different possible actions but rather a capability for commitment or resolve
in which the agent sets for himself some significant and often difficult or
challenging project, plan, or goal. This view draws support from Harry
Frankfurt’s insight that persons are distinguished from other animals by
their unique motivational abilities.22 As I interpret it, the volitional resolve
that constitutes devotion to some ultimate end is itself a kind of motivation
unlike other sorts, distinct in particular from the various appetites typically
named ‘‘desires’’ and from emotions involving such desires. There are several different sorts of desire, but they share in common the feature that the
person is moved by the attractiveness of an object to desire it (or moved by its
repulsiveness to flee it). The eudaimonist tradition favors the idea that all
motivation has this magnetic form. For example, George Wilson defines a
goal as ‘‘something attractive. We attend to it and organize our resources
around it because we want it.’’23
By contrast, existential commitment involves what I call projective motivation, in which we give ourselves ends to which we may not have been previously attracted at all, although we recognize some kind of value in them.
Through projective resolve, we set new goals for ourselves or take up new
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projects and concerns, making it our business to care about something or someone; or we renew and strengthen our devotion to a standing end. This kind
of motive innovation carries us creatively beyond our prior desires and
inclinations. It may also help us carry out our intention when prior desires
for our intended act are too weak. In later chapters, I review different types
of desire, because the general structure of projective motivation can be explained only by contrast with the ‘‘erosiac’’ form of human desire described
by Plato and Aristotle as the basis of their eudaimonism, which is the focus
of Part II of this book. Part I focuses on clarifying the concept of heroic
or striving will that is to be explained in terms of projective motivation and
distinguishing it from other senses of ‘‘willing’’ found in contemporary action theory.
2. The Existential Theory of Striving Will as Projective Motivation
Thus the overall goal of this book is to draw attention to the importance
of willing in the heroic or striving sense and to argue that it is best understood in terms of the theory of projective motivation. The broader account
that interprets core character, life-meaning, and the formation of a ‘‘self ’’
in terms of striving will, and then explains this phenomenon in all its manifestations in terms of projective motivation, I call ‘‘the new existential theory of the will.’’
The new existential description of heroic or striving will points toward
the idea of self-motivation as underlying the specific virtues in which heroic
will is most noticeable. In particular, this ordinary language concept seems
to refer to two closely related capacities: (1) the ability to generate new
motivation in positing goals for oneself and committing oneself to them;
and (2) the ability to supplement or add to the motivation found in preexisting desires by an ‘‘effort of will,’’ renewed determination, or devotion of
more energy and resources toward pursuit of an existing goal. Since the
latter is most apparent in overcoming obstacles, it is closely associated with
courage, making it the more familiar of the two aspects of self-motivation
suggested here. But I call both forms ‘‘projective motivation’’ on the belief
that they share a common psychic structure.
I use the term ‘‘projection’’ in the Heideggerian sense to indicate that
the agent sets herself a goal, or gives herself an end, or motivates herself to
pursue it. In such cases, the agent does not experience her motivation as a
passive effect of perceptions or judgments that reveal desirable objects but
rather experiences the motivation as actively formed. But because the term
‘‘projection’’ has other, established meanings, my use of it could easily be
misunderstood. In moral theory, philosophers in the Humean tradition
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have held that values are ‘‘projected’’ by human attitudes, desires, and emotions onto a world that in itself is value-neutral, meaning that their objective reality is illusory. Similarly, in personality theory, psychologists have
held that persons ‘‘project’’ onto other people (including their therapist)
or onto superhuman beings what are really aspects of their own psyche.
For instance, I see my child as insolent because I am angry at my boss, or
I imagine God as having all the qualities of a loving father that I wish I
could be.
What I mean by ‘‘projection’’ is something absolutely distinct from these
metaethical, psychoanalytic, and anthropological senses of the term. In the
existential sense, we ‘‘project’’ ends for ourselves rather than simply discovering them as appealing to preexisting appetites within us, and we ‘‘project’’
ourselves toward the goals we set rather than simply finding ourselves drawn
to them. This does not mean that we project desirable characteristics onto
the object or goal to make ourselves want it. That we participate actively
in the genesis of some motivation rather than being merely its passive recipient does not mean that we create a fictional picture of our end or produce
some externalized image of our own thought. Nor does it mean that we
arbitrarily hurl ourselves toward some end for no reason. Rather, there are
always putative grounds for volitional projections: there is always a story to
be told about why an agent projected some goal or set of activities for
herself. Chapter 14 defends an objectivist account of the practical reasons
that agents can have for projecting different kinds of ends. Although the
metaphysical status of these reasons is not my topic in this book, my objectivism about practical reasons commits me at least to some form of moderate realism about values that can justify setting new ends or strengthening
resolve in pursuit of them.
Given the potentially misleading Humean or Feuerbachian connotations
of ‘‘projection,’’ I could have called these self-motivational processes something else, like ‘‘transformative motivation’’ or ‘‘self-composing’’ motivation; but all the alternatives seemed either more awkward or to presuppose
something about the role of such motivation in autonomy that remains to
be demonstrated. In cognitive psychology today, the closest analog to what
I call projective motivation is labeled ‘‘intrinsic motivation’’ to mark the
idea that the agent values the relevant ends for their own sake.24 For my
purposes, however, this distinction is not precise enough, since an agent can
(and surely does) value her own happiness as a final end. It is not the
finality of ends but rather their transcendence of the agent’s own good that
most clearly reveals the kind of self-motivational activity that this new body
of psychological work recognizes—the kind that is distinctive of willing in
the existential sense.25 Moreover, if I used the term ‘‘intrinsic motivation’’
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instead of ‘‘projective motivation’’ throughout, I would be giving the misleading impression that I am contributing to this genre of work in cognitive
psychology. Hence I have stuck with ‘‘projective’’ with the hope of reviving
its Heideggerian usage.
The idea that motivation can be directly initiated or evoked by some
kind of inner activity or mental effort is bound to prompt the question of
what motivates2 this activity1 or effort. On pain of infinite regress, the answer
cannot be that some further activity2 generates this motivation2 to form
some motive1. To stop the regress, the answer must be that nothing motivates2
the projection of ends or motivation1-composing activity itself. Yet this
activity, which is ‘‘willing’’ in its existential sense, is a response to perceived
reasons for the relevant ends and/or for the process of pursuing these ends—
reasons that do not already constitute motives when we consider them. Projective motivation thus amounts to the idea that persons can respond to
reasons for action that remain external to their present ‘‘motivational set’’
by internalizing them, or giving them motivational force. This is clearest when
the objective grounds to which projection of some end E responds are ones
that do not already draw us toward E ‘‘erotically,’’ in the most general sense
of this term. Since this contrast between erosiac and projective motivation is
fundamental for my existential theory of the will, a large part of the book
is devoted to exploring and defending it. This requires distinguishing between the thin or merely formal notion of a ‘‘motive’’ prevalent in contemporary theories of action and practical rationality and the thick or
substantive notion of motivation as a kind of psychological state with its
own phenomenology, which is distinguished from other states by the way
it is experienced as bringing the agent to form plans or intentions.
Contemporary theories of motivation generally focus on the formal role
of beliefs and desires as reasons for action and on what kind of rationality
these may involve. This has taken the focus away from the character of
different kinds of motivation as conative experiences. A phenomenology of
motives means more than simply considering ‘‘what it is like’’ to be motivated in a given way; it also involves looking at the intentional structure of
motivational attitudes, or the comportment of the agent toward the object,
as evidenced in our experiences of these attitudes. This book returns the
focus to the experienced structure of various kinds of human motives, beginning with a review of the erosiac structure of ‘‘desire’’ (orexis) in Platonic
and Aristotelian thought.
3. An Outline of the Main Argument
Given the many topics covered in this book and the complexity of my
approach in some sections, readers may find it helpful to have a map of the
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main line of argument—that is, a brief overview of the central themes of
the individual chapters and an explanation of how they fit into the overall
argument. This section explains the seventeen steps of the main argument
and their division in the three parts of the book.
The book includes several other features to help readers follow the main
thread of the argument through its many turns. At the end of this chapter
is a Reader’s Guide which suggests ways to move from one part of the text
to other parts, depending on one’s interests and levels of prior preparation.
Each subsequent chapter also begins with a summary of the chapter’s topics
and their relation to neighboring chapters. Following the summary, some
chapters also include brief introductions or reviews of progress. The detailed Glossary at the end of the book allows one to keep track of named
terms and principles. Extensive cross-references throughout indicate related
discussions in other parts of the text.
The book as a whole has two main theses: (1) that the existential conception of the striving will is a coherent and distinctive alternative to rival
conceptions in Eastern thought, Western eudaimonism, and contemporary
action theory; and (2) that this existential conception is correct in predicting that projective motivation plays a central role in moral motivation and
other self-defining commitments that shape the ethos of a person. The
book is subdivided into three parts because the defense of Thesis Two is
divided into negative components (critiquing competing models) and positive components (directly defending the existential model). Most of the
arguments for Thesis One are given in Part I of the book; most of the
negative arguments for Thesis Two are developed through the critique of
eudaimonism in Part II; and most of the positive arguments for Thesis Two
are presented in the case studies that comprise Part III.
However, there are a few complications within this otherwise linear development. First, the idea of projective motivation is further explained and
refined in the first chapter of Part III (chap. 9) because the definition developed there depends on a contrast with the erosiac model and psychological
eudaimonism, which are explained in Part II. Chapter 9 also provides several case studies illustrating this refined conception of projective motivation. Second, the analyses of friendship and practices in chapter 8 are
developed as part of the critique of eudaimonism, but they also provide
some positive illustrations of projective motivation, like the case studies in
Part III. Third, the analysis of radical evil in chapter 10 includes the other,
darker side of the existential critique of eudaimonist accounts of virtue
developed in Part II. However, the emphasis in chapter 10 is again on
positive evidence for the existence of projective motivation. Fourth, the
existential theory of willing sketched in Part I is incomplete without the
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account of reasons or grounds for willing developed in the defense of existential objectivism in Part III. But the list of objective grounds depends on
the case studies. Thus, for reasons of narrative continuity, points relevant
to the defense of each main thesis are found in all three parts of the work.
But, these complications aside, the first main thesis is the focus in Part I,
and the second main thesis is the focus in Parts II and III.
3.1. The Defense of Thesis One by Articulation of the Existential Conception
of Willing
The defense of the first main thesis has several parts, three of which are
meant to provide framing background for the main arguments. Together
they provide a preliminary account of what willing in the existential sense
means and why it is a distinct concept from free choice.
1. Chapter 2 begins with an account of the ordinary language or prephilosophical concept of heroic willing, which is explained in the existential
conception of striving will.
2. This chapter then offers a preemptive response to the objection that
this concept of willing is uniquely Western. I argue that the same idea is
present in paradigmatically ‘‘Eastern’’ thought, but it is construed negatively
as willfulness or the will to self-aggrandizement. Comparison and contrast
of ‘‘Eastern’’ and ‘‘Western’’ views on heroic willing reveals the possibility
of a moderate concept of volitional determination or resolve that is distinct
from its corrupt forms as the conatus ascendi or libido dominandi.
3. Chapter 3 argues that willing in this sense of resolve or self-motivating determination is not adequately described or explained in contemporary action theory. I consider four different pictures of willing that emerge
in the recent history of philosophical theories of action. However, even the
best of these accounts, which equates the will with the power of decision
through which we form the intentions and purposes that distinguish human
action from mere behavior, misses the phenomena of projective motivation.
Thus it leaves out much of what gives willing its existential significance.
This discussion also shows why projective motivation, if it exists, plays a
deeper role than decision or choice in establishing the character or ethos of
a person.
This historical analysis gives just enough content to the existential conception of willing that we can see what has to be shown to justify it: we
have to prove that human persons are capable of projective motivation. But it is
not immediately obvious how to go about this, first, because the concept
itself needs much more clarification, and second, because the most likely
examples that might be cited to illustrate it will be explained without projective motivation by the eudaimonist tradition that dominates contemporary virtue ethics. To solve these problems, one might engage recent analytic
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work on motivation and try to make conceptual arguments for projective
motivation. But, as already noted, such theories often begin from a thin
concept of ‘‘motive’’ without full attention to the phenomenology of motivational experience. Moreover, recent work on motivation by Davidson,
Williams, Mele, Dancy, and others may be influenced in subtle and not
readily perceived ways by assumptions derived from the eudaimonist tradition that tend to obscure projective phenomena.
Therefore it seems better first to engage the eudaimonist tradition in
detail, both because it provides a substantive conception of motivation that
serves as a foil for the existential account and because a critique of this
model suggests that we need to hypothesize projective willing to explain
virtuous motivation itself. As explained in the opening section of chapter
4, the core of the larger argument for main Thesis Two requires the idea
that motive-states that we can experience without necessarily intending to
act on them generally have what I call the erosiac structure. So this structure
must be explained before subsequent arguments for the existence of projective motivation can proceed.
4. Chapter 4 clarifies the idea of projective motivation by contrast with
the erosiac model of motivation first systematically set out by Plato, focusing in particular on the account of desire-as-lack in the Symposium. Drawing
on work in contemporary moral psychology, I distinguish three different
types of desire in Plato’s broad sense and distinguish targetable from nontargetable goals.
5. Chapter 5 argues that Aristotle’s psychology largely follows the core
claims of Plato’s model, except that the quasi-volitional role played by
Plato’s thumos or middle soul is taken over by ‘‘intellectual appetite.’’ I defend and develop the distinction between the three main types of erosiac
desire recognized in this account. But the intellectual appetite account does
not recognize striving will as having any independent motivational power
distinct from rational desires for the good that informs choice, and thus all
human motivation is explained in broadly erosiac terms.
6. Chapter 5 also argues that there is a legitimate sense in which the
erosiac model constructed from Plato and Aristotle is formally egoistic. I
distinguish formal egoism from other more familiar kinds of egoism (as a
doctrine about human motivation) and consider one highly important kind
of argument against motivational egoism, namely the argument that it is
self-defeating. I then ask whether a version of this paradox of self-defeat
applies to formal egoism.
It is important to note that the burden of this argument does not fall
primarily on the historical accuracy of my readings of Plato and Aristotle.
Although I think these interpretations are fair and, I hope, provide interesting insights into these much-studied authors, what is crucial for my main
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argument is that the erosiac model as I reconstruct it is as coherent and strong
a rival to the existential account as possible. If there are ideas in Plato,
Aristotle, or their successors that would strengthen this account of motivation, then they should be added to it. Slightly different versions of the
erosiac model are to be found in Aquinas and other medieval philosophers,
and it would be interesting to consider whether any of their insights allow
us to improve this model. Relative to the sketch I have given, though, we
can understand projective motivation negatively as non-erosiac.
3.2. The Negative Defense of Thesis Two by the Critique of Psychological
Eudaimonism
Any psychological theory according to which all motivational experiences
are explainable in erosiac terms dispenses with willing in the existential
sense and needs to be refuted to defend my second main thesis. The paradigm case of such a theory is what I call psychological eudaimonism (PE), which
consists of the erosiac model plus two further motivational and normative
theses:
(a) that all desire is unified (in an appropriate sense) in the desire
for eudaimonia, flourishing, or well-being of the agent—his individual good and components of it that are joint goods essentially
shared with others; and
(b) that an enlightened understanding of our eudaimonia extends
this fundamental desire for it to ethical goods, including the species of ‘‘nobility’’ that are intended for their own sake by virtuous
agents.
This position is to be distinguished from what we might call rational
eudaimonism (REu), which is the thesis that an agent’s practical reasons for
action are all unified (in the justificatory sense) in considerations concerning
the agent’s flourishing and its necessary conditions (including joint goods
necessarily shared with the others). According to REu, then, all practical
reasons to pursue or avoid any X ultimately derive their normative force
from X’s capacity to promote or hinder the agent’s eudaimonia. Each version of REu must provide some account of what the agent’s true good
includes, as must each version of PE. The distinction between REu and PE
is very important, because someone could apparently endorse the former in
her normative account of reasons without necessarily endorsing the latter
in her moral psychology.26
Such a position would face difficult questions about how or whether
certain key reasons arising from requirements of human eudaimonia could
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play any action-guiding role (without which they cease to be practical reasons). We might also consider whether rational eudaimonism could be
combined with an existential conception of willing that allows for projective motivation. I briefly address these issues in chapter 7, section 4, and
chapter 8, sections 3 and 5.5. While I believe that an adequate existential
account of willing requires a conception of practical reasons that extends
beyond those recognized by REu—and I sketch out such a conception in
chapter 14—critiquing REu is not my main purpose in this book. The
defense of main Thesis Two requires only that PE be refuted.
As in my analysis of the classical erosiac model, this part of the argument
begins by consulting historical examples (especially Aristotle) in order to
reconstruct in systematic form the most fair and representative version of
PE I can conceive, which I label A-eudaimonism.27 Its name is chosen to
suggest this model’s plausible attribution to Aristotle and Aquinas; but
again, the success of my main line of argument does not depend on it
reflecting Aristotle’s or Aquinas’s view with complete accuracy. It would be
affected only if some misinterpretation of their texts has caused me to miss
some way of strengthening PE against the existential critique I offer. The
critique itself is a version of the paradox of egoism described in chapter 5,
extended to the formal egoism involved in A-eudaimonism. Here are the
main steps in this part of the argument:
7. Chapter 6 focuses on Aristotle’s eudaimonism as a case study and
argues that when eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics is understood as holistically including all other human goods, we can construct a theory (Aeudaimonism) in which there is a unique highest good, the desire for which
embraces and underlies all other desires. The question is whether such a
conception of motivation is compatible with the virtue ethics that it is
supposed to support.
8. Chapter 7 argues that Aristotle’s conception of virtuous motivation
as aimed at the noble for its own sake is incompatible with A-eudaimonism.
The paradox of A-eudaimonism is that the agent’s flourishing requires the
by-product benefits of caring about goods that are materially unconnected
to the agent’s own good. But such by-products are not directly targetable
without self-defeat. Given Aristotle’s account of the role that happiness
plays in motivation and moral virtue, there is an internal conflict that cannot be solved in his own terms. I consider Aristotle’s own attempt to resolve
this problem and other worthy attempts by Kraut and Annas, and argue
that they all fail. A-eudaimonism generates a paradox that is structurally
similar to familiar paradoxes of egoism unless it is supplemented by projective motivation.
9. Chapter 8 has three tasks. First, it evaluates several different contemporary neo-Aristotelian efforts to resolve the paradox of eudaimonism, including ideas proposed by John Cooper, Paula Gottlieb, Alasdair
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MacIntyre, and Gary Watson, and argues that none avoids the need to
postulate projective motivation. This helps explain why the revival of virtue
ethics has been unable to show how the goals we ought to pursue and the
virtues required to sustain pursuit of them are fully traceable to (or explainable from) the telos of human psychology or the nature of human agency.
Second, this chapter addresses versions of external eudaimonism and indirect eudaimonism that accept the paradox but construct other ways for
knowledge of the psychological requirements of human flourishing to guide
communities of human agents toward those motive-states that will promote
eudaimonia. Third, this chapter argues that the same paradox arises in neoAristotelian accounts of friendship and MacIntyre’s account of practices;
for projective motivation plays a key role in both these phenomena.
3.3. The Positive Defense of Thesis Two: Case Studies in Projective Motivation
With psychological eudaimonism and the erosiac model as a foil, Part III
begins by developing a more rigorous account of projective motivation and
striving will. This restatement is driven by the analysis of the main historical case study, which explains the beginning of a countertradition opposed
to psychological eudaimonism that runs from the late Plato through Scotus
and Kant to the existentialists and alterity theorists such as Levinas. Thus
what Part III presents is not a random series of case studies but a historically related set of ideas moving from the counter-eudaimonist tradition in
medieval and early-modern philosophy into existential psychoanalysis and
contemporary Continental and analytic moral psychology. Seen this way, it
is clear that these ideas constitute a tradition in MacIntyre’s sense—a vital
but underappreciated and often suppressed tradition in which the existential conception of striving will is the keystone. The task of Part III is to do
for this existential tradition what MacIntyre did for eudaimonism, reconstructing its central ideas in more rigorous and defensible form.
The case studies providing positive evidence for Thesis Two follow a
roughly historical progression, beginning with the emergence of the projective idea in theological conceptions of divine creativity and its extension to
human creativity. The discussion of themes in Arendt and Levinas is inserted at this point, out of historical sequence, because their themes build
directly on the idea of divine agapē. I then return to problems with eudaimonistic accounts of weakness and strength of will, which lead to Scotus’s
decisive break with Aquinas’s conception of moral motivation. This paves
the way for Kant’s account, which fails only in restricting striving will to
deontic contexts. In this light, it makes sense that existential psychoanalysis
and contemporary analytic work in moral psychology discover a much
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broader range of possible commitments that can be formed by projective
willing. Here is a fuller summary of the steps in Part III:
10. Chapter 9 begins with the example of divine creativity as an ideal
counterexample to the erosiac model. For Plato himself appears to have
recognized that his erosiac conception of motivation generates a theological
problem concerning why God would want there to be a physical universe.
This problem led to an alternative concept of divine creative motivation
that serves as the first historical paradigm of projective motivation.
11. This revolutionary idea is taken up in a long tradition that understands agapic regard and (more broadly) pure creative initiative in projective
terms. This idea develops in Christian theology up to Kierkegaard, who
inspired Anders Nygren’s analysis of agapic versus erosiac love. We find
the same basic idea in Continental philosophers from Martin Buber and
Dietrich von Hildebrand to Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas. Generalizing from these examples, we may say that the antieudaimonist tradition in Christian and Jewish theology seems to be united precisely by its
recognition that a crucial element is missing in Aristotelian and Thomistic
moral psychologies. Without this element, we cannot understand love and
hatred in their pure volitional forms; nor, therefore, can we understand the
essence of good or evil. However, a problem originates with Nygren that is
inherited by Levinas and Harry Frankfurt: namely, the idea that agapic love
can have no reasons or basis at all in the nature of the beloved. This error
is corrected in the refined model of projective willing presented at the end
of chapter 9, which distinguishes projective from erosiac motives by their
content-to-agent directions of fit rather than by the absence or presence of
any reasons for the goal. According to this model, the projection of ends
always has grounds either in the product-value(s) of the ends or in the
process-value(s) of pursuing these ends. Thus the existential model of the
will is saved from the arbitrariness that results from Nygren’s version.
12. This refined model is illustrated and defended by the study of ‘‘radical evil’’ in chapter 10. The chapter begins with a critique of the Aristotelian account of vice as weakness or ignorance. There are two problems here:
psychological eudaimonism reduces evil to weakness of will, and it reduces
strength of will to mere self-control, that is, resistance to appetitive or emotional temptations. Both these diagnoses can be refuted by a clear look at
the phenomena. First, some kinds of evil motivation, which I label ‘‘radical,’’ reveal volitional strength rather than weakness. Noting important differences among several kinds or levels of ill will, I argue that the projective
model helps explain these differences and make sense of the fact that evil
projects can be pursued with the utmost commitment or resolve of the
whole self. I then consider in each case what reasons may ground the projection of different kinds of harm to others for their own sake. I also defend
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this Kierkegaardian idea of radical evil against MacIntyre’s critique. Second,
the same kind of willpower at work in cases of self-control is also observable in strong-willed agents who encounter no little internal emotional or
appetitive resistance. Existential accounts of volitional strength are therefore more convincing than eudaimonist accounts.
13. Chapter 11 traces this idea that virtues and vices are primarily volitional dispositions into Duns Scotus’s innovative conception of the will to
justice or righteousness as the true form of moral motivation. I argue that
as Scotus conceives it, this motive is clearly projective in structure and is
closely related to the projective conception of divine and human agapé that
Scotus develops from the Christian idea of divine creativity described in
chapter 9. Scotus is the bridge between the ancient and modern portions
of this tradition, since his picture directly anticipates Kant’s model of the
good will.
14. Chapter 11 also defends three theses with respect to Kant. First, the
moral will in Kant’s Groundwork is a species of projective motivation; hence
if the Kantian motive of duty is possible, then my main Thesis Two is true.
But second, much of the discontent with Kant’s model in contemporary
moral psychology results from the fact that Kant, like Scotus, thought that
a pure moral will was the only kind of projective motivation, the only sort
that did not simply convert instinctual drives and acquired appetites into
maxims by choosing the principle of subjective preference satisfaction. The
best neo-Kantian authors, such as Korsgaard, now acknowledge that Kant’s
own account of self-motivation is much too narrow precisely because it
leaves out several kinds of personal commitments made for reasons other
than universal justice or fairness to all agents capable of autonomy. Thus
Thesis Two is broadened into the claim that persons can projectively commit themselves to almost any end that can be found in intelligible thick
conceptions of good or worthwhile lives. Kant is correct, in my view, that
we can move ourselves to act for the sake of deontic moral considerations
(assuming these can be spelled out adequately); but Kant does not go far enough
in recognizing a wide variety of volitional devotions that are autonomous
in the same sense as motivation by the moral law in his account, in opposition to preexisting desires he describes as contingent impulses and inclinations of the pathological psyche.
Third, I argue that Kant, like Scotus, sees libertarian freedom as essential
to the will that generates its own motivation to love justice, obey the moral
law, or respect persons as inviolable ends. However, the essential structure
of projective motivation does not by itself entail libertarian freedom. An
argument for libertarian freedom has to come either from the conditions
of responsibility for acting and willing or possibly from the conditions of
modal awareness, that is, having the concept of nonactual possibilities, and
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other modal concepts founded on this. But these parts of the existential
system are beyond the scope of this book.
15. Thus in models of divine creativity, agapé, and moral motivation in
Scotus, Kant, and Nygren, we find both precedent and evidence for the
existential model of the will. Chapter 12 looks at the emergence of this idea
in twentieth-century psychology, especially in the new study of ‘‘intrinsic
motivation’’ and in Viktor Frankl’s mid-century theory of life-meaning.
Frankl’s studies concern how human beings shape life plans and help endow
their lives with personal meaning (i.e., meaning that is subjectively experienced by the agent). In the psychoanalytic tradition, Frankl’s existential
critique of Maslow’s eudaimonism turns out to be a less rigorous version
of the critique of psychological eudaimonism that I give in chapter 7.
Frankl’s success with logotherapy thus provides strong evidence for the
importance of objective values as grounds for projective motivation in the
existential model. I support this position with a case study on the selfdefeating nature of self-absorption and a critical discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s argument that caring is justified by its by-product benefit to caring
agents.
16. Chapter 13 takes up Frankfurt’s innovative analysis of ‘‘caring’’ as a
distinctively volitional phenomenon and argues that we can make sense of
this claim and Frankfurt’s evidence for it only by understanding such caring
as a form of projective motivation with a reflexive component concerning
the agent’s first-order motives. Starting from work by Elizabeth Anderson,
Bernard Williams, Jeffrey Blustein, and others, I then argue that the kind
of ‘‘commitment’’ that is an essential component of Frankfurtian caring
is not only projective but also distinguished by consequence-transcending
grounds. The reasons for an ‘‘aretaic’’ commitment exceed the productvalue of the ends to which the agent devotes himself. This feature explains
the unconditionality found in certain volitional loves, ground projects, or selfdefining commitments without fanatically insulating them from critical
reason.
17. Chapter 14 defends against Frankfurt’s various criticisms a moderate objectivism about broadly ethical criteria (and other ‘‘nonmoral’’
grounds) for worthwhile objects of caring. I argue that (a) there must be
nonarbitrary discernible grounds for caring and commitment with objective
significance for all agents (against some forms of liberal neutralism); and
(b) among these we find many ‘‘ethical’’ considerations in the broad classical sense, including truth, beauty, and aspects of human welfare. In this
respect, my account will resemble some ‘‘new natural law’’ list theories of
the good. However, my account differs from them by emphasizing, with
Ross and Moore, that many ends with intrinsic value worthy of our attention are not themselves components of human well-being or flourishing
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(although our volitional relation to them may be part of our good). Since
the importance of such ends is not derived from the requirements of justice
to persons as ends-in-themselves, their axiological basis requires some other
explanation that we still lack.
Following Kierkegaard and Joseph Raz, my analysis retains a sense in
which human persons do create their own meaning through the volitional
appropriation of possible ends; but they could not do this if there were not
a variety of forms of intrinsic value that exist (in some way) prior to the
existential will, to which the will can projectively respond. The chapter concludes with a list, derived from the case studies throughout the book, of
both product- and process-values that can potentially ground or rationalize
setting long-term goals and purposes that can give meaning to a human life.
This striking result provides starting points for a subsequent existential
theory of personal autonomy and authenticity. In particular, it suggests that
human autonomy is founded on the alterity of values, without which the will that
generates autonomous motivation could not operate. This is a generalized
and more plausible version of Levinas’s result that personal autonomy depends on our being infinitely responsible for the other person, or our experiencing non-erosiac ‘‘desire’’ for their alterity or ‘‘Face.’’ Although he was
on the right track, Levinas repeated Kant’s error and limited his attention
to the intrinsic value of persons. In fact, it is not only the highest or inviolable value of persons as ends-in-themselves but the entire range of values
comprised in the beautiful, the true, the good, and the meaningful on which
our autonomy is based. This is what remains in the existential model of
Aquinas’s thesis that the human will is constituted with a fixed telos outside
itself. Our will is innately oriented to a diverse range of values that extend
beyond our eudaimonia, and no specific set of them functions as our telos in
the classical sense or as defined in A-eudaimonism. However, without
being-in-a-world of values worth caring about, we would be able to will
nothing at all. This point also distinguishes my moderate account of our
volitional powers from the pretensions of Nietzschean will to power. The
book concludes with a few reflections on balancing the value of volitional
commitment to relationships, projects, and goals with the value of authentic
response to others whose freedom transcends our agendas.
4. The Limits of This Analysis
Given the range of topics and historical figures taken up in the seventeen
steps summarized above, it is important to emphasize several ways in which
the tasks of this book are limited, in some cases awaiting further work.
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4.1. Autonomy and Motivation Theory
There is no way to construct a decisive demonstration of the existential
model of striving will, but together, I believe that the critique of eudaimonism in Part II and the case studies in Part III provide a compelling case for
taking this model seriously. This case could be further strengthened by
showing that the theory of projective motivation provides solutions to unsolved problems in the theory of personal autonomy. If personal autonomy
and authenticity cannot be adequately understood without the existential
model of distinctively volitional motives developed in this book, this would
be a powerful confirmation of the existential theory. Now, the accounts of
caring and commitment that are the focus of chapters 13 and 14 are closely
related to the most important work on autonomy and authenticity in the
twentieth century, but this topic requires a separate book for adequate treatment. Thus in this book I avoid any in-depth discussion of Frankfurt’s
notion of volitional identification and its familiar problems, postponing
this rich topic for a subsequent volume. Similarly, in this book I avoid any
in-depth discussion of contemporary analytic theories of motivation. But in
the subsequent volume, the theory of projective motivation must obviously
be related to this important body of recent work.
4.2. Action Theory and Psychology
My analyses of both contemporary action theory and psychological theories
of human motivation are also limited in obvious ways. I have been able to
address only the few ideas from theories of agency that are crucial for my
argument, and this book makes no attempt to develop an account of practical reason that could serve as the basis for a normative ethics. However, the
ideas developed here provide a foundation for a critique of contemporary
analytic theories of action and practical reason.
There is also a lot of important new work in empirical psychology that
is relevant to my main theses, which could not be reviewed here for simple
reasons of space. The discussions in chapter 11 merely touch on some of
the relevant topics, such as the theory of intrinsic motivation. However,
psychological analyses of empirical data on motivation are often much more
dependent than they realize on basic philosophical assumptions about motivation that inform their interpretation of the evidence. This is especially
true, I think, in the development of highly influential recent theories of
personality types and trait theory, which are relevant for conceptions of
character and virtue. An existentialist must reject several of these accounts,
such as the Myers-Briggs–type theory, both as ignoring the will and as too
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essentialist. For this reason, it is helpful to approach psychological research
on motivation and character with an adequate philosophical framework
already in place.
4.3. Emotion and Volition
There is a also a rich and growing literature on emotions, in both philosophy and psychology, which is relevant to my theses. Philosophical theories
of emotions have undergone radical transformations in the past century,
and many of the newer theories concerning the role of rational judgment in
emotions are clearly related to my account of willing. Moreover, this significant progress in the philosophy of emotions has led some moral philosophers to assume that it must be in this domain (if anywhere) that we can
locate a psychological home for those ground projects, cares, and commitments that we need to understand in order to make progress in finding new
foundations for ethics in the broadest sense. But in fact, even the newer
cognitive theories of emotion cannot fully explain (or, in some cases, even
accommodate) these crucial motivational states. That is because, as the existential tradition has long known, these cares and commitments have volitional features that distinguish them from the sorts of motivation involved
in most of the many different kinds of states that we call emotions (for in
fact, ‘‘emotion’’ is at best a family term covering several different genuses
of psychological states). It may be that various species of emotion—for
example, anxiety, interest in a worthy challenge, pride in accomplishment,
romantic love, or even spiteful hatred—are closely related to states of caring
and commitment. But if so, this is not because aretaic commitment reduces
to a kind of emotion, but rather because some ‘‘emotions’’ are really derivative from or dependent on more fundamental volitional states that are not
essential to many other species of emotion.
A full review of recent work on motivation would allow a defense of
this claim that volitional resolve is not an intrinsically ‘‘emotional’’ process,
in the most familiar connotations of that term. These two categories have
a more complex relationship than this: (1) When we have clarified the
distinctive characteristics of volitional states in their existential sense, we
may well see that some motivational states currently described as ‘‘emotions’’ are better understood as states of will. (2) When the moral psychology of volitional motivation is explained (at least in outline), then in this
light we may be able to see how distinct emotional states that are not
themselves volitional may nevertheless help explain or ground acts of projective motivation or agent resolve. (3) Once the account of will as projective motivation is developed into a full understanding of autonomy or selfdetermination, we may be able to see how the cultivation and/or suppression of various emotional states may be involved in volitional caring and
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commitment. In short, several important kinds of willing in the projective
sense may identify the agent with various related emotions, even though the
volitional states are not simply reducible to these emotions.
Because emotional states can stand in these necessary relations with projective motivational states, the two can easily be confused, and this makes
it imperative to understand willing in the projective sense before exploring
its relations with emotion in greater detail. However, for my phenomenological method, this is also a problem, because illustrations of projective
motivation will almost always be closely tied to related emotional states,
and hence descriptive analysis must work hard to avoid conflating the two.
Thus the work in this book needs to be supplemented with a full existential
analysis of emotions as part of the broader project of an existential anthropology and existential virtue ethic.
4.4. Value Theory
Although the final chapters of this book make a small contribution to debates about practical normativity and value theory, I have not tried to engage recent work on the range and status of values in any detail. Although
I favor moderate realism about values, my task in this book is not to defend
any particular thesis about the metaphysical status of intrinsic values. I am
only concerned to argue that we seem to find values that extend beyond
our own well-being, and that they can serve as a ground for caring and
commitment of the self to significant ends without themselves causing the
motivation that arises from the volitional process of projecting goals based
on them. This ‘‘middle way’’ seems to me to capture what is right in both
(1) accounts according to which persons actively generate their own projects and interests by endowing with meaning objects and goals that are not
in themselves significant; and (2) accounts according to which persons only
passively respond to value and significance that is already ‘‘there’’ in the
world. A full defense of this middle view does require undertaking the
burdens of metaphysical argument, especially since it is part of my larger
project to reject both eliminativism and naturalistic reductions of values:
values can be correlated with but not reduced to value-neutral properties,
just as consciousness can be correlated with but not reduced to physical
properties. But these parts of my larger project are beyond the scope of this
book.
4.5. The Historical Examples
Finally, it would obviously require an entire book longer than this one to
do justice to all the literature on Aristotle’s theory of virtue and eudaimonia
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that is relevant to my argument. In this flourishing area in contemporary
philosophy, there is so much to learn from and respond to that my brief
critique of a handful of prominent defenses of Aristotle will necessarily
seem inadequate to experts in this field. The same holds for my evaluation
of Kant. The literature on Kant’s theory of the moral will is too large even
to survey adequately here, and so I have chosen my examples carefully,
considering and replying to only a few representative accounts. Here again,
an expert specializing in Kant’s practical philosophy will doubtless find my
argument insufficient. To such concerns, I can only repeat the caveat that
my main theses are not primarily historical, and so the historical interpretations are primarily illustrative in function.
This book belongs to a special genre of philosophy that we might call
wide-angle syntheses. It aims to bring together ideas from a broad spectrum of
historical periods and from both analytic and Continental thought in the
twentieth century. Such a synthesis aims to develop new ideas while also
demonstrating their historical precedents through a discussion of a wide
array of thinkers, themes, and cases. Such works also generally aim to reach
beyond academic philosophers to the broader world of the humanities and
the interested public. The downside is that one cannot go into as much
detail in any one part of the argument as would be desired in a monograph
focused only on that topic. But there must be a place for such wide-angle
works in philosophy today if we are to achieve paradigm shifts in our
understanding rather than only to elaborate on topics already placed within
dominant interpretative framework(s).
5. A Reader’s Guide: Ways through the Text
One great advantage of this book’s synthetic approach is that it offers
something for almost any reader, from the undergraduate interested in philosophy to specialists in particular areas. Readers with more background in
Continental philosophy will find the discussion of analysts such as Harry
Frankfurt accessible, and likewise, analytic philosophers with little or no
exposure to contemporary Continental thought should find Levinas discussed in terms they can easily grasp. (For example, between Frankfurt and
Levinas stands Nygren, and the book is designed to make such genre-crossing connections apparent.)
This section is intended to give some suggestions, beyond what can be
gleaned from the Analytical Contents, for readers who may first be interested in parts of the book but not the whole. It will also indicate which
sections are less technical and thus more generally accessible and which are
more technical and thus may require more specialized background. The
introduction to each chapter gives more detailed guidance. In general, I use
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named principles and abbreviations as a simple way to save space and keep
track of key ideas, and readers can find a list of these in the Glossary at the
end. I also occasionally introduce natural deductions with numbered steps
to help clarify the structure of my arguments for readers who appreciate
this sort of aid. But readers who do not can generally skim over these
deductions without losing the thread of the analysis. In my view, philosophy is not necessarily better when done with p’s and q’s, but there is also no
reason to avoid symbolic or schematic representations of complex arguments
where these may help clarify or make the ideas more comprehensible. Either
way, the goal is to make the ideas more accessible and the arguments more
well-reasoned.
Historical Topics
Readers primarily interested in specific historical figures or periods will
probably find adequate guidance in the Analytical Contents. Sections focused on Plato, Aristotle, Scotus, and Kant are clearly marked. There is no
one section devoted entirely to Aquinas, unfortunately, but his thought
figures at points in chapters 4, 5, and 10. Likewise, readers with some
background in virtue ethics or neo-Aristotelian thought will find plenty of
interest in chapters 7, 8, and chapter 13, section 2.
Religion
Anyone whose interests are primarily in religion or philosophy of religion
or in religious ethics might want to start with chapter 9. However, agapic
love is also an important theme in chapter 11, section 1.2, and chapter 10
defends the idea that hatred can parallel agapic love in purity (see esp. sect.
2.6). As these suggestions indicate, this is certainly the kind of book that
different readers can profitably begin at different points, working their way
back to the main argument from more specific subarguments and using the
Glossary to understand any piece of terminology defined in earlier chapters.
General Readers
Readers without advanced training in philosophy but interested in existentialism and the will may want to steer clear of more technical sections on
analytic philosophy. Such readers can start with the contrast between ‘‘Eastern’’ and ‘‘Western’’ paradigms in chapter 2, the exploration of radical evil
in chapter 10, and the discussion of Frankl and Emily Gordon’s case in
chapter 12. The discussions of MacIntyre on practices in chapter 8 and the
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discussion of egoism in the second half of chapter 5 have also proven accessible, although both include a couple of slightly more technical pages, which
one could easily skim through. Although it contains items that will mean
more to readers familiar with Aristotelian ethics, chapter 6, section 1 could
also provide an introduction to the argument of the Nicomachean Ethics I for
college students or the interested general reader. I like to think that the
explanations of Kant’s motive of duty, Levinas’s ‘‘metaphysical desire,’’ and
Plato’s Symposium might play equally useful pedagogical functions.
Continental Thought
Readers primarily interested in twentieth-century Continental philosophy
might want to start with chapter 2, since the contrasts developed there
have lots of resonances in contemporary Continental ethics, and the brief
discussions of Nietzsche and Nancy will be familiar territory. One could
jump directly from the end of chapter 2 to chapter 9, including the sections
on Arendt and Levinas, which contain this book’s main contributions to
ongoing Continental debates. However, the discussion of Arendt may make
slightly more sense in light of the analysis of themes in Marx’s 1844 manuscripts in chapter 8, section 5.3. None of these sections is very technical,
and among them, only the Levinas section presupposes any prior background. Continental readers will easily recognize my contrast between projective and erosiac motivation as a development of Levinas’s narrower
version of a similar contrast. Anyone primarily interested in this theme
could read chapter 4 for a more rigorous development of the erosiac model
and skip the discussions of Aristotle and eudaimonism by moving straight
to chapter 9 on the agapic model. Taken together, these two chapters obviously describe each side of the main contrast around which the whole book
is structured.
Analytic Philosophy
Readers who are more interested in the book’s contributions to analytic action
theory and moral psychology but less interested in the historical content might
wish to begin with the review of conceptions of the will in chapter 3. This
chapter concludes with the first definition of projective motivation, and one
could in principle move straight from that point to chapter 9, section 5,
where projective motivation is defined more precisely in terms of directions
of fit. However, the intervening five chapters are not simply a detour
through eudaimonism back to the elaboration of the projective concept. It
will help to read the first sections of chapter 4 to understand how the
contrast with the erosiac model works, and to attend to the distinction
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among the three types of erosiac desire and the discussion of egoism in
connection with Elster’s work in chapter 5. Finally, all of chapters 13 and
14 are devoted to issues in contemporary moral psychology, especially
Harry Frankfurt’s work on caring.
Technical Sections
The book contains a few more technical sections, including the discussion
of the core argument for the existential theory of willing in chapter 4,
section 1.2, and the last section of chapter 6 on the A-eudaimonist core
argument. Both these sections are helpful for comprehending the overall
argument of the book.
Less vital technical discussions are found in chapter 7, section 3.6, on
first- and second-order desires; chapter 9, section 2.1 on divine perfection
and section 5 on the structure of projective motivation; and chapter 11,
section 2.2 on Kant’s argument that the motive of duty cannot consist in a
desire for any particular set of consequences. In chapter 6, the excursus on
the interpretation of the highest good in Aristotle is more complex, but not
because of any challenging deductions. Any of these technical sections can
be skipped without losing the overall thread.
The distinction between three types of erosiac desire in chapter 5, section 1, can look technical because of the labels, but it is fairly straightforward and intuitive and is constantly referred to throughout the rest of the
book. The same is true of the explanation of egoism and the analysis of
Aristotle’s conception of the highest good in chapter 6: it is aided by diagrams and named principles, but it is not logically that complex. The later
chapters on psychology, caring, and commitment involve some fairly sophisticated conceptual distinctions but little complex deductive apparatus.
Chapter 2 introduces my main themes more concretely by considering the
familiar sense of ‘‘willing’’ as heroic striving that seems to have been largely
forgotten in contemporary accounts of action, autonomy, and freedom. It
argues that this heroic sense of ‘‘willing’’ was given a bad name by major
schools of Eastern philosophy and by several Western thinkers who also
saw it as the will to domination. A countertradition in Western philosophy
has defended the heroic will, but often only in its corrupt forms as a will
to ascendance. Between these ‘‘knockers’’ and ‘‘boosters,’’ there is a more
basic existential conception of the striving will, which it is the task of this
book to clarify and defend.
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and Western Perspectives

Overview. This chapter relates the concept of ‘‘heroic’’ or ‘‘striving’’
will introduced in chapter 1 to a positive attitude toward self-assertion prominent in certain Western thinkers and defends it against
criticisms found in opposing Eastern traditions. By locating the volitional phenomena at stake within this long-running debate, this chapter distinguishes the existential conception from the extremes in both
traditions and defends a moderate view of the will’s positive potential. Topics covered run from Hindu and Buddhist teachings through
Augustine to Luther, Nietzsche, and contemporary Continental
thought. The analysis is accessible to the general reader but also provides a historical frame that should be novel even to readers with
advanced training.
The first chapter began by introducing the concept of ‘‘heroic’’ willing as a
self-motivated effort to set goals and strive to pursue them; it distinguished
this concept from other, thinner notions of the will. This distinction will
be developed in more detail in chapter 3. But first, it will be useful to
address a fundamental objection to pursuing this concept of willing:
namely, that the heroic striving will is biased toward dubious Western values, and so any existential conception developed from it risks valorizing
precisely the kind of ambition and self-assertion that prevents peace, enlightenment, and salvation from suffering. The objection is not simply that
the existential view is culturally parochial or fails to capture universal features of personhood; more deeply, it is that the existential model encourages
one to see life as a conquest or quest for mastery over others or over the
world. To examine this concern and to set the stage for the subsequent
28
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analyses, I start by acknowledging two opposing attitudes toward the striving will in the history of philosophy and indicating how my account hopes
to move between them.
1. The Paradigmatically ‘‘Eastern’’ Attitude toward Will and
Willfulness
Underlying many disputes between different philosophical interpretations
of the will in Western philosophy is a basic difference in attitude toward
willing as such. Since this contrast concerns many thinkers over long periods involving significant cultural changes, I can do no more than paint it in
broad strokes, omitting the detailed references that a full history of this
subject would involve. The goal here is merely to present the contrast in
basic outline, rather than to give a complete account or evaluation for any
of the traditions in Eastern philosophy touched on here.
1.1. Hindu, Buddhist, and Daoist Examples
There is a long tradition of Hindu and Buddhist thinkers who have, sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly, doubted the value of willing per
se. This tradition, going back at least to the ancient Indian Upanishads,
looked negatively on individual self-assertion as a source of conflict and
held that true peace could be attained only by a kind of giving up of individuality in favor of group consciousness or even the loss of self in a primordial oneness with the whole of Being. Thus in the Taittireeya
Upanishad, we are told to imagine a man with all his worldly desires satisfied and to multiply this by a hundred million times; compared to this, we
are told, ‘‘A man full of revelation, but without desire, has equal joy.’’1 The
sages who originated this view thought that willing could only mean selfassertion in a violent or misappropriative sense: in their view, ‘‘will’’ stands
for the arrogance that not only imposes form on nature but also desecrates
the sacred, forces itself on others, and in general seeks to dominate everything its agent sees as alien. ‘‘The impure, self-willed, unsteady man misses
the goal and is born again and again.’’2 In other words, his willfulness prevents his enlightenment and escape from the cycle of reincarnation.
We are familiar with this view in its more recent guise as the suspicion
that active pursuit of demanding worldly goals reflects a deeper desire for
self-aggrandizement, an assertion of one’s own priorities over everything
else, a determination to impose one’s will by force, mastering and controlling anything that resists. In fact, this idea is so deeply embedded in the
sources of all human culture that the archetypal concept of the profane is
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expressed partly in terms of that which is mastered, bound down, and destined by the sacred,3 with the implication that only the Divine has the right
to willful appropriation of anything in this world. The willful, proud man
will introduce chaos and disrupt this order by trying to possess and dominate, to seize what can never rightfully be his. This negative attitude toward
willing thus went hand in hand with the soteriological conception of salvation as self-transcendence via total renunciation of all appropriation and
ambition. ‘‘The person of superior integrity takes no action, nor has he any
purpose for acting.’’4 Similarly, a much later text reads: ‘‘A noble heart never
forces itself forward,’’ since that would be proud self-assertion, and the
monk is unconcerned with glory or shame.5
In this view, enlightenment leads not to a galvanizing of the will but
rather to its dispersal. As Aldous Huxley put it in his laudatory summary
of ‘‘Mortification and Non-Attachment’’ in philosophy, ‘‘Enlightenment
comes when we give up our self-will and make ourselves docile to the workings of Tao in the world around us and in our own bodies, minds, and
spirits.’’6 Indeed, on this view, ultimate harmony implies a state transcending all motivation, a peace in which one is free from the disquieting disturbance of cares and thus beyond the trials of the samsara, this world of selfimposed suffering: ‘‘As the sun, the eye of the world, is not touched by the
impurity it looks upon, so the Self, though one, animating all things, is not
moved by human misery but stands outside.’’7 The problem is how to tell
this supreme state above all motivation from the state below it, that is, the
mere inertia of a stone, or the lifelessness of a corpse (Plato, Gorgias 492e),
though Zen Buddhism might deny that the distinction matters.
In part, this understanding of willing as essentially violent and egoistic
seems to trace to the assumption that will serves the ends of pleasure or
that will is a kind of strategic practical rationality aimed at desire gratification. In Hindu, Buddhist, and also Daoist religious texts, we find this picture of willing closely associated with a famous critique of hedonism. As
Joel Kupperman explains, we owe to Buddhist teachers the arguments (1)
‘‘that pleasure typically involves attachment, in that one comes to crave
more of (or a repetition of ) what is pleasant,’’ so that, given the misfortunes
of human existence, ‘‘a life oriented towards pleasure will, in effect, alternate
fever . . . with boredom’’; (2) that since pleasure requires prior frustration,
‘‘a realm of constantly guaranteed instant gratification points towards entire
boredom’’; and (3) that a life devoted to chasing ever-elusive total pleasure,
which recedes the closer we get to it, is degrading, self-deceiving, and ultimately humiliating.8 A will that simply serves the desire for pleasure, then,
cannot bring happiness and dignity to human life.
Moreover, all worldly attachments to goods subject to luck are a sign of
inferior comprehension on this view. Lao Tze teaches that ‘‘Many loves
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entail great cost; many riches entail heavy losses.’’9 This seems to imply that
it is better not to love, since emotional attachment leads to violence—a
frequent theme in the Eastern tradition. This extends to all forms of commitment to worldly ends: ‘‘One should remain ever free of involvements.’’10
For engagement in any worldly project not only makes us subject to fortune
but also leads to the temptation to hate and dominate whatever stands in
our way. As that latter-day Daoist Master Yoda says: ‘‘Fear leads to hate,
and hate leads to suffering.’’11
Quite similarly, the third-century-b.c. Buddhist aphorisms of the Dhammapada teach inner peace through detachment: ‘‘Good men, at all times,
surrender in truth all attachments,’’ all worldly ambitions.12 ‘‘Eudaimonia,’’
or happiness in its most holistic sense, consists in freedom from dependence
on the insecure (temporal, material) objects of desire pursued by average
persons in family and social life:
Let the wise man leave his home life and go into a life of freedom.
In solitude that few enjoy, let him find his joy supreme: free from
possessions, free from desires, and free from whatever may darken his
mind.
For he whose mind is well-trained in the ways that lead to light,
who surrenders the bondage of attachments and finds joy in his freedom from bondage, who free from the darkness of passions shines in
pure radiance of light, even in this mortal life he enjoys the immortal
Nirvana.13
Yet this work is insightful enough to recognize that the spiritual discipline of the sage is also one kind of heroic effort: ‘‘Those who have high
thoughts are ever striving,’’ although their ‘‘passion is peace.’’14 So the striving will of the sage to reject all worldly desires and bodily lusts must involve
a form of motivation distinct from all such appetites, and it can be described in timocratic metaphors (as Plato also saw): ‘‘the greatest of victories is the victory over oneself,’’ and thus the sage’s life is ‘‘lived with
courage and powerful striving.’’15
This striving for wisdom is essentially different from the quests of
‘‘those who shamelessly are bold and self-assertive, crafty and cunning’’ in
pursuit of temporal goods. Rather, the sage exhibits the inner strength of
‘‘those who peacefully strive for perfection, who free from self-seeking are
not self-assertive, whose life is pure, who see the light.’’16 It seems that the
Buddhist authors of this work clearly recognize a virtuous form of motivation initiated by the self, but they reserve it for the will to detachment and
deny it to any form of worldly ambition. In that sense, as Chris Gowans
points out, ‘‘Kant’s insistence that the will is the locus of moral value is
reflected in the Buddha’s belief that the moral quality of our intentions is
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what is primarily important in determining the morality of our actions.’’17
But they disagree about what the ultimate motive of moral actions is.
It is interesting in this light that the Bhagavad Gita also opens with the
metaphor of war, although its hero, Arjuna, refuses to fight his kinsmen
and, like Socrates, would rather suffer than do evil.18 His teacher, Krishna,
advises him to fight anyway, without concern for earthly pain and pleasure,
since the soul is immortal and cannot be killed.19 On this view, it is possible
to fight in the outer, visible world without any real inner care for this
world’s pleasures or powers. But to achieve this inner detachment itself
requires a kind of volitional focus or effort; by contrast, ‘‘endless are the
thoughts of the man who lacks determination.’’20 Indeed, Krishna recommends a kind of pure discipline that does not even directly target enlightenment: ‘‘Set thy heart upon thy work, but never on its reward; Work not for
reward, but never cease to do thy work.’’21 Thus although the sage transcends all desires and passions and rejects all quest for possession of earthly
goods, he does so by cultivating ‘‘an unwavering mind.’’22
Jeffrey Blustein describes this as a form of negative ‘‘caring about caring,’’ that is, an effort directed at ‘‘the elimination of cares, towards disengagement from life.’’ He also notes that in the Buddhist ideal, even this
higher-order will to detachment is supposed ultimately to undo itself:
‘‘Eventually, when we have severed our attachments to the world and freed
ourselves of all first-order cares, caring about [not] caring will also fall
away.’’23 There is clearly a difficult question here about how willing can
eliminate itself; this seems on its face to be a pragmatic contradiction, although I will not argue here that it is metaphysically impossible. What
remains clear is that the Hindu, Buddhist, and Daoist traditions regard
first-order devotions to goals external to the self as attachments that prevent
one from attaining Nirvana, or blessed peace.
For convenience, I label this as the paradigmatically ‘‘Eastern’’ attitude
toward willing. But I do not mean that there were no philosophers from
Eastern cultures who dissented from it.24 There is not only a good deal of
diversity among different traditions in Eastern philosophy and religion but
also diversity of interpretation of central doctrines among different authors
and subtraditions within a broad context such as Buddhism. So my summary of ‘‘the’’ Eastern view is to some extent a simplifying caricature, although it will be heuristically sufficient for my purposes.
1.2. Greek Examples
To this crucial caveat I add another: I do not mean that only philosophers
born and educated in Eastern cultures subscribed to this view, which is
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labeled ‘‘Eastern’’ only for convenience. The classical Greek thinkers I discuss in subsequent chapters were heavily influenced by this broadly ‘‘Eastern’’ tradition, as were the Roman Stoics and other Hellenistic
philosophers. This debt owed to earlier Eastern religion is the reason why
Huxley was able to interpret Greek philosophers and Eastern sages as part
of the same universal tradition or ‘‘perennial philosophy.’’ Except for the
Sophists, not only do all the major Greek schools repeat and refine the
Hindu/Buddhist critique of hedonism, reshaping it in novel ways; they also
agree with the Buddha’s argument that it is a mistake to ‘‘seek enduring
happiness by trying to attach ourselves to things that are in constant
change.’’25 In addition, the whole later tradition of eudaimonist moral philosophy from its beginning implicitly assumed that individual self-assertion
is likely to be a sign of unbridled passion or uncontrolled thumos, which
is self-destructive. The problem is not that self-will or assertiveness must
necessarily be materially egoistic (i.e., acquisitive or ambitious for power),
for its aims may not always be self-interested in this sense. More fundamentally, the problem is that self-will is perceived as inherently chaotic, unpredictable and disorderly, and insubordinate in its presumptuousness. The
rule of right reason, by contrast, imposes a kind of calm control that is
unmoved in itself. Or if it is moved by the beauty of the Good, rational
appetite is eventually dispersed at the attainment of true happiness, which,
lacking nothing desirable, must be completely unmotivated to change. This
is correlated with the classical idea of perfection as a stasis without any
reason for change, personified as an unmoved mover. The Divine is unperturbed by any kind of will to development, because that would signal imperfection.26 For example, as Nussbaum notes, Epicurus held that ‘‘The
gods are complete: that is what it is to be divine, without limit or need.’’27
Of course, the different classical schools reflect differing degrees of influence by the Eastern ideal on classical philosophy. In their emphasis on
ataraxia or ‘‘tranquillity,’’ the Epicureans and Stoics valorized dispassion in
a way that Aristotle did not. As Nussbaum writes, ‘‘These philosophers do
not simply analyze the emotions, they also urge, for the most part, their
removal from human life. They depict the flourishing human life as one
that has achieved freedom from disturbance and upheaval, above all by
reducing the agent’s commitments to unstable items in the world.’’28 Just as for the
Hindu sages, the erosiac conception of motivation as a lack or disturbance
in our psychic homeostasis, coupled with the instability of fortune, implies
that strong emotions regarding luck-affected goods will be destructive to
our happiness. If these emotions are contingent or avoidable rather than
natural and necessary, then we should excise them to avoid unsatisfiable
desires. Plato likewise argued that virtue would be sufficient for eudaimonia, and hence the guardians of his ideal republic would have ‘‘no room
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for the emotions of pity, fear, and grief. For nothing that is not a lapse in
virtue is worth taking very seriously.’’29 This attitude is explicitly opposed
to caring deeply about particular loved ones, as Nussbaum notes. And she
admits that ‘‘There seems to be something cold and even brutal in the wise
man’s self-sufficiency, in this hardness with which he denies his need of
others and limits his investment in their lives.’’30 Yet this is the result of the
Eastern sage-ideal and its rejection of all active engagements in temporal
affairs as veiled forms of self-will.
Aristotle does not go this far, since on his account, human eudaimonia
must involve noble activities, especially philosophical contemplation and
high-minded engagement in the affairs of one’s state moved by civic concern for the common good, and the noble sentiments or emotions that go
along with such activities. As Nussbaum says, for Aristotle, ‘‘there are
things in the world that it is right to care about.’’31 But seen against the
larger background of a philosophical culture steeped in the Eastern paradigm, this must be recognized as Aristotle’s way of incorporating into the
eudaimonistic model an ideal that is essentially out of tune with its Eastern
origins, that is, an ideal of self-assertion and courageous challenge-seeking
that comes instead from archaic Greek poetry, from the old Homeric honor
code. In other words, Aristotle is compromising between the Hindu ethic
inherited through Plato and a diametrically opposed Homeric ethic that it
was Plato’s chief goal to overthrow. Indeed, it is the primary purpose of all
philosophy in the Socratic tradition to resist and overcome this feudal concept of nobility based on the charismatic rule of the warrior-king, along
with the powers of fate that help or hinder his cause without moral principle.32 So Aristotle’s ideal of the active life of virtue may not at first glance
seem particularly close in spirit to the ideal of the Hindu sages; but that is
only because within their basic framework, Aristotle tames and domesticates precisely that kind of timocratic, glory-seeking self-assertion that led
the Hindu sages to regard all willing as conatus ascendi, or as violent selfimposition upon the world. For this purpose, Aristotle finds that recognizing the extent to which our happiness remains subject to fortune can be
important because it makes pity possible and saves us from the hubris of
the pitiless tyrant.33
Arguably, the Stoics still valued active effort toward positive results
(when ‘‘appropriate’’) more than the Epicureans did, since they rejected the
idea that negative equanimity as mere freedom from desire or pain was an
intrinsic good. Thus Cicero criticizes Epicurus for holding that the mere
absence of pain is a real (kinetic) pleasure: ‘‘This is not the sort of thing
than can arouse appetitive desire. The static condition of freedom from
pain produces no motive force to impel the mind to act.’’34 By contrast, he
understands virtue as involving ‘‘a steadfast seriousness of purpose’’;35 it is a
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form of heroic resolve aimed at positive moral ends and not only at detachment. For example, it includes above all the courage to die without hesitation for one’s country in battle—something the less timocratic Epicureans
rarely praised, though they preached against fear of death. It could also
include the courage to commit suicide when honor demanded it.36 Virtue
is thus both cognitive and volitional, or noetic and spirited, for the Stoics:
‘‘Virtue requires a vast amount of study and experience, which the other
arts do not. Moreover virtue demands life-long steadiness, firmness of purpose, and consistency.’’37 This emphasis on heroic striving distances Cicero
somewhat from the Hindu sages.
1.3. Augustine and Luther
Nevertheless, the enormous influence of this Eastern heritage extends far
beyond those thinkers who are explicitly conscious of any ‘‘Oriental’’ debt.
For instance, it is clearly seen in the attitudes of St. Augustine, who feared
that the human will is inherently prone to reject any external authority or
objective standards above it: ‘‘It turns towards its own private good when
it wants to be under its own control.’’38 Like the Hindu and Buddhist
teachers and the Stoic thinkers they influenced, Augustine believes that
what appears on the outside as lust for pleasures or inordinate desire for
any worldly good begins inwardly as rebellious self-assertion against God:
‘‘For it is pride that turns one away from wisdom . . . someone whose good
is God wants to be his own good, as if he were his own God.’’39 Thus all
sin begins with insubordination of the will; the devil originally turns from
God toward himself, because he ‘‘wills to enjoy his own power in perverse
imitation of God.’’40 This is precisely the ‘‘willfulness’’ so masterfully expressed in Milton’s portrait of Satan in Paradise Lost : ‘‘Better to reign in
Hell than serve in Heaven.’’41 To strive for any achievement made up of
temporal goods is to be part of ‘‘the city of this world, a city which aims
at dominion, which holds nations in enslavement, but is itself dominated
by that very lust of domination.’’42
Indeed, Augustine sees this libido dominandi, the ‘‘lust for power’’ exhibited
by the Roman people,43 as the basic tendency of the unrepentant and unsaved human will. Although God made human beings equal in his image,
and did not intend any human beings to have dominion over others,44
‘‘Pride hates a fellowship of equality under God, and seeks to impose its
own dominion on fellow men.’’45 Thus the will to dominate is the basic
form of corruption in Augustine’s analysis, although he does allow that all
natural human powers, including the powers of our will, are good in themselves; they are simply subordinate to eternal goods, such as justice.46
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Extending Augustine’s thought, Luther and Calvin arguably took the
further step of regarding all human self-assertion as willfulness or a stubborn will to misappropriation of powers and rights not given to us by God;
in other words, whatever our will initiates is an expression of pride or a
rejection of our natural place. In that case, the humility and repentance
necessary for salvation cannot themselves be volitional undertakings but
must consist in a diminishment of the will. The humbled person will give
up dogged pursuit of her own projects and let herself be guided by God.
Salvation, thus understood as total capitulation to God which breaks the
self-aggrandizing drive and pride in all one’s pursuits and practices, is itself
not earned or voluntarily chosen but received solely as grace. And if such
grace could even be voluntarily refused or accepted by our own power, then
either stance would still be at least partially a self-determined act of the
will. So, given that willing is proud, we must say that the very acceptance
of grace is also caused solely by God.47 Thus it is the interpretation of
willing as essentially profane that motivates the doctrine of salvation sola fide.
Luther provides perhaps the clearest illustration of this profanization of
the will. In his vitriolic response to Erasmus’s argument that total divine
determination of the will would render pointless any effort for moral selfreform, Luther wrote: ‘‘You say: Who will endeavor to reform his life? I
answer: Nobody! No man can! God has no time for your self-reformers,
for they are hypocrites. The elect who fear God will be reformed by the
Holy Spirit. The rest will perish unreformed.’’48
Erasmus had already posed the insightful objection that publishing the
doctrine of total divine predestination as an edifying religious teaching is
pragmatically self-contradictory, since this doctrine implies that the act of
teaching it cannot change any reader’s soul. To this, Luther responds:
These truths are published for the sake of the elect, that they may be
humbled and brought down to nothing and so saved. The rest resist this
humiliation. They condemn the teaching of self-desperation [or spiritual helplessness]. They wish to have left a little something that they
may do themselves. Secretly they continue proud, and enemies of the
grace of God.49
It is abundantly clear in these passages that Luther regards any human
initiative whatsoever—any movement of the will not solely caused by God
and attributable only to Him—as a misappropriation of divine right, an
arrogation of power, or nothing more than a willful refusal to submit. Salvation requires complete ‘‘humiliation,’’ a state in which the independent
human will is totally eliminated, brought down to ‘‘nothing.’’ Yet in spite of
himself, Luther here inadvertently implies something strictly inconsistent
with his total predestinarian doctrine, namely that human beings do retain
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a single power: the higher-order will to refuse saving humiliation, to keep
their will alive against the order to surrender unconditionally to the Sovereign who demands a total monopoly on all volitional power. In other
words, the one and only thing we can truly will on our own initiative is to
rebel; or, at least when God allows us to act on our own, this is the only
thing we can do. Since no effort of ours can contribute even in the smallest
way to our salvation, ‘‘does it not evidently follow that when God is not
present to work in us, everything we do is evil?’’50 For Luther, then, rebellion would almost seem to be our natural function, our very telos! Our
nature, then, must be completely destroyed for us to be saved.
2. The Paradigmatically ‘‘Western’’ Attitude
2.1. Baconian Hope
The view bequeathed to us by Augustine and brought into modern pietist
faith by Luther has ever been in tension with another view in Western
philosophy, which is especially prevalent in the history of Western political
thought. It dates back at least to the heroic conception of courage in the
honor codes of the Attic tribes in Homeric times and of the Germanic
shield-kings in the Dark Ages of northern Europe. At the core of this view
is the idea that taking initiative can be good, that motivating oneself to creative
endeavors or undertaking challenging quests for noble ends is a key part of
what makes life meaningful. In this countertradition, self-assertion is viewed
in a positive light and need not constitute rebellion nor pride in the sense
of a will to misappropriation. The self-assertive individual may distinguish
herself from her peers, but this can be a side effect of dogged pursuit of
noble goals for their own sake. The agent’s motive in taking initiative or
departing from the status quo need not be hatred of rivals, nor a resolve to
reject tradition out of hand, nor a determination to self-aggrandizement by
any means necessary. These arrogant attitudes are certainly possible for the
human will in its heroic or striving sense, but they are hardly its only possible expressions. Even the desire to conquer and rule can be positive when
directed against forces that should be overcome, such as the recalcitrance
of a nature that prefers not to yield its fruits and the natural evils of human
misfortune and suffering.
Centuries later, this is precisely the spirit we find in Francis Bacon’s great
hopes for a positive science with technological results that will improve
human well-being and in John Stuart Mill’s strident calls for social reforms,
such as universal education, that will relieve ignorance and misery for the
masses. As Charles Taylor argues (contra Heidegger and some Frankfurt
School thinkers), although technology and instrumental reason may have

................. 16406$

$CH2

05-23-07 10:55:35

PS

PAGE 37

38

Will as Commitment and Resolve

become ‘‘an iron cage’’ for us, their rise has not been rooted solely in a
will to domination that flatters our ‘‘self-determining freedom’’ nor in ‘‘an
overdeveloped libido dominandi’’ that seeks mastery of nature for its own
sake.51 Rather, we have developed technology and complex means-ends reasoning in part to advance the causes of ‘‘ordinary life’’:
The sense that the life of production and reproduction, of work and
the family, is what is important for us, has also made a crucial contribution, for it has made us give unprecedented importance to the production of the conditions of life in ever-greater abundance and the
relief of suffering on an ever-wider scale. . . . We are heirs of Bacon,
in that today, for instance, we mount great international campaigns
for famine relief or to help the victims of floods. We have come to
accept a universal solidarity today, at least in theory, however imperfect in practice, and we accept this under the premiss of an active
interventionism in nature. . . . This practical and universal benevolence also gives a crucial place to instrumental reason.52
Taylor’s insight is that the quest for scientific knowledge as a source of
technological solutions to everyday problems has often exemplified all the
undaunted determination and perseverance of which the heroic will is capable; this quest has not been simply an arrogant conatus ascendi or will to
conquer the resistant and glorify the self. Likewise in religious, moral, and
political affairs, many of our greatest teachers and reformers—ironically
even those who espouse paradigmatically ‘‘Eastern’’ attitudes toward willing, like Luther—have been persons who took great risks, initiated creative
breaks from the past, and struck out in a new direction. In short, they have
been strong-willed persons of character. Certainly the leaders of fascism,
with their intense will to domination, also illustrated the negative possibilities of striving will as an essential human capacity; but the self-aggrandizing
purposes they pursued are hardly the only ones to which human persons can
devote their whole being.
Thus, as our heroes demonstrate, passionate assertion of one’s willpower
in dogged pursuit of worthwhile goals is not equivalent to or necessarily
connected with ‘‘self-assertion’’ in any sense that connotes competitive desires, egoism, status-seeking, or vicious pride. Recognition of this fact I will
call ‘‘the Western attitude.’’ For ‘‘industry,’’ in the old sense of applying
oneself to beneficial tasks, became a key virtue in the attitude Weber rather
misleadingly labeled the ‘‘Protestant work ethic.’’ This involves more than
just a willingness to work hard for a stable place in the world and social
status with one’s peers. It also involves valuing creativity, invention, and
originality and conceiving these as goods to be achieved only through risking a quest for the new—and so understood, this attitude was hardly limited to Protestants in the modern period. The passion for innovation is not
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necessarily a treachery against established authority; rather, to live and grow
spiritually, we have to find challenges and continually enhance the old with
the new. Human beings intrinsically tend to find fulfillment not just in
variety per se, but in variation of tasks, obstacles, and tests of excellence.
We look for opportunities to apply our ingenuity to persisting problems
and even to find new problems to solve if we do not have enough already.
This attitude also says that ambition can be good when properly focused
and constrained. Not only can it function as the engine of progress for
society; proper ambition within moral limits is also essential to a person’s
sense of his or her self-worth. As John Rawls has rightly said, our society
holds that the freedom to pursue one’s just conception of the good is itself
a great good, essential to self-esteem.53
This ‘‘Western’’ attitude is also likely to see quietude or lack of initiative
as a sign of complacency, weakness, or despair rather than as a sign of
spiritual purity. Elements of this view have achieved a prominent place in
the frontier tradition and Emersonian ideals of ‘‘self-reliance’’ that so
strongly influence current American ideology. For example, think of our
typical praise for the ‘‘self-made man’’ (or woman), the ‘‘go-getter’’ attitude
in business, or the person who ‘‘pursues his dream.’’ We also tend to respect
someone who values his or her work for its own sake. Consider W. Howard
Ulrich of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, who continued working at Morgan Stanley until he was ninety years old, served on his high school alumnae board
and his church’s building committee, and helped run the local Optimist
Club.54 It seems most unlikely that Mr. Ulrich was motivated primarily by
the lure of money, status, pleasure, or any other external incentive; rather,
it is more likely that he was kept going so long by his dedication to these
tasks—a motivation sustained by his own will.
2.2. Will to Power as a Corrupt Species of Striving Will
Unfortunately, in the history of Western philosophy, this positive attitude
toward willpower was first theoretically framed and interpreted only in reaction to the Eastern negation of the heroic will. And as a negation of the
original negation, like all negative reactions, this willpower ideology accepted too many of the presuppositions of the position that it dialectically
inverted. In particular, its most vehement spokesmen in early-modern
Western political philosophy tended to accept far too readily the leading
Eastern idea that all willing is willfulness, or that self-assertion in all its
forms is veiled conceit or concealed self-aggrandizement. Thus, at least in
philosophical defenses of the paradigmatically Western view (as opposed to its
literary representations and its actual embodiment in many persons’ lives),
this Eastern judgment was usually not denied; rather, the most extreme
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philosophical exponents of the Western attitude simply insisted that such
willfulness is glorious, courageous, manly, or great. Harking back to the
(defeated) amoral Homeric conception of nobility and virtue (the kalon and
arête in their charismatic sense), every expositor of this view, from Greek
Sophists such as Thrasymachus and Callicles to early-modern writers like
Machiavelli and Hobbes, proclaimed that willing is indeed all that the Hindu
sages and their manifold followers condemned it for being. They only insisted that instead of condemning the will for this, we should revel in its
vitality and celebrate its haughty self-validation. In effect, they said that this
flame of will may consume itself, as the sages predicted, but in the meantime
it will burn twice as bright for living half as long!55
This position is, of course, most fully developed and defended by Nietzsche, whose theory implausibly regards all human motives as expressions
(conscious or unconscious) of the ‘‘will to power’’ or libido dominandi—the
drive for hierarchical triumph or ascendance over others—which he regards
as the essence of all ‘‘life.’’ Nietzsche is innovative in his theory of motivation since, unlike so many others, he rejects the idea that we can explain all
human action in terms of the desire for overall happiness or the drive to
satisfy various instinctual and learned desires. This is sometimes understood
as a simple inversion of rational control over desires and passions. Thus, as
Robert Solomon puts it, Nietzsche’s ‘‘vigorous and spine-chilling notion
of the ‘Will to Power’ . . . emphasizes not aesthetics but something else,
‘energy,’ ‘enthusiasm,’ ‘strength,’ as well as ‘self-mastery,’ which does not
mean the conquest of the passions but rather their cultivation.’’56 This cultivation, however, involves the determination to self-expression that Nietzsche sees as underlying all consumptive organic desires and emotional
yearnings. But in the name of this mystical life-force, which is the impulse
to domination or absolute ascendance, Nietzsche rejects every moral ideal
that could make social life or cooperation for a better world possible. With
the Hindu sages and their descendants in mind (including his father, a
Lutheran minister), he dismisses these ‘‘slave moralities’’ as attempts to subvert our noblest destiny or to drain the life-force from our will. Thus the
will as simple creative projection of goals or plain engagement with longterm ends and projects because of their intrinsic value is entirely obscured
in Nietzsche’s jeremiad against moral obligations to others.
Thus Nietzsche celebrates the heroic will only in its corrupt forms; he defends the heroic will against the Eastern critique only by equating it precisely with the deficient mode of striving will against which this critique
had a good deal of validity. He portrays the heroic will as an agonistic
struggle for superiority, a beautiful but tortured assertion of self against
everything else, a pure conatus ascendi in Spinoza’s sense.57 While Nietzsche
took himself to be reviving the ideal of heroic character in Norse/Germanic
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mythology, in fact he promoted only a distorted amoral version of it.58 All
that is valuable in the heroic will, including its existential importance for
the formation of the self, must now be retrieved from behind the shadow
that Nietzsche cast over it.
This problem is not unique to Nietzsche, of course. It also infects Emerson’s exaggerated conception of individual independence and private conscience as the measure of ‘‘manliness’’ and authentic life.59 Earlier, it
sometimes appears in Hobbes’s celebration of human inventiveness and
Bacon’s enthusiasm for new inquiry, the creation of new scientific methods,
and ‘‘the art itself of invention and discovery.’’60 Bacon praises thinkers with
the ‘‘spirit’’ of empirical inquiry that is ‘‘not enslaved to their own or to
other people’s dogmas but favoured freedom.’’61 Yet he constantly protests
that his rejection of Greek metaphysics and traditional logic is not for the
sake of personal ambition, but rather for ‘‘human progress and empowerment.’’62 Thus in modern Western authors in whom the idea of striving will
is salient, the distinction between its pure form and its corrupt expression as
the ‘‘will to will’’ (a phrase that first occurs in Nietzsche’s Nachlass) or the
ambition to make one’s mark on the world is often obscured.
This explains how, in his otherwise insightful history of the will in modern philosophy, as great an intellectual historian as Yirmiyahu Yovel could
mix features generic to the striving will in all its forms with other features
peculiar to its arrogant and self-aggrandizing species. In broad brush
strokes, Yovel writes that:
The modern will is typically self-assertive, expansive, and individualistically shaped; in most of its varieties it strives to self-realization
and self-enhancement, to personality and autonomy; it stresses initiative and the attribution of responsibility. . . . The modern will openly
questions tradition, values novelty and innovation, unsettles rigidly
received rules. . . . In all that the will is typically restless, stretching
beyond itself and its present situation in constant search of the new,
the distant, the different.63
This description captures part of the paradigmatically Western recognition of the positive potential in striving will, in particular the idea of transcending one’s existing desires and seeking new challenges. As Yovel says,
‘‘the human will tends to posit for itself the goals it pursues.’’64 But his
description also makes the will formally self-interested, and he still interprets it as an expression of the ‘‘mind’s fundamental Eros,’’ now oriented
toward material and worldly goals.65
The almost Marinettian futurism of Yovel’s characterization derives
from confusing the way that projective volition generates new motivation
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with particular goals typically pursued through willed striving in the modern period, such as the displacement of traditional orders, or self-aggrandizement through risk and conquest: ‘‘The modern will refuses to conform
to the constraints of the world as given. It strives to change the world in
its own image and interests: to reshape and control outer nature (through
technology, planning, resource exploitation, etc.).’’66 Although this surely
describes Bacon, it seems to be a short step from this to the will as ‘‘enframing’’ or possessing the world. Thus Yovel cites colonialism as the attitude
that ‘‘the new geographic and ethnic horizons were to be filled and dominated by an expansive human (i.e., European) will.’’67 Beyond simple monetary greed, he surmises that the Spanish conquistadors were driven by ‘‘a
will that wills its own infinite use and exertion.’’68
This is a plausible explanation of Cortez, but the will to domination of
the world, or to the pure enjoyment of one’s willpower in facing any challenge, is not the only possible (or even the paradigm) form of projective
motivation. Self-motivation as creative initiative does not necessarily aim at
overturning traditional orders, at rebellious self-assertion, or at the conquest
of other wills independent of our own. Projective motivation is a way of
setting and pursuing ends; it has no essential relation to positing selfaggrandizing or militaristic ends. It is also possible to will the beautiful, the
true, or the good, to restrain one’s ambitions within right limits, or to
attune oneself to values that require putting aside one’s interest in molding
the world’s material or making a mark on reality. As Ogion tells his apprentice Sparrowhawk in Ursula Le Guin’s Wizard of Earthsea, ‘‘Manhood is patience. Mastery is nine times patience,’’ and the world does not exist merely
for our use or delight in power.69 In devotion to an order higher than
his own will, Ogion’s will is stronger than Cortez’s. Thus, to defend the
paradigmatically Western conception of striving will as potentially good or
to recognize the proper value of what John Casey calls the ‘‘active virtues
(so admired by Hume and Gibbon), which make a man formidable’’ does
not require endorsing the ‘‘assertive, proud ethical tradition’’ of Homer.70
Nor does it necessarily require denying the Kantian position that moral
worth cannot depend on fortune but only on factors that the agent can
control:71 that is an independent normative question.
3. The Continental Inversion
Not surprisingly, many thinkers in recent Continental philosophy have reacted to the Nietzschean version of the modern will with one more dialectical inversion, taking them back to something like the original Eastern
attitude that he so vehemently despised. This third negation is perhaps
clearest in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, who appears to condemn
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not only willing as active initiation or goal-seeking planning but even ordinary intentional states of perception and judgment as ‘‘violent,’’ grasping,
and essentially other-subordinating. In short, the violence of willfulness
now infects all human intentionality, turning our minds into consuming
centers bent on appropriating or absorbing the world into ourselves, or
making it fit into our preconceptions and the terms of our own consciousness. Haunted by Nietzsche and Sartre, and determined to restore the possibility of agapē—the non-egoistic neighbor-love that Nietzsche diagnosed
as ressentiment and Sartre rejected as impossible—Levinas becomes almost
Augustinian in his fear that anything short of total submission to the Other
to whom we are always-already responsible is a symptom of pride and
willfulness. All the requirements of reciprocity and mutual recognition in
universalist ethics become suspect as likely covers for the acquisitive self or
for possessive, totalizing, violent, and domineering self-assertion, reckless
of our relations to others and inimical to caring attentiveness to individual
needs. And this Levinasian view, which would have sickened Nietzsche and
confirmed his worst fears, has influenced a whole generation of later French
and American thinkers.
To take just one example, in an innovative book, Jean-Luc Nancy argues
that the freedom that is ‘‘the essential fact of existence’’72 cannot be understood as the correlate of any kind of necessity known to philosophy nor
explained in terms of any modal concept of possibility or causality,73 for
this always turns freedom into the ‘‘free will ’’ that makes the subject into
the master of its representations.74 Like the existentialists preceding him,
Nancy is opposed to the idea that freedom is just a property that persons
possess or something that entities simply exhibit or instantiate if they are
individual subjects.75 So he follows Heidegger in rejecting what he understands as the ‘‘voluntaristic will’’76 and all theoretical explanations of freedom, which only block our experience of freedom as a practical openness
or ‘‘free space’’ for existence.77 Like Heidegger, he avoids interpreting freedom in terms of will, for the latter is tainted as Fichtean ‘‘will to will,’’ or
arrogant self-assertion for its own sake. Thus the concept of will has once
again become suspect in Continental thought, just as it has been for very
different reasons in twentieth-century analytic philosophy.
Despite being strongly influenced in his break with Freud by ‘‘Nietzsche’s Dionysian will—an exuberant, creative affirmation of life,’’78 Otto
Rank understood better. Against both extremes, he writes that ‘‘The will in
itself is not as ‘evil’ as the Jew-hating Schopenhauer believes along with the
Old Testament, nor as good as the sick Nietzsche would like to see it in
his glorification.’’79 Rather, it is the capacity by which the ego defines itself
through ‘‘end-setting,’’ which Rank encouraged in therapy. As such, the
will is not reducible to will to power or to ‘‘willfulness, obstinacy, protest,
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insistence, and aggression.’’80 Without exercising his or her will to set life
goals that are not forced on her by an ‘‘alien will’’ (nor by reaction against
such coercion), a person cannot achieve an authentic identity, or ‘‘develop
himself into that which he is.’’81 Even if this suggests an overly individualistic conception of goal-setting, it is a valuable corrective to the antivolitional
bias of much recent Continental thought.
4. Contemporary Moral Psychology as Corrective
I agree with Rank that the extreme positions in both the Eastern and Western attitudes toward the will are wrong. The resources to correct these
errors and establish a clearer picture of willing are found in diverse work
on ethics and moral psychology in both recent analytic and Continental
philosophy. Within philosophical research on closely related topics such as
autonomy, caring, integrity, character, virtue, and self-understanding, as
well as in work on moral theory, we find the clues needed to see what was
right in the Western attitude toward willing without merely inverting or
simply ignoring the Eastern critique. In this literature, we find a convergence from many directions on the conclusion that willing understood as commitment to lasting causes and life projects is central not only to becoming a
self or individual unified by resolute cares but also to having a meaningful
and fulfilling life.82 ‘‘Will’’ is not primarily a matter of subduing some
material for the sheer joy of conquering, or mastering some recalcitrant
force, or dominating whatever is alterior to our will or independent of us.
This will-to-will interpretation confuses existential willing with its perversions, or deficient modes.
Reconstructing the alternative moderate idea of willing and justifying the
positive attitude toward it in Western thought are the main aims of this
book. This is partly a normative task, although my goal is not to develop a
specific system for making moral judgments or to present a specific normative ethics. However, my task is closely related to ‘‘ethics’’ in the broad
sense of an inquiry into how best to live one’s own life (including what
kinds of communities are required for the best sort of human life). For, as
I construe it, the will’s most important function is precisely to set life goals,
define personal ambitions, and provide the motivational staying-power necessary to pursue worthwhile ends in the face of adversity.
Interestingly, many of the best authors in recent moral theory, such as
Joel Feinberg, Peter Railton, Michael Stocker, and Derek Parfit, have argued that such primary projects or goals of an agent’s life may not be
egoistic in any substantive sense, since her own pleasures, power, or material
resources may form no part of the intended end. But they have not explained why agents devote themselves to such ends nor even what it really means
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to devote oneself to something. Likewise, authors such as Harry Frankfurt
and Bernard Williams also recognize the fundamental importance of nonegoistic ‘‘ground projects,’’ or selfless ends that can be as important to us
as life itself, or with which we can identify wholeheartedly, in defining the
practical identity of our self.83 But since they are interested primarily in
using such examples against a certain style of moral theory—in particular,
construing such projects and pursuits as ‘‘personal’’ or private imperatives
that can conflict with the impartiality of neo-Kantian moral standards—
they have not said enough about how we form such ground projects or wholehearted commitments or what kind of motivation they involve. So although
the notion of commitment has come to play a crucial role in recent moral
psychology and in metaethical debates, its relationship to classical accounts
of human motivation remains unanalyzed, and thus its radical implications
are not yet perceived.
Some philosophers who rely explicitly or at least implicitly on this concept of commitment even seem to think that figuring out what it involves
is a task we should simply leave to empirical psychology—as if the answer
could not make any fundamental difference to ethics. They forget that
contemporary psychological theories are still crucially conditioned and influenced by precisely the dominant philosophical theories of motivation
of the past—that is, the eudaimonist, Hobbesian, Humean, and Kantian
ones—that we may need to reevaluate. Whether any of these doctrines can
adequately explain the phenomena of caring and commitment—and if not,
what revisions we might have to make to accommodate these phenomena—is exactly what we need to know. While empirical psychology may
help in this analysis, it cannot be a theoretically unbiased or neutral source
of information. Only a philosophical analysis that places this question in
its required historical context and that provides a critical phenomenology
of these experiences can address this matter adequately.84
At the same time, unfortunately and ironically, writers focusing on philosophical accounts of human motivation have largely ignored these phenomena of caring and commitment that are central to recent attempts to
revive ethics in its broadest sense. In analytic moral psychology, recent
scholarship intended explicitly to address the nature of human motivation
has focused largely on the relation between different species of ‘‘desire’’ and
various kinds of belief, especially moral judgments in the neo-Kantian sense.
But the resolution of recent debates about ‘‘internalism’’ and ‘‘externalism’’
depends on questions about the will as a motivational faculty.
In Chapter 13, I will argue that to play the roles they do in our lives,
ground projects and long-term commitments require that the agent actively
sustain a certain kind of resolve to continue pursuing the end despite changes
in external circumstance and a reflexive determination to continue caring
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about one’s goal, whatever other desires may conflict with it. These states
involve an ongoing effort not just to pursue the goal but to keep it as a
central goal of one’s life; the agent exercises a determination to stay on
target. I will speak of these distinctive motivational states involving such
self-motivation as states of the will. In this sense, ‘‘the will’’ is, then, a motivational faculty, a psychological capacity for the special kind of self-motivation
we see in forming commitment and maintaining resolve. Without understanding the will in this way, we cannot make sense of concepts that are
indispensable for a moral theory that goes beyond questions of basic social
justice to the broad ethical issues about how to live, what to strive for, or
how we can shape our own character.
As I will argue in Chapter 14, if we are persons defined by willing in the
sense explained in this book, then Frankfurt’s question concerning what is
worth caring about must be both important to us85 and at least partially
answerable on rational grounds as well. Differently put, there must be some
objective criteria, at least partially accessible to reflective human reason,
through which we can recognize the value of different goals and objects of
pursuit—as well as the value of these pursuits themselves. It is on the basis
of such recognition that we can commit ourselves to life projects. We want
the purposes to which we devote our time and energy to be worth attention
in their own right. Even if some part of their value is imposed by our caring
itself, this movement must still be based on some other discernible value
that we did not simply invent or posit. Thus it undermines the possibility
of authentic caring to assume that our cares can have no articulable basis
or that they cannot even be subject to philosophical critique. The values
that are the basis of our caring may not play much role in determining our
political judgments about the basic structure of society, but we could not
be persons, let alone citizens, without them.
However, Frankfurt was reluctant to reach this conclusion, and thus,
despite his intended departure from Kant, his account of what we care
about has remained too formal.86 A substantive analysis of our grounds for
caring includes attention to the classical triad of the True, the Beautiful,
and the Good but also attention to other less familiar criteria. My account
of these criteria for caring, as cursory as it is, is thus an essential part of my
existential theory of the will. For, as I argue, we can make reference to such
criteria without having to trace their importance for us to a traditional
eudaimonist version of teleology.
To lay the ground for these later analyses, chapter 3 further develops the
distinction between my moderate conception of striving will and typical
usages of ‘‘will’’ and ‘‘volition’’ in recent analytic philosophy. Conceptions
of willing in contemporary action theory arise from developments in the
modern period that thinned out the motivationally thick concept of willing
at issue between the ‘‘Eastern’’ and ‘‘Western’’ paradigms.
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Overview. The first half of this chapter looks at the rejection of ‘‘the
will’’ as a psychological faculty in modern thought, and the second
half considers the revival of volitional concepts in action theory since
the mid-twentieth century. It serves as an introduction for readers
with no advanced background in this field, but also challenges prevailing dogmas in contemporary action theory. The final section shows
how the heroic conception of striving will adds the motivational
function missing from recent analytic interpretations of willing as a
stage in the genesis of intentions or free actions.
1. The Decline of the Will
It would be an understatement to say that ‘‘the will’’ was out of fashion in
twentieth-century thought, especially in academic psychology and philosophy. The very term suggested to many leading theorists the idea of some
scholastic faculty, a metaphysical fiction as outmoded as aether in physics.
During the heyday of behaviorism in psychology, Gilbert Ryle taught a
whole generation of philosophers that ‘‘the language of ‘volitions’ is the
language of a para-mechanical theory of the mind’’ with no basis in ordinary language.1 Such was Ryle’s influence that in the 1960 Encyclopedia of
Philosophy there was no entry on ‘‘Will,’’ and the entry on ‘‘volition’’ was
devoted entirely to theories concerning what makes something a voluntary
or intentional action.
Ryle’s dogma is still common in fields as diverse as analytic philosophy
of mind, some genres of Continental philosophy, clinical psychotherapy,
and even personality psychology. For example, on tests and inventories
widely used today to give people career advice, to make employment decisions, and for other important purposes, ‘‘personality types’’ are defined in
47
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terms of behavioral traits, interests, interaction styles, and emotional dispositions, without any reference to the person’s ultimate priorities, values, or
willed direction in life.2 In all these fields, the idea that ‘‘the will’’ is a special
capacity distinguishing human persons from other animals remains out of
fashion. Although the will is making a comeback, a majority of scholars in
these disparate domains still refuse to recognize a role or place for volitional
phenomena in any sense irreducible to other folk concepts, such as belief,
desire, intention, disposition, behavioral pattern, interpersonal style, rationalization, mood, and so on.
This tendency to reduce ‘‘willing’’ to something else had a long history
before twentieth-century developments. Before looking at contemporary
theories of action and motivation, it will help to have some background in
the history of philosophy and psychology in the modern period.
1.1. Freud and Hobbes
In psychology, the decline of the will is due most directly to the influence of
Sigmund Freud. As the prominent existential psychotherapist Irwin Yalom
writes:
Freud’s model of the mind . . . was based on Helmholtzian principles—that is, was an antivitalistic, deterministic model where the
human being is activated and controlled by ‘‘chemical-physical forces
reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion.’’ Freud was unrelenting on this issue. . . . Behavior is a vector, a resultant of the
interplay of internal forces.3
In other words, Freud’s conception of motivation was fundamentally
Hobbesian: the motive on which we act is simply the upshot of a contest
between inclinations that themselves ultimately trace to pain and pleasure
stimuli. In Leviathan, after having defined ‘‘deliberation’’ as the ‘‘alternate
Sucession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes, and Fears . . . no lesse in other
living Creatures than in Man,’’4 Hobbes says:
In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhering to
the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the Will; the
Act, (not the faculty) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation, must
necessarily also have Will. The Definition of Will, given commonly by
the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were,
then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary
Act is that, which proceedeth from the will, and no other. . . . Will
therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating. And though we say in common
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Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse
he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, or Appetite.5
On this view, the will is not a form of agency standing above our appetites
and aversions; it is simply whatever desire emerges as strongest in the economy of our attractions and repulsions. As a result, there is no sense in
which we can act voluntarily out of appetite but against our real will, since
there is nothing more to our will than the last appetite on which we act.
Since Hobbes equates our will with our strongest desire, or perhaps the
final intention embodying this desire, his theory is also minimalist: we enjoy
no volitional powers beyond those included in our powers of appetite and
instrumental reasoning.
Hobbes’s definition of will is important in the history of modern philosophy because it launches the ‘‘post-Cartesian’’ period, eliminating the Platonism that remained in Descartes’s account of the will in the Meditations.6
As Hans Oberdiek comments in his history of the will, Hobbes’s doctrine
that deliberation ‘‘amounts to nothing more than a tiny war of desires and
aversions . . . would seem to eliminate the will altogether,’’ at least in the
sense of an independent executive or motivational faculty.7 Hobbes insists
that freedom is simply the ability to do what one desires without external
constraint, and that our psychology involves no ‘‘second-order agency of
the will’’ that could stand above states like desires and inclinations in order
to shape from them persisting purposes and intended plans of actions that
carry us into the future. As Thomas Pink argues, this denial of secondorder agency
has proved enormously influential since. In particular, it has marked
Anglo-Saxon theory, from Hume through to Ramsey, the pioneer of
modern rational choice theory, and Ryle. . . . And this Anglo-Saxon
tradition of disbelief or at least doubt in second-order agency still
has plenty of supporters. Daniel Dennett, for example, has wondered
whether there really is an agency of decision-making which explains
our actions. . . . And in his moral psychology . . . Bernard Williams
denies that action arises out of second-order agency of the will.8
However, before we consider this legacy in contemporary action theory,
we should consider three other episodes in modern philosophy that set the
stage for twentieth-century debates.
1.2. Locke, Hume, and the Cambridge Platonists
Following Hobbes, Locke attacked the notion that the mind contains distinct ‘‘faculties’’ as implying that each is a ‘‘distinct agent’’ within us, and
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defined the will as an unanalyzable power of bringing about change;9 Hume
followed him by defining the will as ‘‘the internal impression we feel and
are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our
body, or new perception of our mind.’’10 Thus what we call ‘‘willing’’ is
merely an epiphenomenon of the kinesthetic internal sense, an impression
caused by the initiation of some first-order action, whether bodily or mental.
Hume follows this by arguing that the ‘‘different stations in life,’’ or
natural classes, and the ‘‘uniformity of human actions’’ within nations and
individuals show that psychology is run by the same kind of regular laws
as physical mechanics.11 Since in ordinary life we constantly rely others’
actions being predictable and rooted in stable dispositions, ‘‘whoever reasons after this manner, does ipso facto believe the actions of the will to arise
from necessity.’’12 And even more influentially, Hume argued, against the
classical view that reason should rule the passions, ‘‘that reason alone can
never be a motive of any action of the will’’ and ‘‘can never oppose passion
in the direction of the will.’’13 Thus the will was not only generally reduced
to an impression involved in first-order action but more specifically conceived as the economy of desires and aversions arising from expectations of
pleasure and pain.14 Hume offered a more nuanced account of our natural
passions than Hobbes and Locke (including ‘‘calm desires and tendencies,’’
such as social dispositions).15 But he set the stage for later utilitarian models
of the will16 and for the subsequent view (found in Adam Smith and many
romantic authors) that human motives decompose without remainder into
simple egoistic desires for self-related goods and sympathetic desires for
the good of others with whom one feels an emotional bond (of family,
community, or common species).
In the same period, the Cambridge Platonists and their followers, such
as Jonathan Edwards, agreed with Locke in rejecting faculty psychology
and freedom as simple alternative-possibilities liberty but held to a more
rationalist theory of the will as cognitively motivated by judgments about
the value of ends. In his Freedom of the Will, as John Smith explains, Edwards
defends the idea of ‘‘moral necessity,’’ a psychological determinism in which
‘‘the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.’’17 Our will
is determined by the strongest motive, which is equivalent to ‘‘the mind’s
apprehension of the greatest apparent good,’’ although the particular way
our apprehension works develops like a habit over time (and is influenced
by grace).18 Thus while the will is cognitive, it is teleologically determined;
as Oberdiek says, for Edwards ‘‘the apparent good draws us towards it like
a powerful magnet draws iron filings.’’19
In his manuscript on free will, Ralph Cudworth similarly argued against
the voluntarist idea of a ‘‘blind will’’ that ‘‘still remaineth as free, and indifferent to do or not this or that, as if the understanding had given no judgment at all in the case, and doth at last fortuitously determine itself without
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respect to the same either way.’’20 Like Edwards after him, Cudworth
stressed that will and understanding are not separate faculties, since it is the
‘‘man or soul’’—meaning the single agent or self—who does both.21 Following the eudaimonist tradition, Cudworth conceives such agent causation
as rooted in the essential propensity of our psychological nature, that is,
the ‘‘constant, restless, uninterrupted desire or love of the good as such, or
happiness.’’ This means that we always will our apparent good.22 But unlike
Edwards, Cudworth also objects to the simple rationalist position that ‘‘the
blind faculty of will always necessarily follows the last practical judgment
of the understanding’’ about the greatest good,23 since (as Aquinas held)
the ‘‘good’’ we essentially desire is so general and hidden that our desire can
be ‘‘diversely dispensed out, and placed upon different objects, more or
less.’’24 Yet Cudworth denies that this means the will can just choose indifferently between apparent goods and, again like Edwards, he holds that the
‘‘hegemonic, or ruling principle in a man’’ is dispositional, and its understanding or judgment of the apparent good is shaped by prior choices.25 But
unlike Edwards, for Cudworth this means that ‘‘this hegemonicon’’ is a
‘‘self-forming and self-framing power’’ itself activating man’s innate natural
desire for the good, which, through its own ‘‘purposes and resolutions, . . .
designs and active endeavours,’’ alters its own dispositional tendency to
judge or apprehend the good more in one way than in others.26 This seems
to imply a conception of the will as executive agency, contrary to Locke.
But these more subtle views about the will’s influence on motivation did
not win out against the doctrine of Hobbes and Hume that ‘‘every human
act may be explained as the causal outcome of one’s desires and beliefs at
the time of action.’’27 Nor is Edwards’s or Cudworth’s Platonic conception
of motivation as grounded in the desire for the good necessarily incompatible with Hume’s position that it is not ‘‘contrary to reason to prefer even
my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater.’’28 For Edwards and Cudworth must say that such a desire is unnatural, that it is desire rather than
reason that is malfunctioning in Hume’s example. They agree with Hume
that motivation terminates in beliefs about our apparent good and in consequent desires, but they give final control to the ‘‘general appetite to good,
and aversion to evil,’’ which Hume treats as just one motive among others
in his list of ‘‘calm desires.’’29
In Britain, the idea of will as second-order agency standing above all
prepurposive desires in the agent was developed by Butler and Reid. Butler
writes that ‘‘there is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every
man which distinguishes between internal principles of the heart [i.e., natural motives] as well as his external actions,’’ and ‘‘It is by this faculty . . .
that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself.’’30 As Korsgaard explains, Butler’s distinction between motive-power and authority requires
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that ‘‘When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above
all of your desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desire
to act on.’’31 Similarly, Reid distinguishes ‘‘the determination of the mind
to do, or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power’’ from
‘‘every motive and incitement’’ on which the will acts.32 Reid also insists
that choices based on practical deliberation are fully imputed to the agent
and are ‘‘always accompanied with authority.’’33 This view anticipates
Kant’s account of decision as giving normative status to the motives on
which we intend to act. But Butler and Reid do not clearly defend Kant’s
idea of practical reason as self-motivating (see chap. 11); and outside the
rationalist tradition, few philosophers thought of the will as having any
control over the formation of motives themselves.
To take one example, in his prize essay, Schopenhauer distinguishes between ‘‘freedom of action,’’ which is the ability to behave in accordance
with an already given volition, and ‘‘freedom of willing.’’34 But for him, even
the latter only concerns whether the will is free to form or not to form an
intention based on motivating objects presented by cognition. Thus his
question is the same as Leibniz’s: ‘‘does the entrance of a motive into the
consciousness necessarily bring about the volition, or does the will retain
complete freedom either to will or not to will?’’35 Note that this question
has nothing to do with the original formation of motives themselves. As
his translator comments, for Schopenhauer, ‘‘the free will reveals itself in
its tendency to respond to motives. . . . the extent of its freedom will be
proportionate to the scope of the motives to which it may respond.’’ Thus
freedom is ultimately traceable to the enlargement of the intellect’s cognitive powers.36 In this sense, Schopenhauer anticipated James’s approach.
1.3. William James
In the late nineteenth century, William James gave a new account of the
will that built on the legacy of the empiricist tradition and anticipated
several developments in contemporary action theory.37 From the Aristotelian premise that will concerns actions that are in our power, James first
concludes that ‘‘the only direct outward effects of the will are bodily movements.’’38 Voluntary control of movements is attained only after we have
learned of these movements by experiencing them as involuntary behavior:
‘‘Reflex, instinctive, and emotional movements are all primary performances’’39 that build up the ‘‘kinaesthetic impressions’’ necessary for us to
control our limbs through an internal body image.40 In cases where the
body image is disrupted, such ‘‘volitional’’ control over our movements is
impaired.41 James then argues at length, in response to Bain, Wundt, and
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Helmholtz, that no ‘‘feeling of innervation’’ or ‘‘outgoing discharge’’ is necessary as an antecedent to action in voluntary bodily movements.42 Like
Hobbes, James defends the view that ‘‘all our thoughts of movement [are]
of sensational constitution’’; but he argues that this still leaves room for
spontaneity or ‘‘scope for our inward initiative to be shown’’ in focusing
on some sensations rather than others.43 This link to sensation, which supplies our understanding of different movements and their ends, is needed
to explain
what that ‘‘idea of a movement’’ is which must precede it in order
that it be voluntary. It is not the thought of the innervation which
the movement requires. It is the anticipation of the movement’s sensible effects, resident and remote, and sometimes very remote indeed.
Such anticipations, to say the least, determine what our movements
shall be.44
James’s entire account of the will, then, amounts to spelling out in much
more detail than Hobbes could (with the benefit of experimental results in
nineteenth-century psychology) the mechanisms by which states of ‘‘desire’’
are represented and can account for bodily movements. No notion of constituting motives by decisions or sustaining motivation by committing oneself
to care about some person, issue, or thing ever enters into James’s analysis.
The nearest James comes to giving ‘‘decision,’’ or executive volitional
agency, any role is in cases where tie-breaking is needed between various
sensual representations pulling on the agent. Sometimes ‘‘the bare idea of a
movement’s sensible effects [is] its sufficient mental cue’’ and sometimes an
‘‘additional mental antecedent, in the shape of a fiat, decision, consent, [or]
volitional mandate’’ is required.45 The former is a voluntary ‘‘ideo-motor
action,’’ which makes up the ‘‘habitual goings and comings and rearrangements of ourselves which fill every hour of the day,’’46 while the latter is a
special case. James believes that ‘‘every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object,’’ or produces a
tendency (however weak) to move in this way, and only ‘‘an antagonistic
representation’’ can keep it from automatically producing ideo-motor
action. This is so because ‘‘consciousness is in its very nature impulsive,’’ or
movement-generating.47 Only in such cases, where there are competing
tendencies, is ‘‘the express fiat, or act of mental consent to the movement’’
needed. What such fiat does is to ‘‘neutraliz[e] . . . the antagonistic and
inhibitory idea,’’ letting the other representation take effect. Thus fiat does
not evaluate motivating representations of sensible effects in any way distinct
from that in which such representations themselves motivate us; it simply
adds one more representation to the pile, thus releasing the ‘‘inner spring’’
that translates into ‘‘motor discharge.’’48 Hence, just as Hobbes said, the
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process of deliberation is simply a vector-summing of thoughts about action that are in tension, or of mental representations of opposed objects of
action. As James said:
The result is that peculiar feeling of inward unrest known as indecision.
. . . As long as it lasts, with the various objects before the attention,
we are said to deliberate; and when finally the original suggestion either
prevails and makes the movement take place, or gets definitively
quenched by its antagonists, we are said to decide, or to utter our voluntary fiat, in favor of one or the other course.49
The act of fiat or consent turns out to be the ‘‘last appetite’’ again.50
Thus Oberdiek gives too much credit to James in suggesting that his notion
of fiat shows that ‘‘will is not simply the last appetite or aversion adhering
to action,’’ but rather a way in which ‘‘We organize and systematize our
diverse perceptions, aspirations, emotions, and beliefs through deliberation
into a choice.’’51 For the deliberation preceding the fiat is just a more complex version of Hobbesian deliberation: ‘‘The process of deliberation contains an endless degree of complication. At every moment of it our
consciousness is of an extremely complex object, namely the existence of
the whole set of motives and their conflict.’’52 The outcome is a matter of
‘‘the oscillations of our attention’’ and the ‘‘associative flow of our ideas,’’53
and not of any agency standing above these. So Oberdiek is right that James
identifies as voluntary those actions ‘‘which must be performed attentively
and which, in doing, we experience a feeling of resolve, effort, or fiat.’’54 But
this self-resolving conflict is not ‘‘resolved’’ in the existential sense. James’s
introspective feeling of fiat is simply another version of the ‘‘feeling’’ of
initiative that Hume said we experience as an after-effect ‘‘when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body.’’55
1.4. Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein
This Jamesian model set the tone for subsequent treatments of volition in
both psychology and philosophy in the twentieth century. Gilbert Ryle
assumes that ‘‘the prime function of volitions, the task for the performance
of which they were postulated, is to originate bodily movement.’’56 Likewise, Ludwig Wittgenstein says that since James, ‘‘the prototype of the act
of volition is the experience of muscular effort.’’57 Though there are apparently more ‘‘active’’ cases, such as when ‘‘I deliberate whether to lift a certain
heavyish weight, decide to do it, . . . then apply my force to it,’’58 they are
not ‘‘voluntary’’ in any special sense that does not apply to less reflective
acts like casually scratching an itch or spontaneously getting out of bed; the
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voluntary or ‘‘volitional’’ is merely a family-resemblance concept.59 Wittgenstein does critique and reject James’s ideo-motor theory of action as
caused by the kinesthetic sense of the bodily act, just as he rejects Wundt
and Helmholtz’s ‘‘innervation’’ theory of action as distinguished by a sense
of trying to move muscles.60 In general, however, he thinks that ‘‘willing’’
just refers to acting voluntarily or to performing intentional actions, such
as particular bodily movements or mental acts like imagining.61
As Michael Scott says, concluding his review of Wittgenstein’s late writings on action, ‘‘the will, if it is conceived as a special type of mechanism
or originator of action, plays no role. The voluntariness of an action is
shown by the agent’s mental states, dispositions, forms of behavior, feelings
etc.,’’ that establish the action’s context.62 Thus Wittgenstein denies that
willing is a separate executive action of deciding or motivating our actions,
distinct from such first-order intentional acts themselves:
In the sense in which I can ever bring anything about (such as a
stomach-ache through over-eating) I can also bring about an act of
willing. In this sense I bring about the act of willing to swim by
jumping into the water. Doubtless I was trying to say: I can’t will
willing; that is, it makes no sense to speak of willing willing. ‘‘Willing’’ is not the name of an action; and so not the name of any voluntary action either.63
As I read this, Wittgenstein means to give a reductio of volitionalism: if
willing were itself a kind of action, then it would in turn be something we
could will to do. But since willing is identical with intending, and there is
no will to intend prior to the intention itself, willing is not itself an act.64
This is Wittgenstein’s famous regress argument against volition as a
distinct form of agency. If willing were an action, Wittgenstein thinks, it
would be like trying to perform a first-order intentional act. But an act such
as raising my arm does not feel like trying to manipulate an instrument;
there is no sense of effort other than that involved in actually tightening the
muscles that move the arm.65 Thus ‘‘the sensation of innervation which is
supposed to constitute the consciousness of the act of will’’66 is merely that
involved in intending any mental cognition or physical movement under
our control. The subjective experience we call ‘‘volition’’ cannot be anything
more than the kind of tension we feel in straining to lift a heavy weight,
since there is no prior, distinct sense of trying to make such an effort: our
behavior and its correlated kinesthetic sensation are all we find when we
introspect such supposed paradigm cases of ‘‘willing.’’67 Wittgenstein’s denial that we can ‘‘will willing’’ is thus symptomatic of the attitude that
volition is merely the subjective experience of attempting to do something
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already intended; on this assumption, willing as a distinct action of volitionformation could be experienced only as a trying to try, which is either redundant or merely a case of instrumental self-manipulation. Will is not, as we
imagine (due to deceiving linguistic analogies), a pure unmoved moving
power or ‘‘motor which has no inertia in itself to overcome’’; since willing is
not an act that we can try to perform, the frustratable-versus-unfrustratable
distinction does not apply to it at all.68
A similar regress argument is given by Ryle as a reductio of the thesis
that volitions are what ‘‘makes actions voluntary, resolute, meritorious and
wicked.’’ The problem is that ‘‘predicates of these sorts are ascribed not
only to bodily movements’’ but also to inner thought processes such as
studying or trying to write something, which can be subject to praise or
blame:
Some mental processes then can, according to the theory, issue from
volitions. So what of volitions themselves? Are they voluntary or involuntary acts of mind? Clearly either answer leads to absurdities. . . .
If my volition to pull the trigger is voluntary, in the sense assumed
by the theory, then it must issue from a prior volition and that from
another, ad infinitum.69
This argument obviously depends on the dubious assumption that there
is only one sense of ‘‘voluntary,’’ namely, ‘‘being caused by a volition.’’ For
only given this premise can it follow that if a volition is voluntary, then it
is caused by another volition, etc. Thus, like Wittgenstein, Ryle attacks a
straw man. Neither of their critiques applies to theories according to which
non-volitional bodily or mental actions are made contingently voluntary by
intentions, while intentions themselves (or the decisions in which they are
formed) are essentially voluntary expressions of primary agency.
Yet it was primarily on the basis of such flawed regress arguments that
Anscombe and Davidson rejected the idea of will as a special kind of internal agency and proposed instead what Pink calls the ‘‘Pro-Attitude’’ interpretation of voluntary action. In the following two sections we will see how
these developments in modern philosophy influenced twentieth-century action theory and examine three different concepts of the will that it produced. Within this large literature, I have selected only some representative
examples of the different views, since the goal is to arrive at a new concept
of the will that goes beyond the conceptions developed in action theory.
2. Kane’s Three Senses of ‘‘Will’’
The best single book about the will in twentieth-century philosophy is
Robert Kane’s masterpiece, The Significance of Free Will. The main goal of
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Kane’s tour de force is to defend a sophisticated version of leeway-libertarian incompatibilism in the debates about the sort of freedom required by
moral responsibility. This question is not my present topic, but, as Kane
rightly says, it was a mistake in mid-twentieth-century philosophy to think
that we could eliminate the notion of ‘‘will’’ from the analysis of moral
freedom. Despite the revival of this notion in more recent theories of action
and moral psychology, Kane writes: ‘‘the deeper connections between the
will and longstanding questions about freedom are still not well understood, to my mind, even by those who are familiar with current debates.’’70
I agree: part of the reason there still remain deep and seemingly unresolvable
disagreements about the conditions of moral freedom, despite the advances
and efforts of so many talented philosophers in the last forty years, is that
our background notion of the will itself remains inarticulate in certain key
respects. As I hope to show, our efforts to comprehend human freedom
are hampered by some fundamental mistakes in our understanding of the
relationship between ‘‘will’’ and motivation, mistakes that trace to the classical roots of Western philosophy. Overcoming these barriers should open
the way to a more profound interpretation of moral freedom than has hitherto been possible. In short, we cannot solve the main riddles about ‘‘freedom of the will’’ without better understanding the nature of the will that
is supposed to be the locus of freedom.
This chapter considers four different senses of ‘‘will,’’ moving from the
most minimal concept of ‘‘willing’’ employed in the literature of action
theory to what I consider to be the most substantive and important sense
of the term. In the process, I argue that recent developments away from the
minimalist concept point toward the need for a much better understanding
of ‘‘willing’’ in the most substantive sense, but contemporary theory has not
reached this point. This four-step division of will-concepts is different in
content and function from the taxonomy that Kane gives in the beginning
of his book, but looking at his distinctions will help clarify and support
my own taxonomy.
Kane distinguishes between ‘‘three traditional senses’’ of the word ‘‘will’’
(and its cognates in other languages). The first is ‘‘desiderative or appetitive
will ,’’ which refers to the state of wanting, or desiring, or being inclined to
some result or end.71 The second sense is rational will, or ‘‘a set of powers
defined in terms of a family of concepts whose focal member is practical
reasoning.’’ Will in this sense, which is the primary one for Kane, concerns
the making of two kinds of action-related judgments: ‘‘practical (or normative) judgments . . . about what ought to be done (or about what the best
thing is to do), and choices or decisions’’ through which the agent forms
an intention to act now or in the future.72 Kane describes these senses of
will as two sides of a single process:
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Wants, desires, preferences, and other expressions of desiderative will
are among the inputs to practical reasoning—they function as reasons
or motives for choice or action. By contrast, choices, decisions, and
intentions, the expressions of rational will, are the outputs of practical
reasoning, its products. If there is indeterminancy in free will, on my
view, it must come somewhere in between the input and output—
between the desiderative and rational will.73
We should pause to notice that this process as Kane envisions it is very
much like the process described by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica.
In brief, Aquinas takes up Aristotle’s notion of practical deliberation and
boulēsis or rational wish, adds to it the notion of an intention to act as the
proper output of the will or ‘‘rational appetite,’’ and includes a limited form
of libertarian freedom between the two.74 As Kane points out, this medieval
notion of rational appetite sounds like a disposition but, unlike ‘‘sensuous
appetite,’’ it presupposes ‘‘powers to form and act upon rational desires’’; in
other words, it involves ‘‘rational willing,’’ or will in Kane’s second sense.75
Third in Kane’s list is will in the sense of an ‘‘endeavor,’’ making
‘‘an effort,’’ or ‘‘trying’’ to do something. For this, Kane adopts Brian
O’Shaughnessy’s term, striving will.76 Although O’Shaughnessy developed
this as part of what I will call a ‘‘volitionalist’’ theory of action, according
to which all intentional actions involve ‘‘volitions’’ in the sense of efforts
or tryings, Kane is not concerned to defend or refute this theory of action.
Rather, for him, we experience ourselves as trying or making an effort when
we face some kind of resistance, as, for example, in a case where our prior
motives clash (or our desiderative will is divided); in such cases, the effort
we make to resolve the conflict plays a central role in some kinds of ‘‘selfforming willings.’’77 For example, in prudential and moral choices, we may
experience a strong temptation to some act A, while we are also ‘‘committed
to moral beliefs and long-term plans’’ that conflict with A.78 It turns out to
be vital for Kane’s account that such efforts are themselves explained by
agents’ already existing character and motives, as triggered by their present
circumstances: ‘‘It is because their efforts are thus a response to inner conflicts embedded in the agent’s prior character and motives that their prior
character and motives can explain the conflicts and why the efforts are
being made, without also explaining the outcomes of the conflicts and the
efforts.’’79 For Kane, we can have leeway-libertarian freedom because in
cases where the motivational ‘‘inputs’’ of the will are conflicted and thus do
not by themselves determine the intention-forming decision ‘‘outputs,’’
there is room for efforts to decide to mediate between these poles of the process, bringing about different possible results from the same inputs.80
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But there are problems with this picture—not as an explanation of libertarian freedom (which is not my present concern) but rather in its background moral psychology. First, Kane’s account is supposed to explain how
you can be ‘‘the ultimate creator (prime mover, so to speak) of your own
purposes,’’81 but it appears from his model that you can form purposes only
out of the various objects of your preexisting desires or appetites. Second,
although Kane recognizes that ‘‘efforts’’ of will can also be ‘‘directed at
sustaining or carrying out intentions or purposes already formed in the face
of obstacles,’’82 Kane conceives this kind of striving as a species of ‘‘selfforming willing’’ only when it resolves conflict again (in this case, conflict
between standing intentions and contrary desires). Apparently he does not
imagine such efforts to sustain a purpose P as adding any new motivation to
P beyond that which is derived from prior incentives and the will’s tiebreaking supplement. This seems to imply that if the appetites contrary to
P now clearly outweigh the motivation involved in setting P, and so there
is not an indeterminate mix of motives, the will cannot decide to sustain P.
On this picture, even a person’s efforts to control his first-order motives by
focusing his attention in certain ways derive their power entirely from a
prior desire ‘‘to control and modify his behavior’’ and they constitute selfforming willings only if this desire and those he is attempting to control
are in indeterminate balance.
Third, when we consider the nature of the intentions that result from
rational willing, as Kane emphasizes, we see that future-directed intentions
are very often nested within layers of longer-range intentions relating to
‘‘broader purposes.’’ Citing groundbreaking work by Michael Bratman, Gilbert Harman, Carlos Moya, and others, Kane points out that in coordinating our activities and deliberations in accordance with ‘‘larger plans,’’ an
agent’s intentions can ‘‘also embody an agent’s ‘commitments’ to future
goals.’’83 But what are such commitments, and how are they formed (do
they also flow entirely from preexisting motives and prior decisions flowing
from earlier motivational sets, etc.)? And third, how do we distinguish these
motives that we experience as ‘‘commitments’’ from those that we experiences as ‘‘temptations,’’ as in Kane’s examples?
In explaining this distinction, it cannot be simply that the commitments
envision longer-term goals that take more time to realize and involve a more
complex set of plans and coordination of tasks. For not all temptations
are toward short-term gratifications; some can incline toward more remote
possible ends and can even require elaborate planning to achieve. For example, imagine someone who gets an urge to abandon his family and live in
luxury on an offshore island resort. He seriously considers going for it and
begins planning his bank robbery, his escape route, how to make the authorities believe he is dead, and so on. Yet in the end, this whole scheme is
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really just a complex temptation at odds with what he himself would earnestly describe as his most fundamental commitments in life. Presumably
to experience a serious temptation is both to experience one’s intentions
being somewhat unfixed or changeable—so following the temptation is a
real volitional possibility—and to find this course at odds with the values
and ongoing projects with which one already identifies. So understanding
this phenomenon requires some interpretation of identification and autonomy. To get at the root of this problem, it will be helpful to reconstruct
some of Kane’s categories of willing in a different ordering reflecting essential disagreements about the will and agency in twentieth-century
philosophy.
3. Four Basic Concepts of the Will
3.1. The Minimalist Concept
My ordering begins with those theories that either dispense altogether with
‘‘the will’’ as a set of powers in Kane’s sense or at least reject the will in
both his second sense as an executive function that deliberates and decides
and his third sense as a type of effort or trying to form an intention. Ironically, philosophers sometimes arrive at a minimalist view by simply equating
the idea that we have wills with the idea that we enjoy libertarian freedom.
In some versions of libertarianism, an act of will becomes a simple act of
consent to some motivating reason or desire rather than an act of decision
flowing from or even helping to constitute these motives. This separation,
which Kane’s picture of the will-process is meant to avoid, has led to a host
of interrelated objections that the will is only an ‘‘arbitrary’’ or ‘‘decisionistic’’ power whose election of one option among many cannot itself be rationally explained or substantively motivated. It is unfortunate that such a
pure voluntarist equation of will with a liberty for alternate actions is now
widely thought of as representing ‘‘the existentialist’’ position.84 Peter van
Inwagen provides a better example:
I use the term ‘‘free will’’ out of respect for tradition. My use of the
term is not meant to imply that I think there is such a ‘‘faculty’’ as
‘‘the will.’’ When I say of a man that he ‘‘has free will’’ I mean [only]
that very often, if not always, when he has to choose between two or
more mutually incompatible courses of action . . . each of these
courses of action is such that he can, or is able to, or has it within his
power to carry it out.85
Since van Inwagen does not even say that the alternative ‘‘courses of
action’’ each require something like an intention, it seems that ‘‘will’’ in his
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minimalist sense could exist in any system that without varying its current
properties could behave in different ways in a single circumstance—perhaps
even if it lacked mental life or consciousness entirely. So by itself this definition is compatible with a ‘‘libertarian behaviorism.’’86 Notice that if we
remove libertarian freedom from this minimalist concept of willing, then
we are left with the eliminativist view that there is no such ‘‘thing’’ as the
will at all, that the notion is a mere disease of our language that fools us
into to reifying certain feelings we have when acting.
Within contemporary action theory, this view that we can dispense with
the very idea of ‘‘volition’’ is based on the claim that the conceptual vocabulary of intentional action can explain everything we need to account for.
The two most developed versions of this theory that I treat here are those
of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson. Both are indebted to the work
of Wittgenstein and his student, G. E. M. Anscombe. In one of his first
statements of this view, Dennett writes:
The account of intention that has been given includes no talk about
volitions or willing. That is because, as Anscombe argues, the verb
‘‘to will’’ is a hoax. There are no such things as acts of will or volition.87 . . . The idea that willing is some sort of radiation generated
by gritting the teeth and saying, ‘‘move, move, move,’’ is hopeless. It
arises, no doubt, from such experiences as lying in bed and saying to
oneself ‘‘I must get up, I must get up, it’s late. On the count of
three: one, two, three,’’ until one finally gets up. . . . The fact of the
matter—that sometimes the thoughts seem to help and sometimes
not—suggests that thinking to oneself is merely an accompaniment
or by-product of the actual business of determining action.88
Instead, Dennett argues, the brain makes the decision one way or another
unconsciously according to whether the right ‘‘balance is tipped’’ in one’s
neural activity (which need not be recognized verbally) so that one seems
to ‘‘will’’ to get up.89 In this case, giving verbal stimulation to one’s own
neural activity is exactly analogous to some third party giving such stimulation: ‘‘the success in both cases, of course, would depend on the relevance
and abundance of the information produced,’’ which need not be conscious.90 Most of all, ‘‘The notion that must be avoided is that awareness
is in any way a centre from which efficacious signals, volitions, or any sort
of psychic radiation emanates.’’91
So Dennett denies that the psychic states that cause intentional movements or bodily actions are essentially conscious and that they have any
special role or distinct status in the mind’s processes. This might seem to
make it difficult for Dennett to distinguish more ‘‘habitual’’ or routine
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actions done with little agonizing forethought from actions fraught with
experiences of choice, but he would simply say that the latter involve more
activity in the higher linguistic neural pathways than the former.92
Donald Davidson’s causal theory of intentional action, which developed
over the course of several essays, is more subtle than Dennett’s and closer
to certain aspects of the Aristotelian tradition as well. As Carlos Moya
summarizes in his excellent book on action theory, Davidson’s fundamental
aim throughout his work on action was to show, against the Hempelian
nomological models of causation, that ‘‘rationalizations,’’ which explain acts
in terms of the agent’s prior beliefs and desires, ‘‘are a species of causal
explanation.’’93 He hoped to show this by arguing that when a certain set
of beliefs and desires (or other pro-attitudes) are the reasons for which an
action was done, they must not only justify the act (or make psychological
sense of it) but also cause it. Thus in his early paper on ‘‘Actions, Reasons,
and Causes,’’ Moya says, Davidson initially conceived intentional action as
both the causal result of a pro-attitude plus some belief, and as the deductive
result of a practical syllogism starting from propositions expressing a belief
and a desire.94 The act is ‘‘caused’’ by its rationalization (the practical deduction), even though the proposition expressing this causal relation will
be true only as a singular claim in each case, not deducible from a lawlike
connection between kinds of reason and kinds of action.95
Like Dennett, then, Davidson hoped to show that intentional actions
can be caused without the intervention of any mysterious ‘‘volitional’’
agency. As with Aristotle, his moral psychology requires nothing more than
rational belief-forming capacities and various desires (which can perhaps be
trained through habituation). Davidson changed this in later papers only
by introducing ‘‘intentions’’ as a distinct element in the account and by
reformulating his initial practical syllogism explanation of how practical
reasons come to justify intentional action. It is doubtful that this move
really avoids the problem of actions resulting from wayward causal chains
unrelated to the reasons that the agent would cite in explaining her behavior; but deciding this issue is not vital here. This is enough to classify
Davidson’s view as a quasi-Aristotelian minimalist theory of willing.
It was in response to this sort of view defended by Ryle, Wittgenstein,
Anscombe, Dennett, and Davidson that the theorists in my second group
defended the ineliminability of ‘‘volitions’’ in what turns out to be a rather
novel sense of the term.
3.2. The Volitionalist Concept
At the second level, we find various interpretations of ‘‘willing’’ as a kind
of effort or trying that either constitutes or is the immediate cause of socalled ‘‘basic actions’’ (out of which more complex actions are supposedly
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composed). As Kane puts it, this is the view of ‘‘theorists who identify
efforts or tryings with volitions, and argue that volitions, so understood,
are involved in all intentional action.’’96 The most extensive defense of
such a view is given by Brian O’Shaughnessy in his two-volume study.97
O’Shaughnessy meticulously works through different possible accounts of
the mental antecedents to physical or bodily action. But this also reveals
the limits of his approach: for him, the question of whether we ‘‘will’’
anything depends on how we bring about intentional first-order acts—
something that many nonhuman animals can also do. ‘‘Willing’’ in his sense
is not a distinct activity in the transition from motives to articulate intentions nor does it determine the autonomy of one’s motivations. This applies
generally to a whole family of views in contemporary action theory that
Robert Audi dubs ‘‘volitionalism.’’
In his helpful summary of this literature, Audi surveys several ‘‘varieties
of volitionalism,’’ which he describes as ‘‘a theory of the nature of action
which gives a central place to one or another kind of willing.’’98 Several of
these theories, such as Hugh McCann’s, portray volitions as mental ‘‘actions’’ that prompt outward performances or, as in Lawrence Davis’s theory, as ‘‘attempts or tryings,’’ which are a special class of actions.99 Like
O’Shaughnessy, D. M. Armstrong and Raimo Tuomela ‘‘conceive volition
as roughly equivalent to trying,’’ a mental effort that can causally explain
action.100 Others, such as Michael Zimmerman, have equated volition with
a ‘‘kind of decision,’’ while philosophers in the Millian tradition, including
Wilfred Sellars and Myles Brand, have described volition as one type of
intention which is the ‘‘proximate cause of action.’’101
All these conceptions start with a thin concept of will as a mental state
that is necessary or even sufficient to cause intentional bodily movements
(or outward acts). They save ‘‘willing’’ in this thin sense from the minimalists by conceiving it as a distinct element in the structure of first-order
actions. Usually, except when it includes libertarian freedom, this structure
is meant to apply not just to persons but potentially to other animals as
well. So the notion that willing itself (quite apart from its freedom) is
something essential to and distinctive of persons is lost. Moreover, although
will in this twentieth-century ‘‘volitionalist’’ sense is a kind of mental ‘‘striving,’’ as Kane said, it is only an effort to act as intended or an attempt to
initiate basic motions of body or thought (e.g., trying to redirect one’s
attention when suddenly distracted from a crucial task at hand). Volition
implements or enacts intentions already formed. It has nothing especially
to do with shaping one’s underlying motives for acting, or forming fundamental commitments, or integrating them with one’s existing values and
priorities.
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Perhaps ‘‘volition’’ in the mental-trying sense could be said to include
the process of mustering resolve to sustain our commitments against adversity. But if so, volitionalist accounts do not adequately distinguish the kind
of volitional effort that deeply affects the ethos of a person from other
types of mental ‘‘striving,’’ for example, psychomotor efforts such as trying
hard to control a largely numbed arm when waking from a deep sleep, or
trying to focus one’s eyes where the optometrist instructs, or trying to pour
just the right amount of milk into our coffee. Thus this approach does not
isolate and explain the heroic kind of ‘‘striving will’’ that plays a unique
role in shaping our character and life goals and keeping us committed to
them despite adversity.
As Audi explains, some ‘‘volitionalist’’ accounts recognize volitions as
having a special kind of self-referential content. For example, Carl Ginet
holds that in exerting bodily movement, I do not simply will the exertion:
rather, I will ‘‘my exerting . . . I will that my willing—this very willing of
whose content we speak—cause the exertion.’’102 This is insightful, since it
brings out the essential reference to the agent’s individual identity and authorship of her actions that we find in all intentions, including those aiming
at immediate bodily movement. But it does not recognize willing in Kane’s
second and central sense. What unites all these ‘‘volitionalist’’ accounts, as
Audi points out, is just the conviction that volition is a class of mental
events that ‘‘are, or are crucial in, producing action—if not its immediate
causes, then its closest psychological causes.’’103 Such theories start from
‘‘the picture of actions as caused by such elements as the agent’s desires,
beliefs, and decisions’’ and try to provide a ‘‘causal factor which genetically
unifies actions in terms of a common kind of origin, even if not necessarily
an ultimate origin, in the psychology of the agent.’’104 In this popular contemporary outlook, willing is interpreted relative to a set of problems in
action theory that already assume, for the most part, that motivation is
defined by the limits of interaction between beliefs and desires (and possibly emotions, if these are not reducible to belief-desire compounds).
Although these ‘‘volitionalist’’ action theories are not limited to human
acts, they do have a relationship to moral theory. An essential part of their
goal is to show that ‘‘volitions’’ in their sense must be posited if we are to
explain the conditions that make actions voluntary and thus morally imputable to their agents. This is an effective argument against minimalism, because Hobbes and his empiricist followers agreed that ‘‘volition’’ is
equivalent to whatever conditions make human actions voluntary, which is a
condition of responsibility. Following Aristotle, for an action to be voluntary, it must both be done intentionally (arising from ‘‘internal’’ sources)
and uncoerced. Within this schema, the volitionalists hold that to do an
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act A intentionally is to cause A (or its components) by a volition in the
sense of an effort or endeavor to A.105
The volitionalist theories thus build on an older tradition in which the
concept of will is defined by its practical function: ‘‘willing’’ is whatever
psychic state plays the role of making the action that follows from it intentional and thus potentially voluntary. In his history of the will, Hans Oberdiek stresses this idea that volition is used ‘‘to distinguish between
intentional and unintentional action, a grave matter in many criminal law
cases.’’106 For example:
Self-controlled action, as Aristotle explains it, serves as an important
forerunner to our own notion of ‘‘voluntariness.’’ For in Aristotle’s
account, self-controlled (or voluntary) actions are those where an
agent, acting with the appropriate degree of knowledge and without
compulsion, seeks an end because of some kind of desire (orexis) originating within him.107
Oberdiek sees the contributions subsequent to Aristotle primarily as giving us more adequate criteria for making this distinction, for example, by
adding the idea that the will is ‘‘a phenomenon of subjective, introspective
consciousness, a mental event preceding action’’ (Descartes),108 and by adding the notion of intention to distinguish human actions from mere behaviors
(Aquinas).109 The function of the will as a philosophical concept on Oberdiek’s reading thus agrees with today’s volitionalists: ‘‘A theory involving
‘volitions’ promises not only to distinguish involuntary from voluntary behavior, but to explain how voluntary actions occur and what counts as an
action.’’110
Similarly, in his own interesting account, Oberdiek argues (following
Davidson, Donagan, and others) that act-descriptions and predications of
‘‘is voluntary’’ must be treated intentionally: ‘‘an agent acts voluntarily only
when the act-description is one which the agent is aware describes his
act.’’111 Departing from traditional usage, Oberdiek distinguishes between
‘‘free’’ and ‘‘voluntary’’ actions, so that coerced actions may be voluntary
yet unfree;112 in this attenuated sense of ‘‘voluntary,’’ the set of voluntary
acts is equivalent to the set of acts caused by a volition; for example, a wink
is willed, a blink is not. Though, like other volitionalist theories, his account convincingly responds to minimalists like Ryle, it still treats the will
only in terms of what Thomas Pink calls ‘‘first-order agency,’’ or the capacity to perform first-order actions—doings with a purpose explained by
attitudes ‘‘such as desires and intentions’’ that are not themselves aimed
at forming desires, intentions, or any other such action-explaining
attitudes.113
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This kind of volitionalism is also found in some contemporary theories
of autonomy as voluntary action under certain conditions of practical rationality. For example, Gert and Duggan distinguish three senses of
voluntariness:
In ordinary discourse the term ‘‘voluntary’’ as applied to actions has
a number of senses which though related are, nonetheless, distinct.
Of these, three are central: (1) a voluntary act is simply an intentional
(as opposed to accidental) act; (2) a voluntary act is a free (as opposed to constrained) act; (3) a voluntary act is an intentional act
done by an agent who has what we have described as the ability to
will (volitional ability) to do that kind of action.114
The first two conditions are roughly equivalent to voluntariness in Oberdiek’s sense; the third adds to this a complex condition requiring that the
agent can recognize ‘‘coercive’’ and ‘‘noncoercive incentives’’ for doing a particular act X and would usually respond to them in appropriate fashion, for
example, by not doing X when coercive incentives for not doing it are
present, by sometimes doing it when noncoercive incentives for doing it are
present, and so on.115 There are many kinds of incentive: ‘‘moral, prudential,
patriotic,’’ monetary, and so on, and in order to act freely, an agent need
only be able to have beliefs that there are incentives of the many kinds
normal people recognize and respond to them such that he ‘‘almost always’’
acts in accordance with coercive incentives, and sometimes acts in accordance with noncoercive incentives.116 By contrast, a son who obsessively
visits his mother’s grave due to guilt feelings either cannot ‘‘believe that he
should not visit her grave, or if he can come to believe this it does not affect
his actions.’’117 Gert and Duggan suggest that those who cannot recognize
common incentives or interests ‘‘are in that respect like delusional psychotics,’’ while those who recognize but do not rationally respond to incentives
‘‘are in that respect like compulsive or phobic neurotics.’’118
Like John Fischer’s explanation of agent control, this analysis assumes
that the idea of autonomy is meant primarily to embody standards of normal reason-responsiveness, and so Gert and Duggan build into their conditions an objective (if rather unspecified) range of reasons or ‘‘incentives’’ that
autonomous agents must be able to recognize and respond to appropriately.
They gloss over the problem that what such reasons or incentives are will
be in part socially determined. More important for my purposes, they entirely ignore the question of whether autonomy requires any ability to control
one’s incentives oneself or any distinctive kind of motivation (which may hardly
be ‘‘incentival’’ in form). Thus they still conceive volition entirely in terms
of first-order agency: ‘‘we define ‘willing’ as doing intentionally or trying to
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do.’’119 Autonomous willing is merely attempting or performing intentional
action that is sufficiently reasons-responsive.
One of the best arguments against this volitionalist tradition is given by
Carlos Moya. In developing his case, he retrieves insights from some of the
minimalists that are lost in volitionalist models (even though Moya does
not in the end agree with the minimalists either). According to Moya, the
volitionalist approach is motivated by the problematic minimalism of older
accounts of action. For example, in the British empiricism of Hobbes and
Locke, ‘‘Willing to move our bodies is, properly speaking, a mental happening
caused by some motive or desire.’’120 If we reject this assimilation of actions
to events, then we have to explain how actions that essentially involve events
or happenings (or what McCann calls ‘‘results’’) are constituted. But if each
result becomes a result by being caused by a more basic action, and each
such action also involves a result, we have an infinite regress. The solution
to this problem, according to ‘‘new volitional theory’’ (Moya’s term for
Audi’s ‘‘volitionalism’’) is to posit absolutely basic actions that involve no results
or events distinct from these acts. These maximally basic actions are, as we
have seen, ‘‘volitions’’ in the sense of (intentional) mental efforts to ‘‘execute intentions’’ and are thus experienced as states of trying to do whatever
the agent already intended or striving to execute an existing plan to realize
the agent’s purpose.121
Moya seems to reject the idea that such trying volitions can be what
execute intentions because of the following dilemma: ‘‘volitions can only
solve the result problem if they do not involve physical happenings; but if
they do not involve physical happenings they cannot be executive’’—not,
at least, without positing a mysterious interaction between mental and
physical substances.122 I am not sure that this objection is decisive, since
Brian O’Shaughnessy’s dual-aspect theory is designed precisely to avoid it.
As Moya says, for O’Shaughnessy, ‘‘Being mental, and having physical effects, trying is the point where mind reaches the body, a mental ‘pineal
gland.’ ’’123 Moya raises technical objections designed to show that ‘‘trying’’
in O’Shaughnessy’s sense could only be trying to move one’s body in some
way, not trying to do any nonbasic action like start a car or go into town.124
I do not think these arguments are decisive in showing that all ‘‘efforts’’
involved in executing intentions are physical efforts of some kind: one
could, for example, ‘‘try’’ in O’Shaughnessy’s sense to remember someone’s
name or to execute some other intention aimed at a purely mental result.
In any case, Moya concludes that ‘‘Between intention and overt physical
action we do not need an intermediate trying, for trying is just starting the
action’’; and in the case of ‘‘spontaneous bodily movements’’ like raising
one’s arm, this is something we just know how to do by ‘‘natural, unlearnt
ability.’’125 Again, I am not sure that this is right, for it seems to me that
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the volitionalist project begins from the fact that we often can introspectively detect an act—or at least a distinct mental moment—of trying to
initiate the bodily sequence involved in an outward action: this moment
involves a thought that we might articulate as ‘‘now I will do what I planned
to!’’ or ‘‘now let’s begin!’’—even though, of course, we rarely articulate this
thought in such a reflective propositional form. In fact, we often begin
implementation of ordinary short-term intentions (like picking up a fork)
with so little reflective awareness that this moment of mental trying approaches the vanishing point.
But even if this is right, it does not save volitionalism as a complete
theory of intentional action. For although there is something to the idea that
the execution of many kinds of intention involves basic mental acts of effort
or tryings, Moya argues convincingly that such ‘‘volitions’’ cannot be the
essence of agency, or what constitutes our movements as intentional action.
As he explains, the regress problem that motivated volitionalist theories
depends on the assumption that all actions other than basic ones (or trying
volitions) ‘‘have results, that is, non-actional or act-neutral events that are
necessary, but not sufficient, for the corresponding action to take place.’’126
But this assumption is false, as Moya shows by the key example of ‘‘meaningful action,’’ or communicative action (using Jürgen Habermas’s familiar term
for the same thing). Actions with symbolic meaning are not just basic actions done in the context of some convention governing the meaning of
signs; rather, their ability to draw on conventionally established meanings
derives from the ‘‘commitment’’ they involve to related future actions.127
Although some meaningful or communicative acts, ‘‘such as greeting someone or making a move in chess,’’ do not involve commitments to specific
future actions (such as letting the visitor in or moving one’s pawn to K4),
they do involve following the rules or implicit norms of the communicative
practice presupposed by such acts. And as Wittgenstein showed, ‘‘following
a rule in the present commits the agent to certain other actions in the
future.’’128 Thus all communicative action presupposes the capacity to form
future-directed intentions. It is worth adding that Habermas arrived at very
similar conclusions in his highly nuanced work on communicative action.129
This account reveals the basic inadequacy of the volitionalist approach:
by centering agency in basic actions, it misses what is most essential to the
intentionality of human actions, namely, its ‘‘holistic’’ nature. ‘‘Intentional
states are necessarily a network, a whole system. They are not discrete separate items.’’130 It is their place in a network of narrative significance, which
gets its holism from the norms to which intentions implicitly commit us,
that gives our actions their intentional quality. This quality does not derive,
then, from the character of mental states (like reasons or trying volitions)
that various causal theories have held to cause actions. This insight also
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finds strong support in Alasdair MacIntyre’s narrative theory of action and
intention131 and in similar accounts in the hermeneutic tradition.
3.3. The Decision-as-Agency Concept
As we have seen, in contemporary philosophical theories of action, it is
now usual to distinguish between (1) bodily movements or cognitive
achievements such as directing one’s attention; (2) the intentions to act a
certain way that guide such movements and make them actions (performances under a subjective description); and (3) the motives from which intentions derive, which typically fall into two classes: desires and emotions,
and reasons (judgments and beliefs). Depending on the theorist, practical
judgments and beliefs may or may not be able to motivate by themselves,
absent any prior desire for the end for which we intend to act. Within this
scheme, volition could be identified with either the executive or the motivational side of the structure of an action: it is either (A) the effort to enact
an intention to perform bodily movements or thought processes, which
makes these performances into actions by connecting them with the intention; or (B) the desires that the agent believes the act will help satisfy or
his all-things-considered judgment that this act is the thing to do in the
circumstance. In neither case is the origin of the intention itself an action
distinct in character from the ‘‘first-order’’ mental and physical acts that it
intends.
Yet in nonphilosophical discourse or ordinary language, the notion of
‘‘will’’ retains much richer connotations. As Thomas Pink has argued, in
‘‘ordinary psychology,’’ the decision-making by which we form intentions
to act and apply reasons to plan future actions itself counts as a special type
of intentional action. For Pink, volition thus has the more substantive sense
of second-order agency. By this, it should be noted, Pink is not referring to
Frankfurt’s notion of ‘‘second-order volitions,’’ which are part of his theory
of autonomy. Rather, Pink’s thesis is that the ‘‘willing’’ that is essential to
the structure of ordinary first-order intentional action must itself be understood as a special activity in its own right:
First we have our everyday actions and attempts at action—our firstorder agency. Then we have, among the psychological states which
explain and rationalise our first-order agency, some such as intentions
whose formation constitutes agency too. That agency, of which the
most intuitive case is decision-making, is our second-order agency. By
tying our action control to prior decision control, a Psychologising
conception of freedom ties the freedom of our first-order agency to
a capacity for second-order agency.132

................. 16406$

$CH3

05-23-07 10:55:57

PS

PAGE 69

70

Will as Commitment and Resolve

This concept of decision as a special kind of action can be traced, as
Pink suggests, back through Aquinas to the Stoics, who both conceived the
will in terms of second-order agency. The Stoics distinguished human from
animal agency by ‘‘the human capacity for sunkatathesis, or making assent
to propositions about how one should act.’’133 The Stoics conceived such
intention-forming acts of ‘‘consent’’ as ‘‘an agency of practical judgment,’’134
which is an integral part of our species essence as ‘‘rational animal.’’ Augustine adds to this Stoic agency the concept of liberum arbitrium or libertarian
freedom. However, as Kahn argues, ‘‘Augustine’s concept of the will does
not get a fully philosophical development until it is integrated within a
theoretical model of the psyche, namely Aristotle’s.’’135 The concepts of
deliberate action and choice had to be brought together in a more adequate
account of second-order agency. Still, in Augustine, as with his predecessors, ‘‘there is no one concept that ties together the voluntary, boulēsis or
desire for the end, and prohairesis, or deliberate desire for the means. But it is
precisely the role of voluntas in Aquinas to perform this work of conceptual
unification.’’136
Kahn describes in detail the development of this idea of voluntas and its
superiority as an analysis of will over Aristotle’s divided model. Since
‘‘Aquinas partially identifies liberum arbitrium with voluntas or ‘the will’ as the
power to makes decisions. . . . [h]e thus establishes a close connection
between the will and the concept of freedom that is unparalleled in Aristotle or any Hellenistic Greek discussion of boulesis.’’137 Aquinas thus introduces what Pink would call a psychologizing account of voluntas as an
executive agency.
Pink’s psychologizing notion of freedom thus involves a concept of volition as a capacity or power that goes beyond anything found in ‘‘volitionalist’’ models of first-order intentional action.138 Unlike ‘‘volitional or
conational theories of action,’’ which equate volitions with states ‘‘whereby
we try to move our bodies,’’ a decision to act in Pink’s sense forms intentions, while tryings follow from or execute intentions once they are formed:
To take a decision to act is not, like trying, to initiate bodily movement, but rather to form a persisting psychological state—a state of
intention in which we are left motivated to act as decided. Decisions
are forms of agency which explain intentions; whereas tryings, like
bodily actions, are quite distinct forms of agency which intentions
explain.139
Pink argues that our ‘‘ordinary conception of freedom’’ or control,
which does not derive merely from the notion of moral responsibility,140
implies such a capacity for second-order agency: ‘‘Not only do we suppose
ourselves to have a freedom to act otherwise; we suppose ourselves to have
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the freedom to decide and intend otherwise as well.’’141 But decisions are
not arbitrary gestures; Pink argues that the formation of intentions itself
counts as agency because it shares the same kind of practical rationality as firstorder acts.142 Reasons for an act A are also reasons to form an intention to
A.143 Thus, with respect to first-order acts, a decision has a motivational function: ‘‘our actions are not just explained by beliefs and desires. Our actions
are often explained by what appear to be further actions [e.g., ‘decisions’]—
actions that are performed in the head, and which somehow generate the
motivation for the actions which they explain.’’144
On this account, there is thus an important asymmetry between acts of
will or decision and the first-order actions whose guiding intentions are
formed by these decisions.145 The intentions constitutive of first-order actions (whether mental or physical) are not sufficiently explained by the
beliefs and desires that motivate them; they also require a decision to form
this intention rather than other intentions that would have different motives.146 Decisions, however, are sufficiently explained by their motives or
follow immediately from them without needing a further decision to form
a decision to act on these motives. We might fear a regress objection to
this claim: since all actions are intentional, and Pink construes decision as
a kind of action, then decisions must involve intentions, which would then
have to be formed by further decisions, and so on.
This objection is just another version of the argument we noted earlier
from Wittgenstein that any conception of willing as a distinct or special
act of the mind would imply the absurd possibility of willing to will. Brian
O’Shaughnessy makes a very similar argument against decisions as actions:
citing the Wittgenstein passage we discuss above, he says that Φ is ‘‘the
willing of some φ’’ if Φ is ‘‘the act of bringing about φ,’’ where φ is, for
example, a ‘‘limb movement’’ like ‘‘the event of an arm rise.’’147 When Φ (a
‘‘volition’’) is thus construed as the carrying out of a preexisting intention,
a further act θ that wills or brings about Φ would make no sense. For θing here, O’Shaughnessy considers nerving or ‘‘getting myself ’’ to shoot
some fellow; but if this does not refer to some kind of imaginative selfmanipulation (like promising myself rewards for doing it), then it cannot
be distinct from the act of shooting him (Φ), which is ‘‘the making happen
of a finger movement’’ on the trigger (φ).148
The problem with both Wittgenstein’s and O’Shaughnessy’s arguments
is their assumption that acts of will are only executive in relation to existing
intentions, initiating the process of carrying them out. Only on this interpretation does an act of decision become the carrying out of an intention to
form intentions to act. So interpreted, decisions seem unnecessary; moreover, as Pink says, the ‘‘Pro-Attitude model’’ is underwritten by the notion
that nothing that was not a reason or justification for doing A could still be
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a reason for deciding to do A, and so the latter is superfluous.149 Yet as he
argues, our control over our decisions or intention formation is ‘‘direct’’
rather than merely instrumental: ‘‘The agency which gives us decision and
intention control is agency which constitutes the taking of a particular decision to act, rather than agency which causes that decision to be taken.’’150
In other words, we do not control our decisions by performing some
further ‘‘decision-causing action,’’ since our control over decision is direct.151
Thus normally the ‘‘intention to decide to A’’ is formed with the very decision
that forms the intention to A; decisions are in this sense immediately selfexecuting. Within first-order action, an intention to act in such-and-such a
way may not be carried out (either because the agent changes her mind
before the time arrives or because its implementation is blocked by external
impediments). But at the second-order level, there is no such distance between forming the intention to decide and actually deciding.152
Some accounts of autonomy also conceive the will as second-order
agency in Pink’s sense. For example, Stampe and Gibson define ‘‘the will’’
as ‘‘the intention-forming powers of the mind, or traditionally, ‘the power
of choice,’ ’’153 and define ‘‘ ‘decision’ or ‘choice’ to mean just a mental event
or act of mind in which an agent came to have the intention to do something A, where that event or act is one of such a kind that the agent’s
reasons for doing A might have been the cause of that intention.’’154 This is
a weaker condition than Pink’s reason-applying conception of decision, but
it still rules out intentions directly installed by neurologists or brought
about by hypnotic suggestion, for example. Stampe and Gibson argue convincingly that ‘‘internal barriers’’ may prevent a person from freely deciding
or forming an intention to act and thus prevent her from acting autonomously; for example, an agoraphobic woman does not freely remain in her
room.155 But they explain this by saying that her decision to remain in the
room is unfree because it lacks ‘‘the condition of the will that makes it
possible for an agent to make the rational decision about what to do,’’
where rational is defined internally or subjectively:
the rational action being what would be best ‘‘relative to’’ the desires
of some agent and the evidence he or she actually possesses. (Thus,
to be able to make ‘‘the rational decision’’ is, on one standard view,
to be able to make that decision the implementation of which would
tend to maximize the satisfaction of one’s desires, if the relevant beliefs were true.156
Stampe and Gibson anticipate the objection that in this sense, the agoraphobic woman does decide rationally, since she satisfies her strongest desire
(i.e., to avoid open spaces), though at the cost of frustrating other desires,
like the urge to see her friend.157 But they suggest that what makes her will
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unfree is rather that counterfactually, even if, ‘‘in her own estimation,’’
going out were worth the risk of a panic attack, she still would not decide
to do what would then be the subjectively rational thing for her to do; her
will cannot track rationality in alternate possible variations of her circumstance. Similarly, what makes us unfree in a holdup is that even though we
act rationally in handing over our wallet to the gunman, were we to believe
that the rational thing was to defy him, we would be too scared to do it.158
Stampe and Gibson compare this notion of free will to a ‘‘free-working
mechanism: like a weathervane, which is not stuck in one position, but
rather can point in the direction of the wind, whatever direction the wind
may blow.’’ Although a stuck weather vane may point in the right direction
if by accident the wind is flowing in that direction today, it is not free,
since it does not track the wind.159
In response, we might doubt that a robot that perfectly decided the best
action in the circumstances relative to the goal of fulfilling its programming
could have anything like ‘‘a will.’’160 But aside from this intuitive problem,
Stampe and Gibson’s conception of autonomy offers an implausibly indirect account of the feeling of coercion in such situations. Even if I thought
I could defy the gunman had I reason enough to do so (e.g., if my wallet
contained the only copy of a formula for a cure to AIDS) the fear on which
I act in the actual sequence where it is not outweighed is not a motive with
which I identify, in Frankfurt’s sense.161 If volitional identification involves a
form of commitment or resolve that is distinct from ordinary preferences
and desires for our well-being, such a self-motivating capacity might allow
for a more direct explanation of the agoraphobic’s unfreedom as well: she
may resolve to leave her home with the plan of meeting a cherished friend
downtown, even though she thinks she is unlikely to follow through on
this, given her condition (the resolve thus expresses a kind of defiance or
alienation of the emotion on which she still reluctantly grants that she is
likely to act). In fact, she is not able to form a real intention to open the
door, because the intentions guiding her first-order acts are governed by a
strong desire for enclosure that overrides the alternate motivational force
of her resolve. Unlike Stampe’s and Gibson’s account, this more direct
explanation does not equate volition with intention control or decision
motivated solely by preexisting desires and beliefs. Like Pink, then, Stampe
and Gibson do not recognize in will as second-order agency any motivational
capacity distinct from desires or practical reasoning about the good.
Kane appears to endorse a similar decision-as-agency concept in his account of the ‘‘rational will.’’ He finds the roots of this concept in Augustine
and Bramhall, who both held that decisions are a special kind of action,
which in turn ‘‘normally bring about intentions to act—intentions are their
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results.’’ And since intentions have purposes or goals as part of their content, he concludes that ‘‘a choice or decision can be described as both the
formation of intention and the creation of a purpose that subsequently
guides action.’’162
The key point here, as in Pink’s argument, is that prior desires or internal reasons to act cannot by themselves, or in combination with beliefs, just
become purposes that explain actions as intentional. Rather, something else
has to happen in the agent first: some of the ends pointed out by our
preexisting desires have to be taken up into intentions. This is the crucial
point overlooked by minimalist theories, such as Donald Davidson’s, which
‘‘held that explanations of action could be given in terms of beliefs and
desires (or wants) alone, with the intermediary notion of intention playing
no indispensable role.’’163 On the contrary, Kane rightly endorses recent
arguments, such as Alfred Mele’s, that intentions are formed at the termination of practical reasoning, and that it is only once an intention is formed
that the agent really has a purpose or goal of action, since merely having a
pro-attitude toward some outcome is not the same as its being one’s purpose: ‘‘what is desired or wanted is not always selected as a goal.’’164
Similar criticisms of Davidson’s initial belief-desire model are made by
Carlos Moya. Like Anscombe and Davidson, Moya holds that agency is
closely related to intentional action: ‘‘a certain piece of behavior is an action
if, and only if, it is intentional (or intentionally performed) under some
description. . . . There are non-intentional actions, or non-intentional true
descriptions of actions, only because there are intentional actions, or intentional true descriptions of actions.’’165
In other words, something counts as a kind of action only because it can
be done intentionally; either it is what Moya calls a ‘‘pure action’’ that can
only be done intentionally (like marrying or making a chess move or lying),
or it is what he calls a ‘‘neutral’’ action type that can be done intentionally
or unintentionally (like offending or kicking).166 But, building on his model
of meaningful actions (discussed above), Moya argues that aside from simple actions aimed only at an outcome in the immediate moment (e.g., routine or habitual intentional acts like scratching an itch), most human
intentions involve a kind of commitment to act on the reasons (beliefs, desires,
and other considerations) that explain them or ‘‘rationalize’’ them in Davidson’s sense. For example, while driving home, ‘‘My intention to get home
or my intention to turn involve a certain kind of rational commitment: if I
have those intentions I ought to engage in certain appropriate actions on
pain of incoherence. We could call these intentions ‘future intentions.’ ’’167
Thus intentions add something essential to action over and above desired
aims, plans, and rules for acting, something irreducible to other elements of
action:
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Only when one commits oneself to act so as to match an ideal has
one formed an intention. Intentions, I contend, are not mere desires,
aims, plans, or rules: they are commitments to act so as to match their
content (the desired, aimed at, or planned action). Aims, plans, and
rules can remain inert. Only by constituting (part of ) the content of
an intention do they become efficacious as guides to action.168
On this view, fully intentional actions involve pragmatic commitment,
and so forming such intentions seems to require an act of pragmatic commitment. Moya’s account thus implies that ‘‘decision’’ in Pink’s and Kane’s
sense amounts to a reflexive act in which the agent commits herself to future
goals and standards that form requirements of narrative coherence for her
continued agency. Such commitment is ‘‘the core of agency,’’ according to
Moya.169
Given this normative character, it is clear that intentions transcend ‘‘mere
dispositions or tendencies to act.’’170 Like Pink and Kane, Moya urges that
desires, beliefs, and internal reasons for action in general become part of
the explanation of action only through the formation of intentions:
Reasons are not, by themselves, causes of actions. Our reasons do not
give rise to our actions as heat gives rise to the boiling of water. Only
when we intend or decide to act on these reasons do these reasons
become efficacious. . . . Agency is what makes [internal] reasons efficacious, and not conversely. It belongs to the human condition that
we have to commit ourselves to act and to engage in acting in a
concrete and definite way because desires, beliefs and drives are never
decisive for us, rational and reflective beings, as, on the contrary, they
are for most animals.171
For only normal human beings, who have the concept (as opposed to
the mere intuition) of time, have the capacity for the future-oriented commitments involved in fully intentional action; other animals are capable of
‘‘minimally intentional actions’’ aimed at the immediate present or done
from routine and instinct but not of planning intentionality with its normative dimension.172 Thus, if ‘‘the will’’ refers to our capacity to form intentions involving such pragmatic commitments, only human beings have a
‘‘will.’’ In the decision-as-agency concept, then, we have finally located a
sense of ‘‘willing’’ that, even without a full account of moral freedom, is
distinctively human.
This concept is lacking in Davidson. Beginning with problems in accounting for weakness of will, Davidson modified his original quasi-Aristotelian theory of action to include intentions to perform an action as
something over and above the beliefs and pro-attitudes that rationalize the
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action. The intention to A, now identified with the all-out summary judgment that A-ing would be better than any other available actions, does not
necessarily follow from the beliefs and pro-attitudes that explain or rationalize A-ing. Nor is intending to A identical with A-ing. Moya diagnoses
this shift as a result of Davidson implicitly recognizing the distinct status
of future intentions.173 But despite these modifications, Davidson’s late
model of intention does not recognize that intentions are the result of
decision as second-order or reflexive agency. He still equates an intention
with an unconditionally positive disposition to an action or practical judgment about it.174
Following Bratman, Moya shows that several problems arise for this
conception of intentions, because ‘‘all-out judgments are at least implicitly
comparative,’’ whereas intentions are not.175 I can, for example, simultaneously have two intentions to do two different things (either together or
separately) while judging all-out that one is preferable to the other.176
Moreover, the commitment model of intention allows for conditional intentions (intending to do A provided that a given condition is satisfied)
whereas the all-out judgment model cannot. These difficulties, together
with the problem of wayward causal chains, show that we cannot understand intentions as simply caused by the reasons that rationalize them.177
Summarizing these criticisms, Moya says: ‘‘In viewing intentions as all-out
pro-attitudes Davidson conceives them as too similar to desires not to face
problems before cases of intending which are not cases of judging the object
of the intention as the most desirable alternative.’’178
Although Moya does not describe his own alternative to Davidson’s
causal account as a theory of ‘‘willing,’’ it should be clear by now how
similar his alternative is to Pink’s theory of decision and Kane’s concept of
rational willing. Moreover, all of these accounts are indebted to Kant’s
understanding of willing as an activity in which we create intentions on the
basis of considerations that we (at least implicitly) take to be practical
reasons that could also apply in similar circumstances in the future or that
function as practical rules for us. As Christine Korsgaard explains in her
thorough account of this idea, the normative problem arises for human
beings, unlike all other known animals, because our natural inclinations and
impulses do not ‘‘dominate’’ us; hence we can raise the question: ‘‘Is this
desire really a reason to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception
and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise . . . it cannot
commit itself or go forward.’’179
The key idea in this conception of action does not follow, however,
simply from the premise that we are not dominated by prepurposive desires
and impulses because we can reflect on them. By itself, this premise is compatible with the claim that we sometimes simply fail to reflect and act
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straightaway on prepurposive motives arising in our consciousness, without
any maxim. The Kantian theory requires the stronger premise that whenever
we act on intentions formed voluntarily through decision (or whenever we
perform what Aquinas would call a ‘‘human action’’), we are implicitly
endorsing the motives incorporated into our purposes as reasons for future
action in similar circumstances. Korsgaard clarifies this in her response to
Nagel: we ‘‘are committed to making the same decision on some range of
possible occasions.’’180 This means that in deciding, we endorse some reason
for action that is more than a singular prescription. Call this the Kantian
Principle of Action (KPA): voluntary action entails ‘‘commitment’’ to a
practical reason.
Note that the sense of ‘‘commitment’’ involved here is a fairly thin one:
it is normative because it implies a prima facie reason for future action, a
consideration that is in principle repeatable. This is weaker than the kind
of identity-conferring ‘‘commitment’’ that is essential to what Korsgaard
calls181 ‘‘practical identity’’ (see chapter 11, section 2.3), which is also the
commitment involved in volitional caring (see chapter 13). ‘‘Commitment’’
in this stronger sense is not implied by every voluntary action. Some evidence for the Kantian principle can be found by introspective investigation
of voluntary action, for we find that in the intention-forming decision,
‘‘the ego sides spontaneously’’ with motivating inclinations or emotions.182
Korsgaard argues that KPA is implicit in the practical point of view: ‘‘It is
from within the deliberative perspective that we see our desires as providing
suggestions which we may take or leave.’’183 This can be strengthened into
the claim that we have to see ourselves as agent causes of our decisions,184 but
KPA in itself does not include this metaphysical postulate.
Together, Pink, Kane, Moya, and Korsgaard provide formidable evidence
for the decision-as-agency concept of willing. However, they still fail to
address a remaining fundamental question about the way that acts of ‘‘will’’
in this sense can be motivated. Their approach shows that the purposes for
which we act, as embodied in the network of intentions that guide our acts
(or the narrative descriptions under which our acts are intentional and thus
potentially voluntary as well)185 can be thought of as created by us out of our
prior motives or reasons for acting. Pink speaks of this creation of purpose
as adding motivating force to the prior motives, and this seems plausible.
Moya adds, again convincingly, that the prior reasons that inform the creation of new purposes will have to include, in addition to new facts, our
whole network of past intentions and the pragmatic commitments to particular actions and norms bound up with them. But beyond these formal
observations, these theories tell us virtually nothing about the actual content
or structure of the original motives (aside from past intentions) that we have
at our disposal and what sorts of purposes we can make out of them. On
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their view, this is simply a question of empirical psychology beyond the
boundaries of philosophical theories of agency.
Kane, for example, explains that practical reasons in the ‘‘internalist’’
sense of ‘‘psychological attitudes’’ that can ‘‘play a role in the etiology of
choice or action’’ mean pretty much the same thing as a ‘‘motive’’ that can
be cited in explaining that action or in explaining the formation of the
intention that the action executes.186 But such remarks on the formal role
of reasons and motives constitute an account of ‘‘rational willing’’ only
because willing in this sense concerns merely the formation of intended
purposes out of prior motives, not the nature or generation of these motives
native to human psychology or deriving from individual life experience. So
although decision-as-agency accounts give us a fairly robust concept of willing in comparison to the volitionalist and minimalist concepts, they remain
focused on a motivationally thin function; ‘‘willing’’ in the sense of decisionmaking as a kind of second-order agency still plays no direct role in shaping
what we might call primary motivations (those that do not come from standing
intentions but that inform and help explain the act of forming a particular
intention or creating a given purpose). While the will plays a robust role in
the structure and generation of intentional action, it remains almost entirely
dependent on those primary motive ‘‘inputs’’ (to use Kane’s term) that
make acts of decision possible. In Aquinas, too, while voluntas is clearly a
kind of second-order agency, the motives between whose influences it
moves in forming intentions remain entirely determined by sense appetites,
imagination, habit, and practical reason. Although the will may be an executive agent, it works from a fixed background of motives that only alter over
time as a result of the will’s actions, the experiences these produce, and
changes in external circumstances. This assumption Kane, Pink, Stampe,
Gibson, and Moya seem to share with their volitionalist and minimalist
foes: the concept of the will is defined in terms of action and intention
alone. It can be extended in a general theory of agency including ‘‘autonomous’’ action, but the theory of motivation is a separate question. If there
is any sense of ‘‘will’’ beyond what follows from the structure of agency,
this could only be ‘‘will’’ as an expression for libertarian freedom. A theory
of the will is complete, then, once we have the right theories of action,
autonomy, and moral freedom. It does not require any further phenomenology of human motivation itself. That task, it is assumed, can simply be left
to psychology.
This is the basic assumption that unites what I call (from this point on)
motivationally thin theories of the will. Despite large differences between these
theories, they all treat willing as an operation that can be fully described in
formal metaphysical terms without looking in detail at the psychological
contents of willing, the experienced structures of motives, or their roles in
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what I call the ethos of a person. This phrase is a convenient shorthand for the
whole way a person experiences life; how it is (or is not) meaningful to
him; how his own character and sense of value grow and change over time;
and (in the broadest sense) what kind of ‘‘personality’’ he has. Thin theories
of the will abstract from the question of whether willing in their sense—or
any other—plays any special role in expressing or shaping the ethos of a
person. In other words, they take for granted that the will is (if anything at
all) simply an operation of mind that is to be identified by its unique formal
role in the general structure of intentional action: ‘‘willing’’ is a concept native to
action theory, not the theory of motivation. This is true whether the will is conceived
in ‘‘volitionalist’’ fashion as the formation of a trying, or in the secondorder agency fashion as the formation of an intention to act, or in a libertarian variant of either of these models as election between different possible
tryings, intentions, or decisions as agent-causing intentions, and so on.
On such thin views, the experience of preexisting motives that serve as
inputs for practical deliberation and decision can be called ‘‘appetitive willing,’’ as Kane puts it; but here the term ‘‘will’’ has a totally different sense,
because such prior appetites are regarded as generated by a set of psychological processes that are quite distinct from practical willing. Willing in any
thin sense, such as practical reason and intention formation, is represented
as having at best only an indirect effect on appetitive willing. The thin
concept of willing as the practical process of forming intentions and purposes can be interpreted in more minimalist or more robust ways, with
those conceptions that involve decision-making as second-order agency
being the most robust today. But none of them sees practical willing as
directly involved in controlling, shaping, or forming our motives themselves. If willing is itself motivational, as I argue in the rest of this book,
then even the decision-as-agency model of willing still gives us an incomplete picture, despite its superiority over volitionalist and minimalist
models.
3.4. The Existential Concept of Striving Will
Existentially thick theories of the will, by contrast, hold that willing in its
primary and most important sense is a phenomenon unique to the psychology of persons that is picked out or identified by its special roles in shaping
the ethos of a person, or (for short) its existential functions. ‘‘Willing’’ is not,
then, simply a formal concept of action theory, that is, a concept determined primarily by its metaphysical role. Its metaphysical senses are secondary relative to its primary practical meaning as a special psychological
process with a complex phenomenology and anthropological significance.
In particular, existentially thick theories regard the will as a motivational process

................. 16406$

$CH3

05-23-07 10:56:02

PS

PAGE 79

80

Will as Commitment and Resolve

involved in intention formation and thus as a psychological and ethical concept
(in the broadest sense of this term).
As I argue in the introduction, this rich sense of ‘‘will’’ is still alive in
nonphilosophical or ordinary discourse. For example, in familiar usages,
‘‘will’’ is associated with ‘‘determination,’’ ‘‘diligent purposiveness,’’187 and
making difficult decisions; it signifies a way of focusing one’s energies on
doing something, or inward resolve to pursue a certain course, which is often
especially apparent in the face of adversity. Kane would apparently explain
these as instances of ‘‘striving will,’’ involving an effort to execute an intention
formed by decision on the basis of preexisting motives. But this thin interpretation of striving will in contemporary action theory is inadequate because it implies that all the motivation involved in such an executive effort
is inherited from the preexisting motives in the etiology of the intention.
Instead, the familiar phenomena of ‘‘heroic willing’’ actually suggest the
creation of new motivation and also the reinvigoration and consolidation of existing
motives in the agent. In contrast to Kane’s characterization, the existential
conception of ‘‘striving will’’ emphasizes these twin motive-shaping
functions.
This idea is also found throughout the genre of existential psychology.
For example, Rank’s complaint against Freud is not simply that he excludes
will in the sense of free decision. Rather, Rank focuses on the idea that
volitional strength exhibited in creative initiative is characteristic of the
‘‘normal man.’’188 Thus he defines the will as a motivational faculty: it is
‘‘a positive guiding organization and integration of self ’’ that transcends
‘‘instinctual drives.’’189 This familiar motivational sense of ‘‘volition’’ is not
to be restricted, as Iris Murdoch suggests, ‘‘to cases where there is an immediate straining, for instance occasioned by a perceived duty or principle,
against a large part of preformed consciousness.’’190 The motivational quality named by ‘‘will’’ does not always require an experience of inner tension,
or a phenomenal quality we might describe as an inner ‘‘gritting of mental
teeth,’’ as for example, when Whoopie Goldberg struggles to hand over her
check for $4 million to the Salvation Army nuns in the film Ghost. The
striving will as a source of self-motivation is just as much in evidence when
someone commits himself, without reservation, to doing something he already had other reasons for wanting to do (perhaps joining a team whose
other members already like him) when these predecisional motives were not
by themselves sufficient to motivate his decision. In such cases, the will
adds something new and has reasons independent of prior desires for doing
so. Or so I argue.
As we see in chapter 9, this existential version of striving will has theological roots. For the moment, however, I am only concerned to ask how
such an idea could be framed within the terms of contemporary action
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theory at all. We can outline in a provisional way what it would mean for
there to be essentially volitional motivation that can neither exist outside willed
purposes nor derive from other prior motives that can move the agent without her intending to act on them. ‘‘Motives’’ as action theorists now describe them include such states as desires, emotions, or other pro-attitudes
and internal reasons for acting that are prior or external to the intentions they
motivate; as we have seen, to inform actions, such motives have to be taken
up by decisions and made into purposes for the sake of which we intend to
act. ‘‘Volitional’’ motives, if they exist, would have to have a different, internal relation to decision and intention: they could motivate only in becoming
our purposes. In other words, they would involve a special way of being
motivated to action that always involves taking them up or actively intending to act on them. In this sense, incorporation by decision (or some analogous process), or expression in the agent’s intention, is already built into this
distinctive way of being motivated. By this, I do not mean simply that a volitional
motive has the property of being ‘‘a motive that has become a purpose
through being taken up into an intention by the decision which formed it.’’
Of course, it follows necessarily that any motive with that property also
operates as a purpose in action attempted or planned. Rather, I mean that
there is a kind of motivation distinguished by its experiential structure and
that this motivational structure cannot occur without the ends or goals
envisioned becoming intended purposes of their agent. These motives are
themselves volitional states, because we bring them about in the higherorder resolve to pursue certain goals or to embody these ends as purposes in
our intentions. The resolve involved here, as we shall see, may arise through
a process that is distinct from decision in its ordinary senses of intention
formation or election among options.
This hypothesis can also be framed the other way around, starting from
intentions. The entire decision-as-agency tradition (from Aquinas, through
Scotus and Kant, to the present) has emphasized that intentions are not
simply caused by motives, like one force causing another in an event-causal
mechanism. Thus Hauerwas defends Richard Taylor’s view that an accurate
description of an act must include ‘‘an essential reference to an agent,’’191
because the description requires an intention that exists within ‘‘the agent’s
perspective.’’192 Like our intentions, our motives have being only within the
whole gestalt of our agency; as Hauerwas puts it, ‘‘in moving ourselves as
agents we embody the motives that give our action and ourselves their
peculiar unity and form—in a word, their character.’’193 This explains why
the intentions that we form in response to our motives also shape to some
extent what future motives we will experience.194 It is only an extension of
this idea that present motives are also always partially determined in their
specific content and strength by being ‘‘embodied’’ in intention. If this is
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right, then the power of forming intentions includes the capacity to modify,
mold, or perhaps crystallize prior motives that are always somewhat malleable, or partially indeterminate in some cases. This explains why, as Hauerwas observes in raising a problem for Aristotle’s action theory, ‘‘The end is
seldom determined apart from the consideration of the means necessary to
achieve it,’’ which itself may only be fixed in prohairetic choice.195 Yet if both
the ends at which our motives aim and the specific manner in which they
are directed toward these ends can be fixed or specified in the process of
forming plans of action with particular purposes, perhaps the intentionforming capacity’s power to shape its own motive-inputs can extend even
further in some cases. Perhaps it can form new motivation that need not
depend on prior appetition or emotion at all—motivation that can arise
entirely within intention-forming agency.
If such essentially volitional motivation exists, then ‘‘striving will’’ plays
a direct role in determining both the substantial direction and the strength
of some of the motives on which we act. This contrasts directly with all
the others models of willing we examined, in which we can derive the ends
or purposes of our intentions only from our preexisting motivational set.
On these views, we can perhaps indirectly alter our motivational set through
our actions but we cannot directly generate new motivation in the process
of forming intentions to act for some purpose. For reasons explained in the
introduction, I call these volitional states in which the motivation is directly
generated by the striving will ‘‘projective motives,’’ or ‘‘states of projective
motivation.’’ I hope not only to show that projective motivation exists but
also to make clear why it plays certain crucial existential roles that explain
its significance in our lives.
Thomas Pink comes closest to this idea of projective motivation when
he suggests that we do build up our own motives in one sense by reinforcing
or adding to the motivating power of the prior motives on which we decide
to act. Pink sees this especially in the phenomena of resolve or determination to stick to future intentions, in which we experience a strengthening
of our initial motivation. As he says, decisions control future actions in a
direct or ‘‘essentially non-manipulative’’ fashion196 by ‘‘perpetuating the
force of the considerations that have already motivated it.’’197 But Pink does
not see that for this to be possible, the will must be more than the faculty
of decision or the intention-forming module of the mind. For the abstract
function of forming intentions does not by its mere form determine anything about how strongly or in what different ways we may be motivated to pursue
our intended goals. As we’ll see below, in most traditional theories of motivation, it was held that both the mode and the strength of our motivation
to pursue our intended purposes are always a direct function of the kinds
and degrees of ‘‘motive pull’’ present in the preexisting motives out of
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which our purposes were formed. If projective motivation is possible, then
this is false.
So the existentialist should agree with Pink that in ‘‘ordinary psychology,’’ the decision-making by which we form intentions to act and apply
reasons to plan future actions itself counts as a special type of intentional
action. But for Pink, this action of the will is motivated simply by practical
judgments about the desirability of ends; willing derives from prior ‘‘desiderative’’ or ‘‘rational’’ motives, or some combination of the two, as in familiar classical and medieval accounts. Though decisions form purposes that
may not be completely determined by preexisting motives, decisions still
do not directly affect the prior motives on which they depend. Though
Pink allows that ‘‘one can form intentions that are not accompanied by any
conviction that what is intended is desirable’’ or that are not explained by
practical judgment about reasons to act, in his view this happens only in
deviant cases: ‘‘the core function of intention formation is to apply or execute our practical judgments about how we should act.’’198 This is where
the new existentialist dissents. For her, the ‘‘will’’ can do more than form a
reason-considering decision to act in some definite way or other; in addition, it includes the capacity to generate its own native form of motivation
that is different from all the prior motives that we know as generated by
instinct, inclination, and evaluative judgment about our good, which also
influence our decisions.
It is important to emphasize that what I am calling here the ‘‘existential
concept’’ of striving will does not necessarily include or depend on a libertarian, agent-causal, or otherwise incompatibilist theory of the freedom required for moral responsibility. Any complete existential conception of
moral freedom must include such incompatibilist conditions and a nonMolinist account of libertarian freedom and autonomy. But as I make clear
in chapter 11, section 3, the question of libertarian freedom can usefully
be bracketed and postponed for future work, since the idea of projective
motivation is not in itself a libertarian concept. If the will is free in the
libertarian sense, this will doubtless be part of any full explanation of why
it can play such a central role in shaping our life-narrative. And it is easy
to see in this light how the striving will (in our existential sense) could so
often be conflated with libertarian freedom and thus eventually with the act
of decision in which freedom seems to rest in the process of forming intentions and acting. But to understand the will’s existential functions in human
life, we have to know about its psychological character, including the structure of motivation unique to it, and not only about its freedom. Thus when
the will is reduced simply to a faculty of free decision or free intention
formation, we lose sight of much of its existential significance for the ethos
of personal agents.
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The Next Steps
Of course, I have not yet shown that projective motivation as outlined here
is possible or that there is any evidence in favor of thickening the decisionas-agency concept of willing to include motivation-generating powers as
well. We have only located the crucial point where the existential concept
of the heroic or striving will departs from contemporary accounts in analytic action theory. The evidence in favor of the existential concept is the
theme of the next chapters, in the following way.
First, in chapter 4, I argue that Plato’s concept of desire as eros sets the
basic paradigm for most later Western philosophical models of motivation
in general, including Aristotle’s notion of ‘‘rational appetite.’’ In chapter 5,
I refer to Aristotle in distinguishing three types of desire conforming to
Plato’s general schema and distinguish the ‘‘formal egoism’’ of Aristotle’s
psychology from traditional forms of material egoism, whose paradoxes
Aristotle’s eudaimonism avoids. However, as I argue in chapters 6 and 7, a
rigorous reconstruction of Aristotle’s eudaimonist account of human motivation reveals similar paradoxes in the relation between virtue and happiness. I argue that if something like Aristotle’s virtue ethics is true, then not
all motivation can have the form of ‘‘desire’’ as described in classical Greek
accounts and in Aristotle’s own psychology. In chapter 8, I canvas several
possible responses to this existential critique of eudaimonism and argue
that they all fail to resolve the fundamental problem; thus virtue still requires projective motivation.
In chapter 9, I explain what projective motivation means in more detail,
starting from the paradigm case of divine creativity as it was conceived in
the Neoplatonic tradition leading to existential theology. I then lay out the
formal structure of projective motivation seen in this paradigm case and
offer several plausible illustrations of this phenomenon in human experience (in addition to the virtuous motives and practices already discussed in
chapters 7 and 8). Chapter 10 then argues that we also see evidence of
projective motivation in the phenomena of radical evil as opposed to the
eudaimonist model of vice as ignorance or akrasia. The better understanding
of ‘‘strength of will’’ afforded by the existential model leads into chapter
11, which argues that Duns Scotus rejects the eudaimonist approach for
what is the first clearly projective account of moral motivation. Likewise,
Kant’s ethics and moral psychology require a limited form of projective
motivation. Although I think the ‘‘will to justice’’ as understood by Scotus
and Kant provides strong evidence for the existential model against eudaimonism, I still argue that Kant conceives our volitional capacities far too
narrowly—a problem that can be solved only by articulating other possible
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non-deontic grounds for projecting ends. This thesis is defended again in
chapter 13, which argues that we need to accept the projective model of
the striving will to make sense of the crucial phenomenon of existential commitment, and in chapter 14, where I develop an account of the main grounds
for commitment to ends.
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The Erosiac Structure of Desire
in Plato and Aristotle

Overview. This chapter begins by explaining how an investigation of
the Greek ‘‘erosiac’’ model of motivation supports the main argument
for the existential conception of the striving will. The sketch of projective motivation given at the end of chapter 3 can be filled out by
contrast with the conception of desire developed in Plato’s moral
psychology, which is then incorporated into Aristotle’s eudaimonism.
The focus in sections 2 and 3 of this chapter is on themes from
Plato’s Lysis, Meno, Republic, and Symposium that should be accessible to
general readers. Readers interested only in the concepts extracted
from these texts that are used in the book’s main argument for the
existential view can focus on sections 2.4 and 3.2.
1. Toward an Existential Theory of Motivation
1.1. The Transmission Principle: A Problem in the Theory of Motivation
The previous chapter concluded with the suggestion that the existential
concept of the will as a form of second-order agency in Pink’s sense involves not only deliberation and decision-making but also a distinct kind
of striving that generates new motivation either in setting new purposes or
in executing a standing intention or plan. As I argued, this is distinct from
striving in the sense of ‘‘trying’’ to carry out a formed intention, where the
motivation for such an effort is entirely derivative of the motivation for
forming the intention in the first place. Now, this existential concept of
willing challenges not only the motivationally thin concept of the will that
underlies all the conceptions of volition in contemporary action theory, but
also the various models of human motivation that underlie this thin concept
86
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of willing. In fact, it is reasonable to regard the thin concept, which conceives volition in terms of ‘‘practical willing’’ in Kane’s sense, as a natural
outcome of the main models of motivation in the history of Western philosophy. This is explained by the following historical hypothesis: in their
earliest forms, the main models of motivation that have influenced Western
moral psychology all predate and condition the development of executiveagency accounts of the will in late antiquity and early medieval philosophy,
and the more sophisticated conceptions of decision and practical deliberation developed in contemporary action theory and theories of practical reason, respectively.1 If this is right, then there is an important sense in which
our conceptions of the ‘‘volitional’’ processes of intention formation and
practical reasoning are controlled by deep prior assumptions about human
motivation—assumptions that often do not surface in action theory. Some
theory of motivation is genealogically prior to any theory of the will as an
element in human agency, even if the latter theory does not discuss motivation directly at all.
For example, as we saw in chapter 2, the main alternative models in
contemporary action theory all presuppose what I will call the Transmission
principle (TP): when we have formed intentions to act, our motivation to
pursue our intended purposes inherits both (1) all its strength and (2) all
its intentional direction and content immediately from prior psychological
states that are either (a) already motivating in their own right (such as
desires) or (b) motivating when combined with these (such as beliefs). The
difference between such prior states and the motivation involved in intending to act for a given purpose is simply that the former can be experienced
as motives (or as parts of motives) without actually intending to act on
them. To mark this, let us call these psychological attitudes that incline us
to form intentions ‘‘prepurposive motives’’ (or PPMs). For example, on the
basis of a desire for revenge or an emotion of resentment, we might form
an intention to harm someone in such a way that he (and others) will know
the harm comes intentionally from us. Our motive to act on this intention
draws its content and strength from these prior motives: the intended result
will satisfy our desire or perhaps express our emotion. Now TP can be
restated as follows: volition (including decision and its other forms) does
not generate any new motivation; it only transmits motivation from PPMs
into the intended purposes and into efforts to enact those intentions. Or,
equivalently, our intended purposes derive all their motivational power and
direction from prior motives in our ‘‘internal set,’’ as Bernard Williams
famously called our standing psychic repertoire of PPMs.2 In such models,
which find their clearest modern precedent in David Hume’s moral psychology, we cannot generate new motivation directly in the process of forming intentions and setting their goals or in trying to carry them out. At
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most, we extend existing desires to new cases or clarify what we already
have internal reason to do by acquiring new descriptive beliefs or learning
that some of our former beliefs were false.3
Although theories of motivation vary widely in contemporary moral psychology, TP is a central element in virtually all of them. For example, it
underlies the common view that we act on our strongest desires—a view
that Alfred Mele has restated in more rigorous form as the theory that we
act on our strongest ‘‘buffer-free’’ desire for an action seen as within our
power.4 Mele’s account presupposes the crucial distinction between motives
and intentions. As we saw in chapter 3, intention in contemporary action theories refers to the first-personal understanding of what we are doing or planning to do that makes our bodily movements into an action as opposed to
mere behavior—and on some accounts, intentions are formed by decisions.
We always act under a certain description or with a certain aspect of our
behavior as our intentional object: for example, ‘‘walking into the store to
get a soda’’ rather than ‘‘trying to avoid someone on the sidewalk coming
toward me.’’ As this example illustrates, intentions must include at least the
proximate end toward which the action is consciously directed in order to
pick out the right aspect or description of the behavior which is essential
to the act.
Motives, by contrast, are all assumed to be prepurposive: they are not in
themselves formed intentions that explain actual or planned movements of
the mind or body, causing these to count as actions; rather, they typically
lie behind the possible formation of many different intentions and explain
why the agent fixes on the ends involved in his specific intentions to act
this or that way. As Steven Sverdlik argues in a helpful article, motives
correspond to the beginning or major premise in a practical-syllogism reconstruction of our action, which is why we think ‘‘that motives are usually
more general in content than the resulting intention,’’ and that ‘‘a given
intention (or action) could be the result of a number of different motives.’’5
Sverdlik observes that the question about what ‘‘motives’’ are has rarely
been addressed in ‘‘English-language philosophy’’ because ‘‘Action theory
now largely concentrates on intention, desire, belief, and the (usually undefined) concept of motivation.’’ He begins with six ‘‘relatively uncontroversial’’ propositions about motives:
1. They are ‘‘actual psychological states or events.’’
2. They are ‘‘at least part of the cause of an action or the decision
to act.’’
3. While they precede an action, motives ‘‘typically continue to
be present or operative as the act takes place’’ [this is Sverdlik’s
weaker version of TP].
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4. They are mentioned typically to ‘‘explain why the agent acted
as she did.’’
5. From the agent’s viewpoint, her motives specify ‘‘what is of
value about her action’’ (or what valuable end it realizes).
6. ‘‘The two main types of motive seem to be emotion and
desire.’’6
Sverdlik then argues that if we consider them from within the Davidsonian belief-desire model of action, ‘‘It seems clear that motives belong to the
conative, desiring side of the story,’’ since beliefs do not seem to be ‘‘even
a part of the motive for an action.’’ Factual beliefs ‘‘concerning means,
consequences, or specifications of general desires’’ acquire motivating force
only when they are connected to some desire. Of course, ‘‘internalists’’ have
defended the idea that some evaluative beliefs do constitute motives to act,
but Sverdlik replies that externalists about moral motivation can hold that
the motive is ‘‘some separate state of desire which is entailed by the belief ’’
about one’s obligations.7 This is roughly to say that the externalists do not
need anything more than a desire that follows from the evaluative judgment
it involves.8 Similarly, ‘‘the emotions we regard as motives characteristically
give rise to desires to act in ways related to the content of the emotions’’;9
for example, fear gives rise to the desire to flee from the relevant danger.
If this is right, then beliefs and emotions become motivating only by
way of desires, and the best hypothesis is that the motive is the ‘‘ultimate
desire’’ from which the end in our intention is derived.10 And since ‘‘the
identity of an action rests partly on what intention it incorporates,’’ on all
the leading views about act individuation, ‘‘all intentional actions (or all
actions under the descriptions in which they are intentional) have a motive.’’11 In sum, on Sverdlik’s view, which is fairly representative of the
current literature, certain beliefs and emotions may cause desires, and these
in turn motivate the formation of intentions, which get their ends from at
least one (though possibly more than one) ultimate desire(s): ‘‘intentions are
formed as a way of pursuing the agent’s goals or desires.’’12 Intentions thus
derive their motivational direction and strength from prior terminal desires
and emotions, as TP says. And ‘‘motive’’ and ‘‘desire’’ are practically synonymous in Sverdlik’s account, since both mean whatever plays the relevant
functional role in the identity of the intention and action.
This brief look into contemporary motivation theory shows why the
debate between neo-Humean and neo-Kantian views on moral motivation
may shed light on whether TP should be taken for granted. More generally,
the correctness of TP is really central, though often unrecognized, in current debates between externalist and internalist positions on motivation.
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But a discussion of this literature is beyond the scope of this book. I postpone it in part because it will be easier to evaluate this debate once the
existential conception of striving will is clear.
1.2. The Existential Core Argument
It is now evident why the existential account of striving will sketched in
chapters 2 and 3 cannot be defended without refuting TP. This in turn
requires showing that the dominant models of motivation in our philosophical tradition are incomplete, since they leave out forms of motivation
experienced in our intended purposes that do not trace in any direct way
to prior motivating states. The most likely way to show this would be to
find purposes or intentions (on which some agent acts or tries to act) whose
motivational structure is recognizably different from all prepurposive motivational states and which never originates outside of purposes (i.e., never in a
PPM). In other words, if volitional motivation generated in the striving
will is possible, its intentional structure should be different from those of
PPM states—even though all motives share a conative ‘‘direction of fit’’ (in
which the world conforms to the end envisioned) that contrasts with the
cognitive direction of fit characteristic of beliefs (in which the content believed conforms to the world).
But traditional philosophical accounts of human motivation do not recognize or distinguish any motives other than PPM states in the explanation
of human intentions. This is why I said at the end of chapter 3 that if
experience reveals the existence of such essentially purposive motives, which
arise within decisions and decision-like processes, then we will need radically to rethink our traditional models. This suggests a way to proceed in
justifying the existential model. If we can find any distinguishing features
of recognized prepurposive motives other than the world-content direction
of fit that is shared by all motive-states, then we could look for any motivational experiences contrasting with these features as possible cases of projective motivation.
Ideally, this approach calls for a complete survey of prepurposive motives as a preliminary task: we (1) start from as complete as possible a
conception of PPM states; (2) explain what it would be for some state of
motivation to differ in intentional structure from all these PPMs despite
sharing the same world-content fit; and (3) provide evidence that various
motive-states with this different intentional structure exist or need to be
postulated to explain other evident psychological phenomena. But the first
task as written—namely, developing a complete account of prepurposive
states that are both experienced as intrinsically motivating and can inform
our decisions, purposes, or specific intentions to act—is unmanageably
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large. It has proven difficult enough in recent work in moral psychology to
counsel a more limited approach.
Hence, rather than simply surveying all the different sorts of states that
can counts as PPMs on different theories of motivation and trying to evaluate what is common to them all, I will start instead with the particular
theory of prepurposive motivation that is both the richest in content and
historically the most influential: that is, the one I call (borrowing from Alan
Soble) the ‘‘erosiac’’ model of Plato and Aristotle.13 This theory focuses
on what Wayne Davis calls ‘‘appetitive desire,’’ which connotes ‘‘cravings,
yearning, longing and urge.’’14 This gives us a distinguishing feature of PPM
states apart from their world-to-content direction of fit:
The Weak Erosiac Thesis (WET): all prepurposive motive-states have the general ‘‘erosiac’’ structure of an appetitive lack-seeking-completeness.
By itself, WET leaves open the possibility that some of our motives for
intentional action might not be ‘‘erosiac’’ in experienced form because they
might not be PPMs. But since TP eliminates the possibility that the process
of decision or conscious formation of intentional purposes can add anything new to the content or strength of the agent’s existing PPMs, such
purposive motives must inherit the erosiac structure of their prepurposive
sources. Hence TP together with WET entails
The Strong Erosiac Thesis (SET): all motives operative in intentional action
have the general ‘‘erosiac’’ structure of lack-seeking-completeness.
Starting with WET as a working hypothesis thus gives us a way to distinguish projective motives from PPMs and to refute TP. If we can show that
some of our purposive motives operative in intentional action are not erosiac in form, then we falsify SET and thus also refute TP. Here is the
argument as a natural deduction:
1. Weak erosiac thesis (WET) & transmission principle (TP) ⇒
strong erosiac thesis (SET) [by def. of WET, TP, SET]
2. There are some actual cases of non-erosiac purposive motivation ⇒ ¬ SET [by def. of SET]
3. ¬ SET ⇒ ¬(WET & TP) [from 1 by modus tollens]
4. There are some actual cases of non-erosiac purposive motivation [premise supported by phenomenological analysis of examples
and thought experiments]
5. ¬ SET [from 2 and 4 by modus ponens]
6. ¬ (WET & TP) [from 3 and 5 by modus ponens]
7. WET [premise supported inductively by familiar prepurposive
motives, e.g., D1–D3 desires]
8. ¬ TP [from 6 and 7 by elimination]
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The erosiac hypothesis concerning PPMs makes it conceptually possible to
define projective motivation in a way that contrasts with PPMs and gives
us premise 7.
Thus, in my three-step sequence, the modified first task is to explain the
erosiac theory of prepurposive motives, which is introduced in this chapter
and developed in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 9 completes the second task
by explaining how projective motivation can have an intentional structure
distinct from the erosiac structure of PPMs. All the other chapters contribute to the third task, which is to give evidence for premise 4 in this core
argument. Chapters 7 and 8 really develop an indirect argument for premise
4 through a critique of psychological eudaimonism. The later chapters support premise 4 directly by examples.
An objection to this whole strategy of argument would arise if there
were any richer accounts of prepurposive motivation than those in the eudaimonist tradition. For then non-erosiac motive-states might still be prepurposive rather than essentially purposive. But it is fairly clear that, aside
from Kant, most philosophers in the modern period offer sparse accounts
of motivation that are more impoverished than the Greek erosiac model.
Hence evidence that the richer Greek account is incomplete is automatically
evidence of the even greater incompleteness of these sparser modern models. On the other hand, while Kant begins to see the lacuna in the Greek
erosiac model, his own alternative does not recognize everything the Greek
model leaves out. Thus an existential moral psychology recognizes a range
of possible human motives extending beyond the conjunction of erosiac
PPMs and moral motives in the deontic sense. It stands on the opposite
end of the spectrum from the most reductive material egoist accounts of
human motivation.15
2. Plato’s Erosiac Model of Motivation
2.1. Introduction to Orexis
As this outline of my strategy indicates, one of the central tasks of this
book is to critique a certain view of human motivation that originates in
classical Greek philosophy and dominates scholastic thought up to the late
Middle Ages, when it begins to give way alternately to the more reductive
theories of Hobbes and the empiricists and to the richer conceptions of
Scotus and Kant. This classical view emphasizes that in every psychological
state that can motivate action, the agent experiences what we might call a
teleological pull: the agent is ‘‘moved’’ toward the desired end as if drawn by a
magnetic force within it. The notion of pull or attraction is more basic
than the notion that the state of perfection according to our nature is the
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‘‘prime mover’’ in all our motives: this eudaimonist idea is built on the
more basic concept of psychological magnetism. Eudaimonism applies this
magnetic metaphor to all motive-states, even in brute impulses or drives
arising directly from animal instinct. On this view, as Ben Vedder summarizes, ‘‘desire is experienced as a propensity or inclination which is directed
towards something which is still absent’’ or lacking.16
This notion of a teleological pull seems to be contained in the Latin
words from which we get our primary senses of ‘‘desire’’ in English. For
example, Latin lexicons commonly define desidero as ‘‘to long for, to wish
for greatly, to miss’’17 or, even more clearly, as ‘‘to long for what is absent
or lost, to wish for; to miss, find a lack of.’’18 The related word, desiderium,
often has the more specific sense of ‘‘grief for the absence or loss of ’’ some
person or thing.19 This connotation of missing something, or being in a
state in which the absence of lack of some good is salient, seems to go back to
the common senses of the ancient Greek word transliterated as orexis, which
standard lexicons such as Liddell-Scott-Jones define as ‘‘a longing or yearning
after a thing.’’20 In Greek philosophy, a state of orexis implies an intentional
attitude toward what is wanted. As Nussbaum explains, ‘‘orexis’’ is ‘‘a ‘reaching out for’ an object; and all forms of orexis see their object in a certain
way, supplying the animal with a ‘premise of the good.’ ’’21 In fact, Nussbaum argues that Aristotle largely coined the word ‘‘orexis’’ to help show
that every kind of motive that explains ‘‘goal-directed animal movement’’
shares a property that distinguishes it from ‘‘a purely mechanical response.’’22 This is the property of responding to a perceived ‘‘lack of selfsufficiency or incompleteness.’’23 Nussbaum is correct that this makes animal movement more ‘‘active’’ than movement by the influx of physical
force.24 However, as an essentially psychic cause irreducible to physiological
processes, orexis is still passive in a different but crucial sense: we are drawn
toward the goal by its prospect of completing us when we attain it.25
The psychic passivity of such teleological magnetism is seen in the relation between orexis and pathos, whose species were typically interpreted by
the Greeks as a kind of force of appeal flowing from the desired object,
present or absent, either to the eyes or to the mind (nous).26 Plato’s discussion of motivational terms in the Cratylus is significant here, even if it is
more philosophical than etymological:
Nor is there any difficulty about epithumia (desire), for this name was
evidently given to the power that goes (iousa) into the soul (thumos).
And thumos has its name from the raging (thusis) and boiling of the
soul. The name himeros (longing) was given to the stream (rhous) which
most draws the soul; [420a] for because it flows with a rush (hiemenos)
and with a desire for things and thus draws the soul on through the
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impulse of its flowing, all this power gives it the name of himeros. And
the word pothos (yearning) signifies that it pertains not to that which
is present, but to that which is elsewhere (allothi pou) or absent, and
therefore the same feeling which is called himeros when its object is
present, is called pothos when it is absent. And erôs (love) is so called
because it flows in (esrei) from without, and this flowing is not inherent
in him who has it, [420b] but is introduced through the eyes.27
I am not concerned with the accuracy of Plato’s etymologies but rather
with their implication that to be moved is passively to undergo attraction, to
be affected by something external, though not in the way that physical
forces buffet our bodies. Motivation occurs in us, but it is not something
the agent actively undertakes or makes. It flows from the external good
through the agent and back to its source, drawing the agent with it like a
boat on a stream. And when this kind of motivation aims at an object not
immediately possessed, it is pothos, that is, a state of pathos or yearning for
what the agent lacks.
As Thomas Gould notes in his discussion of pathos, ‘‘We no longer think
of strong emotions as outside agents, but the Greeks had always done so.’’28
This is true not only of rage and raw sexual lust but also of calmer experiences of attraction, according to Gould: ‘‘Eros, also poetic inspiration, are
things that happen to us, not things we do.’’ Plato and his followers see
most experiences of pathos as negative rather than romantic or inspiring,
since they involve reason surrendering to lower parts of the soul.29 This
explains why Lucretius, like other Epicureans, would judge that sexual eros
is like a disease. Nussbaum summarizes his argument as follows:
Lovers inflict pain on one another (IV.1079–83). They do so because they perceive their desire for the other person as a source of
pain—a wound or ulcerous sore in the self (IV.1068, 1069, 1070).
Their condition of neediness is experienced as an open hole, a lack
of self-sufficiency, accompanied by weakness . . . in sexual intimacy,
they seek to heal these wounds—or, as Lucretius also puts it, to
extinguish the fire that burns them (1086–87), thus achieving a state
of self-sufficiency.30
Thus the lack model implies that experiences of sexual eros and other
pathē will never be pleasant in themselves. Yet, as I will argue, Plato retains
the general passive form of magnetic attraction even for motive-states involving practical reason and discernment of the Good. As Iris Murdoch—
one of Plato’s greatest students—puts it, ‘‘Good is the magnetic center
towards which love naturally moves. . . . Love is the tension between the
imperfect soul and the magnetic perfection which is conceived as lying
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beyond it.’’31 Although Plato did not make orexis into a term of art, his
general sense of eros is clearly its forerunner.32 To avoid confusion, such
being-drawn-toward or teleological pull as a general feature in the experience of motivation obviously needs to be distinguished from specifically
sexual attraction. To mark this distinction, Alan Soble helpfully invents the
adjective ‘‘erosiac’’ for the former, while reserving ‘‘erotic’’ for the latter.33
But in distinguishing eros and agapē, Soble’s characterization of erosiac love
emphasizes its being object-focused and property-based: ‘‘The central claim
of the first view [the eros tradition] is that something about y is central in
accounting for x’s love for y.’’34 In my view, this is not what distinguishes
erosiac motivation; rather, its distinctive character lies in being caused by
the agent’s perception of properties in the object that are attractive in any
sense implying an absence that the agent is drawn to fill by appropriation
of that object. On this approach, all erosiac motivation will be propertybased, but it need not follow that all property-based love is erosiac. For the
latter to follow, we would need the additional premise that the only properties that can ground love are ones that ‘‘attract’’ in the relevant sense.
For example, in Plato’s aporetic discussion of friendship in the Lysis—an
early dialogue that clearly influenced Aristotle—Socrates puzzles over how
one good person can be friends with another, since similar or ‘‘like’’ individuals apparently have nothing to offer their partner that he lacks or needs.
This is the origin of a long dispute about whether friends should be similar
in qualities and interests or different yet complementary, since ‘‘opposites
attract.’’35 The value of complementarity derives from conceiving goodness
itself in a proto-eudaimonistic sense as whatever is required to be complete
beyond all need:
But, you will say, the like man is not a friend to the like man, but the
good will be a friend to the good, in so far as he is good, not in so
far as he is like. . . .
And I should rejoin, Will not the good man, in so far as he is
good, be found to be sufficient for himself? . . .
And if he does not want anything he won’t feel regard for anything
either. . . .
And what he does not feel regard for, he cannot love.36
It is interesting that Aristotle tried to resolve this classical puzzle about
why a good person needs or even enjoys friends without rejecting its central
claim about human motivation: he proposes that friends are external goods
that even the virtuous person requires for happiness—not for the pleasure
or advantage that they may supply but rather to provide occasions for active
expression of virtuous desires—which is central to the individual’s completeness.37 It would be a mistake, then, to say that Aristotle’s account of
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noble love for friend is simply the diametric opposite of friendship in the
Lysis as mere egoistic concern for the friend as ‘‘useful.’’38
In the Lysis, Socrates is explicit in holding that any form of desire requires some kind of incompleteness: he states that body or soul ‘‘is friendly
with good [agathon, the helpful] on account of the presence of evil [kakon,
the harmful].’’39 In other words, desire requires an absence in our well-being
that is harmful to us, and our desire will be for the good that can fill this
absence and eliminate the harm it represents. Of course, it follows from
this that sheer harm to our well-being, or the opening of some new lack or
want in us, can never be an end we intend for its own sake: thus ‘‘For
nothing, I’m sure, can be friendly with evil.’’40 This thesis, which I call the
Platonic principle of motivation, is also central to the opening argument in the
Meno: nobody ‘‘wishes to be miserable and wretched,’’ and so nobody desires
things they know will be bad for them.41 The one serious challenge to this
principle in Plato’s corpus—namely, Callicles’ argument that a noble person will let his appetites ‘‘become as large as possible,’’ since ‘‘those who
have no need of anything are virtually dead’’—is rejected on the basis of
the leaky sieve analogy.42
Socrates appears to qualify his analysis later in the Lysis: since desires
themselves are intermediate between good and evil (as the Symposium will
explain in more detail later), they could not exist in a world where evil (i.e.,
harm or loss of well-being) was extinct, so there must be ‘‘some other cause
of loving and being loved.’’ Yet he still holds the erosiac thesis: ‘‘that . . .
which feels desire, feels desire for that of which it is in want.’’43 He simply
recognizes that a good can be perceived as lacking in an agent in another
way besides resulting from some contingent harm (like sickness or robbery).
What naturally belongs to a person she will tend to want or perceive as lacking
when she does not actually possess it, just as if something she owns had
been stolen: ‘‘that which by nature belongs to us, it has been found necessary for us to love.’’44 Although the dialogue then ends without a final
explanation of how friendship is possible, Socrates hints at a solution implied by the foregoing analysis: ‘‘if there is a difference between that which
belongs to us and that which is like us,’’ we may be able to say ‘‘what is
meant by a friend.’’45 In other words, in order to give an erosiac account of
friendship, we first need a full account of our nature, which will show what
our eudaimonia requires. We might then be able to see why friends are an
essential part of our good, that is, why they naturally belong to us, why we
feel incomplete without them, as if something were missing or lost—even
if they are also ‘‘similar’’ to us in key respects. This again suggests that the
account of desire in the Lysis is not meant to be materially egoistic; Socrates
is not endorsing the Sophist conception of all motivation as aiming at one’s
own pleasure, power, wealth, and honor.
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In his insightful analysis of Socratic ethics, Terence Irwin explains these
ideas concerning human motivation in terms of Socrates’ ‘‘eudaemonism.’’
In the Euthydemus, as at the end of the Charmides, Socrates endorses ‘‘rational
eudaemonism,’’ that is, the thesis that all rationally justified actions pursue
only the agent’s happiness for its own sake and everything else for the sake
of this happiness.46 But, as we see in the Lysis, he also endorses the psychological thesis that there must be ‘‘primary objects of love’’ for any motivation to begin, and the Euthydemus suggests that only happiness ‘‘meets the
conditions laid down in the Lysis for being a primary object of love.’’47 Thus
Socrates also endorses ‘‘psychological eudaemonism,’’ which implies that
virtue is also chosen because it is best for the agent.48 This is also required,
Irwin suggests, for Socrates’ arguments in the Laches and Charmides that ‘‘wisdom is sufficient for happiness’’: this conclusion will follow only if ‘‘intentional choice of the lesser apparent good is impossible,’’ which in turn holds
only if psychological eudaimonism is true.49
This is my rephrasing of Irwin’s analysis: what he actually says is that
psychological eudaimonism (PE) entails that akrasia is impossible;50 and if
this is true, then ‘‘Socrates is right to ignore the non-cognitive aspects of
each virtue,’’ that is, to equate virtue with wisdom.51 But I think Irwin gives
too strong a definition of PE. On his definition, the doctrine is that people’s
desires are always rational in the sense that they desire whatever it seems to
them will maximize their own eudaimonia. This may be the doctrine that
Socrates’ arguments in several early dialogues require. But a weaker version
of PE holds only that a person’s motives all ultimately aim at something he
apprehends as a good for himself—though perhaps not as his greatest possible good. This weaker version of PE is compatible with akrasia, but it still
includes ‘‘the psychological eudaemonist view that all desires are focused
on the good’’ of the agent, which Irwin rightly finds in Gorgias 467–68.52
Thus weak PE may better represent Plato’s view in the middle dialogues,
which arguably allow for some kind of akrasia yet still maintain the fundamental erosiac thesis that an agent’s desires are for something he perceives
as fulfilling a need or potentially supplying something he lacks. On this
view, any desired object, even if its value appears to be comparatively lesser,
must in itself seem to bring the agent closer to completion or to that state
of self-sufficiency (autarkeia) in which we have everything we could want.53
2.2. Three Types of Desire in the Republic
In contemporary literature, this feature of desire is so familiar that it is
often assumed without question to be the form of motivation as such, and
so it hardly ever becomes a theme for reflection. But in ancient moral psychology it was a frequent topic. Following the analysis in the Lysis, Plato
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developed this idea in two well-known discussions of desires as experiences
of ‘‘lack’’ that anticipate objects that would supply what is lacking in the
desiring subject and thus restore her natural equilibrium. The first occurs
near the beginning of Socrates’ argument for a tripartite division of the soul
in the Republic :
What then, said I, of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally,
and again, consenting and willing . . . ? Will you not say, for example,
that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws towards its embrace what it wishes to accrue to it, or
again, insofar as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods assent
to itself thereon as if someone put the question, striving towards its
attainment?54
Socrates classifies ‘‘will’’ (wish and choice, boulēsis and prohairesis) with
desire here, but for the moment I am concerned only with the intentional
structure of desire that he identifies. Each desire has an intentional correlate
that is essential to its meaning: ‘‘Each desire in itself is of that thing only
of which it is its nature to be.’’55 From this it follows that ‘‘mere thirst’’ has
‘‘mere drink’’ as its object, whereas only a qualified version of this basic
desire, such as ‘‘hot thirst,’’ specifically desires ‘‘cold drink’’ as its object.56
Although this distinction between pure and qualified desires and their
pure and qualified correlates has seemed contentious to some commentators
concerned about its role in Socrates’ argument for the division of reason
and desire, it actually points toward an important phenomenological distinction between two kinds of desiderative states, which I will label D1 and
D2. Briefly, D1 includes any unqualified urge that has an intentional object,
when this object is generic and without any cognitive specification, whereas
‘‘preference desires’’ (D2) are qualified versions of such urges, directed onto
an object with a more concrete specification for the agent. Socrates also
insists that a desire for ‘‘good drink’’ rather than for drink as such is a
qualified desire, distinct from the raw impulse.57 But, as Plato argues, the
qualification ‘‘good’’ seems to introduce something new here, because such
an evaluation of the object has a kind of objective force lacking in D2
preferences, in which the qualification of the object as desirable may be
wholly agent-relative. When instead the judgment that X is good is made
in some agent-neutral sense, it makes a claim on others that they should
also see X as good and so possibly desire it. Desires correlated with an
object thought to be good in any such objective sense I will call ‘‘evaluative
desires’’ (labeled D3). By contrast, ‘‘thirst that is just thirst is neither of
much nor little nor good nor bad, nor in a word of any kind.’’58 So qualifications of the desired object by kind concepts take us into states beyond the
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D1 level, either by introducing subjective preferences or by introducing
objective validity claims about goods we should all desire.
Desires of all three types are experienced as a disturbance in or difference
from a state of total satisfaction or bliss; the sense of lacking or falling
short of this state is the desire, which aims at an end that seems to promise
restoration of this state of natural equilibrium. This is clearest with respect to
bodily inclinations in the Philebus, where, as Cynthia Hampton explains, ‘‘In
general, wherever the natural union of the indefinite with the definite is
destroyed within a creature, the result is pain, and when the union is restored, pleasure is produced (32A–B).’’59 Similarly, W. H. Auden writes,
‘‘Animals . . . do not go on quests. They hunt for food or drink or a mate,
but the object of their search is determined by what they already are and
its purpose is to restore a disturbed equilibrium.’’60 On the Platonic view,
human beings do go on quests because they can conceive more remote and
abstract goals that have to be defined in the search for them, since our
common conception of the ideal state is so much more indeterminate. As
Alasdair MacIntyre puts it in his famous reconstruction of Plato’s eudaimonist model, the unity of an individual human life is like that of a quest
story. Personal identity requires
. . . the unity of a narrative embodied in a single human life. To ask
‘‘What is the good for me?’’ is to ask how best I might live out that
unity and bring it to completion. To ask ‘‘What is the good for
man?’’ is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in
common.61
Here the telos of our highest D3 desire is still conceived as a form of
completeness in which the quest terminates, an equilibrium in which our
complete good is achieved. The basic structure of the end thus remains the
same in all three forms of desire.
Of course, in the Meno, Plato famously had Socrates argue that people
can desire only what appears ‘‘good’’ to them (in the sense that it brings
advantage or contributes to their happiness), which seems to imply that
some rational evaluation, whether right or faulty, is implicit in every motivational state.62 Relative to this simplistic analysis, the moral psychology of
the Republic seems to be a clear advance, since it distinguishes the rational
evaluation involved in some desire-states from appetitive states lacking this
element, which intend their objects without a judgment that they are ‘‘good’’
in any objective sense. Thus, as Gary Watson argues in a famous paper on
autonomy, there is a real ‘‘distinction between wanting and valuing,’’ which
is central to Plato’s ethics.63 While ‘‘On Hume’s account, Reason is not a
source of motivation,’’ for Plato, ‘‘the rational part of the soul is not some
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kind of inference mechanism. It is itself a source of motivation. In general
form, the desires of Reason are desires for ‘the Good.’ ’’64
Rational or evaluative desires, in other words, have the D3 structure
briefly sketched above. On Watson’s reading, for Plato there is a necessary
connection between the evaluation and the motivation: ‘‘to think a thing
good is at the same time to desire it (or its promotion),’’ and thus the
values it confers provide ‘‘reasons for action.’’ By contrast, lower kinds of
desire have objects that ‘‘may not be thought good.’’65 Although this way
of putting the contrast tends to suggest that there is no state in between
raw sensitive impulses (D1) and boulēsis, or evaluative desire (D3), the advance on the Meno account is still clear. As Irwin explains, Plato answers
Socrates’ arguments (in the early dialogues) against the possibility of incontinence by explaining ‘‘how action on appetite is intelligible if it is independent of beliefs about the good.’’66 Such actions are intelligible because
human beings, like lower animals, are naturally prone to some pure desires
for rationally unqualified objects: these desires are as self-explanatory as the
rational desire for happiness. As we see in lower animals, action on such
appetitive desires can be intentional without being coordinated by ‘‘the
agent’s conception of an overall good.’’67
In another way, however, the Republic analysis preserves a central part of
the intuition at work in the Meno and Protagoras, namely the idea that desires
of any sort—purely appetitive or rationally qualified—are ‘‘attractions’’
toward something that, insofar as it ‘‘attracts,’’ functions like a ‘‘good’’ recognizable by intellect. In a nonjudgmental sense, then, mere food or nourishment is the ‘‘good’’ for which mere hunger is the desire. The Republic
recasts the Meno principle that every desire is for what is evaluated or represented as good for us into the more basic principle that every desire is for
its correlate ‘‘good’’ and is moved by the thought that this good will satisfy
it. This principle is more inclusive in application since it covers D1 and
D2 states as well as D3 evaluative desires. Thus, although Plato emphasizes
the contrast that Watson highlights between ‘‘valuing’’ and ‘‘desiring’’—or,
more accurately, between rational desires and lower appetites—Plato also
recognizes that they have something in common: every desire has the motivational structure of yearning for an object that promises to satisfy a salient
lack. Thus ‘‘the soul of the thirsty, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing
else than to drink, and yearns for this and its impulse is towards this.’’68 In
general, ‘‘affections,’’ like ‘‘diseases,’’ produce impulses that ‘‘draw and drag’’
the agent toward their end, just as do positive evaluations of some possible
end made by the rational part of the soul.69
One might be tempted to object that Plato meant this analysis to apply
only to lower, instinctive appetites such as hunger and thirst, since he immediately goes on in Republic IV to analyze ‘‘high spirit’’ and reason in different
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terms, and D3 desires require at least some involvement of evaluative cognition or practical judgment. However, as we see in the Symposium, in Socrates’
and Diotima’s speeches, the ‘‘lack structure’’ of desire is explicitly reformulated in order to extend it to motivation by the good as the object of
judgment, or to what I have called D3 states involving objective evaluation
of the conditions of our well-being.
2.3. The Lack Model in the Symposium
The second set of passages presenting the strong erosiac thesis occur in the
last four speeches of Plato’s Symposium. The lack structure of eros is most
obvious in Aristophanes’ myth of sexual desire as unconscious longing for
a state of ‘‘primeval wholeness’’ or primordial bodily oneness with one’s
heterosexual or homosexual correlate.70 Following Agathon, Socrates clarifies this point about the intentionality of love: ‘‘it is the nature of Love to be
the love of somebody. . . .’’71 Moreover, its attitude toward its object is one
of longing: ‘‘Then isn’t it probable, said Socrates, or rather isn’t it certain
that everything longs for what it lacks, and that nothing longs for what it
doesn’t lack?’’ (Symposium 200 a-b).
This implies, contra Agathon’s speech, that love lacks the divine beauty
and happiness that it loves or that it seeks. Yet Socrates’ premise seems to
ignore that we sometimes continue to long for good things such as health
and riches when we already have them. Against these potential counterexamples, Socrates notes that in such cases, ‘‘what you want is to go on having
them, for at the moment you’ve got them whether you want them or not.’’
And since the contingency of fortune and mortal fate deprives us of the
certainty of enjoying such things permanently, ‘‘desiring to secure something
to oneself forever may be described as loving something which is not yet to
hand.’’72 This interpretation of the potential counterexamples has the crucial implication, made explicit in Diotima’s speech, that our true end is a
transcendent one: ‘‘we are bound to long for immortality as well as for the
good—which is to say that Love is a longing for immortality.’’73 For only
in a state of union with divine nature will our longing be fully satisfied.
Thus Plato conceives eudaimonia as an otherworldly end that transcends
human nature.74
We may add a further point here to defend Plato’s analysis. If someone
objects that we must have a desire to possess good things in the present moment
in order to explain our pleasure or happiness in having them right now,
then the premise that we can desire only what we lack can be made counterfactual: to desire X entails that if one lacked X, one would long for it and
be dissatisfied without it. Thus our satisfaction with X in the present moment of possessing it can be explained by our sense that we have avoided the
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desire and sense of ‘‘lack’’ that we would experience in the nearest possible
worlds in which we did not possess X. Although we often speak loosely of
our continuing to desire something simultaneously with having it, Plato can
regard this as an inaccuracy of ordinary language: our happiness is really
due to the (temporary) termination of the desire in the possession or presence
of X, together with the disposition to desire X again should we ever lose it.
This is why Aquinas, following Plato’s logic, conceives ‘‘delight’’ as ‘‘simply
the resting of the appetite in a good,’’75 and holds that the most complete
fulfillment of desire must involve certainty of being unable to lose its object.
The upshot of this analysis is Plato’s most general formula for desire: ‘‘And
therefore, whoever feels a want is wanting something which is not yet to
hand, and the object of his love and of his desire is whatever he isn’t, or
whatever he hasn’t got—that is to say, whatever he is lacking in.’’76 And
from this it easily follows that love itself cannot be or have the beauty that
it desires.
I am not concerned here with the familiar arguments that Socrates’ inference is invalid, because we should distinguish between lacking/possessing
an attribute or property like ‘‘beauty’’ and lacking/possessing a beautiful
object.77 For suppose that sexual attraction to another person’s bodily
beauty in fact aims at something like a certain complex set of intimate
experiences with that bodily form and at the release of physiological tensions which involve pleasurable stimulation and psychological satisfaction.
If this (or some similar complex) is what sexual ‘‘possession’’ of another
person’s bodily beauty means, then it is clearly an experience we can lack in
the relevant sense despite ourselves having physical attributes that might
inspire such a desire in others. What the sexually desiring person lacks is
this tactile experience of another’s beauty;78 having the desire really does
imply lacking the experience it envisions. That this agent-relative property
is (part of ) the usual target of sexual love does not, of course, imply that
every kind of desire for beauty must be agent-relative, so the question of
whether we can desire beauty that we possess can still be raised for nonsexual loves. A complete refutation of Agathon would really require showing
that in every case, the good sought in the love is one that the lover lacks.
Whether Socrates’ refutation of Agathon can be defended this way or
not, it is crucial to see that Socrates’ lack formula is meant to apply to all
recognized forms of human motivation and not just the epithumia, such as
hunger and sexual attraction. Andrew Payne is quite right that in the Symposium, Plato treats eros as a species of epithumia and does not (contra Halperin)
treat it as a kind of rationally evaluative wish (or boulēsis).79 However, the
lack structure found in eros is not regarded by Plato as peculiar to the
epithumia: rather, it is also true of boulēsis and, in general, every form of orexis,
and this is precisely why Plato can speak metaphorically of orektic states like
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the philosopher’s desire for wisdom as if it were a kind of eros. Thus Diotima insists that eros , or love in the more general sense, ‘‘includes every
kind of longing for happiness and the good,’’80 including states that are
clearly not epithumia as defined in the Republic.81 Commenting on this, Payne
writes:
Over the course of Diotima’s speech the focus of eros expands
greatly, but it never loses certain epithumetic qualities. Eros is a selfinterested longing for an object which it lacks, a desire which places
the lover in an asymmetrical relation with the beloved. These epithumetic qualities stand behind the claim that Diotima does not simply
change the subject away from the common meaning of eros to the
rational desire for happiness and the good.82
I agree with the claim that Diotima is not simply equivocating; however,
her main point is precisely that these features of sexual desire, which Payne
calls ‘‘epithumetic qualities,’’ are not limited to distinctively epithumetic appetites after all: rather, they are the formal features of all motivational states,
all forms of orexis. Thus we can talk about the formally ‘‘erosiac’’ structure
of desires without limiting ourselves to lower appetites shared by human
beings and other animals. Still, Socrates’ general formula for desire does
need refinement, because as it stands it would imply that we desire anything
we happen to lack, when in fact only some of these ‘‘absences’’ are salient
and thus only some of them become intentional objects. Diotima’s speech
accomplishes this refinement.
Diotima begins by fending off an objection to the conclusion of the
argument against Agathon: namely that it would entail that Love is ‘‘bad
and ugly.’’ Instead, she says that the ‘‘lack’’ implied by desire does not entail
the opposite quality, but is rather an intermediate state: to desire beauty is to
be ‘‘on the way’’ to it, rather than simply to lack it, like someone who is
ugly. Similarly, she portrays love as ‘‘halfway between mortal and immortal,’’ a ‘‘powerful spirit’’ that acts as medium or hermeneut between impoverished human beings and the gods who enjoy perfect beauty and
goodness.83 In her invented fable, Love is the son of Need and Resource,
begotten on the same day as Aphrodite’s birth.84 The implication is that
Love has enough resources at least to see or imagine what it lacks and thus
to start on the way toward it or to pursue it85 —just as in the theory of
‘‘recollection,’’ or anamnesis, some trace of the knowledge lacked is requisite
in order to make its absence salient and to provide a proleptic preconception of what we are looking for, which makes its recovery possible (as in
Heidegger’s hermeneutic notion of ‘‘forehaving’’). Thus Diotima adds that,
just as the gods do not seek for wisdom and truth, since they have it,
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Nor, for that matter, do the [totally] ignorant seek the truth or crave
to be made wise. And indeed, what makes their case so hopeless is
that, having neither beauty, nor goodness, nor intelligence, they are
satisfied with what they are, and do not long for the virtues they have never missed.86
This is almost identical to an argument in the Lysis that those who desire
wisdom must at least understand that they are not yet wise or recognize the
good they lack (which is obviously a major Socratic theme).87
The ‘‘lack’’ that is essential to desire therefore cannot be a complete
separation from the good lacked, as happens with a good that is irrelevant
to beings of our kind, which is an ‘‘absence’’ to which we are naturally
indifferent. Rather, it is one that is felt as a void precisely because we have
some partial sense of the end, some anticipatory trace or hint of its importance for well-being, which allows it to become our intentional object or to
‘‘hook onto’’ us, drawing us into the intermediate state of ‘‘becoming’’ or
moving toward it.88 Being able to desire higher goods is thus itself an advantage over creatures that cannot even experience this lack in the requisite
way. This explains the route from Plato’s erosiac model in the Symposium to
Aristotle’s ethics: the goods we can desire are a reflection of our nature, so
our erosiac capacities will provide some indication of our telos.
Diotima argues that objects gain their relevance to us—and hence become salient enough to motivate—by their apparent goodness. This argument
commences after the dialectical turning point when Socrates asks what value
Love can have for us if it is not itself the good or beautiful.89 Diotima
responds indirectly, beginning with the suggestion that desire for the beautiful is really only one part or aspect of Love: ‘‘You see, what we’ve been
doing is to give the name of Love to what is only one single aspect of it,’’90
that is, sexual attraction. In fact, she insists that love properly includes only
desire for what is evaluated as beneficial:
I know it has been suggested, she continued, that lovers are people
who are looking for their other halves. But as I see it, Socrates, Love
never longs for either the half or the whole of anything except the
good. For men will even have their hands and feet cut off if they are
once convinced that those members are bad for them.91
The desire to lose a limb evaluated as fatally diseased is clearly an evaluative or D3 desire, just like the rejection of bad water. In the Republic, of
course, the thirsty man’s aversion to drink that he evaluates as poisoned is
attributed to reason, and ‘‘desire’’ in the narrower sense of epithumia, or
appetites shared with animals, is restricted to D1 urges (and possibly their
D2 applications). But Diotima’s point is precisely that D3 motivational
states share the same general lack structure: indeed, they display it more
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clearly and definitely. Love, in the most general sense of a movement drawn
by the absence of something ‘‘good’’ as intentional object, is thus found at
all three ‘‘levels’’ of the tripartite soul, from the instinctual desire of beautiful bodies, to the ‘‘spirited’’ desire for honor and for noble ‘‘laws and institutions,’’92 to the intellectual loves of scientific knowledge, philosophical
wisdom, and finally the Form of Beauty itself.93
In the Symposium, then, the meaning of eros is broadened from sexual
desire to love for every significant good that we can recognize as lacking or
needed to complete us. This is presented as the model of all human motivation: we are drawn toward completion. This certainly does not mean that all
motivation is a brute conatus in some direction, because the general ‘‘erosiac
structure’’ is also found in cases where reason has to evaluate the different
goods pursuable in our situation. As Gadamer writes in his informative
commentary on the Philebus :
The blindness of the life-urge, which prevails in everything, exists
completely apart from any choice. The other ‘‘choice’’ or option balancing the blind life-urge is choosing itself—for which one has already decided as soon as one begins weighing these two against each
other. And this choice presupposes knowledge [of some good]. What
makes human beings human is the fact that they must ask about the
good and must give preference to one thing over another (prohairein)
in conscious, deliberate decision.94
Because for Plato all motivation is teleological, pulled by final ends that
seem to be naturally part of our well-being or holistic good, only wisdom
or right understanding of our good enables us to make such decisions well.
As Giovanni Ferrari writes, the second group of speeches (by Aristophanes,
Agathon, Socrates, and Diotima) are united by their view of love, ‘‘not as
sundered into good and bad, but as a single aspiration, common to all,
and directed (despite differences of sexual orientation) at the same generic
object—wholeness.’’95 Although Socrates disagrees with Agathon’s inference that Eros is beautiful and good ‘‘because he is love of the beautiful
and good,’’ Socrates agrees with Agathon that the generic object of love is
the ‘‘kallos—one word in Greek, but with a semantic range requiring many
in English: the beautiful, the fine, the noble, the good (197b3–9).’’96 And
as Ferrari perceives, Diotima’s argument that love remains praiseworthy
even though it does not itself have the good it seeks ‘‘reinstate[s] the message of Aristophanes’ tale: that love is above all a search for what has been
lost. Aristophanes only misidentified the loss: It is not the other half, but
our good,’’97 which Diotima understands in its most holistic possible sense
as an immortality in which we possess the good always and with absolute
security.98
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2.4. Diotima and Aquinas: Formal Egoism, Intended Goods, and By-Products
However, Ferrari, like many commentators, does not seem to recognize the
depth of the problems raised by Diotima’s main point against Socrates.
Unlike Socrates, she holds that ‘‘Love is not exactly a longing for the beautiful,’’ but rather for ‘‘the conception and generation that the beautiful effects.’’99 This suggests that Eros is properly desire for the product that
results from the pursuit of beauty (and, in some cases, from union with it);
hence it only indirectly wants the beautiful object itself. Sexual desire, for
example, is not simply desire to be united with bodily beauty; at bottom it
is an existential desire for the good of immortality, which we can achieve
only deficiently through organic procreation.100 The same divine end would
seem to be the real ‘‘good’’ for the sake of which the Form of Beauty itself
is desired, since genuine immortality of the soul is said to be the product
of this Form’s revelation: ‘‘if ever it is given to mortal man to put on
immortality, it shall be given to him who sees the Form.’’101 In other words,
whereas Socrates agreed with Agathon that Eros is desire to find and possess the kalos as an end-in-itself, Diotima’s analysis in fact returns us to
Aristophanes’ view that what Eros really wants is the wholeness that results
from finding the kalos.
By claiming that the ergon or proper function of Eros is ‘‘giving birth in
the beautiful,’’102 then, Diotima is really modifying Socrates’ account to fit
the framework of eudaimonism, which requires that the apprehended goods
that can attract desire must be related to the agent’s own well-being in some
way. As I will explain in more detail in chapter 5, this ‘‘formal egoism’’
must be distinguished from various versions of material egoism (asserted,
for example, by the Sophists and Thomas Hobbes); it means only that the
prospect of the agent’s own happiness, however materially conceived, is
what ultimately moves him: ‘‘Plato was as certain as Socrates had been
that what all human beings always want most is their own true well-being.
Happiness, eudaimonia, the state of being God-blessed, is defined as that
which all men desire (Symposium 205a).’’103
So understood, the formal egoism essential to eudaimonism is simply a
clarification or corollary of the strong erosiac thesis, pointing out that to be felt
as lacking, the good that moves desire must be apprehended as lost by the
agent or missing from the agent—as if a piece of himself had gone astray.
As Aquinas puts it, ‘‘each thing desires its own fulfillment and therefore
desires for its ultimate end a good that perfects and completes it.’’104 This
means that the agent desires its highest object for the completion it will
apparently provide to her. Otherwise stated, the thesis of formal egoism
simply makes clear that all motivation according to the erosiac model is
appropriative, aimed at incorporating something into the agent or possessing
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it for him. This is what Anders Nygren meant by calling Platonic Eros
‘‘acquisitive love.’’105 If we distinguish between (a) an object or state that
attracts or moves us to desire it and (b) the attainment or possession of that
object or state that ends our desire by providing the missing component of
our well-being, then the strong erosiac thesis implies that desirable objects
only become goals for us in form (b). This is equivalent to the thesis of
formal egoism.
This point has often been confused in the critical literature. For example,
Vlastos protests against Nygren’s analysis, which I have largely endorsed,
saying that love as explained by Diotima is not rightly understood as ‘‘egocentric’’ or ‘‘acquisitive’’:
it is only too patently Ideocentric and creative. But while it gives no
more quarter to self-indulgence than would Pauline agape or Kantian
good will, neither does it repudiate the spiritualized egocentricism of
Socratic philia. That first description of the aim of eros in Diotima’s
speech—‘‘that one should possess beauty for ever’’—is never
amended in the sequel in any way that would make egocentric eros a
contradiction. . . . It is not said or implied . . . that ‘‘birth in beauty’’
should be motivated by love of persons. . . . What we are to love in
persons is the image of the Idea in them.106
Vlastos’s claim is that Platonic love falsely appears egocentric to Nygren
only because it is love of an abstract ideal, not love of individual persons as
particulars, with all the ‘‘kindness, tenderness, compassion, concern for the
freedom, [and] respect for the integrity of the beloved’’ that such interpersonal love requires.107 But while Vlastos is surely right that Plato is not
trying to explain or understand this kind of interpersonal love, and that his
alternative ‘‘Ideocentric’’ Eros is not materially egoistic, he clearly admits the
sense in which it is formally egoistic. To love the Idea of Beauty ‘‘for its own
sake,’’ according to Plato, is to be drawn toward its value because of the
completeness that would come from possessing it eternally.
Two similar examples should suffice to illustrate this idea. To Diotima,
what we want is not that the Form of Beauty should simply exist for its
own sake. Rather, our ultimate goal is the vision of it which somehow
unites us with it, bringing us (since this is the perfect object) the total
completeness that is the telos of all erosiac desire. Likewise, Aquinas explains that ‘‘Happiness is said to be the supreme good of man because it is
the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.’’108 And since, for Aquinas, this attainment is the Beatific Vision—an idea partly inspired by Diotima’s vision of the Form of Beauty—this good must by its nature be
unlosable once attained: ‘‘Since happiness is the complete and sufficient
good, the desire of man must be brought to rest and all evil excluded. Now
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man naturally desires to hold on to the good which he has, and to have the
assurance of keeping it.’’109 Aquinas relies on this conclusion that the complete good must be perfectly secure in arguing that the complete good is
not attainable in this life but transcends our natural state.110 Like Diotima,
Aquinas recognizes that in D3 states, desire is a response to rational grounds
for wanting the object or a response to an apprehension of the end as
valuable for life (in different possible ways). As a response, it is moved by
these perceptions and judgments, which is what Aquinas means by the dependence of appetite on evaluative intellect. For example, in discussing God
and the Holy Spirit, Aquinas argues that every ‘‘intellectual nature’’ must
have a will, because understanding must incline it to its proper end (in a
fashion analogous to natural or non-volitional appetites):
every inclination of the will arises from this: by an intelligible form a
thing is apprehended as suitable or affective. To be affected toward
something—so far as it is of this kind—is to love that thing. Therefore, every inclination of the will and even of the sensible appetite
has its origin from love. For from the fact that we love something,
we desire that thing if it be absent.111
This is a clear statement of the idea that all motivation (including intellectual motivation, or volition) is desiderative in the general sense of Platonic
Eros.
However, Diotima’s proposal that Eros longs for the begetting that the
beautiful effects can also be read as implying that our desire is not simply
(a) to attain some good (or attractive or beautiful) end E; or (equivalently)
(b) to gain the contribution that attaining E makes to our well-being; but
rather (c) to realize a distinct good P, which is the product of pursuing or
attaining E. This is problematic, because such a product-good can arise
from pursuing or attaining E without the agent expecting it, or at least
without her intending it.112 In such cases, Socrates seems right that attaining
E (as a contribution to his completeness) is the good toward which the
agent is erosiacally motivated; the desired good is not actually P, as Diotima’s proposal would imply on this reading. So why would Plato introduce
this alternative analysis as superior to Socrates’? One possibility is that as a
eudaimonist he needs to explain the fact that there apparently are possible
ends of action E whose attainment seem in themselves to have little directly
to do with the agent’s well-being; therefore, if these can be final ends for
us, formal egoism (and hence the strong erosiac thesis) would be false. For
such ends, the eudaimonist might adopt Diotima’s explanation and say that
it is the fulfillment produced by gaining these ends (or begat in them) that
really motivates us. But if that is his reasoning, then the eudaimonist is in
trouble. For, as Aquinas recognizes, it is wrong to say that the activity in
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which our highest good consists ‘‘is desired because of the delight it
gives.’’113 Rather, delight is the unintended (even if expected) by-product of
pursuing and possessing (or resting in) the transcendent good of God for
its own sake:
It must be noted, then, that delight is a proper accident which follows
upon happiness or some part of happiness, for a man is delighted
when he possesses some good suitable to him [or naturally completing him]. . . . Clearly, then, even the delight which follows upon the
perfect good is not the essence of happiness, but something resulting
from it as its proper accident.114
In other words, the good that motivates by attracting is that which will
end our desire by making us whole, not the psychological satisfaction that is
experienced in such repose. We may understand this as distinguishing between goods of forms (b) and (c) above.115 Additionally, Aquinas draws on
this distinction in arguing that the will’s movement or motivation depends
on an attractive good outside its own states or operations: ‘‘Nor does the
will seek good for the sake of repose, for if this were the case, the very act
of will would be the end. . . . Rather it seeks to be at rest in the activity
because that activity is its good.’’116
However, as Ferrari’s analysis shows, Plato is aware of the problem that
intended ends may be distinct from their by-products, and he even has
Diotima make use of this distinction to show how lower forms of specific
love can lead to higher forms. A certain kind of lover is ‘‘prone to become
more deeply fascinated by the beauty that issues from his love than by the
beauty that first attracted it. This displacement of attention is what motivates his climb to each new level on the upward path.’’117 For example,
motivated by eros for a particular body’s beauty, he produces a poetry lauding this bodily beauty. But then he reflects on this product: ‘‘His ‘beautiful’
words have beauty as their topic—not the beauty of this body alone, but
also bodily beauty in general, because to praise something is to insert it in
a comparison class.’’118 Recognizing this more general good, he starts desiring it instead: he is drawn to ‘‘thoughts and expressions of beauty,’’ which
in turn produce a better, more noetic soul. Seeing this beauty produced in
his own soul, he desires to produce it in others, such as friends or apprentices: the product of this new desire is ‘‘edifying speeches intended to bring
out the beauty of the soul (that is, decency of character, 210b) entrusted
to his care.’’119 Then he turns to the beautiful topic of this discourse, and
in desire for the education of good character in general, he works to produce good laws and institutions. His attention shifts now to these products:
his desire switches to the beauty of the knowledge that produced them and
finally to the beauty of the Good itself which is the final object of such
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knowledge. So understood, the Ascent can be summarized as shown below
(pairing its stages with doxastic levels of insight in the Divided Line in
Republic VI):
At every stage of this Ascent, ‘‘the initiate’s concern is transferred from
the beauty that enticed him to the beauty that he has generated.’’120 The
final product is the true virtue and immortality that comes from fulfilling
the highest form of eros in the vision of Beauty itself. And this is the final
stage because, as Ferrari says, this final product (immortality, perfect wholeness) is not itself qualified as beautiful or as a good that could in turn
attract our desire for it, so our attention does not switch from the Form to
our enjoyment of it.121 This seems to agree precisely with Aquinas’s point
that noetic delight before God cannot itself be our desired end, because it
is the kind of good that can only be a by-product. To pursue it directly as
our end would be self-defeating.
This analysis will prove extremely helpful throughout our investigations.
What it shows is that some valuable states that can result from pursuit and
attainment of other goods are only contingently by-products of such processes: they can also be directly wanted (e.g., in D3 desire) and pursued for
their own sake without self-defeat. Let us call such objects targetable goods.122
Diotima’s Ascent works because some types of goods targetable by D3
desires can also be produced as by-products of lower desires. Thus the lower
desires can be converted into new desires for their own by-products. And the
Diotima’s Ascent of Eros
1st

Love of physical
beauty in one
specific attractive
body

2nd Love of beautiful
speeches and
poetry

Result Begotten

Maieutic Transition

Beautiful speech,
rhetoric (to woo
the beloved)

Level of Insight

Sees ‘‘that the beauty (none)
in one body is akin
to the beauty in another body’’

Imitative art and
Learns to love beauty (ekasia)
aesthetic sensitivity in the soul

3rd Love of beautiful Inventive crafts,
Learns to see all
(pistis)
souls and concern edifying discourses beauty in souls as the Practical knowto educate
same and to love
how; right opinion
particular youth
learning
4th Love of learning,
knowledge, and
wisdom; ‘‘great
ocean of beauty’’
Love of Beauty
and the Good
itself

Philosophical
dialectic, ‘‘the
abundance of
philosophy’’

Learns the beauty of
scientific knowledge;
beauty in all different kinds of learning

(diánoia)
Knowledge based
on demonstrable
principles

Vision of Beauty;
Immortal virtue

[nothing]

(noesis)
Beatific insight
beyond all words

................. 16406$

$CH4

05-23-07 10:56:00

PS

PAGE 110

The Erosiac Structure of Desire in Plato and Aristotle

111

Ascent stops at the point where the agent desires to attain a good the
appropriation of which produces only a nontargetable by-product good, that
is, one that is not directly willable (and so no further conversion can occur).
In fact, since this good is simply eudaimonia itself (understood as including
immortality), it would be more accurate to say that the vision of the Form
of the Beautiful produces no by-product good (c) that is really distinct from
(b) attaining or enjoying that Form.
So Diotima’s model proves to be as coherent as Aquinas’s, as long as we
recognize that in the last stage of the Ascent, it becomes misleading to say
that what Eros really desires is something begotten in the good attained.
Rather, at this stage the object is the Universal Good, which is the agent’s
comprehensive good; thus erosiac motivation can aim no higher than at
attaining this perfect good. In other words, erosiac motivation can aim at
begetting a product-good P as a result of attaining some distinct end E only
if attaining E is an imperfect good for the agent. The perfect good, by contrast,
is understood as having no valuable by-products that it does not already
include. Thus, once the end is the perfect good, Socrates’ formula for love,
rather than Diotima’s, must apply.
Plato and Aquinas also seem to affirm the converse: namely, that an
imperfect good cannot really be desired just for its own sake (taking its
attainment as a final end) by an agent who understands its incompleteness.
Since we really desire such an end E only because it resembles or imperfectly
participates in the transcendent good whose attainment constitutes completion for us—or equivalently, because of the perfect good that we beget in
ourselves by pursuing E—an agent who knows this must desire E for its
relationship to this transcendent good or for what it contributes to attaining the transcendent good. We may call this thesis that the true finality of
an end entails its comprehensiveness the Transcendent principle (Trans). Since
it implies that only imperfect goods help produce targetable by-products,
this principle helps explain Diotima’s proposal in response to Socrates. Her
notion of ‘‘begetting in the beautiful’’ expresses the idea that our desire for
non-comprehensive goods really aims at more than we know: its true goal
transcends mere attainment of finite goods precisely because they are imperfect. We really aim not just at these partial goods but at the whole Good
through them. As we will see, this point becomes crucial in evaluating Aristotle, whose conception of eudaimonia is not as transcendent as Plato’s or
Aquinas’s.
3. From Plato’s Middle Soul to Aristotle’s Intellectual Appetite
Before going further, it may be helpful to clarify how I am approaching
ancient philosophy in this analysis. There is an important methodological
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distinction between at least three ‘‘levels’’ of scholarship on ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. First, we have studies by classicists,
trained experts in Greek language and literature, some of whom focus on
the corpus of authors like Plato and Aristotle as their specialization. For
someone who regularly teaches these philosophers at an introductory level
to undergraduates, it can be quite disturbing to read such works: consider,
for example, John Rist’s impressive study arguing that Nicomachean Ethics
Books 2 to 4 reflect Aristotle’s new conception of the ‘‘productive intellect’’
in the De anima and are later than Books 1, 8, 9, and 10, which Aristotle at
the time of his death still planned to rewrite to reflect his new conception
of nous as a separate substance.123
Second, we have studies by philosophical specialists in ancient philosophy who are concerned primarily to establish the right interpretation of
these canonical texts and to draw important philosophical conclusions from
them. For example, in this category we have works like Julia Anna’s definitive study of the contrasts between major schools of ancient moral philosophy,124 which is primarily a historical study but secondarily a positive
contribution to ongoing debates in ethics. Third, we have authors whose
primary expertise and focus is on contemporary debates in moral psychology and normative theory but who wish to bring into these debates what
they regard as crucial insights or errors in ancient moral philosophy. For
example, in this broad genre, we have Gary Watson’s analysis of the difference between perfectionist or virtue accounts and consequentialist normative theories,125 Harry Frankfurt’s critique of Aristotle’s conception of
character,126 and Alfred Mele’s interpretations of akrasia, self-control, and
autonomy.127
Of course, these are only rough genre distinctions, and there are many
authors who write in more than one of these genres.128 But they are sufficient to clarify my use of Plato and Aristotle, which obviously belong in
this third genre: my primary intention is to draw on these ancient philosophers in order to contribute to contemporary debates in moral psychology.
In the next chapter, I use themes in Aristotle to develop and extend the
typology of motives within the genus of ‘‘erosiac desire’’ already sketched
in my discussion of Plato. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that the
heroic notion of striving will was largely suppressed or covered over in the
Western tradition at the point when Plato’s conception of the ‘‘middle part
of the soul’’ as the seat of spirited courage became Aristotle’s faculty of
rational desire or ‘‘intellectual appetite.’’129
3.1. Thumos as Indeterminate Motive-Power
Although Plato is without doubt the main classical source of the erosiac
structure of desire that dominates later analyses in Western philosophy and
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psychology, as we will see, he also contributed in two ways to the development of the existential conception of striving will. In chapter 9, I consider
the radical implications of the Neoplatonic model of divine creativity as a
primary historical source for the projective conception of striving will. In
another, more modest way, Plato contributed to the idea of ‘‘the will’’ as a
motivational capacity rather than simply as the locus of decision-making.
While Plato does not seem to anticipate the important concept of decision
as second-order agency—which has to wait until the Stoics—his theory of
the tripartite soul does provide a distinct place for those forms of motivation that, when properly trained and directed, were thought by Greeks to
be the basis of courage.130 Since the virtue of courage is closely associated
with our ‘‘heroic’’ capacity to pursue our ends despite difficulty or adversity,
it provides one natural sense of ‘‘strength of will.’’
If we identify thumos, or the ‘‘high-spirited temper’’ that Plato defines as
the middle part of the soul, simply with some form of sudden ‘‘anger’’ that
is likely to provoke ill-considered reactions or with a desire for vengeance,
then it will seem to be just an ‘‘irascible’’ species of the same motivational
genus in which we find the various ‘‘concupiscent’’ appetites for sensual
pleasures (to use Aquinas’s terms).131 Although Plato also certainly thought
of this middle soul as responsible for the cycles of revenge promoted by
the archaic Greek honor code (which he critiques in the Crito), he did not
reduce the thumos to either an angry temper or vengeful spirit. Rather, he
saw something else in this middle soul, something that was largely obscured
by later philosophical reinterpretations of thumos within new divisions of
the soul: namely, a motivational ‘‘energy’’ that lies latent in us (though in
some more than others) without being intrinsically directed toward particular goals, which can therefore be channeled by reason to provide a boost or
reinforcement for the motivation provided directly by our D3 desires for
goods discerned by reason. This was the positive potential that Plato
thought could be harnessed by our rational mind, or nous, the charioteer of
the soul. As Oberdiek comments, for Plato, ‘‘the spirited element, or will,
involves anger and other emotions, but necessarily involves reason and reasoning as well, for spirit only motivates those open to certain kinds of
reasoning.’’132
This hypothesis makes sense of several things Plato says regarding the
middle soul and its role. Plato clearly wants to distinguish this part from
the lower desires, and thus Socrates rejects the proposal that thumos is in
‘‘the appetitive’’ part.133 For Leontius, both experiences are a D2-type desire
to see a macabre spectacle, and yet he disowns, rejects, or condemns this
desire (and hence is angry with himself for giving into it).134 If this is to
make any sense as an argument that thumos is a distinct ‘‘part’’ or motivational genus, Plato cannot simply mean that Leontius has another D2 desire
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not to view something macabre (perhaps out of fear that it will give him
nightmares, for example). For we often experience desires of the same genus
that pull in conflicting directions, as when I would like a Coke and a sandwich but have only enough money for one, or when I would like to see a
movie tonight and to go to the theater but can do only one. What Plato
means to show us is not an agent performing what Charles Taylor has
famously called the ‘‘simple weighing’’ of contingently incompatible desire
consummations, but rather an agent ‘‘strongly evaluating’’ his desires themselves.135 Leontius’s negative evaluation of his perverse preferential desire
has a higher authority than the preferential desire itself, because it depends on
a rational judgment about ‘‘the noble’’ which, in its implicit validity claim,
is intersubjectively binding. This judgment does not come from the thumos
itself, in Plato’s view (since even an irrational child displays thumos); rather,
the role of thumos is to add its motivational surplus to the D3 desire deriving
from the judgment itself. In this example, the two together still fail to
control the appetite, but that is irrelevant to Plato’s main point: as Vander
Waerdt explains, the point is that ‘‘the θυμοειδ ς [spirited part] as the
natural allay or the λογιστικν [rational part], with its own πιθυμαι
[appetitive power] provide[s] a source of motivation independent of the
other two parts,’’ and thus this spirited part is not just a division of the
irrational faculty, as Aristotle makes it.136
Now, Plato does not conceive this motivational supplement of thumos as
directed by or generated in the agent’s determined effort to commit to the
pursuit of some final end. In other words, he certainly does not envision it
as created in an existential decision. But he clearly does think that it can
serve reason (nous) as a motivational engine to help control the lower appetites and to keep the agent on course toward rationally desired goods. This
seems to be the main point of the famous analogy that Socrates draws
between reason as the shepherd who controls wayward sheeplike appetites,
and thumos as the dog who helps the shepherd perform this function.137 It
also helps explain the importance of a well-trained thumos for karteria, the
capacity to endure ill fortune, which is crucial to virtue in the Republic.138
Thumos admittedly has nothing to do with ‘‘will’’ as the faculty of ‘‘decision’’
in Kane’s sense; but in classical moral psychology, the idea of a middle soul
provided a locus for what we have later come to call strength of will. Thus
failure of this part helps make akrasia possible for Plato,139 and its proper
development helps avoid akrasia. As David Carr explains:
on this model rather more is required for good conduct than just
knowledge of the good; wisdom requires the assistance of spirit or
will, for example, to secure the obedience of appetite to the principles
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of right conduct that it formulates. Roughly speaking, then, temperance may be defined as the condition in which the appetites are subjected to discipline by the will; courage consists in the exercise of the
will for the discipline of passion and appetite in accordance with
principles of right reason; and wisdom is a matter of the right instruction or direction of the will for the reasonable control of passion and
appetite.140
In accord with the erosiac model, however, it is axiomatic for Plato that
thumos as a genus of motivation must be moved by the felt lack of one kind
of generic good that the agent desires to possess because he is incomplete
without it. Plato follows the Homeric tradition in holding that the good
which it is thumos’s special role to desire is honor, merit, rank, or status as
‘‘noble’’ (kalon) in the evaluations of one’s relevant circle of peers. For him,
this naturally includes a demand to be treated justly and righteous indignation at undeserved harms.141 And as Plato well knows, in the archaic worldview of pre-Homeric Greece, centering as it did on the timocratic ideal of
the warrior-king, nobility was synonymous with worldly power, charisma
as a leader, and external success in prosecuting one’s conquests. Since on
this conception, any failure to succeed in realizing one’s determined purpose would count as shameful (the opposite of noble), we can see why the
thumos would have a general tendency to supplement any other desire that
has motivated some challenging plan of action. This helps explain Plato’s
much-discussed remark that even a young human child displays thumos.142
This passage has concerned commentators, since it could be taken to
suggest that thumos really is nothing but ‘‘anger’’ as an irascible emotion also
found in higher animals. But Plato should be understood as imagining that
the child is angry not simply because it fails to satisfy a given desire but
because it has an additional passion to get ‘‘its way’’ in whatever it desires
and pursues. This additional motive is for mastery as such (thus it looks like
the innate ‘‘willfulness’’ that the Hindu sages condemned and that Augustine saw as the mark of original sin). It makes perfect sense for Plato, coming
out of the Homeric tradition, to see this anger in the child as the early
expression of the same motivational force that will later add its impetus to
the agent’s pursuit of whatever purposes he has formed, because not to see
them through or to succeed is shameful. We might say that for Plato, even
the young child is already sensitive to the shame implied in not being able
to realize the goal of its action.143
Instead of seeing this willful spirit purely as fury at any opposition to
its desires or as a dangerous desire for worldly ascendance, Plato saw that
it has a positive function under the ethical reinterpretation of ‘‘the noble’’
which was the central aspiration of his moral philosophy. Once the noble
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was identified with a life of unconditional commitment to rationally discerned and impartial ideals of justice for all, the desire for honor would
become the desire for what is intrinsically beautiful or dignified in morally
meritorious acts and characters. Hence in his ideal city-state, the warriors
would be assistants of the guardians, whose middle soul was trained to
desire the beauty of the goods discerned by rational judgment. Their sense
of patriotic honor would demand absolute loyalty not to a warrior-king
but rather to the laws and institutions of their state whose rational beauty
they could appreciate, even without being able to give the logos or philosophical justification of these institutions. In this sublimation of the Homeric
thumos, we see Plato’s view that the passion for honor, like other emotions,
has a malleable nature that can be trained to respond to practical reason.
3.2. Williams on Homer’s Moral Psychology
On this interpretation, Plato’s version of thumos as the middle soul provides
a partial basis for later ideas of the existential will as a motivational faculty.
Plato is not concerned to explain the process of making choices but is,
rather, concerned to incorporate the heroic will of epic poetry within his
framework. In this light, it seems especially ironic that some contemporary
writers have referred to the moral psychology implicit in this tradition as a
basis for rejecting the concept of decision as a form of second-order agency,
which emerged in later theories of action. For example, in Shame and Necessity,
Bernard Williams admits that practical willing as a faculty of making decisions and associated senses of individuality are not found in Homeric literature; but he insists that these ideas ‘‘are not so much the benefits of moral
maturity as the accretions of misleading philosophy.’’144 And despite his
own criticisms of utilitarianism for obscuring the separateness of persons
as moral agents, Williams argues that the only ‘‘unity’’ needed to ‘‘have
thoughts and experiences’’ and to explain our sense of ourselves as agents
is the unity of the ‘‘living person’’ as an animated bodily whole which we
find in Homer’s characters.145 They make ‘‘decisions’’ in the same sense in
which we ordinarily do, Williams claims: simply by acting ‘‘for reasons.’’146
As Williams convincingly argues, in most Homeric cases, intervention
by the gods in human decisions simply represents the fact that ‘‘why one
reason should prevail rather than another, or take over someone’s attention,
can remain hidden.’’147 Thus: ‘‘The interventions of the gods, then, operate
within a system that ascribes action to human beings; and deliberations, as
result of which they act; and therefore, reasons on which they act. In ascribing reasons to people, it also ascribes to them desires, beliefs, and
purposes.’’148
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What more is needed? If there is any notion of ‘‘will’’ still absent here,
Williams says, it could only be a metaphysical illusion introduced by later
philosophical corruption of ordinary language and intuitions, for ‘‘the complex net of concepts in terms of which particular actions are explained’’ was
otherwise ‘‘the same for Homer as it is for us.’’149 In particular:
Homer has no word that means, simply, to decide. But he does have
the notion. For he has the idea of wondering what to do, coming to
a conclusion, and doing a particular thing because one has come to
that conclusion, and that is what a decision is. . . . All that Homer seems
to have left out is the idea of another mental action that is supposed
necessarily to lie between coming to a conclusion and acting on it;
and he did well in leaving it out, since there is no such action, and
the idea of it is the invention of bad philosophy.150
My analysis in chapter 3 shows that Williams’s bare assertion that our
philosophically unencumbered understanding of action supports this Homeric baseline is little more than Rylean dogma. As Pink argues instead,
‘‘everyday beliefs about decision-making,’’ intention, and freedom point
strongly in the direction of the idea that intention formation is itself an
action. This concept of the will as second-order or executive agency is
‘‘the common-sense psychology,’’ and it is only because ‘‘Enlightenment
psychologies’’ that radically revise ordinary intuitions have been dominant
for centuries now in academic philosophy that the thin concept of volition
for which Williams finds Homer’s resources sufficient appears at all
adequate.151
Second, and even more important, if Homeric literature does not develop the concept of decision, surely this is because it is focused instead on
the way heroic willing generates new motivation in the process of defining
its purposes. Williams himself concedes that ‘‘what is ordinarily called will’’
includes the notion of ‘‘efforts of will.’’152 He insists that Homeric characters can make such efforts, both outwardly and ‘‘within the mind,’’ as when
a man ‘‘dialogues with his own thumos,’’ or consults his heart, in order to
discover with which course of action ‘‘he is more identified.’’153 Odysseus
demonstrates a capacity for ‘‘endurance’’ of suffering and frustration of
immediate impulses to realize long-term goals, a ‘‘capacity to hold out
against feeling or desire.’’154 This shows that the idea of heroic willing as
an effort to build up one’s own motivation by commitment to the task or
determination to persevere on the course one has set is present in Homer.
Williams fails to appreciate this because, following Nietzsche’s critique of
Kant, he assumes that the reason ‘‘progressivists’’ find the will lacking in
Homer is that his notion of action ‘‘did not revolve round a distinction
between moral and nonmoral motivations.’’155 But whether this is true or
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not, the will as a motivational power is not simply identical to moral motivation in any allegedly ‘‘abstract modern sense.’’156 In short, the Homeric
epics may provide insights lacking in contemporary action theory, but nothing in the classical idea of heroic thumos is actually inconsistent with the
modern idea of practical willing as decision-making agency, nor does it
provide any evidence for a minimalist conception of the will.
3.3. Aristotle’s Generalization of the Middle Soul
Hence nothing in Williams’s argument undermines my suggestion that
Plato’s conception of thumos retains elements of the Homeric conception of
heroic willing, out of which subsequent philosophical reflection could have
developed the existential conception of striving will as a self-motivating
power. The reason this did not happen is crucial for understanding how in
scholastic philosophy ‘‘the will’’ came to be interpreted as a faculty of decision-making that derives its motives from a form of desire (sharing the
general erosiac structure) aimed at intelligible goods. Following the logic of
his own erosiac model, Plato’s philosophical descendants generalized his
idea of the middle soul from an indignant desire for honor into the general
power of desiring rationally discernible goods or components of human
well-being and choosing among means to them or specifications of them.
Thus the middle soul became composite : not an irreducible third genus of
motivation but simply the appetitive engine of evaluative or practical reason, the point of contact between the rational (logon) and the irrational
(alogon) in a fundamentally bipartite moral psychology.157 This is Aristotle’s
portrayal of the ‘‘intellectual appetite’’ in Book 1 of his Nicomachean Ethics.
Here are key parts of the passage in which this idea is introduced:
Of the irrational element one division seems to be widely distributed,
and vegetative in its nature. . . . There seems also to be another irrational element in the soul—one which in a sense, however, shares in a
rational principle. . . . No doubt, however, we must none the less
suppose that in the soul too there is something beside reason, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. Now even this seems to have a share in
reason, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys reason—
and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in them it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as
reason.158
Aristotle’s phrasing here clearly echoes Plato’s discussion of the tripartite
soul in the Republic IV at several points, and it is no accident that his examples of temperate and brave men are exactly those whose appetite and spirit
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were in harmony with reason on Plato’s view. But we can see a key difference: his model is fundamentally bipartite, and it is one subdivision of the
irrational part that is responsive to practical reason, at least if well
trained.159 Aristotle adds ‘‘That [the higher part of] the irrational element
is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of
advice and by all reproof and exhortation.’’160 This recalls Leontius reproving his own desires in Plato’s famous example of thumos;161 but the part that
is thus amenable to reason is no longer narrowly conceived as a passion
for honor or distinguished from other desires and passions that rise above
instinctive organic drives (which could be considered vegetative): ‘‘For the
vegetative element in no way shares in reason, but the appetitive and in
general the desiring [orektikon] element in a sense shares in it.’’162
As Sarah Broadie argues in her penetrating analysis of Aristotle’s division
of the soul, by saying that the ‘‘sensitive, desiderative and emotional part of
the human soul is not strictly rational’’ yet its function is ‘‘to ‘listen to
reason,’ ’’ he means to emphasize how it differs from ‘‘the human soul’s
nutritive part, and also from the desiderative part of nonrational animals.’’163 She also emphasizes that for Aristotle, the appetite amenable to
reason can be influenced by the external authority of other persons (as with
warriors following the guardians in the Republic), and that this is Aristotle’s
analogy for its internal relation to the agent’s own practical reason.164 In
this persuasive relationship, the reason-oriented desiring part can follow
practical reason willingly—at least out of respect and love for the authority
figure rather than sheer fear of threat—and at the limit it can ‘‘always be
immediately at the ready to fall in with and lend its energy to any project
prescribed by the internal analogue of authority.’’165 Note how this notion
of ‘‘lending its energy’’ agrees with Plato’s conception of the thumos as potentially a motivational supplement to reason.
Yet this resemblance is misleading, since, as we see in the next chapter,
the various types of motive-states now classed together within Aristotle’s
rationally oriented desiring part are all fundamentally erosiac in structure—
whereas the ‘‘energy’’ that Platonic thumos could lend almost appeared to be
projective. Instead, Aristotle’s rationally oriented desiring part functions as
a generic faculty of erosiac attraction to appropriable good or value, which is
open-ended enough to be directed to virtually anything by practical reason
and flexible enough to acquire dispositions to desire anything that can be
apprehended or interpreted as a good (differing in this essential plasticity
from the instinctually fixed desires of nonrational animals).166 As Oberdiek
says, ‘‘in Aristotle’s account, self-controlled or voluntary actions are those
where an agent, acting with the appropriate degree of knowledge and without compulsion, seeks an end because of some kind of desire (orexis) originating within him.’’167 Prohairesis thus channels orektic motivation into
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particular voluntary actions without generating any new motivation in the
process.
So if we define the ‘‘middle’’ position in our psychic hierarchy narrowly
as the position of the reason-aiding faculty—the position that was occupied
by the striving spiritual energy of thumos in Plato—then Aristotle replaces the
middle soul with the maximally generalized faculty of erosiac motivation,
whose highest potential is found in dispositions of erosiac attraction to
rationally endorsed ends that no lower animal can desire.168 Alternatively,
if we define the ‘‘middle’’ position widely as whatever comes between our
highest cognitive powers (which can conceive universals) and our absolutely
irrational inclinations and appetites (shared by all sentient animal life), then
we have a broad territory that could potentially include several different
kinds of psychic states. In this territory occupied by the thumos in Plato,
Aristotle puts the rationally oriented or rationally trainable desires together
with the lower ‘‘practical’’ part of reason.169
This crucial development in Aristotle also helps explain how in philosophy the concept of will came to be understood as a faculty of decisionmaking. Later thinkers in the Judeo-Christian tradition began to regard the
human capacity for resolve and striving for purity in the soul as crucial for
the life of faith; and in order to give it a classical precedent, they associated
‘‘will’’ in this original existential sense with Plato’s middle soul as the
‘‘heart’’ of human beings. ‘‘To take heart,’’ ‘‘to have heart,’’ ‘‘to be hearty or
great-spirited’’—these phrases are still associated for us with courageous
commitment, with giving one’s full effort, and with the strength of will to
strive for difficult goals. But Aristotle and his followers in scholastic theology reconceived the middle soul or ‘‘heart’’ as the general faculty of deliberative desire, or the entire aspect of the psyche in which motives can arise
from (or at least be shaped by) practical deliberation about achievable
goods and thereby determine ‘‘decision’’ as the choice of a particular act.
Prohairesis, or ‘‘choice,’’ is therefore defined by Aristotle as a ‘‘deliberate desire of things in our power,’’170 and the proper function of the middle soul
is precisely to produce such ‘‘choices.’’ Choosing thus became this final
upshot of will as intellectual appetite, which as an executive power of decision inherits its motivation entirely from the preexisting desires for apparent goods as presented by practical reason (which together make up
intellectual appetite). And though they are influenced by reason, all these
desires share the erosiac form (as we will see below). Prohairesis taking place
in the rational appetite produces no new motivation but only transmits the
erosiac motivation of a prior desire. Hence the Transmission principle becomes intrinsic to eudaimonist moral psychology without being explicitly
recognized and defended, and willing is reduced to a transitional moment
between intellectual appetite and action.
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Arguably, prohairesis for Aristotle is still a more limited faculty than ‘‘the
will’’ in Aquinas, who believes it can form intentions on the basis of virtually any kind of prepurposive desire (whether it is a rational wish for some
articulable good or some other lower emotion or appetite). Like other commentators, John Cooper argues that Aristotle understands nonrational desires as ‘‘active psychological movement[s] toward getting in an appropriate
way, or experiencing or doing, whatever it is that the desire is for,’’ so that
desires in this sense will cause voluntary movement if they are unchecked.171
If this is right, then for Aristotle many voluntary actions can begin without
going through prohairesis at all. It will be only those actions that are motivated by boulēsis, or rational wish, that count as ‘‘chosen’’ in a deliberate act
of forming an intention to pursue one’s desired end in a certain particular
way. Or, as Broadie urges, perhaps prohairetic acts can also be an ‘‘unhesitant expression of our moral nature’’ that are the same as we would decide
in deliberation, since they are guided by dispositions formed through acting
on rational wishes in the past.172 By contrast, the Stoics hold that epithumetic appetites like sensual cravings and anger can be acted on intentionally
only if we decide to act on them, and this requires ‘‘reasoned thought that
the actions they are moving the agent to do are to be done.’’173
However, my quarrel is not with Aristotle’s conception of deliberative
choice nor with the executive agency view of the will that derives from this
conception together with his analysis of the voluntary: despite their manifold problems, these theories represented clear advances in Aristotle’s time,
which were further refined in Aquinas’s theory of action and intention.174
My concern is rather with the embedded assumption that all the motivation
that can go into deciding on action and pursuing one’s intentions is both
predecisional motivation and erosiac in form. I believe this assumption determines basic features of Aristotle’s eudaimonist approach to ethics and
leads to certain paradoxes internal to psychological eudaimonism. My critique of Aristotle’s eudaimonism as a basis for an ethic of virtue will single
out the underlying reliance on erosiac motivation as the source of several
problems that remain unresolved in the eudaimonist tradition. But before
these problems can be explained, we must better understand Aristotle’s division of human motives and his version of the strong erosiac thesis, which
are considered in the next chapter.
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Overview. The first half of this chapter focuses on the distinction
between three kinds of desire, starting from Aristotle’s analysis of the
human psyche and bringing in conceptual distinctions from contemporary neo-Aristotelian work on motivation by Watson, Taylor, MacIntyre, Murphy, and others. The second half of the chapter, which
distinguishes among various types of egoism and their paradoxes, is
slightly more technical; but in addition to major figures in the modern period, it engages Feinberg’s critique of egoism, which is widely
taught to undergraduates.
1. Aristotle and the Typology of Erosiac Desire
1.1. Aristotle’s Psychology of Animal Motivation in the De anima
The previous chapter concludes that by replacing Plato’s middle soul with
his ‘‘intellectual appetite,’’ Aristotle embeds the Transmission principle into
his moral psychology: all voluntary actions, including those emerging from
prohairesis or practically rational choice, derive the content and strength of
their motives from preexisting desire-states of one sort or another. In this
chapter, I argue that Aristotle’s psychology commits him to the weak erosiac thesis: all the prepurposive motives that can move us to voluntary action have the erosiac structure first described by Plato.
In its broad outlines, Aristotle’s psychology also recognizes a hierarchical
order of different motivational states, among which three kinds of erosiac
desire like those we find in Plato figure most prominently. As John Cooper
argues, Aristotle uses ‘‘orexis’’ as a general term for occurrent desires, and
Aristotle follows Plato’s view that practical reason itself can motivate in a
way quite distinct from other nonrational desires:
122
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In many places (in Eudemian Ethics, Magna Moralia, in de Anima, in de Motu
Animalium, and in the Rhetoric and Politics, but, curiously, none in the
Nicomachean Ethics), Aristotle explicitly divides orexis (that seems to be
his established word for movements of the soul towards or away from
action) into three kinds: epithumia or appetite, thumos or spirited, competitive impulses, and boulēsis. And he repeatedly makes it clear that
epithumia and thumos are the two genera of nonrational desire, while
boulēsis is his preferred name for the movement towards action produced by the use of reason itself, on its own.1
Stanley Hauerwas understands the division slightly differently: ‘‘A desire
(orexis) for Aristotle is simply that aspect of a creature’s action by which it
is moved to an end by which it expects to gain pleasure. Aristotle recognizes
three different species of desire: wish (boulēsis), passion (thumos), and appetite
(epithumia).’’2 By ‘‘pleasure’’ here, Hauerwas could mean generic satisfaction
that takes different forms depending on which species of orexis we have in
mind. But Hauerwas argues that Aristotle erred not only in failing to distinguish intention as an element of action but also in limiting desire to ends
‘‘that give us pleasure. For although boulēsis is desire modified by reason, it
is still limited to desire for ends which give pleasure.’’3 However, since
bouletic states do not anticipate the same kind of satisfaction as appetitive
ones, Hauerwas’s complaint must be that Aristotle limits desire to ends
seen as likely to benefit the agent in some way. If so,4 then this chapter will be
a development of Hauerwas’s point.
To make sense of these concepts, it helps to start by reviewing some
basic themes from Aristotle’s De anima, which distinguishes different kinds
of psyche by the motive-states and kinds of movement they are capable of
causing. There Aristotle’s hierarchy begins with the ‘‘vegetative’’ (or nutritive) and ‘‘locomotive’’ souls. What Aristotle calls vegetative movement, as
in plant growth and the operation of our digestive system, are completely
unconscious operations that we would now regard as complex regulated
feedback mechanisms (let us label these ‘‘D0’’ causes). Such mechanisms
are not moved by conscious desires of even the most basic instinctive sort
(‘‘D1’’). Aristotle does not attribute any movement of a whole animal
within its environment to such nutritive mechanisms, because he assumes
such local movement always requires sensation5 and that sensation is always
conscious.6 Hence Aristotle thinks that local movement requires at least the
sensation of touch and thus a sentient awareness of pleasure and pain that
could cause an appetite at least of the D1 sort, since some kind of (conscious) appetite is needed to cause bodily movement. The ‘‘nutritive faculty’’ cannot be the source of voluntary local movement, because
‘‘movement is always for an end and is accompanied by either imagination
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or appetite [orexis]; for no animal moves except by compulsion unless it has
an impulse towards or away from an object.’’7
Here ‘‘impulse’’ involves some conscious apprehension of the end to be
obtained. Noting that ‘‘Appetite is one form of orexis, a ‘reaching out for’
an object,’’ Nussbaum argues that ‘‘Even the bodily appetites—hunger,
thirst, sexual desire—are seen by Aristotle as forms of intentional awareness, containing a view of their object’’ that can be altered by rational inspection.8 Aristotle did not perceive that some animals move without any
kind of appetite at all, because he did not know about cases of so-called
tropistic behavior that are controlled by a simple mechanism or program that
can go awry and produces aberrant or repeated behavior if its routine is
disturbed.9 Although it need not be, tropistic behavior is usually interpreted
as entirely unconscious in animals—such as insects—in which it predominates.10 This makes it as much a D0 state as the ‘‘hectic activity’’ and adjustments constantly going on in unconscious, automatic systems such as
digestion.11 Aristotle would probably have to count such behavior as compelled or involuntary, although his paradigm case of compulsion is an external force acting on the body.12
In any case, Aristotle holds that all voluntary movement must flow from
some kind of orexis or desire. As Professor Lear summarizes Aristotle’s
explanation in the De anima:
Human action is a species of animal movement. All animal movement, Aristotle argues, must flow from desire [orexis]. Lesser animals
have basic appetites [epithumia] as well as sense perception, and imagination based on their sensory awareness. But their movements would
be incomprehensible on the basis of sensation and imagination
alone.13
Aristotle defends his hierarchy of the different kinds of ‘‘soul’’ by noting
how they form a cumulative system, with ‘‘higher’’ powers always found
with lower ones, but not vice versa. Higher animals with the powers of
calculation, thought, and speculative intuition of universals have all the
powers of lower animals, including imagination, sensation, and basic appetites, but the converse does not hold.14 The ‘‘basic appetites’’ that are shared
between human beings and the simplest animals capable of conscious desire
will therefore include a whole range of conscious impulses that are both
instinctive and linked to physiological needs. These are what I called D1
desires: ‘‘brute urges’’ or impulses that are either intrinsic to the proper
biological functioning of the body, such as hunger, thirst, sexual attraction,
and perhaps certain kinds of disgust or aversions (e.g., to what smells or
tastes foul), or instinctively driven conscious feelings, such as panic in a
flight response. As appetites, of course, they also have intentional content:
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they are for some sort of object (e.g., food) or for some sort of body-related
state (safety from physical threat). But they pull or draw their subject
toward these apprehended objects or states without the need for any rational endorsement of these objects or states as being good for all similarly
situated animals.15 As dispositions to behave in characteristic ways, these
basic urges and inclinations do have biological functions that we can understand (and thus we can discriminate ‘‘normal’’ from ‘‘abnormal’’ or aberrant
versions of these appetites); but this understanding is not necessary for the
envisioned object or state to attract the animal subject to these appetites.
Otherwise put, D1 desires require no cognitive evaluation. Like basic
sense qualia (such as colors and sounds), they are consciously experienceable without any connected linguistic thought or propositional attitudes
(though they may often be accompanied by such thoughts in higher animals
capable of language). On this hypothesis, there is a discernible level of
‘‘feelings’’ that are purely qualitative states, although they are closely connected with physiological reactions. For example, the newborn infant’s first
instinctive urge for milk is conscious but probably without any more articulation than the feeling of an undifferentiated need, though it soon learns to
associate this with whatever sources of milk are provided. However, what
distinguishes D1 impulses proper is not simply the lack of linguistic articulation but their failure to fix any specific object as the source of the desired
gratification. For example, the infant’s urge is not initially toward any one
thing represented as potentially satisfying it but is a pure feeling of need that
is instinctively directed to the right source of satisfaction.
As Plato’s analysis suggested, we can distinguish such D1 appetites in
this impulsive sense as generic ‘‘urges’’ from another kind of state in which
the urge is specified as desire for a particular sort of object seen as likely to
satisfy the urge. In such a case, the agent’s appetite will not be satisfied by
just any object that will satisfy the underlying D1 urge; rather, her appetite
will be (more) satisfied by some relevant subset of this range, and so we
must speak of this as a different desire: for example, a desire for a beer, rather
than raw thirst. It is different not only in specificity but also in the kind of
intentional content it involves. For by itself, the D1 urge is a ‘‘blind’’ conatus:
its subject has virtually no idea what it is an appetite for until instinctual
responses provide him or her with some experience. At least at this level,
we can clearly say, with William Desmond, that ‘‘what desire wants, needs,
and is committed to, is a fulfilling life.’’16 D1 drives aim for the most part
at the biological bases of life (although without conscious judgment about
those bases). Whether all kinds of desire aim at ‘‘life’’ in any more robust
sense remains to be seen.
By contrast, at least some image, sensual memory, or phantasia of the
satisfying object-type is needed for a D2 ‘‘appetite’’ (the broader category
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including what Aristotle calls epithumia). And in human beings, the desired
kind of object or state is also usually named or linguistically recognized
and hence communicable to others. When we think of such D2 appetites
as growing out of some more generic D1 impulse or drive, we say that the
agent has ‘‘acquired a taste’’ for a particular kind of object or state. This
‘‘taste’’ is a new desire, although it would not have arisen were it not for
prior behavior motivated by the unsaturated D1 urge or experiences of this
urge being satisfied. The fundamental difference, then, is that no D2 appetite forms automatically by ‘‘nature’’; although nonhuman animals are also
capable of such appetites, they develop only as the animal’s biologically
innate drives interact with the environment. Because of their specific intentional content, such D2 states can also move us directly to form an intention
that then guides bodily movements, such that the intention and movements
together constitute an ‘‘action’’ (e.g., drinking a beer). Furthermore, by connection with instrumental reasoning, such an intention can anchor a plan of
action, or an encompassing intention that guides a whole series of actions
calculated to reach the desired end (e.g., driving to the store to buy some
beer).
1.2. The Distinction between D2 and D3 Desires
D2 desires thus correspond to what MacIntyre and Anscombe have called
‘‘surd not further to be explained wanting [sic].’’17 Although Anscombe
questions the possibility of such motives and denies that they can figure in
practical reasoning, MacIntyre correctly notes that we can reason from an
object simply ‘‘as wanted,’’ rather than as good in some other way. He points
out that Hume’s alternative system of practical reasoning is based on this
point.18 Thus the category of D2 desires also includes brute preferences, which
are the only motive-state entertained by most contemporary models in rational decision theory. If agent S has a D2 appetite for object O1 that is
(overall) stronger than her D2 appetite for object O2, then we say that she
prefers O1 to O2, but not for any reason other than the relative strengths of
the desires.19 One way of explaining this might be to refer both appetites
to a common root in some D1 state as an unsaturated urge toward a range
of possible satisfying objects. Thus thirst is an instinctive drive, but I learn
to prefer grape juice to lemonade among objects that satisfy the D1 desire.
But this kind of causal explanation is not essential to the notion of a D2
preference or brute ranking.20
It is part of the nature of brute preference-orderings that an agent acting
only on the appetites they represent can (and perhaps even must) pursue
not only her most preferred object but also her next most preferred and on
down until items lower in the order conflict with some above them.21 If my
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strongest desire is to see the opera and my next strongest is to see the
movie, then I might go to the opera first and the movie next, unless they
are playing at the same time. Since their objects are qualified only as desired,
the conflict between such D2 appetites can concern only limitations external to the motives themselves, such as physical or perhaps mental constraints that prevent them from being jointly pursuable. Hence my D2
preference for one over another incompossible object of distinct desires
involves what Charles Taylor has aptly termed ‘‘simple weighing.’’22 In
weighing which object pleases me more, the objects are only subjectively placed
on a scale relative to other objects with the potential to satisfy my appetites.
As a result, the multiple D2 appetites do not conflict essentially because
their contents involve no contrastive evaluations making reference to values
independent of D2 desires. For example, a D2 desire to swim and a D2
desire to eat some cake can conflict only for contingent reasons of circumstance, such as that eating cake gives me a cramp that prevents me from
swimming. As Taylor says, ‘‘Not being contrastively described, these two
desired consummations are incompatible, where they are, only contingently
and circumstantially.’’23
In agreement with MacIntyre, Taylor notes that simple weighing (or D2
appetites) still has sufficient content to ground what he calls ‘‘weak evaluation’’ or strategic analysis to discover contingent incompatibilities between
my appetites, along with an instrumental calculation concerning how to
maximize one’s overall preference-satisfaction. And where there is no incoherence in my preference hierarchy, D2 appetite can sometimes be sufficient
for an instrumental plan to guide a whole course of action.
Consider an example in which a D2 appetite results when Matthew’s
innate sexual impulse (a D1 urge) gets channeled by experience toward a
certain ‘‘type’’ of woman as a potential mate (this ‘‘type’’ being a particular
constellation of physical, stylistic, and personality features that Matthew
might be at least partially able to describe). Now Cheryl, appearing to be a
token of this type, becomes the object of Matthew’s D2 sexual appetite.
Matthew describes this in reassuring terms simply as a desire ‘‘to go out
with Cheryl and get to know her better.’’ Of course, reasons and motivations of quite a different nature certainly might enter into the formation of
an actual intention to ask Cheryl on a first date. But at this point, we are
imagining a case in which all the agent’s acts toward Cheryl are done with
‘‘only one thing in mind’’ and are motivated solely by their instrumental
relation to the likely satisfaction of an appetite for sexual union. Once
Matthew has a plan of action, his prepurposive D2 desire to have sex with
Cheryl provides the motivation to do particular things that are likely to
advance this plan (e.g., he forms the intention to ‘‘call Cheryl tonight’’).
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The purposive motivation to carry out such intentions is transmitted from
the originally prepurposive D2 appetite and so remains on the same level.
Inclinations or appetites in the D2 sense can also be ‘‘final’’ when they
stand at the top of the instrumental chain motivating other more particular
desires. Of course, this does not require that the agent has a settled intention or plan explicitly articulated and mapped out for himself; the relation
of a final prepurposive D2 appetite to appetites for particular things that
will promote the satisfaction of the first appetite may, for the agent, remain
tacit or internally unarticulated. Yet in every case, the D2 appetites or inclinations are distinguished by the fact that intended objects (or mental contents) are purely subjective in the following important sense: they depend on
no evaluations that make a validity claim on others looking for their agreement. Just in
experiencing a D2 appetite (as distinct from acting on it), the agent is not
even implicitly committed to expecting any kind of interpersonal ratification; in some cases, he may not even care if his appetite is intelligible to third
parties.
If past enjoyment has caused me to want to listen to Mozart’s Eine kleine
Nachtmusik, my wanting this does not imply that others should want the
same thing or enjoy hearing the same piece. But if my desire is motivated
by reasons about the music’s qualities of the sort that others should be able
to recognize (for them to count as ‘‘reasons’’ at all), then my desire is not
a D2 appetite, by definition. Such an evaluative desire (or D3 state) thus
automatically includes at least some motivation to communicate faithfully to
other competent evaluators within one’s linguistic community the existence
of the desire and the evaluation of the desired object upon which it is based.
To ‘‘want’’ something in this distinctive sense is eo ipso to want our desire for
it to be justified by the facts about the object—something that in principle
should be recognizable by others, at least if they are sufficiently similar in
competencies and experience. Like any concern for projects on which one
could base an intelligible sense of one’s practical identity, D3 desire involves an implicit validity claim and the related reference to an intersubjectively recognizable ‘‘horizon of significance’’ that does not itself arise from
or depend on the agent’s desires.24
Contrast this with Matthew’s case, in which he may want Cheryl to
understand his desire to go out with her so that she agrees to the date, but
his reasons for communicating his D2 appetite to her are purely strategic;
he is not rationally committed to her agreeing that he should choose her
on some objective criteria of merit. Nor, for his purposes, need he want her
to think that she has good reasons to go out with him or that he is in some
objective sense worthy of being desired: he only needs her to share the same
brute preference for a date. Hence, in most cases at least, the content of
D2 desires is communicable; but if the D2 desire itself motivates the agent
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to communicate its existence to others, it can motivate this only strategically
as a means to its own satisfaction. And thus, unsurprisingly, D2 appetites
may often motivate the agent subject to them to hide their existence or
misrepresent them to others instead. In these respects, all D2 appetites
function exactly like ‘‘brute preferences’’ in standard rational decision theory;25 one person’s preference for chocolate ice cream involves no claim
whatsoever about what flavor of ice cream another person should prefer.
My telling the soda-shop waiter that I would like chocolate is (considered
by itself ) just strategic action—though I might do it in a polite way for
moral reasons. Similarly, as Cooper points out, for Aristotle nonrational
desires may involve propositional content, but their apprehension of the
apparent good does not rest on any chain of reasoning showing it to be
good.26
So even though they are routinely communicated, and this is basic to the
coordination of much human interaction, D2 appetites involve no ‘‘validity
claim,’’ or implicit reference to normative standards of warrant, nor any
implicit acceptance of the burden to provide reasons for the desire to others
in a critical exchange. It is not even essential to the experience of a D2
desire that others be able to understand what a D2 appetite means to its
subject—though this may often be required by a derivative instrumental
need that the subject has for others to help him in satisfying his desire. For
example, I need the chef to understand my preference for a ‘‘medium-welldone’’ steak so that he knows how to cook it the ‘‘way I like it.’’ But if the
chef is presumptuous enough to ask me why I want my steak this way, when
everyone of cultured taste knows that it is best medium-rare (since this
allows the full flavor to emerge, etc.), there is no answer I could give. My
preference, though it is cognitively specific rather than an unsaturated instinctual urge, is not motivated by any reasons with normative force, so it
is not on the same level as the type of aesthetic evaluation with which the
chef is challenging it. A being who was capable only of D2 appetites would
be as deaf to the chef ’s appeal as my cat is to my frustrated plea that his
pill is good for him in an objective biological sense.
Of course, since a normal human being is not like the cat in this respect,
in practice D2 appetites may often be psychologically associated with other
states that involve more objective evaluation. Even Cheryl’s belief that Matthew is ‘‘cute’’ might qualify, since this involves a judgment that others
could share if it is warranted, and this in turn motivates certain reactive
dispositions in her, such as disagreement, anger, surprise, or even resentment toward her friends when they most firmly deny that Matthew is
‘‘cute.’’ Of course, ‘‘cute’’ is a vague term, and it may often be used to
indicate a brute preference; but I am imagining that in Cheryl’s case it does
not express a sheer subjective preference for Matthew, however intimately
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connected it might be to other merely D2 appetites in her psyche. There
are many polysemic evaluative terms, such as ‘‘cute,’’ which have no particular ethical significance, but whose application often seems to involve an
evaluative attitude with more robust reason-giving significance than brute
preferences.
One might object to this analysis on the grounds that all desires give us
some sort of reason to act, namely a reason to satisfy the desire. Against this
objection, I note Gary Watson’s insight that
any desire may provide the basis for a reason in so far as the nonsatisfaction of the desire causes suffering and hinders the pursuit of
ends of the agent. But it is important to notice that the reason generated in this way is a reason for getting rid of the desire, and one may
get rid of a desire either by satisfying it or by eliminating it in some
other manner (by tranquilizers, or cold showers). Hence this kind of
reason differs importantly from the reasons based upon the evaluation of the activities or states of affairs in question. For in the former
case, attaining the object of desire is simply a means of eliminating
discomfort or agitation, whereas in the latter, that attainment is the
end itself.27
This gives us another way of explaining the distinction between D1-D2
states and D3 evaluative desires. Watson’s point is that a D1 or D2 desire
for an object whose ‘‘goodness’’ is apprehended only in its brute power to
draw our practical attention toward it can be said to generate a minimal
disjunctive ‘‘reason’’ either to satisfy the desire or get rid of it, whereas D3
states or ‘‘valuations’’ generate non-disjunctive reasons to pursue the desired
object or goal.
Mark Murphy makes essentially the same point in his critique of contemporary desire-fulfillment models of welfare: whereas something (x)’s
being an aspect of one’s well-being ‘‘always provides a reason for one to act
to secure x,’’ merely having a ‘‘desire for x’’ gives the agent ‘‘only a reason
to secure x or to rid him- or herself of the desire for x.’’ As Murphy
argues, even idealized versions of the desire-fulfillment model (e.g., with
full information conditions) will be subject to this criticism:
For since all genuine strong subjectivist theories do not discriminate
among desires on the basis of content, it will be possible for bizarre
and pointless desires, like a fundamental desire to avoid touching
brown boxes, to persist or even to be made present for the first time
in one’s preferred hypothetical desire situation. But these are desires
that one has no reason to try to satisfy, no matter how well-informed
the agent that has them; the most one might have reason to do is
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either to [try to] satisfy them or to rid oneself of those desires. This
would be enough to show that strong subjectivism is a false view.28
This critique works because strong subjectivist theories about well-being
define it entirely in terms of the satisfaction of what I have called D1- and
D2-type desires—although the idealizing conditions in modified versions
of this approach are (unsuccessful) ad hoc attempts to force the rational
desiderata of D3 desires into D2 preferences. Likewise, an objective list
conception of well-being tries to specify the goods that we have objective
reason to desire in the D3 sense. Taylor’s point that such desires involve
‘‘strong evaluations’’ can then be rephrased as the point that D3 desires
involve and express the agent’s defeasible judgments about what constitutes
his objective well-being. That is why, in D3 desires, a non-disjunctive reason to attain the end motivates the desire for the object; as Watson says,
‘‘We aim to satisfy, not just eliminate, [rational] desire.’’29
It also explains why D3 desires have to be learned through experience
and/or teaching: unlike innate drives, the relevant reasons for regarding the
object as desirable or the ability to apply language involving strong evaluative
contrasts must be acquired. Hence MacIntyre can say that ‘‘This type of
educated desire is what Aristotle calls boulēsis as contrasted with nonrational
emotion, thumos and appetite, epithumia.’’30
These points clarify the distinction sketched in chapter 4 between subjective D2 appetites and D3 desires that involve evaluative attitudes or
judgments concerning the objective value of the desired object that imply
the existence of in-principle intersubjectively shareable reasons for the judgment. We can sum up the differences we have identified as follows:
1. As we saw in the analysis of Plato’s Republic, drawing on Gary
Watson’s distinction between valuing and mere wanting, D3 desires
give their subject reasons to pursue their objects and to maintain the
desire itself (since they qualify their object as objectively desirable),
whereas D2 appetites give their subject only disjunctive reasons to satisfy them or to eliminate them.
2. Drawing on Charles Taylor’s related distinction, D3 desires involve contrastive or strong evaluations that not simply rank good objects
of desire higher than bad ones on the scale of cardinal comparisons.
D2 appetites constitute brute preferences, in which there is a simple
weighing of the preferred object over other options.
3. Drawing on Jürgen Habermas’s idea that normative judgments
are distinguished by their illocutionary force as implicit validity claims
on the free rational agreement of other competent evaluators, we saw
that D3 desires involve what the agent takes to be reasons for a
categorical positive evaluation of the desired object that should be
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rationally endorsable by others irrespective of their particular D2
preferences.
By describing the positive evaluation of the desired object as ‘‘categorical,’’ I mean here that it need not depend on the object having any instrumental value toward the satisfaction of desires that the agent has and others
might not share. The agent moved by a D3 desire is rationally committed
to a willingness in principle to explain the reasons for his desire to others
who, irrespective of individuating psychological differences, should be able
to understand why the agent is moved by these reasons and endorse these as
reasons for desiring the object.31 However, for D3 desires, this still requires
all the agent’s relevant interlocutors to share the fundamental desire for
well-being or for the good in the generic sense of ‘‘flourishing.’’ This is why
Plato’s Meno describes such ‘‘good’’ things as beneficial and ‘‘bad’’ things as
harmful or injurious (Meno 77A–E). Thus, following a medieval schema,
we may add as a fourth condition that:
4. D3 desires are for some object or state of affairs (X), where X
is apprehended in its aspect as valuable to us (or as good for us) in some
respect for reasons (Y) related to human well-being. In short, X contributes in some way to human flourishing.
The phenomenal quality of being motivated to gain or realize X may be
conscious without explicit reflection on reasons Y, but such reasons are
implicit in the D3 desire and should be discursively articulable on reflection
(by a competent interpreter)32 in such a way as to draw forth an agent’s
agreement that this is indeed ‘‘why she wanted X.’’ Some D3 desires may
depend on more explicitly made comparative judgments (e.g., that V is better
than W in some respect). But what is common to them all is that the
evaluative attitude—the apprehension of X as good or valuable—usually
straightaway involves motivation to form the intention to act so as to realize X, unless other motivational states interrupt, override, or counteract it.
This is not a claim that reasons for X external to the agent’s existing motives immediately motivate her, since I assume that the general desire for
well-being is in place. Given this orientation, the agent’s desire for X flows
smoothly out of her evaluation of X, although the latter may involve
lengthy deliberation and even discussion of its merits with others. In theories that recognize only states up to and including D3 states, decision or
choice is usually construed as deliberation about which D3-desired objects
to pursue now, and it works by clarifying and comparing our evaluations
so that one option in our available range emerges as better (either intrinsically, or as a means to our prior ends, or both), which makes it more
‘‘desirable’’ as a result.

................. 16406$

$CH5

05-23-07 10:56:08

PS

PAGE 132

Aristotelian Desires and the Problems of Egoism

133

Thus we may think of D3 desires as syntheses of a value judgment and
the attraction toward the apprehended object that this value tends to stir
up in the agent. This is quite different from the kind of internal connection
between evaluative conviction and motivation to act accordingly that Humean noncognitivists recognize, however, for, strictly speaking, Humean
moral psychology does not allow for D3 desires at all. Humean accounts
of motivation as rooted in noncognitive sources usually characterize all desires in the D2 fashion: for example, David Lewis says that desires are not
blind urges, since they can connect with beliefs about the means that will
bring us what we want, but the wanting itself expresses only subjective
expected value, not objective ‘‘choiceworthiness.’’33 As Lewis summarizes
the Humean claim, ‘‘our actions serve our subjective expected value according to our subjective degrees of belief.’’34 On this model, ‘‘belief serves
desire’’ only by generating an expected value for a less specific proposition
A out of the values for the more specific cases that A covers or includes.35
Other than these additive connections in the desire calculus, there are no
necessary connections between beliefs (such as objective value-beliefs) and
desires:
If there are universal correlations between certain beliefs and certain
desires, that too is a contingent matter. Someone might have no desire
at all for joy, knowledge, or love. Someone might believe just what
you and I believe, and still have no desire at all for joy, knowledge,
or love. Indeed, someone might believe just what G. E. Moore believed about the simple, non-natural properties of these things and
still have no desire for them.36
The familiar anti-Humean who maintains the possibility of D3 desires
in which the desire necessarily follows from a given evaluative belief can
grant that what Lewis says is true for D2 inclinations or preferences. But
in Lewis’s subsequent arguments against various anti-Humean alternatives,
he seems to think that Humeanism could be false only if the role of ‘‘desire’’
as a folk-psychological concept itself required that something standing in
necessary connection to beliefs should count as a ‘‘desire.’’37 For example,
the simplest anti-Humean theory that Lewis critiques just equates desires
with certain credences or beliefs that they require—a theory that he maintains generates contradictions whenever the credences involved are less than
certain.38
However, in contrast, my schema for D3 desires does not build in a
necessary connection between the evaluative beliefs and the motivational
state, although some conceptions of desires in the D3 sense would add this
feature. For our D3 desire to be distinct from a D2 preference or inclination, it need only be a state in which the agent is motivated to pursue some
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end because of her evaluation (E) of its objective value or choiceworthiness.
This implies the counterfactual that if she lacked E, then she would not
have the relevant D3 desire, but not the counterfactual that if she lacked the
desire, she would lack E. So the evaluation is possible in principle without
the desire, but when present, the desire embodies the evaluation. This
model also leaves open the possibility that without E, the agent might have
a quite different D2 desire for her object, which gives her object a high
expected utility or preference-satisfaction value from her perspective. When
she has E, she might well have D3 and D2 simultaneously, and she might
also have D3 without D2. So the presence or absence of D2 varies independently of E, and any connection they have would be contingent, since E is
not what motivates a subjective preference or mere inclination like D2. By
contrast, the evaluative desire D3 requires E as its counterfactually necessary condition.
Aristotelian anti-Humeans sometimes write as if D3 desires automatically
follow from objective value judgments; when coupled with the prudential
capacity to make reliable judgments about what contributes to flourishing,
the disposition to such desires is sometimes offered as an analysis of virtue.
But there is evidence to show that the connection between ‘‘pure’’ evaluative
attitudes and D3 desires is not this tight. If it is possible to evaluate some
object or end X as valuable or good in some respect (as healthy, beautiful,
noble, etc.) without any accompanying desire for it (or aversion to it), then
evaluative attitudes can be distinguished from D3 desires or action-oriented
motives that evaluations often accompany.39 Some forms of ‘‘internalism’’
are construed so as to deny this possibility when the D3 desire is grounded
in moral considerations. But, as Alfred Mele argues in a recent article, the
phenomenon of ‘‘listlessness,’’ which ‘‘consists in the total absence of motivation to engage in activities that formerly were matters of deep personal
concern,’’40 is possible despite the persistence of moral beliefs or convictions. In such conditions—for example, perhaps in a serious depression—an agent may have the evaluative attitude which is normally
embodied straightaway in a D3 desire, but now she does not experience
this motivation. Aristotle also implies the possibility of such states in one
of his arguments that ‘‘mind’’ [nous] cannot be the cause of forward ‘‘local
movement’’:
Further, neither can the calculative faculty or what is called ‘‘mind’’
[nous] be the cause of such movement; for mind as speculative never
thinks what is practicable, it never says anything about an object to
be avoided or pursued, while this movement is always in something
which is avoiding or pursuing an object. No, not even when it is
aware of such an object does it at once enjoin pursuit or avoidance
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of it; e.g., the mind often thinks of something terrifying or pleasant
without enjoining the emotion of fear. It is the heart that is moved
(or in the case of a pleasant object some other part).41
Thus Aristotle also seems to recognize pure speculative evaluations that,
although they are about actionable values, may not be motivating in themselves without our general desire for happiness standing behind them. Instead, Aristotle says, ‘‘mind practical’’ is ‘‘capable of originating local
movement,’’ but only by calculating means to ends given by desire (in the
general sense of orexis), ‘‘for that which is the object of appetite [orexis] is
the stimulant of mind practical.’’42 This suggests that without the underlying desire for happiness, the evaluations that figure in boulēses would not be
motivating. In support of this point, Cooper also recognizes that in the De
anima, Aristotle holds that nous and dianoia by themselves do not produce
motivation except when coupled with some form of orexis, which may be
boulēsis, that is, rational desire.43 Following McDowell, we may construe
this orektic state as an embracing ‘‘conception of how to live’’ that is inseparable from uncodifiable evaluative judgments about the good, but the cognitive and conative sides of this gestalt remain formally distinct.44
1.3. D2 and D3 Desiderative States in Aristotle
Given this conviction that all types of desire-states share the formal erosiac
structure, it is easier to understand why Aristotle insists on the unity of
‘‘appetite’’ (orexis) as one general power of the soul with diverse manifestations. As we have already seen, Aristotle repeatedly links lower ‘‘desires’’
(epithumia) to sensation and immediate physical gratification; if an animal
has ‘‘sensation, then necessarily also imagination and appetition, for where
there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, and where these, necessarily also desire.’’45 Hunger and thirst are typical instances of such epithumetic desire,46 and since epithumetic desires arise in response to ‘‘feelings
of pleasure and pain,’’47 they are not influenced by long-run considerations
but only by ‘‘what is just at hand: a pleasant object which is just at hand
presents itself as pleasant and good, without condition in either case, because of want of foresight.’’48 Desire in this epithumetic sense seems to be
ambiguous between what we have described as raw biological urges without
representation (D1) and inclinations that are directed to preferred objects
(D2).
To link Aristotle’s conception of desire to the foregoing analysis, it will
help to subdivide further the D2 category into those desires that arise directly from the specification of instinctive impulses by intending particular
objects represented as satisfying these impulses, and other ‘‘preferences’’
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that have specific intentional content without objective evaluation claims
but are not simple specifications of generalized urges. In both cases, instinct
alone is insufficient to explain the D2 desire, since there are other objects
that might satisfy our instinctive urges besides the objects we actually desire.
But a D2 desire for chocolate ice cream represents something as pleasant in
a way more closely linked to satisfaction of a biological urge than, say, a
desire to read biographies (as opposed to romance novels). Yet the latter
stands on the D2 level if it involves no evaluation that makes a claim on
others or invokes no principle with interpersonal significance. Let us call
the former ‘‘biologically grounded inclinations’’ and the latter ‘‘culturally
grounded inclinations.’’49
In his attempt to distinguish desires from ‘‘valuations,’’ Watson makes a
point relevant to this subdivision of the D2 category. He notes that desires
other than ‘‘appetitive or passionate desires’’ (e.g., those for a particular kind
of food or sexual partner) may exhibit ‘‘independence of evaluation,’’50
meaning that we can experience them ‘‘against our will’’ or ‘‘unfreely.’’ For
example:
One may be disinclined to move away from one’s family, the thought
of doing so being accompanied with compunction; yet this disinclination may rest solely upon acculturation rather than upon a current
judgment of what one is to do. . . . Or, taking another example, one
may have been habituated to think that divorce is to be avoided in
all cases, even though one sees no justification for maintaining one’s
marriage. In both of these cases, the attitude has its basis solely in
acculturation and exists independently of the agent’s judgment.51
These aversions as Watson construes them are culturally grounded inclinations rather than D3 desires; even though they seem ‘‘more akin to evaluation than to appetite’’ since they may be expressed in evaluative language,52
they are only habitual preferences lacking the strong evaluation involved in
D3 desires. There are presumably many similar preferences and inclinations
that have cognitive content without objective evaluative significance and yet
remain only distantly related to innate biological instincts and the impulses
they generate.
On this analysis, Aristotle’s sense of ‘‘desire’’ as epithumia lines up with
biologically grounded inclinations, while his notion of ‘‘passions’’ seems
closer to culturally grounded preferences and the feelings that go with them.
His conception of epithumia emphasizes what such D2 inclinations have in
common with raw D1 states: namely, an intimate connection to bodily
needs, biological instincts, and physiological alterations produced by physical stimuli. Now, D2 inclinations on my analysis need not be motivated
ultimately by the pursuit of physical pleasure or avoidance of physical pain;
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as Elliott Sober and David Wilson note, ‘‘hunger sometimes accompanies
the desire to eat,’’ but not always: ‘‘Desires need not be accompanied by
disagreeable sensations that disappear once the desire is satisfied.’’53 It is
important to understand that the erosiac model does not conceive all appetitive pull as a physical feeling of attraction. In D3 desires, the sense of lack
need not be felt as ‘‘painful’’ at all, although it remains a disturbance seeking
requital. Some D2 states may be brute preferences without any immediate
link to visceral sensations. Yet in the epithumetic subcategory of D2 states,
this physiological connection will hold.54
However, as we have seen, desire in this sense as epithumia is only one of
three species of orexis for Aristotle:
If any order of living things has the sensory, it must also have the
appetitive [orektikon]; for appetite is the genus of which desire [epithumia], passion [pathos], and wish [boulēsis] are the species; now all
animals have one sense at least, viz. touch, and whatever has a sense
has a capacity for pleasure and pain, and therefore has pleasant and
painful objects present to it, and wherever these are present, there is
desire, for desire is just appetition of what is pleasant.55
Orexis (here translated as ‘‘appetite’’), Aristotle’s general term for any
state of motivation, thus emphasizes the connection between these different
types of desire. In his critique of thinkers who divide the soul into only the
‘‘calculative, the passionate, and the desiderative [or epithumetic],’’ Aristotle
takes it as a reductio of their position that they cannot treat orexis in general
as one of the basic faculties:
It is absurd to break up the last-mentioned faculty, as these thinkers
do, for wish is to be found in the calculative part and desire and
passion in the irrational, and if the soul is tripartite appetite [orexis]
will be found in all three parts.56
The point is just that each of Plato’s ‘‘parts’’ has its own form of longing, or orexis: ‘‘wish’’ is motivation produced by the rational part of the
soul, while ‘‘passion’’ is the motivation produced by the spirited part, and
epithumetic desire is the motivation produced by the lowest part of the tripartite soul (bodily drives and sensory inclinations). Aristotle holds that it is
more relevant to treat orexis as a unified faculty (the orektikon) because otherwise it would cut across the tripartite soul, leaving each of Plato’s three
parts with both motivational and nonmotivational aspects, which would be
peculiar. On the tripartite account, mind would then engage in speculative
thinking but also in wishing, and the lowest part would engage in sensation
but also in epithumesis. To Aristotle, it makes more sense to treat mind, sensation, and appetite in general [orexis] as the basic types of soul, thus allowing
all forms of motivation to be rooted in a single faculty:
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That which moves therefore is a single faculty and [is] the faculty of
appetite [orexis]. . . . As it is, mind is never found producing movement without appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when
movement is produced according to calculation it is also according
to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation,
for desire [epithumia] is a form of appetite. Now mind is always right,
but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong. That is
why, though in any case it is the object of appetite which originates
movement, this object may be either the real or the apparent good.57
The tripartist could respond that ‘‘appetite,’’ or orexis, divides into three
forms corresponding to his three parts, but the result would be messy, for
it would leave us with six parts of the soul. Commenting on this passage,
Lear says:
we find wishes in the part of the soul which reasons about how to
act, and we find desires in the ‘‘irrational’’ part of the soul: for example, the basic appetites for food and sex. . . . It seems that either
Aristotle must give up the idea that the soul has parts, or he must
find a way of conceiving the source of movement to be a single part
of the soul. He chooses the latter option. There appear, he says, to
be two sources of movement, practical mind and appetite. Practical
mind differs from theoretical mind in that it is concerned with how
a desire can be satisfied. . . . Aristotle located both practical mind and
appetite within a single faculty of the soul responsible for movement:
the desiring part [to orektikon].58
Thus Lear, like most Aristotle scholars, portrays Aristotle as holding a
fundamentally bipartite model of the human soul (ignoring the vegetative
part), within one of which there are two basic types of motivation, one
irrational and the other amenable to reason (with passions in between):
The Appetitive Soul [orektikon]

The Rational Soul [nous]

appetite passion practical mind deliberate choice speculative mind
(epithumia) ( pathos) (boulēsis)
( prohairesis)
(nous)
(Rational Appetite)
However, the previous passage from the De anima clearly suggests that
wish can be for an object that appears to be but is not actually good,
implying that ‘‘wish’’ is not, strictly speaking, part of reason or nous. This
may not mean that ‘‘practical mind’’ is simply part of orexis but rather that
wish is the aspect of orexis that connects mind to motivation, which combined
make rational appetite. Thus in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that
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the ‘‘irrational element’’ of the soul includes both nutritive and appetitive
divisions, and the latter (or at least part of it) ‘‘shares in a rational principle’’59 since in continent, temperate, and brave men it obeys or ‘‘is in some
sense persuaded by reason.’’60 If this is right, then ‘‘practical mind’’ or ‘‘intellectual appetite’’ does seem to form a kind of ‘‘middle soul’’ between the
strictly rational and strictly irrational in Aristotle’s conception, although it
is a compound middle soul (as I argued in the earlier discussion of prohairesis).
Aristotle’s division of the soul is contested among interpreters, but for
my purposes, the crucial point is that Aristotle attempts to find one universal structure for all motivation on the model initially furnished in Plato’s
Lysis and Meno: namely, the teleological schema in which movement or action is the result of the agent’s being drawn by an object apprehended as
‘‘good’’ in some way—real or apparent. His understanding of ‘‘wish’’ (boulēsis) or the motivation produced in ‘‘practical mind’’ is obviously similar to
the four-part schema for D3 desires given above.61 But ‘‘desires,’’ or biological inclinations in the form of D1 or D2 states, are supposed to have a
similar structure: the object appears as pleasant first, and the agent is drawn
toward it like a beacon second (in logical though not necessarily temporal
order). Thus while ‘‘wishes’’ have real evaluative contents (as in my D3
schema), and epithumetic ‘‘desires’’ are mere D2 states with representational
content but no evaluative interpersonal significance, Aristotle says they are
linked by the fact that in both cases, ‘‘the object of appetite [orexis] starts a
movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement, the object
of appetite being to it a source of stimulation.’’62
Aristotle’s insight is that what both D2 and D3 states have in common
is their magnetic form or, in Platonic terms, their basic erosiac sense of a
lack, or incompleteness, in the presence of an object that seems to promise
completion or satisfaction of the lack. The agent is thus stimulated by and
drawn toward this object. As Lear says (using the term ‘‘desire’’ widely for
orexis in general):
There must be something which moves animals to move, and this
motive force is desire. Desire and animal movement have a similar
structure: desire is desire for an object which the animal is lacking, an
animal movement is directed toward the object of desire. . . . Humans
distinguish themselves from other animals by their ability to think
and by the fact that in addition to appetites [epithumia] they have more
sophisticated desires—for example, the desire to understand. Human
action cannot be understood merely as an attempt to satisfy basic
appetites.63
Yet the lack structure shared by all the different species of appetite is the
reason why, as Lear emphasizes, awareness of an appetite is an essential part
of the motivational state itself.64
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Hence, like Plato’s dialogues, Aristotle’s treatises support the idea that,
although they differ in the status of their cognitive content, preferential
inclinations and evaluative desires share two important features: (1) the
attraction of the object as represented or intended is primary, while the
subjective feeling of the agent is secondary in response to the object; and
(2) the object is desired because realizing it not only contributes to wellbeing but does so in the particular sense of fulfilling a want or tending to
restore the agent to a kind of equilibrium of which the desire itself is a
disturbance (or ‘‘affection’’ in the archaic sense). These two features make up
what I call the fundamental structure of ‘‘desire-as-lack.’’
1.4. D2 and D3 States in MacIntyre’s Moral Psychology
Interesting support for this reading of Aristotle may be found in the fact
that Alasdair MacIntyre’s model of human motivation takes Aristotle’s theory of motivation as I describe it to be sufficient to account for the phenomena. In his Carus Lectures, MacIntyre describes the process by which
human beings achieve their natural telos, becoming ‘‘independent practical
reasoners’’ (his alternative to Kantian autonomy), as one in which human
agents learn to ‘‘stand back’’ from their given desires and evaluate them.65
This means that human beings can have reasons for their actions with a kind
of normative significance unavailable to other acting animals—the kind of
significance that Korsgaard roots in practical reflection (see chap. 3, sec.
3.3). Like Korsgaard, MacIntyre says that to have a reason justifying one’s
actions, it is never sufficient simply to have a desire that the act seems likely
to satisfy:
Why not? Because it is always relevant to ask why I should at this
particular time in these particular circumstances choose to act on this
particular desire rather than on some other. At any particular time I
have some range of projects, of goals, and of desires. So when I propose to myself to act on this particular desire, I have to ask ‘‘Is it at
this time and in these particular circumstances best to act so as to
satisfy this particular desire.’’66
The difference, for MacIntyre, consists in the fact that practical reflection can recognize goods as objective components of well-being in a way
that D2 appetites cannot. This makes possible a kind of practical comparison other than brute preference-ordering. Goods internal to practices and
social roles are one kind of intrinsic good,67 but the most comprehensive
standpoint of practical reflection seeks to order these goods, along with the
satisfaction of D2 desires, with human flourishing as its ultimate end and
standard:
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We therefore need to distinguish between what it is that makes certain goods goods and goods to be valued for their own sake from
what it is that makes it good for this particular individual or this
particular society in this particular situation to make them the object
of his or her or their effective practical regard. And our judgments
about how it is best for an individual or a community to order the
goods in their lives exemplify this third type of ascription, one
whereby we judge unconditionally about what it is best for individuals or groups to be or do or have.68
Unlike Korsgaard and other neo-Kantians, then, MacIntyre insists that
rational evaluation of D2 desires is itself ultimately motivated by the embracing D3 desire for our flourishing. The categorical or unconditional
imperatives that serve as standards for evaluating given appetites are imperatives of flourishing, and the kind of reflection that characterizes independent practical reasoners is motivated by and serves the purpose of attaining
eudaimonia. Thus MacIntyre explicitly rejects the Kantian idea that autonomous practical reflection might transcend erosiac motivation entirely:
It is not of course that the child becomes able to act without desire.
The notion of acting without desire is itself a phantasy and a dangerous one. It is rather that the child becomes open to considerations
regarding its good. It develops a desire for doing, being, and having
what it is good for it to do, be, and have.69
In other words, it develops D3 desire and the ability to distinguish this
from mere D2 appetite.
Learning this distinction depends in part on recognizing that what is
best for my well-being is partly a matter of expert knowledge about which
I lack the kind of automatic authority that I enjoy concerning the experience of my D2 appetites: ‘‘I am not similarly authoritative in respect of
judgments about what it is good or best for me to do or be or have.’’70 The
‘‘transformation of the child’s desires and passions’’ through habituation
involves modifying ‘‘infantile’’ forms of her or his desires,71 which depends
on involving her or him in ‘‘a set of social relationships which are not at all
of her or his own making’’ at the beginning.72 In part, this transformation
works by developing the child’s ability to imagine ‘‘different or alternative
futures’’ involving ‘‘different and alternative sets of goods to be achieved,
with different possible modes of flourishing.’’73 This is because ‘‘learning
how to detach oneself from one’s immediate desires’’ depends on evaluating
their causal relationship to a ‘‘range of goods . . . presented by alternative
futures,’’74 which will be the objects of D3 desires.
It is significant that nothing in MacIntyre’s account requires us to move
beyond Aristotle’s model of human motivation (although we have to add
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the concept of intention to his theory of action, as well as libertarian freedom based on comparative judgment). A form of practical wisdom based
on D3 desire is the highest element in the tale he tells concerning how we
become independent practical reasoners. Thus his theory remains formally
(though obviously not materially) egoistic in structure:
What I become able to do, if I acquire an adequate sense of self, is
to put in question the relationship between my present set of desires
and motives and my good. What constitutes a good reason for my
doing this rather than that, for my acting from this particular desire
rather than that, is that my doing this rather than that serves my good,
will contribute to my flourishing qua human being.75
This reference to the agent’s own good confirms that MacIntyre’s theory
of practical reasoning stays within the limits of eudaimonism, and this is
why the kinds of objective reasons for acting on a desire that he allows are
only those that figure in D3 desires, not projective motives. A ‘‘desire for
x’’ is ‘‘a desire for what it is good and best for me to desire’’76 only if so
desiring is consistent with my happiness or flourishing (holistically understood); this must be the final measure in any formally egoistic theory.
2. Formal and Material Egoism
We have seen that a more robust model of D1, D2, and D3 desires seems
to account for all the motives in the moral psychology of the De anima (as
well as in MacIntyre’s model). As a result, Aristotle seems to be committed
to the weak erosiac thesis and, given his analysis of prohairesis, also to the
Transmission principle. If the argument so far is correct, then Aristotle’s
moral psychology involves much the same formal egoism that we found in
Plato’s Symposium. However, this has to be carefully distinguished from the
kind of psychological and moral egoism that the Sophist school defended.
As Bernard Williams writes:
neither Plato nor Aristotle thought of the ethical life as a device that
increased selfish satisfactions. Their outlook is formally egoistic, in
the sense that they suppose that they have to show each person that
he has good reason to live ethically, and the reason has to appeal to
that person in terms of something about himself, how and what he
will be if he is a person with that sort of character. But their outlook
is not egoistic in the sense that they try to show that the ethical life
serves some set of individual satisfactions which is well defined before
ethical considerations appear.77
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This distinction between formal and material egoism is crucial but needs
to be clearer than Williams makes it here. In the following sections I will
suggest a way of understanding this distinction, consider a famous paradox
that undermines material egoism, and explain how formal egoism purports
to avoid it. This will prepare us for the critique of eudaimonism in
chapter 7.
2.1. Formal Egoism and Satisfaction
As with Plato, Aristotle’s own version of the erosiac thesis commits him to
a type of formal egoism. For in both subjective D1-D2 desires and objectively evaluative D3 desires, the agent aims at a pleasure or a good that can
in some way be appropriated into his own being; this is the basic teleological structure or formal direction essential to orektic desire. It is part of the
noematic structure or formal meaning of an end desired in any of these senses that
achieving it implies restoring a kind of motivational equilibrium or harmony which is experienced as lacking in the salience of that end. This is
not to say that this ‘‘equilibrium’’ or ‘‘requiting of a felt incompleteness’’ is
a separate end to which the object of desire is an instrumental means, but
rather to say that an essential aspect of any orektically desired end is its
relation to the agent’s completion. The character of the motivation experienced in these diverse states is always such that its intentional correlate
appears under the aspect of an ‘‘object that fulfills a lack,’’ however else this
content and the kind of ‘‘lack’’ it involves may differ. For example, I have
a D2 inclination for ‘‘a beer-as-quenching-thirst’’ or I have a D3 desire for
‘‘education as a means to knowledge-that-I-lack.’’ A desire for X in any
orektic mode involves a sense on the part of its agent, however vague and
perhaps unarticulated, that accomplishing or gaining X will requite an incompleteness or restore him to a state of psychic balance or holistic
equilibrium.
The type of ‘‘satisfaction’’ this involves differs quite substantially between D1, D2, and D3 states: in the case of both brute urge gratifications
and the fulfillment of more fine-grained or discriminating inclinations, the
satisfying object or state simply attracts without being qualified by any
objective judgment about its agent-neutral properties (the sort of qualification found in evaluative desire). Thus the agent’s reflective judgment that
the goal of a D1 or D2 desire will be satisfying to her is subjective or desiredependent in a way that the judgments involved in D3 desires are not; for in
D3 desires, the goal attracts only because it is first judged to be the kind of
thing that would satisfy our nature and needs, whether we had any appetite
for it or not. Nevertheless, in all these cases, the agent’s original ‘‘upsurge’’
toward the goal, or first-personal experience of motivation to act, involves
a sense of some kind of deficiency in her well-being; it is an anticipation of
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filling in an absence. D1, D2, and D3 states share this structure of a ‘‘pull’’ on
the agent: the agent is initially passive and is moved from her stasis by
something that attracts or pulls her toward it; so, speaking loosely, we could
say that her motivation is a being-pulled-along. In dynamic terms, ‘‘endpull’’ rather than ‘‘agent-push’’ is primary in all forms of orexis.
As a result, there is an important sense in which the satisfaction that the
end appears likely (or is judged) to cause for the agent is an essential part
of what is desired in D1-D3 states. I will refer to this as ‘‘satisfaction internal
to the object of desire.’’ Given their erosiac structure, it would be misleading to say that in these states, (a) the agent is simply motivated to pursue
some end E, and (b) as a result, obtaining or realizing E will produce satisfaction as an external consequence distinct from E. Perhaps there is a sense in
which (a) and (b) hold for any possible kind of human motivation, if only
because human beings naturally enjoy effectiveness in pursuit of their goals.
I will call this satisfaction related to competence, which is an external effect
of getting whatever we want or intend just because we want it or have
formed the intention to pursue it, the by-product satisfaction of practical effectiveness. It is one kind of by-product satisfaction that may pertain to success in
action on the basis of virtually any type of first-order motive. Perhaps we
also gain some by-product satisfaction from receiving by luck what we
desire, but generally this is much less satisfying, especially if the desired end
is one that can be realized by processes other than luck.
Now, to internalize either of these by-product satisfactions into the object of our desire would obviously signal confusion, since they are positive
feelings that can be achieved only by desiring and effectively pursuing something else for its own sake. This was Francis Hutcheson’s insight in his
version of an argument against hedonistic egoism, which is also found in
Bishop Butler:
According to Hutcheson, the pleasures of satisfying our desires presuppose the existence of the very desires which are directed upon
some object or event other than pleasure, . . . if desires could be
aroused with the view to obtaining the joys of their own gratification,
then the most fantastic desires could be aroused . . . just by the
thought of the pleasures which would be gained if I were to have and
gratify these desires. . . . Similarly, it is logically impossible for a
desire to have as its object its own gratification.78
This is surely correct, for if gratification were the original motive, then
a rational agent would want above all else to cultivate whatever set of firstorder desires provide the most intense combination of gratifications when
satisfied, relative to the opportunity to satisfy them in his circumstances.
So if the desire to eat mud produces significant gratification in those who
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have the desire and satisfy it, and the agent lives near loamy fields, then he
would desire to eat mud for an easy high; similarly for the masochistic
desire to be beaten, if he lives around many sadists. Since this is absurd, by
reductio, the gratification attendant on satisfying desires cannot be the true
object of desires.
The stronger claim that this is metaphysically impossible holds only if
gratification is defined as by-product satisfaction. In that case, we might still
imagine a new second-order desire D2 for the by-product satisfaction that
will be caused by reaching O, the object of a first-order desire D1. But we
would have no direct way to pursue satisfaction of D2, because it depends
on being attracted to O in itself, and regarding O as a means to the secondorder goal of D2 tends to undermine O’s attractiveness. Thus this secondorder goal could only be pursued indirectly, which is why desiring2 this
unusual goal (that D1 be satisfied) does not translate directly into desiring1
O. Moreover, upon getting O, and experiencing by-product satisfaction of
D1 as a result, and thus also gratifying our explicitly entertained D2, we
might experience an additional by-product satisfaction (however faint) at
having attained what we wanted in D2 as well. Thus the possibility of a
satisfaction external to the formal object of any desire always remains: there
is no way to get all possible by-product satisfaction within the intentional
content of our desired ends. A possible surplus always escapes our end in
view; some satisfaction can always come as a surprise.
But although this Hutchesonian argument refutes psychological hedonism, it cannot refute the erosiac model because it does not apply to the
type of satisfaction that is internal to the object of a D1, D2, or D3 desire.
Hutcheson apparently thought that his argument would disprove Locke’s
erosiac conception of desire as a disturbance seeking equilibrium through
gaining ‘‘some absent good,’’79 and he does reasonably distinguish ‘‘desire
proper’’ from painful ‘‘organic sensations’’ that may accompany a desire.80
But no contradiction is involved in the idea that the object of a desire
includes its role in requiting a lack or completing the agent. For the erosiac
model does not reduce all desires to unpleasant physiological states, nor
does it say that desires are for the by-product satisfaction that the agent derives from realizing the desired good; rather it says that they are for some
object, activity, or state qua providing something saliently lacking, negating
a felt negation-of-completion, or metaphorically plugging a hole in the self,
restoring the agent’s psychic equilibrium. As Paul Tillich put it with reference to types of love, ‘‘The appetitus of every being to fulfill itself through
union with other beings is universal and underlies the erōs as well as the
philia quality of love.’’81 Indeed, Tillich seems to endorse Plato’s version of
formal egoism when he says:
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In the loving joy about the ‘‘other one’’ the joy about one’s own selffulfillment by the other is also present. That which is absolutely
strange to me cannot add to my self-fulfillment. . . . Therefore love
cannot be described as the union of the strange, but as the reunion
of the estranged.82
His version of the lack principle is that ‘‘Unperverted life strives for that
of which it is in want.’’83
In other words, the goal desired in any kind of erosiac desire is agentrelative in a crucial sense, even if it is based on an agent-neutral evaluation
of the end’s value for human well-being (and hence the desire involves a
validity claim for others similarly situated); for the goal is seen as part of
the agent’s own completeness. As we said in discussing Plato, the intentional
content of the agent’s desire is the possession (or enactment) of some object, activity, or state without which he cannot feel whole; the desire is for
something qua partly or wholly completing the agent and thus as appropriated by him, or united to him, or done by him. To take a simple example
from common sexual interests, what is desired is not simply the hair, breast,
or foot in itself, but rather my touching or stroking the hair, breast, or foot.84
To achieve this goal may also cause by-product satisfaction (e.g., a feeling
of success), but internal to the goal itself is a kind of ‘‘satisfaction’’ of the
agent—in this case, in a partly sensual erotic pleasure.
This analysis of formal egoism (FE), based on the erosiac model, provides a deeper explanation of a simpler and more familiar concept of FE as
the doctrine that ‘‘every end that an agent pursues is apprehended as part
of her self-realization or perfection.’’ Something like this thin concept of formal
egoism is proposed by Henry Sidgwick when trying to explain why he
wishes to exclude any quasi-eudaimonistic formulation of ‘‘self-love’’ in
defining ‘‘egoism’’:
I conclude that the notion of Self-realisation is to be avoided in a
treatise on ethical method, on account of its indefiniteness: and for a
similar reason we must discard a common account of Egoism which
describes its ultimate end as the ‘‘good’’ of the individual; for the
term ‘‘good’’ may cover all possible views of the ultimate end of rational conduct. Indeed it may be said that Egoism in this sense was
assumed in the whole ethical controversy of ancient Greece; that is, it
was assumed on all sides that a rational individual would make the
pursuit of his own good his supreme aim: the controverted question
was whether this Good was rightly conceived as Pleasure or Virtue
or any tertium quid.85
But the egoism that Sidgwick describes here as the doctrine of ‘‘Selfrealisation’’ and that he regards as ‘‘a form into which any ethical system
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may be thrown, without modifying its essential elements’’86 actually has
more content than his description makes clear. In Platonic and Aristotelian
traditions, FE holds that every motive on which we act aims at some end
apprehended as part of our self-realization because it is something the lack
of which has become salient to us, either because of brute attraction to it
or because of the judgment that it is an objective constituent of our wellbeing. And when FE is understood in this thicker or more robust way, it is
much less clear that every normative theory of moral requirements will be
consistent with FE, as Sidgwick assumes and has influenced many others in
assuming.
For example, Julia Annas reminds us that the type of ‘‘happiness’’ that
every school in ancient Greek ethics took to be our supreme desire is not
‘‘a determinate and specific state, [or] a state of feeling good about something.’’87 Rather, it refers to a general and indeterminate sort of ‘‘good’’ for
the agent that can go beyond satisfaction in any narrow sense to include
her living a well-integrated, complete life, a ‘‘concern for her life being as it
should.’’88 But like Sidgwick, Annas mistakenly thinks this means that ‘‘desire’’ in the ancient Greek sense is just a placeholder for any kind of motivation: ‘‘For the ancients, desire, orexis, is the most general kind of motivation
to do something that we can have. It covers wanting of various kinds, and
also covers motivation generated by reasons, including ethical reasons.’’89
This would reduce the strong erosiac thesis, which claims that all motivation is orektic, to an empty tautology. If this thesis is to have any content,
then desire or orexis cannot be used simply as a shorthand for ‘‘being motivated to pursue some end.’’ And as we saw, in the De anima at least, Aristotle
follows Plato in giving a substantive analysis of orexis as being drawn toward
an end that is qualified as apparently fulfilling some lack in the agent. Of
course ethical dispositions and moderate attitudes that are essential to living
a fully human life may be precisely what are perceived as lacking or not
fully realized and thus desired in D3 fashion. But the underlying sense that
the good is a kind of equilibrium and that I am drawn toward my end
because it will help restore that equilibrium is necessary to understanding
what it means, as Annas puts it, that ‘‘I do all these things [whatever I do],
simple and complex, because I see them as contributing to my telos, my final
end which is my final good.’’90
In other words, in ancient ethics, the lack analysis provides the sense in
which desiderative motivation refers to the agent’s good. As Nussbaum says,
Aristotle’s orexis is appropriative: it is a ‘‘grasping after some object in order
to take it to oneself.’’91 What the agent can desire as ‘‘her good’’ is not
simply as an unbound variable whose value can be filled in by any sort of
end whatsoever. For some things cannot be perceived as absent for me or
lacking in me prior to my motivation to pursue them. If this were not the
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case, then the thesis that happiness or flourishing is our ultimate end would
be an empty tautology that could do no work in moral philosophy.
For this reason, I cannot agree with Annas’s claim that, given the generality of orexis, the doctrine of a final good that is the end of all our motivations ‘‘does not imply that there is any special kind of motivation that we
have to our ends.’’92 Formal egoism has more content than this implies. It
adds something crucial to the ancient psychological thesis that ‘‘all action
is aimed at some good’’93 and to the logically independent thesis that, as a
famous Thomist put it, ‘‘no one can really deny that he seeks well-being’’
for himself.94 This thesis asserting the ubiquity of self-interest (the ubiquity
thesis, or UT) is much weaker than FE; the desire for happiness may indeed
be present in all rational agents, as Kant also held, but this does not entail
that it is our chief desire or that it somehow subsumes all other motives,
either as the whole of which they are parts or as the normative condition
of any normative authority they may have for us.95 Formal egoism synthesizes these two weaker theses in the claim that the desire for happiness is
‘‘fundamental in the sense that no human being can avoid acting in terms
of attaining complete well-being so far as possible.’’96 Although this leaves
open many different possible conceptions of the happiness to be pursued,
it does relate all pursuable goods formally to ‘‘the self ’’ of the agent. In
orexis, we desire goods that we can somehow ‘‘attain or appropriate,’’ or
unite to our being, in order to make our being more complete.97
This formulation of FE also makes clear (as Sidgwick’s does not) that
this is a doctrine not just about how it is rational to behave or how we
ought to act, but about how we are always motivated. In this respect, it is
about the same question as other forms of ‘‘psychological egoism,’’ as opposed to ‘‘moral egoism’’—since the latter may acknowledge the possibility
of non-egoistic motivation but still tell us that we ought (or that it is most
rational) not to act on such motives or that we should do whatever will
maximize our own well-being (conceived either in terms of subjective D2
desire-satisfactions or in terms of an objective list of D3-desirable objects
and states).98 So understood, FE has enough content to raise puzzles, for
example, about how anyone could be motivated to sacrifice his life for
another’s (for how could this constitute his good in any plausible sense?).99
However, formal psychological egoism remains quite distinct from every
version of material psychological egoism in not further specifying the kinds
of goals that human agents can be motivated to seek for their own sake. For
example, Rawls distinguishes material egoism from the ‘‘sense of justice’’ as
a motive by saying:
An egoist is someone committed to the point of view of his own
interests. His final ends are related to himself: his wealth and position,
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his pleasures and social prestige, and so on. Such a man may act
justly, that is, do things that a just man would do; but so long as he
remains an egoist, he cannot do them for the just man’s reasons.100
This clearly implies that material egoists have only certain kinds of ends,
which are not just formally related to the agent’s possession or experience
(as in FE) but materially related to his resources, status, and avoidance of
pain. The person acting from a sense of justice has a non-egoistic end in
this sense even if, as Rawls goes on to argue, giving this motive priority in
one’s life may contribute to one’s own good. This analysis takes us in the
right direction but it needs refinement to clarify the notion of goods materially benefiting the agent.
2.2. Material Egoism: Feinberg’s Analysis Expanded
A definition of material psychological egoism (MPE) adequate for my purposes can be extracted from a famous paper by Joel Feinberg in which he
argues that every type of psychological egoism that could present a challenge to traditional morality has to involve substantive claims about the
self-interested nature of the ends that agents can be moved to pursue.101
Thus psychological egoism cannot be defended with such abstract arguments as: ‘‘Every action of mine is prompted by motives or desires or impulses which are my motives and not somebody else’s,’’ or ‘‘Whenever I
act, I am always pursuing my own ends or trying to satisfy my own desires.’’102 For no synthetic thesis about the content of humanly pursuable
ends can follow from this truism of action theory, which is analytic as long
as we grant that the concept of voluntary action requires that an agent do
some act for her own reasons or on her motives. Says Feinberg:
It is not the genesis of an action [in the self] or the origin of its
motives which makes it a ‘‘selfish’’ one, but rather the ‘‘purpose’’ of
the act or the objective of its motives: not where the motive comes
from (in voluntary action it always comes from the agent) but what
it aims at determines whether or not it is selfish.103
This is even clearer in the case of moral egoism, which cannot be simply
a recommendation to do whatever we really want to. As Korsgaard says,
‘‘the egoistic principle is concerned with the content of the will, not with the
very act of willing.’’104 A straightforward way to make this plausible is to
supply an illustrative list of different types of ends, distinguishing intuitively between those that directly contribute to the agent’s material or psychological well-being (possibly even without being desired) and those that
do not. But, as Korsgaard also argues, the distinguishing factor cannot be
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(as Williams suggests) simply that ‘‘I’’ or ‘‘my own’’ is mentioned in the
end desired or aimed at. For this factor picks out not egoism but rather
narcissism:
For instance, someone in the grip of a pathological case of remorse
or masochism might want that they should suffer. Or someone might
want to be the author of some good thing of which he himself may
never get the benefit, like someone who wants to be the one who
discovers a cure for cancer . . . [or] the godfather’s desire that his own
family should remain in power. . . . Are these desires egoistic? They
contain a self-reference, but they certainly do not all concern things
that you want for yourself, in any intuitive sense.105
As these examples show, the intended end’s being about us or involving us
(as an individual or as a member of a group) is not enough to make it
materially self-interested—although it might be enough to make it narcissistic
or ‘‘self-centered,’’ especially if the role we must play in the envisioned
outcome or end is more prominent than impartial reason warrants.106
Rather, a self-interested desire must be for our own possession or enjoyment
of some good that seems to add something to our material well-being or
pleasure—either individually (in purely egoistic desires), or jointly with
others (in desires of a mixed nature). We do not need to limit this set to a
single kind of ‘‘incentive, say those associated with appetite or pleasure,’’ as
Korsgaard suggests.107 Rather, as Moore argues, rational egoism is much
broader than hedonism because ‘‘The Egoist is the man who holds that a
tendency to promote his own interest is the sole possible, and sufficient,
justification of all his actions,’’ where his interests include not only pleasure
but also ‘‘advancement,’’ ‘‘reputation,’’ a ‘‘better income,’’ and related goods
of status.108 As the nature of such goods implies, to count as self-interested,
the goal must involve beneficial objects or states coming to or being appropriated by the self in suitable senses. When this is understood, it becomes
clearer that not all the ends we aim at are materially self-interested.
The following definitions will allow us to state Feinberg’s point more
perspicuously:
First-order intrinsic good: any good object, goal, or end that we can
intelligibly pursue for its own sake. For example:
• to be nourished by food would be a physiological first-order good;
• to be educated would be a mental first-order good;
• the prevention of pollution might be an environmental first-order
good.
Note that this definition does not assume that these ends are good just
because we desire them; rather, it could be that they are on an objective list
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of ends we ought to desire because of their goodness. Nor does this definition necessarily include all first-order ends that agents can pursue, for I
leave open the possibility that an agent might perversely pursue for its own
sake something that he takes to be good for no one or no thing in the
world.
Self-interested first-order intrinsic good: first-order goods that contribute directly to the agent’s material well-being, mental health, contentment, or enjoyment. For example, here is a roughly Hobbesian list of
things that we pursue as assets, opportunities, or types of hedonic experience:
• first-order pleasure: gratification of physical appetites, pleasures of
bodily sensation, pleasures in being entertained or amused, and so on;
• power, influence, control over others;
• honor, fame, glory;
• shelter, security, protection from misfortune, basic liberties, and a stable political environment;
• health, including adequate sustenance, activity, and chances for mental
development;
• wealth and income, which enable us to provide for needs and satisfy
other desires;
• peace of mind (no disturbing thoughts or anticipation of suffering,
and so on).
Note that self-interested first-order desires for such goods are not necessarily immoral; the desire to quench my thirst is the desire for a certain
sensory state of my own body, and so it is ‘‘selfish’’ in the natural sense but
not necessarily in the moral sense of being wrong. Since it involves no
inherent injustice or violation of nature, this goal could only be wrong
because of other factors in the circumstances, for example, because the supply is limited and others presently need to drink more than I do. Similarly
with desires for possessions I will enjoy, money to buy possessions that will
amuse or delight me, and simple sensual pleasures like taking a walk on a
warm spring morning. Agents commonly consider such goods as directly
adding to their well-being or as constituting additional positive value in
their set of possessions and experiences, even when they are not desired. By
contrast, there are other goods that add to our well-being only if we already
care about them:
Non-self-interested first-order intrinsic good: a good end that transcends the agent’s simple being—i.e., does not directly constitute any
part of the agent’s material welfare or psychological contentment. For
example:
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• knowledge of the world (scientific discovery, insight in the
humanities);
• the well-being of a friend or family member;
• creative achievements (the goods aimed at by arts and crafts);
• scientific achievement, for example, finding the cure for cancer;
• bringing progress and justice to third-world nations.
This category of intelligible ends that are not by themselves materially
connected to any aspect of the agent’s simple well-being (even if they might
cause some agent-relative good to come about) includes goods that will be
experienced by or belong only to some other person or persons, ends that
are strictly part of nonhuman welfare (such as the survival of some endangered species), and abstract ends disconnected from the agent (such as the
truth about some mystery or the beauty of some work of art yet to be). I
regard these as typical species of the genus we could call ‘‘non-self-related’’
or ‘‘self-transcending’’ ends. I will ignore here important controversies
about exactly what ends should be listed in this category, but I hope the
intuitive idea is clear enough: what unites this category is the alterity or
alienness to the agent’s simple being. X’s ‘‘simple being’’ encompasses material
resources that X owns, psychic characteristics (such as talents and mental
capacities) that belong to X, and hedonic states that do not depend on X
already having a given contingent desire or concern. In terms of these definitions, material psychological egoism (MPE) would be the thesis that
MPE: All our actions are ultimately motivated by (D1, D2, or D3)
desires for self-interested first-order intrinsic goods. We never pursue
other goals except as means to these ends.
As these lists suggest, paradigm species of MPE would be the theories
of human motivation traditionally found in Machiavelli’s The Prince and
Hobbes’s Leviathan, according to which, desires for self-preservation, pleasures, power, glory, and security drive all human actions and relationships.109 Notice, however, that my definition of MPE does not say that all
motives are embraced or conditioned by the desire to maximize our firstorder goods. Although maximization would be found in any standard version of material moral egoism (MME) as a requirement of practical reason,110 we should not saddle the psychological egoist with the assumption
that the egoism he finds in human nature always includes an overriding desire
to maximize one’s self-interested first-order goods; a person still could be
egoistic without being that rational.111 In this respect, however, MPE will
differ from FE, since the idea of seeking completeness or a state lacking
nothing already includes implicit within it a kind of threshold or qualitative
maximum at which we always necessarily aim, according to FE (however
bad our aim might be).
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Even to assert an MPE doctrine, then, we must first define that category
of nonselfish final ends that we wish to rule out as impossible for human
persons to seek for their own sake; otherwise our MPE thesis will be empty
or vacuous. But this means that we must start by acknowledging or recognizing a category of ends that we could intelligibly imagine human beings,
or at least some other kind of rational agent, pursuing—and then deny that
we can in fact take ends in this category as final. This perhaps explains why
MPE becomes more implausible the more substantively its claim is specified. For, as I formulated it, MPE can easily be defeated by plausible cases
of what I call pure motives, that is, those in which the agent acts for some
agent-transcending final end. As Feinberg points out, this can include cases
in which the final end is a non-self-interested first-order good (such as cases
of benevolence) and also cases of pure malevolence in which the agent pursues
for its own sake some non-self-interested first-order harm to another person
or to the world.112 The MPE defender can question whether there are such
cases, for example, on grounds that we deceive ourselves and ignore ulterior
self-interested motives behind apparently non-self-interested acts, but such
arguments carry a very heavy burden of proof if they hope to show that
such ulterior motives operate in every case, or that non-egoistic motives are
psychologically impossible for human beings.113 It may be hard to establish
the agent’s motive in any given case, but it is very implausible to believe
that we never aim at agent-transcending goods as final.
Notice that Feinberg’s example of the fallacious argument from all my
motives being mine to MPE would be valid if it were the quite distinct
argument from all my motives being orektic desires to FE. But then the
argument, although valid, would be trivial, since formal egoism is defined
in terms of the erosiac structure of all desires of the sort that ancient Greek
philosophers call orexis. However, the superficial resemblance between the
two arguments may explain the historical origin and popularity of the fallacious argument for MPE that Feinberg refutes.
Here is an example that suggests this link. In the midst of explaining
one of Derrida’s basic theses about human interests and desires, John Caputo makes the assertion (apparently inspired by Nietzsche) that there is
no motivation not originally driven by the agent’s concern for his own
satisfaction; rather, there are only more or less ‘‘selfish’’ forms of it:
We are all more or less narcissistic, for that is what the agent/subject
is. The agent, Aristotle and the medievals said, acts for its own good.
If the agent expends all its energies on the other without return, that
is after all what the agent wants, and that is how the agent gets her
kicks.114
Now, Caputo’s statement involves a simple but instructive equivocation on
‘‘wanting.’’ It would be true a priori that anything that an agent works for is
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‘‘what the agent wants’’ only if ‘‘wanting X’’ is emptily defined just as ‘‘seeking to realize X’’ or ‘‘being motivated to pursue X.’’ But such a definition
of desire is so abstract that it entirely fails to support the Derridean view
that Caputo here means to defend (which is a version of material egoism).
For under Caputo’s empty definition of desire, an agent could ‘‘want’’ an
end that is entirely non-egoistic in content. What Aristotle and Aquinas
defend is, rather, formal egoism, and they do not base this on such an empty
equation of ‘‘desire’’ with ‘‘any motive whatsoever’’; rather, they base their
view squarely on the structural conception of desire in the erosiac model.
To expand Feinberg’s point, when we abstract the concept of ‘‘wanting’’
from this erosiac model, then from the fact that I act on my ‘‘desires,’’
nothing at all follows about the content desired or about the formal relation of
one’s ends to the one’s own eudaimonia. One can get neither MPE nor FE
from the premises of Caputo’s argument by themselves.
Following this non sequitur, in the same passage Caputo manages to
commit the related fallacy of inferring that apparently altruistic actions are
really egoistic in intent simply because the agent enjoys them. With cases
of benevolence in mind, Feinberg (following Garvin) nicely explains this
common mistake:
Not only is the presence of pleasure (satisfaction) as a by-product of
an action no proof that the action was selfish; in some special cases,
it rather provides conclusive proof that the action was unselfish. For
in those special cases the fact that we get pleasure from a particular
action presupposes that we desired something else—something other than our
own pleasure—as an end in itself and not merely as a means to our
own pleasant state of mind.115
This point can be made clearer if we distinguish between what Feinberg
calls pleasure1 and pleasure2,116 or better:
First-order pleasure as a category of self-related goods, including:
• pleasant stimulation of the five senses; and
• pleasant stimulation of our aesthetic sensibilities; and
• amusement and other pleasurable states of mind produced by entertainment, thrill, and so on,
and
Second-order satisfaction as the mental fulfillment that results from (a)
motivation toward some first-order good G for its own sake, when we add
to it either (b) the active pursuit of G, or (c) this pursuit along with
successful achievement of G through our efforts. For example:
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• the pleasure of raising prizewinning horses or in general excelling at
horse breeding;
• the pleasure of writing a great novel or painting an inspiring painting;
• the pleasure of giving a superb performance of a difficult part in a
play;
• the pleasure of managing to climb the Matterhorn despite its
challenges;
• the pleasure of helping one’s child grow up confident and welladjusted;
• the pleasure of helping a friend succeed at solving some difficult
problem;
• even the spiteful pleasure of bringing about a political opponent’s
downfall (just for its own sake and irrespective of whether it helps us
get into office).
As Feinberg says, all of these pleasures require that we already care about
the relevant first-order goods intrinsically, or desire them for their own
sake, quite independent of the second-order pleasure we may get from pursuing and possibly attaining these ends. If I had no intrinsic interest in
writing a beautiful poem but did it just to get a good grade, then producing
the poem by itself would not give me the relevant second-order satisfaction—though getting the grade might satisfy other desires. In some cases,
perhaps I can even get this kind of second-order satisfaction as a by-product simply of pursuing worthwhile ends, whether or not I achieve them.
Therefore the fact that I may derive second-order satisfaction from pursuit
and/or realization of my first-order ends gives no support to MPE whatsoever. A similar argument has been made by James Rachels in his textbooks,
and indeed, as Carolyn Morillo has noted, the basic point of this ‘‘byproduct theory’’ has become familiar enough to count as a staple ingredient
in introductory ethics classes.117 All I have done here is to reconstruct the
point more clearly with the help of more precise definitions of different
kinds of goods.
As I suggested, it is possible that some type of by-product satisfaction
derives from achieving any first-order purpose that I have intentionally undertaken as a final end. If so, then even realizing a self-destructive goal will
bring some second-order satisfaction, but again, this cannot be the motive
or aim of the self-destructive action. Possibly, even when our act is aimed
only at some first-order pleasure for its own sake (say, in going out to a
movie to relax), there is also a weak by-product satisfaction from achieving
that sort of goal, in addition to the first-order pleasure itself. For human
beings inherently seem to enjoy feeling effective in the pursuit of any significant goal and often to enjoy (though in a lesser way) getting what they
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are pursuing by sheer luck. But, as Sober and Wilson note, nothing about
the material or content of first-order motive-states follows from this thesis:
‘‘From the premise that people want their desires to be satisfied, nothing
follows concerning whether their ultimate desires are egoistic or altruistic.’’118
Formal egoism makes this question more complex because it holds that
the desired end is conceived as gratifying the agent’s subjective preferences or
restoring some absent or missing part of his overall well-being. We must
distinguish this satisfaction that is part of the end desired and pursued both
from first-order (material) pleasure and from the ‘‘external-to-intention’’
consequent satisfaction that usually results from achieving our intended goal
(perhaps because of a standing desire2 to get whatever we desire1). Formal
egoism therefore implies that no intelligible end is pursued only or simply as
agent-transcending: non-self-interested ends are really apprehended as having an agent-relative qualification. Appropriation or enjoyment of the good
enters into the intentional content of any desire1 on this model, not as a
distinct goal for which the object is merely instrumental, but as an aspect
of that object or material end.
A Complex Material Egoism?
As I define it, MPE includes several different varieties of psychological
egoism, but of course I make no claim that my formulation covers every
material egoist conception of the springs of human action, and arguably its
classical sources already suggest that my model is too simple. For in the
Leviathan, Hobbes’s explanation of why the state of nature descends into a
chaotic mutually self-defeating war gives a crucial role to a few glory-seeking warlords who will attack others even when they have sufficient material
resources and these are sufficiently secure against attacks by other simple
material egoists. We could conceive such a warlord’s motive as involving
desire for a second-order egoistic end: namely, the relative superiority of his
first-order self-related material goods to others’ holdings of the same (or
comparable) goods. I call this a second-order end because its definition
mentions first-order human goods and/or harms in its interpersonal comparison. In general, I treat a second-order end as any goal that consists in a
certain relationship among first-order goods or harms, either within the
agent or across persons. Thus seeking to balance certain first-order goods
within one’s life would count as a second-order end, and so would any goal
concerning the relative holdings of various goods between persons or other
significant bearers of natural value (e.g., animals, plants, ecosystems).
So a more complete definition of material egoism would expand its conditions beyond first-order MPE (or simple egoism, as I call it) and include the
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pursuit of such egoistic or self-regarding second-order ends. A paradigm
example would be Rousseau’s status-seeking bourgeois, who is more concerned about his social rank and privileges relative to others than about his
own holdings of important external goods and liberties as measured absolutely.119 In fact, according to Rousseau, citizens can become so concerned
about their superiority to others, including their power over them, that they
may accept tyranny as the price: ‘‘citizens allow themselves to be oppressed
only insofar as they are driven by blind ambition; and looking more below
than above them, they consent to wear chains in order to be able to give
them in their turn to others.’’120
This kind of motive arises in human community, according to Rousseau,
because of a natural human tendency to turn our attention from merit as
an absolute first-order good to the relative difference between the merits of
different persons: ‘‘Each one began to look at the others and wanted to be
looked at himself, and public esteem had a value.’’ The emotions of vanity,
contempt, shame, and envy emerge from this shift in focus.121 Egoistic motivation becomes more complex with such interpersonal comparisons; for
instance, a person X who desires another person Y to envy him is moved
by a third-order desire for an apparent good consisting in Y’s second-order
desire for some first-order good G because X has it—i.e., not in itself
but rather G qua possessed-by-X. Complex desires like envy-enjoyment remain
egoistic to the extent that the final end is pursued as supposedly adding to
the agent’s own well-being. The problem is that in such cases, the satisfaction sought seems to depend on the agent and others to whom he is comparing himself already having more basic desires. But I will not attempt
a more rigorous definition of complex material egoism here because its
complications will not be necessary for my main argument. However, they
will be relevant again in the discussion of radical evil in chapter 10.
A New Hedonism?
Finally, according to another view that might be dubbed ‘‘affect-arousal
hedonism’’—to distinguish it from classical Epicurean and modern Benthamite hedonism—my model of material egoism would instead be too
complex, because there is really only one experience that is the causal basis
of all human motivation, namely the kind of euphoric bliss experienced
when parts of the limbic system (e.g., the hypothalamus) are stimulated
naturally by dopamine releases or artificially by electrical currents.122
Morillo sketches such a view, which she calls the ‘‘reward event theory
(RET),’’ and argues that it is empirically plausible enough to challenge the
Feinberg-Rachels pluralistic model of multiple non-egoistic final ends with
contingent by-product satisfaction. Her claim that RET might be able to
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reduce our apparent ‘‘focus’’ on a wide range of seemingly final ends to a
single type of experience hinges on the hypothesis that the pursuit and
realization of these ends become associated in learning these desires with ‘‘the
reward’’ experience (in lesser strength than in cases where its strong stimulation by electrical or chemical means can overwhelm all other motives):
‘‘Thus, the operation of the reward event in more mixed phenomena may
be buffered in such a way that focus [of attention] shifts; but the reward
event would still be the aspect of these more complex experiences which is
what we are motivated to obtain.’’ While the conscious focus of our motive
may vary, the reward event remains ‘‘the anchor of motivation.’’123 In other
words, our focus on outward objects beyond the self (for which ‘‘there are
good evolutionary reasons’’)124 deceives us. What we really want, though we
do not recognize it, is the hedonic reward that we experience when, for
example, we help our friend or listen to Mozart’s music,125 or start a political reform movement that might bear fruit only after our death; for even
then, when imagining the goal achieved, ‘‘such envisagement, particularly
when vivid, can link directly to the reward event. (Is that not what fantasy
is about?).’’126
If RET is right, then, what I called by-product satisfaction is not really
a side effect after all; in fact, it is a weaker version of the same reward we
experience in orgasm, a cocaine high, or direct electrical stimulation of the
pleasure centers, and it is our real aim—that single positive feeling that
alone we are programmed to seek.
Although it poses an intriguing challenge, the main difficulty for this
kind of naturalistic hedonism is in making plausible the extreme hypothesis
that somehow every other familiar kind of goal that we are inclined to interpret as final for the agent when providing an intentional explanation of
various kinds of action could have become so strongly associated with this
single type of rewarding brain event (or perhaps a small range of such
types of reward). Call this the monistic thesis.127 Neither (1) the promising
hypothesis that such a reward underlies physical appetites for food, water,
and procreation, nor (2) the insightful point that when ‘‘mainlined’’ in
ways that evolution never intended, such basic euphoria can stimulate our
instinctual craving to a point that it overwhelms all other interests or concerns, seems by itself to provide any evidence for the monistic model of all
motivation, let alone conclusive evidence for it. The growing empirical evidence for (1) and (2) cannot count as evidence for the monistic thesis while
higher goals do not seem to provide the same kind of visceral payoff.
It might seem that some evidence is provided for RET by the observation that severe clinical depression can rob our familiar concerns and interests of their motivating force. Morillo asks, ‘‘Might a massive failure of
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connections with reward events account for such a massive failure of motivation?’’128 But clearly, to interpret depression this way, we already have
to think that such ‘‘connections’’ with hedonic reward normally do the
motivating—and that is precisely what is at issue. We might speculate instead that neurochemical problems interfere with the normal cognitive
pathways involved in caring about or being interested in agent-transcending
goods—and the lack of these motives makes everything seem pointless as
well as robbing the depressed agent of all second-order or by-product
satisfaction.
Against Morillo’s monistic thesis, there is the simple introspective point
that the joy I experience in seeing some complex other-regarding good transpire—for example, the overthrow of some terrible foreign tyrant, even
though he posed no real threat to our national security—simply does not
feel at all like the relief of getting a splinter out, beyond the utterly vacuous
sense in which both are ‘‘positive’’ experiences. Even while under physical
discomfort or withdrawal from a chemical high, one can still feel a quite
different kind of satisfaction in accomplishing some worthwhile goal (e.g.,
being one step closer to kicking the habit). Indeed, RET makes it hard to
explain the common intuition that there are incommensurabilities between
different kinds of goods. Finally, experience reveals plenty of cases in which
an activity that is initially motivated by desire for a visceral reward starts to
be carried out for its own sake.129 But why would anyone trade a stronger
reward experience for a weaker one—which is how RET must describe
such changes?
In sum, the RET or affective hedonism model shows that it is not conceptually impossible for a kind of ‘‘satisfaction’’ to be the single (unconscious)
goal of all human motivation. But nothing like sufficient evidence for such a
radically revisionary theory of human motivation is on the horizon. Simple
material egoism remains more empirically plausible and thus a more significant target for existential critique.
2.3. The Paradox of Hedonism and the Paradox of Material Egoism
Our account of simple material egoism is sufficient to explain a crucial
objection to this psychological doctrine that is closely related to Feinberg’s
objection against what he calls ‘‘the psychological egoistic hedonist’’ who
focuses exclusively on obtaining a kind of ‘‘pleasure.’’ It turns out that
Feinberg has in mind here what I call second-order or by-product satisfaction—perhaps because he follows Bentham and Mill in calling the satisfaction derived from a wide range of different activities ‘‘pleasure.’’130 The
problem is that this kind of hedonist has mistaken his goal:
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This is the famous ‘‘paradox of hedonism’’: the single-minded pursuit
of happiness is necessarily self-defeating, for the surest way to get
happiness is to forget it; then perhaps it will come to you. If you aim
exclusively at pleasure itself, with no concern for the things that bring
pleasure, then pleasure will never come.131
Feinberg illustrates this point with the splendid example of Jones, who
does not care about religion, or knowledge, or scientific discovery, or fine
arts, or nature, or sports, or literature, or civic activities, or political causes,
or friendships with others, or ‘‘any kind of handicraft, industry, or commerce.’’132 The only thing he cares about for its own sake is happiness itself.
But it is obvious, says Feinberg, that Jones cannot be happy, for ‘‘pleasure
and happiness presuppose desires for something other than pleasure and
happiness.’’ Thus if there are truly happy people, egoistic hedonism must
be false: we must be capable of caring about first-order goals aside from
our happiness as ends in themselves.133
Again, Feinberg’s argument needs some fleshing out. He presents it simply as an evident empirical truth that human happiness requires sincerely
pursuing as final ends the sorts of things Jones either ignores or regards
only as means to happiness. There is wide support for this idea. It echoes
Mill’s claim that an ‘‘exciting’’ life is one engaged with challenging work,
noble causes, and rich relationships, whereas one of the main sources of
misery is egoistic self-absorption.134 Similarly, Derek Parfit asserts that ‘‘If
my strongest desire is that I be happy, I may be less happy than I would be
if I had other desires that were stronger’’; and he offers examples in which
it is better on the whole for an agent to be disposed to act on motives that
would, in some circumstances, make her self-denying or lead her to reject
options that would increase her well-being.135 Parfit makes a similar point
about consequentialism: since ‘‘most of our happiness comes from having,
and acting upon, certain strong desires . . . [which] include the desires that
are involved in loving certain other people, the desire to work well, and
many other[s],’’ if everyone became a ‘‘pure do-gooder’’ who only cared
about maximizing happiness, there would be much less of it as a result.136
This is a development of Williams’s famous critique of act-consequentialism, in which he argued that a pure utilitarian agent who cared only
about the second-order goal of maximizing collective happiness might not
herself be as happy as other agents who form commitments to other firstorder ends (especially including ends that are agent-transcending).137 As
Williams says, ‘‘It may even be that . . . many of those with commitments,
who have really identified themselves with objects outside themselves, who
are thoroughly involved with other persons, institutions, or activities or
causes, are actually happier than those whose projects and wants are not
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like that.’’138 In lacking such specific first-order projects, causes, and involvements, a single pure utilitarian or ‘‘do-gooder’’ may not be indirectly
self-defeating, because she is not an egoist aiming to maximize her own
happiness. But if happiness usually does depend on having more specific
first-order goals, then Parfit is right that the utilitarian agent could not
rationally will that everyone become a pure utilitarian agent like her. Similarly, following Rawls, Harry Frankfurt suggests that a pure utilitarian
agent is one without a genuine self, who cannot be sustainably committed
to any particular ideals or personal values except to the extent that he is
certain he will never encounter circumstances in which abandoning these
cares and commitments would increase collective well-being.139 All of these
arguments involve much the same empirical claim about human psychology
and the bases of happiness that we find in Feinberg.
But in fact there are several different problems with egoism (as a description of human motivation or as a recommendation about how to act and
live) that can be distinguished using our analysis of simple material egoism.
(1) The paradox of material egoism arises when an agent pursues only selfrelated first-order goods for their own sake and takes no agent-transcending
goals as ends in themselves. This would be the case, for instance, with the
Hobbesian simple egoist as traditionally understood. If in fact much of the
fulfillment that makes life worthwhile derives as by-product satisfaction
from the pursuit of non-self-interested goods for their own sake—as virtually
every moralist indebted to the eudaimonist tradition has argued down the
ages—then the simple material egoist will necessarily miss all of this and
thus be self-defeating. This point seems implicit in what Williams says, and
it is at least closely related to Parfit’s point too.140 In the extreme case in
which this egoist seeks only first-order pleasure, he could in principle maximize his desire-satisfaction by remaining forever hooked up to a machine
that constantly stimulated the pleasure centers of his brain while taking care
of his other bodily needs.141 Yet it seems obvious that such a banal existence
could not be the most fulfilling life possible for us, since it is does not draw
on any of our higher capacities or potential for more complex activities and
relationships. This will also be true to a lesser extent in the less hedonistic
versions of MPE. But since human persons sometimes do attain kinds of
fulfillment that transcend such banality, MPE must be false.
(2) Strictly speaking, Feinberg’s ‘‘paradox of hedonism’’ describes the
quite different case in which an agent tries to make second-order satisfaction
itself his sole final end, or ultimate goal. This is self-defeating because such
satisfaction cannot be directly pursued, and making the pursuit of other
first-order goods instrumental to second-order satisfaction robs them of
their power to cause or create second-order satisfaction in the agent. In this
paradox, the agent defeats herself by omitting the required material base
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for by-product happiness—much like the pure utilitarian do-gooder according to Williams, Parfit, and Frankfurt. Feinberg’s ‘‘Jones’’ does not
even pursue self-interested first-order goods for their own sake, let alone
non-self-interested first-order goods; he pursues only a self-related secondorder goal. This would also be the case for a person whose primary goal in
life was to have a higher social status than, say, his twin brother, but who
therefore did not care about any of the goods that he would have to care
about and excel in pursuing in order to achieve such status. When we say
that such a person is destined to failure in his fundamental project, this
conclusion does not depend simply on evident empirical judgments about
the greater significance or fulfillment that human beings tend to gain as byproducts of complex activities involving self-transcending goals rather than
by direct pursuit of self-related first-order goods (as in the paradox of
material egoism). Instead, failure follows necessarily from the concepts, assuming that they apply to human life: turning a derivative second-order
good into our sole ultimate end, and thus turning all the pursuits and activities on which it depends into means to this good, is necessarily self-defeating.
If this is right, then (2) is the stronger paradox. However, it now seems
slightly misleading to call it the ‘‘paradox of hedonism,’’ since that term
typically connotes a person who aims only at various first-order psychic
states, such as sensual pleasures, entertainment, and psychological tranquility (lack of worry, etc.). Feinberg’s ‘‘Jones’’ is really an odd kind of secondorder hedonist, and so we might call his problem the paradox of abstract egoism.
As Korsgaard notes, this paradox goes back at least to Joseph Butler. A
person who prefers second-order or ‘‘subjective’’ satisfaction (as Korsgaard
calls it) over the objective realization of the relevant first-order goal is irrational, since this would imply that he does not care about this goal in itself.
Yet ‘‘[h]e must care about it, or he could not get the subjective satisfaction:
that was Butler’s point.’’142 Interestingly, this point also finds empirical support in psychological studies refuting the hypothesis that altruistic actions
are motivated by the agent’s desire for the satisfaction of being recognized
by others (or even by himself ) as the one who helped the person in need.143
This is unsurprising, since it is conceptually implausible that altruistic acts
are motivated by desire for this kind of psychological reward, which is
essentially a by-product of selfless concern.
However, neither (1) nor (2) are straightforwardly paradoxes of formal
egoism, since that doctrine is meant to be compatible with agents pursuing
non-self-interested or agent-transcending first-order goods for their own
sake (though also as part of happiness). Formal egoism also does not constrain the agent, like Jones, to second-order satisfaction as her single final
end. If there is a similar ‘‘paradox of formal egoism,’’ then, it is less obvious
and it will take more work to show it.
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2.4. Targetable and Nontargetable By-Product Goods: Elster’s Analysis
In approaching the question of whether there is a related paradox of formal
egoism, it will help to inquire further whether we really are sure that (2) is
right: that is, are the motives of Jones (the abstract egoist) necessarily selfdefeating? For this kind of paradox is less well understood than (1), the
paradox of material egoism. Moreover, in discussing the Symposium, we saw
the Ascent explained in terms of the redirection of the agent’s focus from an
end E that produces some by-product good G, to G itself as his final end.
We can illustrate this as follows, with single-line arrows for intention and
double-line arrows for efficient causation:

A

Stage One

Stage Two

G

G
A

E

E

This is possible because the side effect G in Stage One is what we called
a targetable good, which can then be directly pursued in Stage Two; hence it is
only contingently a by-product in Stage One. But if there are nontargetable
goods, which can result only as side effects of targeting other ends for their
own sake, then the agent’s motivation could not be redirected toward these
without becoming self-defeating. And this is most likely to be a problem if
such a nontargetable by-product is itself attractive to the agent, as adding
materially or psychologically to her well-being, and therefore likely to be
desired in some kind of orektic mode. Can we justify the paradox of abstract
egoism by showing that this is what happens if all of someone’s motives
trace to desire for second-order satisfaction?
In some of his earliest pathbreaking work in rational choice theory, Jon
Elster argues at length that there is a recognizable class of states that are
‘‘essentially by-products’’ and therefore remain ‘‘inaccessible’’ in the sense
that they cannot rationally be directly willed or directly commanded.144
Among Elster’s many brilliant examples,145 some clear members of this
class are:
1. total spontaneity of response to events (the paradox of flow);
2. acting in a way that others will judge as ‘‘natural,’’ unforced, or
indifferent to how one is judged (Stendhal’s paradox);
3. going to sleep (the paradox of insomnia);
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4. not thinking about some undesirable subject matter, or ignoring some distraction, irritant, or nuisance (the paradox of
inattention);
5. deceiving oneself—a case that Elster draws from Sartre’s paradox of ‘‘bad faith’’;
6. having no critics—a case from Zinoviev’s dialectics of
persecution;
7. humility understood as the absence of pride (the paradox of
humility);
8. being freely recognized by another as completely independent
of him (Hegel’s paradox of the master’s dependence on the slave).
None of these states is logically contradictory in itself, but it is pragmatically self-defeating to will them.146 Many of the most obvious instances of
this class are negative or privative states, and privative mental states are
especially prominent here. This raises the question of whether the only
reason any negative state ¬X can be volitionally inaccessible or essentially
nontargetable is because trying to avoid ¬X tends to cause ¬X. For instance, ‘‘the absence of consciousness of something cannot be brought
about by an activity of consciousness.’’147
Elster argues that there are also positive states that are essentially byproducts, but some of these cases I do not find as plausible: for example,
sexual lust, romantic love (and related emotions), certain kinds of confidence and effectiveness in war and politics, virtues such as courage, and
even ‘‘autonomy’’ (as characterized in his account of broad rationality).
These, as well as many other positive states such as concentration on a
problem, can often be hindered by reflection on them or self-consciousness
about them, and thus overly eager efforts to achieve them are often selfdefeating because they necessarily involve fixing too much (or the wrong
kind of ) attention on them. Remaining calm while taking a test is a familiar
example; trying to become sexually aroused or to feel romantic love toward
someone may be other examples. Yet these are not essentially by-product
states, because there are often fairly direct techniques to cause (or at least
facilitate) these psychic states. The right kind of reflexive attitude toward
one’s own psychic states, which aims to alter them slowly through fixing
attention on justifying reasons for the preferred states, may inspire the confidence necessary to relax in taking the test or the appreciation of the other’s
qualities necessary for romantic interest, and so on. Similarly, an effectiveness in competitive games that may derive as a by-product from being unconcerned about one’s fate or unworried about critics can often be achieved
(albeit with more difficulty) by direct methods, such as building up one’s
strength or defenses against attack.
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Nor is it clear that autonomy and authenticity are essentially by-products or are always defeated by direct efforts toward them; rather, we must
distinguish between different kinds of reflexive intention or higher-order
motive. Elster is right that trying to be ‘‘original’’ by simply avoiding anything preferred by one’s peers or parents cannot make us authentic; so this
approach to authenticity will be self-defeating. But authenticity should not
be reduced to originality alone (and especially not to originality in this
adolescent sense). Critical reflection on whether we have sufficient objective
reasons for valuing some goal or endorsing our desires for it or emotions
toward it need not be so simplistic in its assessment of what constitutes a
‘‘good practical reason’’ for our second-order attitudes.
Clearly any existential account of autonomy and authenticity as stages
in the ideal of mature human agency cannot agree that these states are
completely beyond the reach of intentional cultivation or that working
toward these second-order goals through reflexive efforts to manage one’s
own first-order psychic states must always involve ‘‘one thought too many.’’
I believe there is a vital psychic space between self-defeating forms of selfinvolvement or excessively reflective obsession with oneself, on the one
hand, and totally unplanned action aimed at first-order goals external to
our own psyche with no reflective self-awareness, on the other. Non-selfdefeating forms of ‘‘care of the self ’’ must occupy this important middle
ground. Overextension of the ‘‘one thought too many’’ critique leads to the
impression that only completely wanton agency could be authentic (and
that is a reductio). This complex question, however, must await a full analysis
of autonomy and authenticity.148
There are other, better examples of positive states that are essentially byproducts, or untargetable. Belief that P, or being convinced about something,
cannot generally be produced by willing or directly pursuing it.149 There
are indirect approaches to belief or conviction—for example, by reading or
informing oneself about the relevant issue—but the results of such dialectical means to one’s end are necessarily unpredictable. If genuine conviction
on the merits is the intended result, then the rational evaluation required could
in principle lead one to a conclusion incompatible with the one initially
desired. If inquiry ‘‘with an open mind’’ is the only available method, we
cannot ensure our initially preferred outcome. Becoming convinced by way
of sheer self-manipulation offers only a simulacrum of rational conviction.
This case is instructive, because it suggests a sufficient condition for
positive states that are essentially by-products. S will be such a state if:
1. S can be produced only by a certain kind of causal or psychological process P; and
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2. The intentional initiation of P, together with all other factors
F that we can directly control, is insufficient to guarantee S and can
lead to results incompatible with S.
In such cases, we can go only some of the way toward bringing about S;
factors beyond our control must take us the rest of the way. This means
that luck, in its broadest sense, must be involved in causing S, but it does
not require that S is a kind of thing that can only result from a fluke (like
coincidences), or some deviant causal chain. Condition (2) requires only
that we cannot in principle know in advance what the outcome of initiating
P will be. Rationally justified assent to a particular proposition does seem
to be an instance of S in this paradigm, and there are probably many others.
Another example might be requited romantic love. To some extent, my
love for R might inspire her to love me in return but it could not guarantee
that R would return my love; yet there might be no other way to encourage
R to reciprocate in the way desired other than by expressing my love for
her. Perhaps another factor I could control in wooing R would be how
possessive or controlling I appeared (since it is well known that trying to coerce
romantic affection from another is self-defeating). I could avoid being
overly possessive by, for example, intentionally refraining from objecting
too strongly if R wanted to date someone else on a trial basis before deciding between us. While this might be a necessary condition for R to return
my affection, it certainly could not guarantee it. Yet it remains better than
my other alternative, which would be to act like the stalker in Fatal Attraction—behavior that is certain to drive R into the arms of my competitor
more quickly than just about anything else I could do. This example takes
us into the realm of states that are essentially by-products relative to interpersonal action, in the sense that they cannot be brought about by direct coercion or command.150 The reciprocation of romantic love is certainly one of
these states, and anyone who does not learn this will probably fail in efforts
to cultivate such a love relationship. The freely given recognition desired
by Hegel’s master is similar.
This analysis leaves open many questions, such as whether, or within,
what limits states that are essentially by-products can be brought about
indirectly by technical strategies that work to produce those first-order psychic states that will in turn produce the initially desired outcome as their
by-product.151 But this abbreviated analysis will be sufficient for our purposes in assessing the paradoxes of egoism. Given that second-order satisfaction is by definition a side effect of pursuing other first-order goods for
their own sake, it follows that it is essentially a by-product in Elster’s sense.
Moreover, second-order satisfaction results only from processes that can
also lead to frustration rather than satisfaction. The only approach to it
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involves risking its opposite. Thus such satisfaction cannot be directly targeted even after it is first experienced—unlike the higher goods ‘‘begotten’’
in the pursuit of lower forms of beauty in the Symposium. There might be
artificial simulacra of such second-order satisfactions that we could intentionally produce—such as the vain self-admiration of someone who counts
up exactly how many good deeds he has done each week—but the true
object slips through the fingers of anyone who tries to grasp it directly or
treat it as a possession subject to control by his will.
Feinberg’s paradox of hedonism, which I renamed the paradox of abstract egoism, is thus a genuine practical antinomy: the direct pursuit of the
abstract egoist’s goal is necessarily self-defeating. And to the extent that the
richest or most rewarding life, or happiness in the fullest sense possible for
beings with human capacities (eudaimonia), necessarily involves secondorder satisfaction as an essential component, eudaimonia must also be in
part essentially a by-product, as Feinberg suggests. Given the further empirical premise that such eudaimonia includes second-order satisfaction that
results only as a by-product of pursuing non-self-related first-order goods for
their own sake, then the paradox of material egoism will also follow.
In the next chapter, we will see that this further premise is central to the
eudaimonist project’s justification of the life of virtue over a life of material
egoism. However, we already have some reason to suspect that trying to
avoid material and abstract egoism by basing ethical norms on a moral
psychology that affirms formal egoism as its bedrock psychological axiom
will not entirely allow us to escape these paradoxes of self-defeat. For the
two fatal problems we have found with material and abstract egoism, respectively, both seem to be rooted not just in the nature of the goods that
each type of agent takes as her ultimate aim but also in the one feature that
these aims have in common: namely, that they are about oneself, or directly
connected to what I call the agent’s simple being. The wealth, sensual pleasures, power, and glory that the Hobbesian egoist pursues are quite different from the second-order satisfaction that the abstract egoist takes as her
ultimate end, but both are agent-related goods that are meant (when realized)
to be appropriated into the being of the agent. These goals are sought for
the agent’s psyche (in the case of second-order satisfaction), or in order to
extend the agent’s bodily powers (in the case of technical artifacts), or to
add to his ‘‘social body,’’ that is, his property, effects, position, and so on.
We might summarize this point by saying that all egoistic paradoxes of
self-defeat are rooted in the possessiveness of egoism. In pursuing objects or
goods in order to appropriate them into his ‘‘self,’’ the agent remains fundamentally self-interested and hence unable to break out of the mirror world
in which all lines of significance or value return ultimately to his own simple
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being. It is this grasping or appropriating aspect of his nature—his perception of all pursuable goods in terms of their ripeness for control or possession or consumption, his measuring of all kinds of importance by their
effects on or for himself—that defeats him. Egoism and its tendency to
self-defeat are rooted in this fundamental narcissism—that is, this refusal
to value alterity, states of the world or other beings that are not possessed
or first apprehended as pleasures.
But if so, then formal egoism will also be self-defeating, although in a
more subtle way than material or abstract egoism. For, as I argue, to see
every worthwhile end in terms of what either the end itself or the activity
of pursuing it might contribute to my ‘‘self-realization’’ is not a neutral
attitude. It colors the object of every kind of orexis, every type of desire in
the erosiac sense, with a formal agent-relativity: this object and/or the pursuit
of it must enlarge, complete, or fulfill the self. For otherwise it could not
be desired (in the ancient Greek sense) at all; it could only be projected by an
agent as a goal that he does not already want, or of which he has no prior
need. Since it excludes such projective motivation, formal egoism seems to
cut us off from the agent-relative benefits of agent-transcending concerns
and commitments just as much as material and abstract egoism do. The full
defense of this claim is the subject of chapter 7.
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6
Psychological Eudaimonism:
A Reading of Aristotle

Overview. This chapter is an interpretative reconstruction of several
key ideas in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, with some reference to Aquinas’s Treatise on Happiness along the way. It will be intelligible to anyone
who has read Aristotle; undergraduates may find the analysis of Aristotle’s theory in section 1 useful quite apart from its role in my larger
argument. section 2 concerns more advanced questions in the interpretation of Aristotle; section 3 presents in propositional form the
model of human motivation to be critiqued in later chapters. Hence
readers interested in following the main argument of the book without revisiting the Nicomachean Ethics in detail could simply read section
3, which provides the basis for discussion in the next two chapters.
Introduction
In this chapter, I prepare the way for an existential critique of a eudaimonist
view of human motivation, taking Aristotle as my focus. I begin by framing
what I consider to be the most defensible version of eudaimonism consistent with the erosiac conception of human motivation. I show that this is a
plausible reading of Aristotle, although I am primarily concerned about the
implications of the most defensible form of psychological eudaimonism
itself, whether it is properly attributed to Aristotle or not. Since my goal is
to describe the best version of eudaimonist moral psychology and then
critique it, I sidestep some questions of textual exegesis by making charitable assumptions about Aristotle’s meaning that would require ‘‘at least a
book’’ (to use Derek Parfit’s apt phrase) for a full defense. However, the
resulting model of ‘‘A-eudaimonism’’ will clearly be Aristotelian in spirit.
171
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This will be a sufficient basis for constructing the main existential objection
to the eudaimonist project.
1. The Highest or Complete Good in Aristotle’s Eudaimonism
The belief that human motivation is exhausted by the three states of orektic
desire described in the previous chapter—instinctive impulses (D1), subjective preferences and inclinations (D2), and evaluative desires (D3)—
provides the basis for Aristotle’s analysis of happiness as the embracing
human goal. Despite the wealth of commentaries on this ideal, I think it is
fairest to begin by summarizing Aristotle’s approach to the highest or complete good as I see it, with reference to the central controversy regarding
the ‘‘inclusiveness’’ of the human good as our ultimate end.
1.1. Toward a Uniquely Ultimate End: Three Criteria for the Highest Good
In his Nicomachean Ethics I (NE), Aristotle follows Plato’s Gorgias in critiquing
two kinds of material egoism: the life aimed at pleasure and the life aimed
at honor, power, and ascendance in political status over others. He generally
follows Plato’s notion that virtue is the key both to true nobility (the kalon)
and to happiness in its most holistic sense (involving a sense of overall wellbeing, the joy of excelling at all one is capable of doing, of having arrived
in life, or having found one’s proper role). His ground for a normative
analysis of the virtues is meant to be a better understanding of this ideal
than Plato provided in his notoriously abstract and perplexing Form of the
Good (eidos ta agathon), which is decisively rejected in NE I.6. Yet Aristotle’s
approach is still to begin with what he considers to be the most general
things we can say about human motivation and related branches of knowledge in order to move from these to more specific accounts of our natural
goal. At the most general level, he begins a multipronged analysis that requires some reconstruction, since a particular branch of it will begin in one
section of NE I, then pause while other topics are addressed, and then
recommence later in other sections (which is unsurprising if the text we
possess is the result of incomplete lecture notes, perhaps even redacted from
more than one of Aristotle’s courses at the Lyceum).
The analysis begins, famously, with Plato’s distinction between what I
simply call ‘‘final’’ ends pursued for their own sake and things done at least
partly as a means to such final ends (Rep. II 357b–58a). Final ends are then
subdivided into activities done for their own sake and desirable products
that are not themselves human activities (NE I.1 1094a5). Next we have
the suggestion that the ends-means relation is relative: if X is a means to Y,
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Y may still be a means to Z, and so on. This ‘‘chain’’ of means-ends relationships, as I call it, suggests a kind of natural hierarchy of practical significance: whatever is further to the right in such a chain has higher or more
general practical importance for human life than whatever is further to
the left. Aristotle takes directly from Plato (without questioning it) the
assumption that this natural hierarchy is virtually identical to the hierarchy of
arts and sciences that has arisen spontaneously in a self-organizing human
society using expert knowledge to manage its affairs for the common good.
Thus ‘‘crafts’’ (the term I use for technē—arts or sciences that require and
employ some kind of expert theoretical knowledge)1 are directly associated
with their defining ends from the start of Aristotle’s text: as in Socrates’
argument against Thrasymachus in Republic I (341d–42e), Aristotle’s analysis assumes that each of the defining ends for the sake of which a distinct
craft exists must be some objective good that is ostensibly part of human wellbeing (and thus a natural object of what I have called D3 desire). It is this
direct relationship of crafts with final ends that allows him to say: ‘‘In all
such cases, then, the ends of the ruling sciences are more choiceworthy than
all the ends subordinate to them, since the lower ends are also pursued for
the sake of the higher’’ (NE I.1 1094a15–16). Just as ends are arranged in
a natural hierarchy, so are their associated crafts.
Aristotle next argues that the natural hierarchy we find in ends is no
accident but a necessary result of the structure of human motivation. This
is the famous argument that the chain of relative means-ends relationships
cannot extend infinitely, so there must be some final end(s) (NE I.2
1094a19–23). (The text here is not clear about the possible plurality of
the regress-stopping ends, but since Aristotle recognizes that later, we can
add it for him here.) This argument has been subject to much dispute down
the ages. I pause to note only that the argument can be made valid if we
are allowed two extra assumptions to fill out what the existing text actually
says: (1) we have to assume that there is some act A that we are now
motivated to do (and this Aristotle surely would have taken for granted);
(2) we must take Plato’s erosiac model of motivation as given. I believe this
is always operating as a background assumption in Aristotle—one that is
so fundamental that it is rarely thematized. Then it is easy to see how the
anti-regress argument goes. For by (2), if I am motivated at all, there must
be some final end I desire that would help complete me. If there were no
such end, then orektic desire could never begin, and this is what Aristotle
means in saying that ‘‘we do not choose everything because of something
else—for if we do, it will go on without limit, so that desire will prove empty
and futile’’ (NE I.2 1094a21, emphasis added). Although this may be a general truth, we can see it clearly only if we start from some substantive
conception of desire, such as the erosiac model. And since by (1) I am
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motivated to A, it follows that: (3) either A is itself what I desire (my
requiting terminus) or it is only a means to such a satiating final end; (4)
either way there is some final end involved in my being motivated, and so,
by dilemma; (5) there is some final end. If the argument so described seems
nearly circular, it is only because we are recognizing how much has been
packed into the underlying notion of ‘‘desire.’’
This argument is immediately followed by Aristotle’s very important
remark that knowledge of the highest good should have great practical
value:
Then surely knowledge of this good also carries great weight for
[our] way of life; if we know it, we are more likely, like archers who
have a target to aim at, to hit the right mark. If so, we should try to
grasp, in outline at any rate, what the [highest] good is, and which is
its proper science or capacity. (NE I.2 1094a23–27)
Notice, if this is right, that it would be natural for there to be already a
science, art, or ‘‘craft’’ aimed at producing this highest good, and identifying
this would be helpful as a clue to the nature of this good. Aristotle’s intuitive picture seems to be something like the following table (with vertical
arrows indicating means-to-ends relations):
Chain of Ends

Chain of Crafts

Highest end(s) (not means to anything else)
X
subordinate ends
X
lowest means, basic acts

Ruling art(s) or science(s)
X
subordinate crafts
X
lowest techniques and skills

On the left side of this diagram, we have reached the conclusion only that
there must be some final end(s) and that if there turned out to be only one
truly final end among these, it would be our highest good. But on the right
side, Aristotle sees a more definitive answer among our relevant starting
data: ‘‘political science’’ seems to be the highest ruling craft, since it orders
the study and activities of all the other crafts, and thus ‘‘its end will include
the ends of the other sciences, and so will be the human good’’ (NE
1094a38–b8).2 As Stephen White says, ‘‘the most ‘authoritative’ . . . pursuit in any system has the overall good of the system as its end,’’ and
‘‘politics is the most authoritative pursuit in any community.’’3
Here Aristotle seems to suggest for the first time that a unique highest
end (for which I reserve the term ‘‘ultimate end’’) will be that which in
some sense ‘‘includes’’ all other ends that can intelligibly be pursued as final
ends. As Susanne Hill argues, the idea that ‘‘the ends for which a thing acts
are hierarchically ordered, some being ends for the sake of further ends,
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culminating in a single, ultimate end,’’ is also found in Aristotle’s Physics
and De anima.4 Here the sense of ‘‘inclusion’’ still seems to be understood
in terms of the means-ends relation, however; it seems to be that all other
crafts are partly for the sake of the goal of political science, although also
partly for their own sake too, whereas the ultimate good that politicians
should seek is sought only for its own sake and never for the sake of anything else.5 I define this relation of ‘‘nonholistic inclusion’’ as follows:
A is included nonholistically in B if either A is just a means to B (A is not
pursued for its own sake), or A is an end-in-itself and also always pursued as a means to B (never exclusively for its own sake).
Irwin’s reading of the passage on the hierarchy of crafts brings up quite
a different sense of ‘‘inclusion’’:
The sciences concerned with praxis (action in the strictest sense) are
concerned with activities that are worth pursuing for their own sakes.
The supreme science does not make these activities purely instrumental; it includes them in the activities that it prescribes as the highest
good. This passage introduces the important idea that the highest
good is an ordered compound of noninstrumental goods, explained
further in 7 § 1–5.6
Irwin refers here to the section where we meet the notion of the ‘‘most
complete end.’’ His gloss makes it sound as if Aristotle said that a given
(specific) final end can be seen as part of a larger, ‘‘compound’’ final end,
which could be conceived as a certain non-mereological relationship among
its parts. But the text in I.2 does not by itself support this ‘‘holistic’’ notion
of inclusion, which comes up only later. The emphasis is instead on the
superiority of noninstrumentality: that is, the thesis that being pursued solely for
its own sake (never also as a means to anything else) makes an end higher
in intrinsic value than ends that are typically pursued both for their own sake
and also as a means to something else.
Now, this thesis is not self-evidently true, though Aristotle and most of
his expositors assume that it is. (A) Listening to a favorite piece of classical
music is something I may do solely for its own sake, not as a means to
anything else; while (B) reading a philosophical work on moral psychology
is something I may do both for the intrinsic value of its insights and as a
means to teaching a course on the topic next semester. Yet despite the fact
that the activity in (B) is also a means, I may nevertheless judge it to be
higher in the sense of more intrinsically valuable than the activity in (A).
(C) Likewise, I might have children both for their own sake and for the
pleasure of their company, while (D) I pursue some casual entertainment
purely as a final end; yet I rank (C) far above (D). So the ‘‘superiority of
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noninstrumentality’’ thesis is false.7 However, looking for noninstrumentality may nevertheless be a way of trying to narrow down intrinsic goods to
a single good that could count as highest; hence I will ignore this important
objection, while we are tracing Aristotle’s effort to find criteria sufficient to
assure a uniquely highest good in the structure of human motivation.
In the text of the Nicomachean Ethics that has come down to us, Aristotle
next digresses into a metadiscussion of the kind of inexact practical knowledge involved in political science and ethics and the dependence of philosophical reflection on acquired virtue in this domain (NE I.3–I.4). When
he returns to the ‘‘point from which we digressed’’ (NE I.5 1095b13)—by
which he apparently means the prior discussion of the different ‘‘fine and
just things, which political science examines’’ (NE I.3 1094b15)—he begins
discussing three leading conceptions of happiness (eudaimonia). But oddly,
this discussion starts before he has finished his analysis of the criteria defining the highest good or shown that eudaimonia generally fits these criteria.8
Still, another crucial criterion for the highest good emerges in the critique
of the life devoted to honor (the ‘‘political’’ life in the traditional/familiar
sense but not in Aristotle’s own ideal sense of politics). Aristotle says that
honor or glory in the eyes of others ‘‘seems to be too superficial to be what
we are seeking; for it seems to depend more on those who honor than on
the one honored, whereas we intuitively believe that the good is something
of our own and hard to take from us’’ (NE I.5 1095b25–27).
This idea that the highest good should be resilient against chance and
fortune—such as the fickle turns of people’s opinions—is one we have
already met in Plato’s Symposium, where this criterion is taken to its logical
limit in the ideal of an absolutely unlosable good possessed with maximum security—something that Diotima thinks is achieved only by the gods. For
Plato, the ‘‘security’’ or ‘‘stability against fortune’’ criterion, as we may call
it, becomes ‘‘total independence of fortune,’’ and interestingly, Aquinas also
defends the criterion in this absolute form: ‘‘Happiness is the most stable
good’’ and ‘‘happiness has stability of itself and always.’’9 For this criterion
in its absolute Platonic form is crucial to Aquinas’s argument that our
ultimate end is world-transcendent or supernatural—not just in the sense
of being attainable only in another life but also in the sense of being the
experience of the Good that informs the goodness of all particular or noncomprehensive goods: ‘‘Now the object of the will, or human appetite, is
the universal good. . . . Hence it is evident that nothing can bring the will
of man to rest except the universal good. This is not found in any created
thing but only in God, for all creatures have goodness [only] by
participation.’’10
Aristotle is not quite so demanding, since he famously concedes (to
popular opinion in his society, and to the poets) that some minimum of
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‘‘external goods’’ subject to fortune—such as money, good looks, and successful children—may be necessary for complete happiness or ‘‘blessedness’’
(NE I.8 1099a30–99b6). Yet he still insists that happiness is something
that can be pursued by design, with the right education (like the goals of
the various crafts), and ‘‘it would be seriously inappropriate to entrust what
is greatest and finest to fortune’’ (NE I.9 1099b15–24). The stability criterion is also clearly at work in Aristotle’s argument that we cannot call a
person wholly happy during his lifetime (when the overall character of his
life is not yet fixed) and in his related argument that activities in accord
with virtue are the most important or primary constituents of happiness:
for we suppose happiness is enduring, and definitely not prone to
fluctuate, but the same person’s fortunes often turn to and fro. . . .
But surely it is quite wrong to take our cue from someone’s fortunes.
For his doing well or badly does not rest on them. . . . Indeed the
present puzzle is further evidence for our account. For no human
achievement has the stability of activities in accord with virtue, since
these seem to be more enduring even than our knowledge of the
sciences. (NE I.10 1100b2–15)
So a person with the inner strength of virtue does not worry about
minor mishaps and bears even major misfortunes well, playing as best as
possible whatever ‘‘hand of cards’’ life deals her. The point is that dispositions of character that constitute virtues are resilient against outward misfortune
and thus shield us at least partly from the effects of disaster, preventing us
from becoming wholly miserable in their wake. As Aristotle says of the
good person in difficult circumstances, ‘‘even here what is fine shines
through, whenever someone bears many severe misfortunes with good temper, not because he feels no distress, but because he is noble and magnanimous’’ (NE I.10 1100b30–33). I am emphasizing this point for two
reasons: first, because Aristotle is often misportrayed in contemporary ethical theory as totally opposed to the ideal of justice ‘‘independent of fortune’’
that plays such a large role in the moral theories of Kant and Rawls;11 and
second because this particular passage suggests that the central role played
by ‘‘magnanimity’’ or ‘‘great-souledness’’ or ‘‘proper pride’’ (meglapsychia) in
Aristotle’s normative theory of the virtues is due to the underlying idea that
the eudaimonistic value of the virtues depends crucially on their providing
stability against misfortune to their agent—an idea to which I return in
section 3 below.
1.2. ‘‘Most Complete’’ as a Nonholistically Inclusive Relation
So far, we have identified three criteria of the highest good: it is a final end;
it is the goal of the ruling craft; and it involves the greatest security against
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misfortune possible for human beings. These criteria, however, are still not
enough to show that there must be one final end that we can regard as the
ultimate goal in more than name only, that is, that there is some intelligible unity
to ‘‘the’’ highest good. This idea is developed in the passages immediately
preceding the famous argument that the human function (ergon) is ‘‘activity
and actions of the soul that involve reason’’ (NE I.7 1098a14). Leading up
to this key argument, we find Aristotle picking up his earlier reasoning
concerning the chain of means-to-ends just at the point where the argument
against an infinite regress leaves off. He restates its conclusion: ‘‘And so, if
there is some end of everything achievable in action, the good achievable in
action will be this end; if there are more ends than one, [it] will be these
ends’’ (NE I.7 1097a23–34). The anti-regress argument is clearly compatible with either of these solutions; yet at this point, the latter solution would
make our ultimate end little more than a simple logical conjunction of all
the various final ends we might pursue (‘‘pursue A & B & C . . .’’), with no
way of assuring us that conflicts among them could be resolved. This is
clearly an inadequate conception of the ultimate end, so Aristotle offers the
following:
Since there are apparently many ends, and we choose some of them
(for instance, wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) because
of something else [i.e., as a means to other ends] it is clear that
not all ends are complete. But the best good is apparently something complete. And so, if only one end is complete, the good we
are seeking will be this end; if more ends than one are complete, it will be the most complete [εειος] end of these.
(NE I.7 1097a26–30)
Despite the continuing dispute over the meaning of ‘‘most complete’’ in
this and other passages in NE I (some of which I consider in the next
section), the simplest explanation seems to be that Aristotle still understood
‘‘completeness’’ (or literally ‘‘end-ness’’) just as what I have called finality
(i.e., being an end-in-itself ), and understood ‘‘most complete’’ (or ‘‘most
end-like’’) just as he did nonholistic ‘‘inclusiveness’’ in the analysis of the
chain of crafts. As Bostock suggests, an end is ‘‘unconditionally complete’’
if and only if it is ‘‘pursued always for its own sake, and never for the sake
of something else.’’ Yet as he rightly points out, this is not enough ‘‘to
ensure that there can be only one end which is . . . ‘unconditionally
complete.’ ’’12
We might move closer to isolating such an ultimate end if we define the
most nonholistically inclusive end as one that satisfied the following two
conditions:
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(a) it is always chosen only as a final end, never as a means to any
other final end; and
(b) every other final end is also pursued as a means to it.
Bostock also reads ‘‘most complete’’ in this way as a maximality condition
specifying a uniquely all-inclusive end.13 Admittedly, the next paragraph in
Aristotle’s text suggests only the first of these two conditions (a) for an end
that is ‘‘complete without qualification.’’ But in the subsequent paragraph,
when Aristotle for the first time explicitly asserts that eudaimonia fits his
definition of the highest good, both of my conditions for maximal nonholistic inclusiveness are implied. Aristotle says of happiness that ‘‘we always
choose it because of itself, never because of something else’’ and that four
other final ends (as paradigm examples) are also chosen because happiness
is among their results: ‘‘Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we
certainly choose because of themselves, since we would choose each of them
even if it had no further result; but we also choose them for the sake of
happiness, supposing that through them we shall be happy’’ (NE I.7 1097b1–7;
emphasis added).
Read as a nonholistic relation, this means, as Irwin suggests, that ‘‘Every
good that is chosen both for itself and for the sake of the highest good is
separate from (not a part of ), and strictly instrumental to, the highest good,
even though it is also chosen for its own sake.’’14 This is not the conclusion
of Aristotle’s analysis, however, because he probably recognized that it still
may not solve the problem of multiple complete ends left by the argument
against an infinite regress in the chain of motivation. For why should we
think that there can be only one ‘‘most nonholistically complete end’’ as
defined above, that is, an end that is fully (or unconditionally) complete
and nonholistically includes all the other ends (which are therefore not fully
complete by themselves)? Although Aristotle lists four final ends as also
pursued for the sake of happiness, perhaps other final ends are pursued for
the sake of some other unconditionally complete final end. Unless there is
a good that nonholistically includes all other final ends (so that all activities
or states pursued for their own sake are also sought as instrumental means
to this fully complete good), then our most important goal could still end
up as just one among a short list of fully complete (or unconditionally
final) ends that we never pursue as a means to anything else.15 In addition
to these models with multiple fully complete ends, we also have possible
models in which no end is fully complete, because every end that is pursued
at least partly for its own sake is also pursued for the sake of some other
such end, forming a ‘‘web’’ of motivation with no absolutely terminal endpoints. We can illustrate these two models as follows, putting ends pursued
at least partially for their own sake at the top of the chart (unconditionally
final ends thus appear only on the top row).
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Both these diagrams are compatible with the anti-regress argument,
which requires only that there are some final ends, not that there are any
fully complete ends. But in each diagram, there fails to be any end that
nonholistically includes all other final ends. Of course, Aristotle’s strategy
could be (as it is sometimes thought) simply to argue that in fact we find
only one fully complete end (happiness) which therefore includes all other
final ends: on this reading, he is arguing that an empirical inspection of
human psychology and sociology reveals exactly one fully final end that
nonholistically includes all others.16 But it would be much more theoretically satisfying if Aristotle could show that in principle there must be a
single highest good. If unconditional completeness alone will not get us
this result, then perhaps there is some other sense in which there must be an
ultimate good that includes all other final ends.
A cautionary note: since Aristotle was the first philosopher to try working out this difficult question about human motivation in detail, it would
hardly be surprising if he did not think of every such nuance or develop a
rigorous response to every such objection. Rather, it is remarkable that his
groundbreaking analysis reaches the level of rigor we find in it. However, if
Aristotle did realize that his nonholistically inclusive good had not ensured
uniqueness for the sort of reasons I describe, then it would make perfect
sense for him to move toward comprehensiveness as an essential condition
of the highest good.17
1.3. Self-Sufficiency as a Maximally Comprehensive or Holistically Inclusive
Relation
To guarantee a uniquely ultimate end, Aristotle seems to require both a
further criterion for completeness and a holistic sense in which the ultimate
end ‘‘includes’’ all other final ends. The new criterion comes precisely in
the next section, where Aristotle discusses ‘‘self-sufficiency,’’ which may be
the most important passage in Book I:
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The same conclusion [that happiness is complete] also appears to
follow from self-sufficiency. For the complete good seems to be selfsufficient. . . . we regard something as self-sufficient when all by itself
it makes a life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing; and that is what
we think happiness does. Moreover, we think happiness is most
choiceworthy of all goods; it is not counted as one good among
many. [If it were] counted as one good among many, then, clearly,
we think it would be more choiceworthy if the smallest of goods were
added. . . . Happiness, then, is apparently something complete and
self-sufficient, since it is the end of the things achievable in action.
(NE I.7 1097b7–21)
In the middle of this passage (elided in my quote) we also find Aristotle’s claim that our happiness must include the happiness of our family and
fellow citizens, since we are political creatures. Aristotle apparently sees this
as confirmation of the self-sufficiency of eudaimonia: since we are zoon politikon, our happiness would ‘‘lack something’’ significant to us if it did not
include the well-being of our community, and so would not be selfsufficient; therefore (by modus tollens) our highest good must include this
social dimension.18 It must also cover our complete life, since otherwise we
could have the highest good yet lack desirable activities or states in other
times or aspects of our lives (which violates self-sufficiency). Notably, completeness is also defined this way in Metaphysics ⌬: things are called complete
if they lack nothing proper to their excellence.19
So understood, it is clear that the self-sufficiency criterion comes directly
from the erosiac model of human motivation: to be the highest good is to
satisfy all natural desire, so that the agent possessing the highest good lacks
nothing. The idea that eudaimonia cannot be just the best in a list of distinct
goods but must in some sense include all naturally significant goods also follows
from the ideal of the highest good implied by the erosiac model: if any
good added to X can make X better in the sense of more thoroughly satisfying natural erosiac desire, then X by itself is not self-sufficient, since the
agent possessing X still lacks some significant good needed for her life to be
perfect.20
In trying to spell out why there can only be one highest good, then,
Aristotle looks to the very heart of the erosiac model of motivation stemming from Socrates and articulates its deepest implications. If all human
motivation is desire aiming at a state in which we lack nothing and desire
itself is suspended in total fulfillment, then that state is the ultimate end of
all action. So if there seem to be distinct final ends at which we aim, then
there must be some relationship between them if that ultimate end is to be
unified in a practical sense that could provide guidance for life. This explains how the erosiac model entails self-sufficiency in the highest good,
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which in turn points toward the idea that the highest good must embrace
within itself or comprehend all other ends that are naturally final for us.
Irwin suggests that it is also possible to read the passage detailing honor,
pleasure, and virtue as pursued both for their own sake and for the sake of
happiness as suggesting that eudaimonia is a ‘‘comprehensive’’ or holistic
good that directly includes other final ends within it:
The highest good, chosen for its own sake, is composed of noninstrumental goods that are chosen both for their own sake and for
the sake of the highest good. . . . To choose them for the sake of
happiness is not to choose them purely as instrumental means, since
the ‘‘for the sake of ’’ relation, as Aristotle understands it, includes
the relation of part to whole.21
If this is right, it helps to distinguish Aristotle’s view from Plato’s, since
Irwin has argued that Plato’s Socrates holds that ‘‘virtues are purely instrumental to happiness and not to be valued for their own sakes’’22 (although
as unified in wisdom they are always the only effective means to this universal end).23 By contrast, Aristotle employs his distinction between action
(praxis) and crafts aiming at producible goods (poiēsis) (whose skills can be
misused) to deny that virtue is the craft of happiness: ‘‘Part of the point of
Aristotle’s distinctions is to show how virtue is not purely instrumental . . .
the virtuous action is itself the end, and is therefore a part of—not simply
instrumental to—the final good that is happiness.’’24
This holistic conception of the highest good is superior because it allows
for noninstrumental parts of eudaimonia.25 To Irwin’s description I add
two points: for the sort of ‘‘comprehensiveness’’ that he has in mind, (a)
the relationship of the other final ends within the highest good could not
be a simple logical conjunction or mereological sum but would have to be
some kind of harmonious ordering; and (b) the highest good would have to
include an ordered relation between all of the other truly final goods we can
pursue for their own sake. For, as Lear points out, given Aristotle’s starting
assumption that ‘‘all human action is grounded in desire [orexis],’’ if there
were no such unity in our highest good, then:
There would be various ends which we pursued for their own sakes
which were not themselves subordinate to any other ends. Life would
potentially be ultimately neurotic. For if the various ends-inthemselves called for conflicting actions in a given situation, we
would be pulled this way and that. There would be no way of acting
that satisfied our conflicting desires. . . . But the hope is that the world
is such and man’s nature is such that there is at least a possibility of
leading a non-neurotic life. The hope is that it is at least possible for
a man’s motivational structure to form a harmonious whole.26
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In other words, the harmonious ordering of ends in the ultimate end
must make possible a strong type of narrative unity in a life devoted to
such ends. Can we have more than ‘‘hope’’ that this is possible? Clearly, the
availability of this sort of practical harmony, or existential coherence, as I have
called it,27 will not be guaranteed by a highest good that only nonholistically
includes all other final ends. For on that model, if one final end E1 conflicts
with another end E2 in some situation so that pursuing E1 to its logical
extreme rules out happiness (by ensuring that desire for E2 will be unsatisfied), we could still decide to pursue E1 without reserve; for, although we
desire E1 for its own sake and as a means to happiness, the former can still
trump the latter. To avoid this, clearly the required harmony among ends
must imply that we pursue a given final end only in the ways and to the extent
that it is compatible with measured pursuit of other significant final ends
as parts of the same whole. It is, then, the erosiac conception of human
motivation that guarantees the possibility for which Lear hopes, by pointing
to what I called the holistically inclusive notion of the highest good.
This conclusion agrees with Bostock’s view (following Ackrill) that Aristotle has ‘‘an ‘inclusive’ conception of man’s ultimate end, for this is taken
to include activities in accordance with each of the many human excellences,
each pursued for its own sake (as well as for the sake of the whole to which
they contribute.’’28 It also agrees with Irwin’s favored interpretation of ‘‘the
most complete end’’ as ‘‘the one that includes the other ends; we are not to
pursue an unordered collection of ends, but [rather] the complete single
end that is the whole formed by them.’’29 If this is taken seriously, in light
of the erosiac model, it implies that in some way we experience desire for
all discrete final ends as expressions or instantiations of the ultimate desire for
the highest good. As I put it in my (much too brief ) treatment of this topic
in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre:
the desire for the highest good flows through and is present in (ordinate and inordinate) desires for all particular intrinsic goods. This
transcendent desire is then the well-spring of the more particular desires not in the instrumental sense, but in the constitutive sense that
we desire happiness itself only by desiring all these particular things.
. . . In Heideggerian terms, the desire for eudaimonia is the ‘‘jointure’’
of all desires.30
Probably the clearest statement that there must be such a unified urdesire underlying all our other desires is given by Aquinas in his argument
that our will cannot be ‘‘simultaneously related to diverse things as ultimate
ends.’’ His first argument for this is as follows:
each thing desires its own fulfillment and therefore desires for its
ultimate end a good that perfects and completes it. . . . The ultimate
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end, then, must so entirely satisfy man’s desire that there is nothing
left for him to desire. It cannot be his ultimate end if something
additional is required for his fulfillment. Hence it is not possible for
desire to tend to two things as though each were its perfect good.31
In this crucial passage, we see Aquinas’s erosiac model of the will, its consequent formal egoism, and the idea of self-sufficiency interpreted as a whole
embracing all truly desirable goods.
This idea is obviously closely related to the transcendent principle
(Trans) that we found in the Symposium, which holds that no end can naturally be desired for its own sake unless it is comprehensive in the holistic
sense (see chap. 4, sec. 2.4). But Trans is a very strong thesis, for it implies
that what appear to be particular final ends in everyday life are not really
final after all. This thesis is perhaps developed most fully in the Thomistic
mystical tradition: for example, C. S. Lewis interpreted the ‘‘desire for
heaven’’ this way, as underlying our desire for other goods, such as natural
beauty:
The books or the music in which we thought the beauty was located
will betray us if we trust to them; it was not in them, it only came
through them, and what came through them was longing. These
things—the beauty, the memory of our past—are good images of
what we really desire; but if they are mistaken for the thing itself,
they turn into dumb idols, breaking the hearts of their worshippers.
For they are not the thing itself.32
However, since Aristotle cannot agree that ‘‘we remain conscious of a
desire that no natural happiness will satisfy,’’33 he must not define the highest good in a way that would make it supernaturally transcendent. He can
hold only the weak transcendent principle: no activity, state, or product can be
unconditionally complete or fully final (or desirable solely for its own sake)
unless it is the whole union of goods that is comprehensively good, so that
one who possesses it lacks nothing naturally desirable. This allows us to
desire familiar things like natural beauty or a good game for their own sake,
as long we are also at the same time desire them as part of our eudaimonia.
This weaker version of the transcendent principle is still enough to ensure that there is only one fully complete (or unqualifiedly final) end, and
that it is sufficient for us or comprehensively satisfying. It is also enough
to entail the principle of formal egoism: all intrinsic goods desirable for
their own sake must be sought, at least in part, as components of the agent’s
good, or as appropriable by the agent. As Bostock puts it, ‘‘Aristotle clearly
means that each person seeks (or should seek) his own eudaimonia.’’34 We can
now use this principle to define the idea of an ‘‘all-embracing’’ good:
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G is the all-embracing good if, for every other final end E, E is desired not
only for its own sake but also as part of the ordered whole of intrinsic
goods that is G.
We can think of Weak Trans as equivalent to the thesis that there must
be such an all-embracing good.35 Using all the concepts explored in this
interpretation of Aristotle, let us now sum up the criteria of the highest
human good or supreme end as he seems to have envisioned them.
Criteria Defining the Ultimate End of All Human Motivation
1. It is the goal of the highest art/science, or ruling craft (which nonholistically includes all others), i.e., ‘‘political science’’ (in its classical sense).
2. It is unconditionally complete or fully final, which means:
(a) It is a final good, that is, a terminal end desirable for its
own sake, and
(b) It is not desired for the sake of (i.e., as a means to, or as
a constitutive part of ) any other complete or final good
[stronger version: it cannot be desired as a means to anything else].
3. It is comprehensive in the sense of holistically including all other
naturally desirable final ends as constitutive parts of itself. This
means:
(a) It is more than a mereological sum or logical conjunction
of first-order final ends. It is an ordered harmony of all other
final ends, or a way of organizing the various intrinsic goods
so that their pursuit forms a balanced whole in human
life.
(b) As a result, the highest good is the ground of possibility
of existential coherence or practical narrative unity of purpose in a human life and hence of inner psychological
harmony of the self.
(c) Thus it also embraces all the other naturally desirable intrinsic goods; for the agent to desire these ends for their own
sake is eo ipso to desire them as part of her own comprehensive good. In other words, it is only by being embraced
in this sense within the highest good that any other final
end acquires its finality. All final ends rightly understood
are seen as parts of this embracing end, so no final end is
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completely final by itself alone, except the comprehensive
good (the weak transcendent principle).
4. It is sufficient for us, that is, the agent who possesses it lacks
nothing, and hence all her motivation is requited, satisfied, or
finished; she would never have any reason to desire anything
else not included in this highest good or to abandon it once
she possesses it:
(a) Given our nature, this means the highest good must have
a social dimension: it will include the good of other persons we care about for their own sake. It will also be
temporally inclusive: the highest good must also be the
good of our complete life rather than only part of our
life.
(b) The highest good must also be as resistant as possible to
arbitrary changes of fortunes and depend as much as possible on features of inner character over which we have
voluntary control and that secure us against the vicissitudes of society and chance.
This seems to be the most perspicuous way to state the various criteria
that the highest good must satisfy to count as the ultimate end of all our
motivation, although, of course, other ways of grouping (and naming) these
components are possible. There are also some key logical relations between
these elements: (3) and (4) entail (2),36 but not vice versa. And (3) entails
(4), but I do not treat self-sufficiency as part of the definition of comprehensiveness, since only the former explicitly requires the erosiac thesis. But
either (3) or (4) is enough to entail uniqueness, that is, that there must be
exactly one highest good. It is also important to note that these purely formal
criteria of the ultimate end do not by themselves tell us which desires are
‘‘natural’’ to us and hence which ends will figure in the content of eudaimonia
as our highest good (4a is not strictly formal but it is added only by way
of illustration). To determine which of our desires express our true nature,
we need the further analysis that begins with the function argument. Yet,
as we already saw, for Aristotle it will be our rational D3 desires that
express our nature. As Jonathan Lear puts it:
Happiness is not based on the satisfaction of desires which a person
just happens to possess [e.g., D2 preferences]. According to Aristotle,
man has a nature: there is something definite and worthwhile that it
is to be a human being. Happiness consists in living this noble life:
in satisfying the desires that are necessary for man to have in order to
live a full, rich life [given his nature].37
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And this agrees with our analysis of the ultimate end. In terms of the moral
psychology of the De anima, our unified desire for our highest good (whatever it is) must be our embracing, most comprehensive D3 desire.
2. Excursus: Maximal Inclusivism, Virtue Inclusivism, and
Dominant-End Models
My reading clearly advocates a strong version of what commentators now
call an ‘‘inclusive end,’’ as opposed to a ‘‘dominant end,’’ reading of the
highest good in NE I. Whether or not the description of the highest good
as ‘‘the most complete end’’ by itself implied holistic inclusiveness for Aristotle, I believe that the criterion of self-sufficiency can be understood only
this way.38 However, I recognize that there has been a wide range of scholarly opinion about Aristotle’s conception of the highest good, eudaimonia,
and the human function. I will enter only marginally into these debates,
since what matters for my overall argument is not whether Aristotle really
held precisely the theory I describe, but whether this is the most defensible
form of eudaimonism, as I maintain.
If Aristotle actually held a dominant-end model, according to which the
highest good is just the most intrinsically valuable item in a list of final
ends, a contemporary eudaimonist could simply part company with Aristotle on this score and favor the maximally inclusive conception instead.
Later I ask whether certain promising variations on the ideal eudaimonism
I describe can avoid any of the objections explained in the next chapter
against this maximally inclusive form of eudaimonism. Since my critique of
eudaimonism depends primarily on the relationship of holistic happiness
or flourishing to virtue, I will concentrate on that issue and largely leave
aside the difficult question of how to relate practical virtues and ethical
achievement to intellectual virtue (sophia) and contemplation (theoria). It will
be enough for my purposes if one plausible version of eudaimonism holds
that contemplation (and pure scientific and philosophical inquiry generally)
should be conceived as simply the best first-order good in an inclusive
harmony of such goods that constitutes eudaimonia rather than as a dominant end that constitutes eudaimonia all by itself.
Whether or not Aristotle should be read as a maximal inclusivist, however, it is important for my purposes to show that some alternatives that
have been suggested would not work as well, especially if we hope to maintain the strong erosiac thesis. Hence in this section I briefly examine two
sophisticated rivals to maximal inclusivism, beginning with Richard Kraut’s
attempt to harmonize Books I and X of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Kraut holds that Aristotle proposes two distinct ideals of happiness, corresponding to two goods, each of which may have ‘‘primacy’’ in a life lived

................. 16406$

$CH6

05-23-07 10:56:22

PS

PAGE 187

188

Will as Commitment and Resolve

‘‘according’’ to this good—that is, when it is the ‘‘ultimate end’’ of a
life—in the following sense:
the ultimate end of a life is one that has three features: (a) all other
ends in that life are desired for its sake; (b) it is desired for itself; and
(c) it is not desired for the sake of any other good in that life. On
my reading, contemplation is the ultimate end of the philosophical
life, and activity in accordance with ethical virtue is the ultimate end
of the political life. The philosopher will engage in ethical activity,
but will do so only for the sake of contemplation. . . . By contrast,
the political life is one that omits contemplation.39
Kraut is led to this view by the need to recognize the primacy given to
contemplation in the philosophical life, according to NE X 7–8, along with
the need to avoid implying that the philosopher can simply dispense with
the practical virtues that have been the focus of the previous eight books.
It is clear that Kraut uses ‘‘for the sake of ’’ here as an instrumental or
nonholistic relation, since he holds that external intrinsic goods (like honor
and friendship) can be pursued ‘‘for the sake’’ of the ultimate end in either
of these ideals, without eudaimonia consisting in (a holistic combination of )
these external goods with other intrinsic goods. Rather, in both these reasonable answers to the question, ‘‘What is happiness?’’ or eudaimonia, ‘‘our
ultimate aim, consists solely in excellent reasoning activity,’’ or the human
virtues.40 In particular:
According to the best of these two answers, happiness consists in just
one good: this is the virtuous exercise of the theoretical part of reason.
. . . Every other good (including the ethical virtues) is desirable for
the sake of this one activity. According to the second-best answer,
happiness consists in virtuous practical activity.41
Putting these pieces together, we see that in Kraut’s terms, a given conception determines the content of eudaimonia by specifying what it takes to
be the ultimate end in the system of ends dictated by our nature: eudaimonia consists in whatever our ‘‘ultimate end’’ really is. Specifying our ultimate end, then, amounts to what I call a conception of our material telos, or
a material conception of eudaimonia (see sec. 3 below).
Given that his ‘‘for-the-sake-of ’’ relation is nonholistic,42 Kraut’s highest
good can (at most) include other final ends as means to it. As a result, the
two conceptions of eudaimonia Kraut describes are logically incompatible.
If what really creates eudaimonia for human lives is only excellent contemplation (or the harmonious union of contemplative activities), along with
whatever this requires as preconditions, then the ethical virtues (or their
harmonious union) are by definition not ultimate, since they can also rightly
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be pursued as a means to contemplation as well as for their own sake.
Likewise, if the excellent practical activities (taken jointly) are ultimate,
then contemplation must be pursued as a means to practical virtue as well
as for its own sake. At most one of these material conceptions of eudaimonia can be correct in its evaluative judgments, or right about our true
nature or material telos. Hence it is difficult to understand in exactly what
sense the philosophical conception could be ‘‘best’’ and the political
‘‘second-best.’’ This comparison seems to require some standard that is
neutral between them, that is a formal concept of eudaimonia that is dialectically prior to and theoretically distinct from either of these material conceptions. It is this formal concept that I define in section 1.3 above as a
maximally inclusive holistic or comprehensive good.
Thus Kraut’s nonholistic concept of the ultimate end does not by itself
determine which of these material conceptions is correct nor guarantee that
we have a unified material telos to be described by any conception.43 For,
as we saw, if we define the ultimate end as that which nonholistically includes all others, then only one end can be ultimate by definition, but we
have no a priori reason for believing that there should be any ultimate good
in this sense. Rather, there are three possibilities: (a) there could be just one
unconditionally complete or fully final end; or (b) there could be no ultimate end if either (b1) two or more ends are fully final, or (b2) no end is
fully final (because each final end can also be pursued a means to another).
In both the conceptions Kraut describes, there is an ultimate end, but his
concept of ultimacy leaves open the possibility that both are wrong because
there is no end that counts as ultimate.44
Of course, if the formal standard Kraut describes is right, then the contemplative ideal would count as more inclusive than the political ideal and
hence more eudaimon (as Aristotle seems to claim). But it will be an empirical
question whether or not contemplation is really for its own sake and never
a means to other ends (such as practically noble goals). The ‘‘politician’’
can respond that just because someone says that the ethical virtues are for
him a means to contemplation (as well as being valued for their own sake)
or that he tries to live a life with contemplation as his material telos, this
does not prove that he really will be more eudaimon or that his material conception of his highest good really is the ultimate end of human life. Although Aristotle’s function argument regards speculative reason as our
highest faculty, modern thinkers have found plenty of reasons to doubt this
judgment (witness the entire Romantic movement).
This in itself is no decisive objection, since all plausible moral theories
will have empirical elements. But the alternative reading seems formidable;
as Kraut recognizes, the holistic approach to the formal concept of the
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highest good seems to point instead to some way of harmonizing contemplative / theoretical activities with ethical / practical activities, recognizing
both as pursuits valuable in themselves as parts of a whole that is eudaimonia. This reading implies that neither of the material conceptions between
which Kraut’s Aristotle says we must choose is adequate. It is less important
for this issue whether a concept of the ultimate end includes external intrinsic goods as constitutive parts or only as necessary means. Kraut focuses on
this when he rejects what I have called maximal inclusivism:
the fundamental thesis of Book I, as I understand it, is that happiness
consists in a long stretch of perfectly virtuous activity of the rational
soul. That one good can be analyzed into several subdivisions, since
Aristotle distinguishes several kinds of perfect virtues of the rational
soul. But happiness is not a composite of all compossible intrinsic
goods: for example, it does not include physical pleasures, or honor,
or friends.45
Kraut’s main argument against including the external intrinsic goods is
that Aristotle’s function argument in NE I.7 shows our ergon to be virtuous
activity of the rational soul, not all the products of such activities (or such
activities plus luck) that we might desire. Although I cannot address the
function argument in detail here, I simply suggest that Aristotle does not
mean to identify (materially or formally) our ‘‘function’’ and our ‘‘highest
good.’’ Rather, our natural function is to perform excellently (or virtuously)
those activities that either lead to or constitute that part of our highest good
that is the most authentic expression of our nature, that is the development
of our nature’s highest potential. On this reading, performing our function
well is not the whole of eudaimonia for Aristotle; this is where he departs
from Plato and the Stoics. Since it is the most important part of our eudaimonia, understanding the activities comprised by this function is crucial for
grasping most of what in fact constitutes our highest good, given our nature. Many views do err in failing to see this and thus misconstrue our
material telos by overvaluing bodily and external goods. But the rejection
of false material conceptions of eudaimonia (which identify our ultimate
goal with health, honor, sensual pleasure, wealth, etc.) does not show that
the highest good is not formally comprehensive. On the contrary, as I suggested, Aristotle appeals to its comprehensiveness in arguing that these are
false material conceptions, since they provide none of the security against
misfortune that a comprehensive good must maximize within the limits of
our nature.
However, more important than Kraut’s exclusion of external intrinsic
goods is his further claim that Aristotle does not recognize a material telos
consisting of a comprehensive harmony of all forms of human excellence
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(in their active expression). By contrast, based on a reading of the function
argument similar to Kraut’s own, Jeffrey Purinton arrives at a nonmaximally inclusive concept of the highest good, which he helpfully calls
‘‘virtue-inclusivism’’: for Aristotle, happiness includes (in some holistic
combination) all virtuous activities, but only these, not other external intrinsic goods.46 This sounds superficially similar to the way Kraut sometimes
describes his position; for example, in his recent summary of his book,
Kraut writes that Aristotle ‘‘consistently adheres to the thesis that happiness
consists in just one type of good—virtuous activity.’’47 Yet in fact Kraut
also rejects both possible versions of virtue-inclusivism, since he denies that
for Aristotle, the highest good is materially identical either to (a) a comprehensive holistic harmony of all virtues activities (practical/ethical and speculative/intellectual);48 or to (b) some further good that nonholistically
includes or subsumes all these virtues. Rather, Kraut asserts that for Aristotle, the best material conception of eudaimonia is one in which intellectually virtuous contemplative activities nonholistically include all other ethical
virtues; in addition to being desired for their own sake, the ethical virtues
are desired for the sake of the contemplative virtues, not for the sake of
eudaimonia as a separate end embracing them both.
As a result, it is impossible, on Kraut’s view, to give a eudaimonistic explanation of why someone should sacrifice contemplative activity to other
moral demands. Kraut’s example is of a son, leading a philosophical life,
whose father has taken ill and requires his son’s aid. Since this means giving
up some time that could have been devoted to contemplation, on the
dominant-end interpretation, this means having less eudaimonia: ‘‘Aristotle
would say that the son must help his father, despite the fact that as a result
his life is less desirable than it would otherwise have been.’’49 As a result,
Kraut concludes that Aristotle is not an egoist in any sense that ‘‘enjoins us
to give priority to our own well-being by choosing the act that maximizes
our good’’; rather, Aristotle is an egoist only in the weak sense that each
agent should always do something that is good for her to some extent.50 If
this is right, however, it is hard to see how the desire for eudaimonia can
function as an overall guide to one’s life.51 Should we regard the desire for
the father’s well-being (one species of the noble) as a desire for a goal
entirely distinct from one’s own eudaimonia? If so, then it seems that the
strong erosiac thesis has been rejected, and thus an agent who felt in every
respect complete and wholly satisfied (lacking nothing) could become motivated to pursue such a noble goal for its own sake, as a kind of surplus to
her own eudaimonia. But this amounts to acknowledging the possibility of
projective or non-orektic motivation, which is what the existentialist claims.
By contrast, notice that both the maximally inclusive and virtue-inclusive
accounts of the highest good imply that the man in Kraut’s example could
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still be regarded as fulfilling his material telos when he puts off some scientific research to help his aging parent, because his eudaimonia involves a
balance of contemplative and ethical virtues, including justice, fidelity, and
what the Greeks called ‘‘piety.’’ Thus the son who abandoned his father
(who had no one else to turn to, whom the son could easily help, etc.)52 in
order to pursue more theoretical research would actually be making himself
worse off: by his being unjust, unfaithful, or impious (among other possible
characterizations of this action), his character is marred, and he fails to
achieve that harmonious balance of activities and states that constitutes his
own happiness in the holistic sense. This is the sort of answer that is widely
regarded as characteristic of eudaimonism, both as an approach to providing a theoretical foundation for normative ethics and as answer to the question, ‘‘Why be moral?’’ It also clearly seems to be the sort of answer implied
by Aristotle’s statements that a person who dies for his friend’s sake ‘‘does
indeed choose something great and fine for himself,’’ and that one who
sacrifices money for his friend’s sake ‘‘awards himself the greater good’’ (NE
IX.8 1169a26–29). Instead, if Kraut is correct, then Aristotle’s view is
closer to Scotus’s, who held that the ‘‘appetites’’ for happiness and for
justice were distinct and irreducible sources of human motivation (see chap.
11).
Let’s return, then, to Purinton’s virtue-inclusivist alternative. In his carefully reasoned paper, Purinton summarizes and evaluates the debate begun
by Hardie53 and Ackrill,54 who focused on the passage concluding the function argument, where Aristotle says:
Now each function is completed well by being completed in accord
with the virtue proper [to its kind]. And so the human good proves
to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the
best and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one. (NE
I.7 1098a16–18)
Perhaps this is the wrong place to start, since at this point in the text,
Aristotle is trying to work from his formal criteria for the ultimate good to
a specific material conception of eudaimonia as the first interpretation of
that good. In my view, the meaning of ‘‘the best and most complete virtue’’
should thus be understood as whatever combination of excellences allows
us perfectly to fulfill our natural function, which will be equivalent (so
Aristotle has argued) to achieving our ultimate good as already defined, that
is, as the comprehensive good. Still, it would be implausible for Aristotle
to think that a single dominant virtue (e.g., theoretical wisdom) could constitute the highest good defined as a holistically inclusive or maximally comprehensive end; if the highest good is comprehensive in my sense, then so
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must be the unified virtue that realizes or constitutes it. Hence what Aristotle means by ‘‘the best and most complete virtue’’ is obviously closely
related to his concept of the uniquely highest or ultimate good.
In his analysis of the debate about NE I.7 1098a16–18, Purinton defends a qualified version of Ackrill’s reading against Hardie, who maintains
that Aristotle’s explicit view makes happiness the first-order good of contemplative activity (whose virtue is exclusively sophia), and ‘‘not an inclusive
end, i.e., a ‘2nd-order’ good which includes a plurality of harmoniously
balanced 1st-order goods.’’55 Purinton’s main aim is ‘‘to show that Ackrill
was right and Hardie wrong about the identity of ‘the best and most
εειος virtue.’ ’’56 He begins by explaining the dilemma resulting from
the fact that Hardie and Ackrill each seem to have convincing criticisms of
the other’s interpretation. I note only the most telling of these criticisms:
(a) when Aristotle says, ‘‘if there are more virtues than one’’ then the best
of these will be the human good, this seems to exclude some (first-order)
virtues; yet (b) only on the inclusivist reading can the conclusion possibly
follow from the premises of the function argument or agree with the Eudemian Ethics, ‘‘where it is quite clear that he means to claim that happiness is
activity in accordance with whole virtue.’’57
Two responses to (a) leap to mind. First one might simply say (what
nobody seems willing to suggest) that probably here Aristotle is just guilty
of a misleading bit of phrasing. Although this is never impossible even in
the greatest writer, this suggestion is usually resisted on the grounds that it
is more charitable to read Aristotle as cleverly anticipating his argument in
Book X that the most eudaimon life is one of pure contemplation. Second,
one might say that Aristotle leaves open the hypothetical ‘‘if there are more
virtues than one’’ not to assert that there is a simple multiplicity of virtues
without any unity, anymore than he wanted to assert earlier that there is a
simple multiplicity of final ends without any unity. Both virtues and ends
can be viewed on two levels: their surface multiplicity and their underlying
unity. Since Aristotle later defends the idea that virtues form a whole or
unity, he ought to think of this whole as transcending in value any single
virtue considered in isolation from the whole.
Purinton’s response is a good deal more sophisticated. He argues that
the second part of Aristotle’s definition of the human good, beginning with
‘‘if there are more virtues than one,’’ is meant to clarify the first part of this
definition by excluding the virtues of the nutritive and sensitive faculties of
the irrational part of the soul. Thus ‘‘happiness is not an activity in accordance with these lesser virtues, but is rather activity in accordance with ‘the
best and most perfect virtue,’ viz., again, the distinctively human virtue, the
virtue of the rational faculty.’’58
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Ackrill, then, was fundamentally right, but he erred in accepting his
critics’ view that in the phrase, ‘‘if there are more virtues than one,’’ Aristotle ‘‘is raising the possibility that there are more distinctively human virtues—i.e., more virtues of the rational faculty—than one.’’59 If instead
Purinton is right that this phrase simply accommodates excellences of the
nutritive and sensitive parts, then Aristotle is not identifying the good that
it is our natural function to realize with one division of distinctively human
virtues (the moral or intellectual, and their various components). We can
explain what Aristotle is excluding in a way that is consistent with identifying our material telos with the whole formed by the unity of all distinctively
human virtues. Moreover, on this reading, Aristotle’s conclusion follows
from his premises in the function argument.60 Finally, Purinton argues that
at the beginning of NE X.7, ‘‘activity in accordance with virtue’’ refers to
human virtue as a whole, which is our telos, according to his reading of the
function argument; and Aristotle’s statement that ‘‘it is reasonable that it
be in accordance with the best virtue’’ is a further conclusion not present
in I.7, referring to sophia as ‘‘the best of the virtues of the rational part of
the soul.’’61 Although Purinton agrees with Kraut ‘‘that in NE 10 Aristotle
is distinguishing two distinct species of happiness (rather than describing
two elements of a single mixed life),’’ he rejects Kraut’s contention that
these two species of eudaimonia are the referents of the two formulations
of the human good in NE I.7 1098a16–18.62
I find this analysis insightful and would add to it only Ackrill’s view
that eudaimonia also includes intrinsic goods external to virtuous activity
(which, as we saw, Purinton rejects). As I said in reply to Kraut, I think
that later in Book I.8, Aristotle clarifies that those activities constituting
our natural function comprise only the most vital part of eudaimonia, not
the whole of it. So I am not persuaded by Kraut or Purinton that none of
the external intrinsic goods are constitutive parts of the ultimate good (as
formally defined in Book I). The opposite (maximally inclusive) view seems
to me to follow from the erosiac model of desire underlying Aristotle’s
eudaimonism and from other passages, such as ‘‘no one would choose to
live without friends, even if he has all the other goods’’ (NE VIII.1,
1155a2–3)—which clearly implies that the combination of ‘‘all the other
goods’’ without friendship would not be self-sufficient.
Certainly Aristotle regards some of the external goods (such as wealth
and power) only as instrumentally necessary preconditions for virtuous activity, without constituting any part of happiness by themselves (as Irwin
has also argued).63 But others, such as health, friendship, and perhaps even
a challenging career, are better considered parts of eudaimonia as well as
instrumental to virtuous activity. If none of the external intrinsic goods
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were part of eudaimonia, then the main distinction between Aristotle’s position and the Stoics, as it was understood in antiquity (e.g., in Cicero’s On
Moral Ends [De finibus]) would vanish. Whether I am right on this point or
not, however, will make little difference to my critique of eudaimonism,
which will apply equally well to Purinton’s model, which includes only
human virtues, and to maximally inclusivist models.
3. The A-Eudaimonist System: An Idealized Aristotelian Model
Given the difficulties in exegesis and significant disagreements among leading Aristotle scholars about his meaning in key passages, it will be useful
to abstract from these historical questions by stating a version of eudaimonist moral psychology that is at least a promising approximation to the
foundational claims of the Nicomachean Ethics, whose adequacy we can evaluate using contemporary analytic methods. Again, my goal is to lay out what
I think to be the most defensible version of a recognizably eudaimonist psychology in the mode of Aristotle or Aquinas (rather than, say, the Stoics)
and then show that this best possible eudaimonism still fails on the basis
of internal problems. I will call this ideal reconstruction ‘‘A-eudaimonism.’’
I begin with the important point that teleological or final causation is
not limited to contexts of experienced desire (or orexis). A teleological explanation can apply whenever certain kinds of functional analyses are irreducible in explaining why something moves or changes as it does and/or
why it is a good or deficient instance of its kind.64 However, human beings
differ from other living things that automatically develop toward fulfillment
of their telos unless external interference prevents it. Rather, in human beings, final causation works through a more complex psychic system of desires leading to voluntary action. Therefore, in any system a motivational
telos universal to human beings must be an activity or state T, such that:
(a) it is our natural function or ‘‘design’’ to attain T; and
(b) we can acquire motives to act with T as our final goal or end but
can also fail to be motivated in the ways necessary to move
toward T.
Call this the common notion of any motivational telos. Without the notion of
some kind of nature, function (ergon), or design, the term ‘‘telos’’ can be
used only metaphorically. This notion is shared by more than one formal
concept of the human motivational telos (or ‘‘formal telos’’ for short), each
of which defines such a telos in terms of its most fundamental relation to
human motives. The A-eudaimonist system begins with the erosiac formal
concept of the human telos, which has the following features:
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I. The subjective psychological experience of desire for our telos. We apprehend our telos as that state the achievement of which would be maximally fulfilling; we anticipate the possibility of feeling complete,
lacking nothing desirable at all. Hence the desire to realize our telos,
which is built into our nature and essential to us (even if we do not
reflectively thematize it as such), is a subjective psychological state
that we can discover in ourselves as a desire for holistic satisfaction,
or as a desire for perfection.
II. The formal egoism of the desire for our telos. Since we anticipate that
this is a good of or belonging to the agent herself, we anticipate consuming or appropriating the satisfaction it involves—although this
consummation will be ongoing.
III. The relationship between our formal and material telos. These first two
features can be used to define our formal telos: it is our final, unconditionally complete, and self-sufficient end. For F to be our formal
telos, then, F must embrace all the goods we can rationally pursue,
and pursuit of F must underlie all our other motives, such that:
A. Whatever we are motivated to pursue, we pursue either as a
means to, as part of, or under the aspect of F. Even if this
is only implicit, because the motivation to pursue F is not
consciously recognized by the agent as the necessary underlying condition of her motivation to pursue other final ends,
it can normally be recognized through due reflection by the
agent.
B. We may not always pursue our true material telos (M), that is,
the good(s) in which our formal telos F actually consists, or
that which constitutes or causes F to be realized for us. This
is partly because the content of M may not be apparent to us
even if we understand our desires as pointing to some embracing good (F) that would be completely fulfilling, and partly
because other appetites may overwhelm our rational desires
for M even when we gain some understanding of it.
According to A-eudaimonism, then, our material telos M is defined relative to our formal telos F, which is the more fundamental concept. By
themselves, however, these conceptual definitions make no existence claims.
A-eudaimonism is further committed to the view that something in our
experience actually answers to this definition of our formal telos:
The Jointure-of-all-Motives Thesis: There is exactly one unified good
F that fits the definition of our formal telos: the motivation to pursue F
embraces all our motives, in the sense that they can all be seen as parts
of, or expressions or instantiations of, the motivation to pursue F.
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While desire for this one good F is necessarily our most fundamental
desire, according to A-eudaimonism, we do not automatically know what
F actually requires or consists in for beings like us—and this is precisely
why proper training of our dispositions and the associated practical wisdom
that Aristotle calls phronesis are necessary for any pursuit of our telos to stand
a decent chance of success. This point helps show why A-eudaimonism is
compatible with a kind of libertarian freedom. As Copleston explains,
Aquinas holds that anything a human being wills is willed as a real or
apparent good, ‘‘but he does not necessarily will the actual infinite Good,’’
for he can ‘‘allow something other than God to appear to him as the source
of happiness.’’65
This is also why there is room for philosophical reflection and debate
about what M really is.66 For example, Aquinas’s primary disagreement with
Aristotle is about what M is; he thinks it requires union of our speculative
intellect with God in a mystical vision of the true divine nature. But he
agrees with the jointure thesis that I attribute to Aristotle. For he says that
every person ‘‘necessarily desires happiness’’ because the ‘‘common notion
of happiness is that of a perfect or complete good,’’ and by this he means
F as I have defined it: ‘‘the perfect good for a man is whatever wholly
satisfies his will. Hence to desire happiness is simply to desire that one’s
will be wholly satisfied, and this everyone desires.’’ This is different from
describing ‘‘the object in which happiness consists,’’ by which he means our
material telos.67
As I read them, neither Aquinas nor Aristotle acknowledges that there
is really room for intelligent philosophical disagreement about whether the
jointure thesis itself is correct.68 They also seem to take as relatively obvious
or uncontroversial a closely related but arguably distinct thesis essential to
their ethical systems:
The Eudaimonia Thesis: F is eudaimonia (the agent’s happiness in its
maximally holistic sense), and thus our all-embracing motive is orektic
desire for eudaimonia.
I distinguish the jointure thesis and the eudaimonia thesis because, interestingly, the latter begins to specify the content of F, albeit only in the most
general way. The eudaimonia thesis also clearly involves commitment to
the strong erosiac thesis: since our fundamental embracing desire is erosiac
in form, all human motivation is ultimately erosiac in form. This is less
clear with the jointure thesis, which claims only that there is a unified,
all-embracing motive (and correlatively, a uniquely all-embracing goal). In
principle, this could be true even if this embracing motive was not erosiac
in form, for example, if it were an intrinsic tendency toward some ideal of
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rationality. However, when the all-embracing good mentioned in the jointure thesis is defined according to the erosiac concept of F, then F must be
the comprehensive object of erosiac desire; so the erosiac concept of F along
with the jointure thesis implies the strong erosiac thesis.69
Thus as I construe it, the eudaimonia thesis does not follow analytically
from the definition of our formal telos. I regard the identification of eudaimonia as our formal telos as a synthetic claim. I believe Aristotle concurs, for
at the point where he says that happiness seems to answer to his prior
description of the ‘‘most complete’’ end of human life, he does not seem to
take this as following self-evidently from the concept of an ultimate good
but only as generally admitted and as the best available first approximation
to something fitting the abstract properties of our formal telos, given the
available data in our experience.70 Of course, this presupposes that there is
some way to interpret ‘‘eudaimonia’’ in the eudaimonia thesis that does not
simply define it as ‘‘our formal telos.’’ However, on my construal, eudaimonia
is intimately related to the erosiac concept of our formal telos, since the
latter is defined above as something that would perfectly satisfy an allembracing orektic desire, an erosiac desire underlying all other motives, if
there is one. Eudaimonia could then be defined as the object of such a desire,
since maximally holistic happiness would leave no significant good lacking
in the agent. That there is such an all-embracing orektic desire would seem
to follow, not from the strong erosiac thesis by itself, but only from this
taken together with the jointure thesis. Given these two, then all our motivation traces to orektic desires, and these are joined together in one allembracing or comprehensive orektic desire, which is by definition the desire
for eudaimonia. Then, given the erosiac definition of our formal telos, the
eudaimonia thesis will follow. We can summarize this reconstruction of
the A-eudaimonist system in the form of the following argument to the
eudaimonia thesis:
The A-Eudaimonist Core Argument
1. The weak erosiac thesis (WET): all prepurposive motives (PPMs)
are generically erosiac in form.
2. The transmission principle: our intended purposes inherit all the
content and strength of their motivation from our PPMs.
3. The strong erosiac thesis (SET): all human motives are generically
erosiac in form [from 1 & 2].
4. The erosiac concept of our formal telos (F defined in maximally inclusive terms as the comprehensive good sufficient to
satisfy all erosiac desire) [conceptual definition based on 3].
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5. The jointure thesis: there is an embracing good that constitutes our
formal telos; our attitude toward this good embraces all human
motivation.
6. All human motives are joined in a single, all-embracing erosiac
desire for a comprehensively satisfying end, in the realization
of which we will lack nothing desirable [from 4 & 5].
7. Eudaimonia: a comprehensively satisfying state, in the realization of which we will lack nothing desirable [conceptual
definition].
8. The eudaimonia thesis: eudaimonia is the good that constitutes our
formal telos [from 6 & 7].
In practice, of course, the Jointure and Eudaimonia theses always go
together as essential aspects of A-eudaimonism, but it is heuristically valuable to distinguish them in order to help explain why each of these aspects
of A-eudaimonism is subject to distinct criticisms. But whether this identification of our formal telos with eudaimonia is a further synthetic claim in
addition to the jointure thesis that human beings have a formal telos recognizable as such in their experience, or whether these are seen as analytically
related parts of a single thesis, in neither case is eudaimonia by itself a
description of our material telos (M). So further claims that specify the content of M beyond identifying it with eudaimonia remain synthetic relative
to the eudaimonia thesis.
This brings us to the point that, in addition to these fundamental theses
of A-eudaimonism, we have Aristotle’s more specific claims concerning the
content of M, or the nature of the ideal life that will in fact realize F. This
account of M begins with Aristotle’s famous function argument in NE I.7,
is developed in his critique of alternative beliefs about M in popular
thought and rival ethical theories, and is completed in his account of the
different practical and intellectual virtues and their unity. As Susanne Hill
says, Aristotle holds that we will be fulfilled only by the ‘‘characteristic
activity of human beings,’’ which is ‘‘the best and most complete rational
activity of which human agents are capable.’’71 Although most of what is
interesting for normative ethics in Aristotle is found in these parts of his
account, it is important to note that someone could differ with Aristotle’s
detailed characterization of M while still accepting the essential claims of
A-eudaimonism, on which I focus.
However, since on my reconstruction, eudaimonia is not just analytically
defined as our formal telos, and thus the eudaimonia thesis is a synthetic
claim, the A-eudaimonist must certainly regard the eudaimonia thesis as a
start on filling out the content of M. That our formal telos is identical to
eudaimonia, whatever that requires, provides the leading proleptic clue in
discerning the content of M: every further claim about M must be referred
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to this criterion. Since Aristotle goes on to argue that what constitutes
eudaimonia for us must be the complete fulfillment of our nature as persons,
any position that we would call ‘‘eudaimonist’’ in moral theory today has
to include some such role for the notion of ‘‘nature’’—as already indicated
above. Thus most A-eudaimonists will at least be committed to the following extension of the above core argument:
9. The material thesis: we have a material telos M (as defined above
relative to our formal telos F): M is ontologically constitutive
of F and epistemically distinct from F.
10. Our material telos M is that which really constitutes or realizes human eudaimonia, whatever people believe the path to
happiness involves [from 8 & 9].
11. It is the nature of every organic natural kind to seek the full
development and expression of its highest or most distinctive
powers and capacities; thus sentient animals of every kind will
remain unsatisfied if their distinctive powers are not expressed
in activities natural to them [an implicit premise of the function argument].
12. The naturalistic thesis: human eudaimonia will be realized by
whatever activities and states completely develop, exploit, and
express the full potential of our natural kind or are required as
necessary conditions of this complete development and expression of our full potential [from 10 & 11].
Aristotle certainly continues in the function argument to develop this
line of reasoning with the idea that the full development and expression of
our potential can be measured by looking at capacities that distinguish
human beings as members of one natural kind from all other animals. But
I will not include this argument as a fundamental part of A-eudaimonism,
since it has been subjected by Bernard Williams to some obvious and still
potent objections about ‘‘the moral ambiguity of distinctive human characteristics.’’72 Moreover, it seems that contemporary followers of Aristotle who
aspire to build a virtue ethics on eudaimonist grounds can offer other, less
objectionable ways of filling out what the full development of our natural
potential must involve, as a way of characterizing the contents of
eudaimonia.
However, in the next two chapters, I argue that the best attempts to rest
accounts of virtuous motivation on eudaimonist foundations all fail because
the system of A-eudaimonism sketched in this chapter is subject to a paradox analogous to the paradoxes of material and abstract egoism presented
in chapter 5. Virtuous motivation, as described by Aristotle and his contemporary followers, is not embraced in the required way by the agent’s
desire for her eudaimonia, but rather requires projective motivation.
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The Paradox of Eudaimonism:
An Existential Critique

Overview. This chapter is concerned primarily with eudaimonist
conceptions of virtue and friendship and will interest anyone interested in aretaic moral theory. It argues that virtuous motivation is not
only materially unselfish but also formally non-egoistic. Starting with
two contemporary efforts to make sense of Aristotle’s account of
friendship, it argues that Aristotle conflates by-product goods and
intentional goals. Aiming at our happiness as our highest end is selfdefeating, since our happiness is in large part a by-product of motivating ourselves to pursue self-transcending ends or goals. Except for
section 6, most of the discussion is not technical and should be accessible to anyone with an undergraduate-level background in Greek virtue ethics.
Introduction
The A-eudaimonist system constructed in chapter 6 provides a clear basis
for formulating several important criticisms that have been raised against
the eudaimonist project. These include what I believe is the decisive criticism that A-eudaimonism cannot accommodate the kind of moral motivation implied by the very conception of virtues for which it was supposed
to provide the objective rational foundation. Together, as we saw, the
Transmission principle and the weak erosiac thesis provide the psychological basis for Aristotle’s eudaimonism. Yet when he tries to work out a
conception of virtue, Aristotle describes forms of ethical motivation that
cannot ultimately cohere with his eudaimonist framework. We will see this
by exploring what I call the ‘‘paradox of eudaimonism,’’ which arises from
the formal egoism to which Aristotle’s psychology commits him. The point
201
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of this critique is to provide a key piece of evidence against the strong
erosiac thesis and for projective motivation. The existential conception of
the striving will is supported by the argument that unless we enjoy this kind
of motivational capacity, the central paradox of eudaimonism could not be
avoided in real life, and persons would be trapped in self-defeating motives.
Although I strive to be faithful to Aristotle’s texts, my main concern
once again in this chapter is not historical but rather conceptual. On some
points necessary for my critique, I simply give my own interpretation of
Aristotle and postpone consideration of most rival readings until later. Although my primary goal is to lay out the relevant problems, I try to stay
with uncontroversial interpretations of Aristotle’s main moral and psychological concepts. The existential critique of A-eudaimonism will allow me
to relate the existential conception of striving will to important ideas in
contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethics and psychology. Thus the critique of
A-eudaimonism continues into chapter 8, which considers some important
contemporary reconstructions of eudaimonism to see if they can avoid the
paradox.
1. Elements of the Pure Motive of Virtue
The central problem raised by the A-eudaimonist system as I have sketched
it in the previous chapter is that the formal egoism it involves seems to be
deeply incompatible with both our contemporary everyday notions about
moral motivation and Aristotle’s own account of virtue. For in treating
eudaimonism as a system explaining human motivation in terms of D3
desires, I have certainly implied that virtue as classically conceived1 is formally embedded in the agent’s concern for her own well-being, which, however enlightened, is still a formally egoistic orientation. For example,
Aquinas embeds virtue in the desire for eudaimonia when he says ‘‘the true
reward of virtue is happiness, for which the virtuous work is done.’’2 Yet I
also agree that Aristotle holds—and even goes out of his way to emphasize—that virtuous motivation involves what I call a ‘‘pure’’ concern for
‘‘the noble’’ (kalon) for its own sake, as opposed to advantage and pleasure
as categories of first-order goods pertaining directly to the agent’s material
well-being. For he says that we may do what, outwardly, the virtuous person
would do without doing it from virtuous motives:
if acts that are done in accordance with the excellences [aretai] have
themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done
justly or temperately. The agent must also be in a certain condition
when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge,3 secondly he must choose the acts and choose them for their own sakes,
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and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable
character.4
Thus a virtuous motive is a stable disposition to choose the right act for
these circumstances because it is (the relevant species of ) the noble act in
the circumstances (i.e., it is courageous, just, generous, friendly, etc.)—not
because it makes us better off. For example, the brave man who encounters
terrible dangers ‘‘will face them for the sake of what is noble, for this is the
end of excellence [virtue].’’5 The virtuous person values a certain end under
a description involving the relevant kind of nobility (in this case, courageous action) intrinsically, not instrumentally, and only this ‘‘pure’’ motivation contributes to eudaimonia.6 In general, we may summarize the doctrine
of Nicomachean Ethics (NE ) II.4 (with some expansion) as a definition of
virtuous motivation with the following three criteria:
Aristotle’s Definition of Virtue
A. The agent must have practical knowledge of what is right/
noble/appropriate in the case (the practical wisdom called
phronēsis).
B. The agent must desire to do what is noble for its own sake, form
the intention to act on this desire, and so act (unless prevented
by coercion or circumstances for which she is not responsible).
C. This desire must be a fully formed motivational state of the
agent, following from a firm disposition to desire and choose
(different species of ) the noble.
So understood, virtue has both motivational and epistemic sides: the disposition to choose actions based on an entrenched desire for the kalon (or its
species: the generous, the just, the courageous, etc.) along with practical
wisdom to distinguish what the noble thing is in the circumstances together
produce prohairetic ‘‘choice’’ of the particular action.
As we have seen, Aristotle also makes two other claims that can be
usefully distinguished from his core definition of virtuous motivation:
D. The rational disposition to desire and choose the noble, along
with the practical wisdom to discern the noble (which reciprocally require and support each other), will both be hindered by
uncontrolled D1 and D2 appetites and passions; and
E. What the noble (temperate, just, magnificent, friendly, etc.) thing
to do is in a given situation cannot be defined by any simple
rules, but we can learn it from role models who function as paradigm cases for us and (on the analogy of the arts) we can recognize it by looking for ‘‘the mean’’ between actions that are
extreme in one sense or another.
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This briefly summarizes how Aristotle arrives at his capsule formula that
virtue is a stable disposition to choose moderate or intermediate actions,
defined relative to us, as a practically wise person would recognize them
(NE II.6 1107a1–3).
Now, parts D and E of this doctrine both raise well-known problems
about the concept of ‘‘the mean’’ and control of the passions, and part C
likewise raises questions about what kind of voluntary control the agent
could have over the development of her own entrenched (or even fixed)
motivational dispositions.7 I will put these objections aside until later in
order to focus on part B. In interpreting B, however, we must be careful
with the level of self-consciousness about virtue that is involved in acting
for the sake of the noble.
It is sometimes suggested that a virtuous agent could act virtuously in
doing a particular action A without any thought of doing A as virtuous. For
surely the disposition to choose the noble makes such action spontaneous
and unreflective for the thoroughly virtuous agent? But this reading involves
a basic confusion: since virtuous action has to involve choice in Aristotle’s
sense, it cannot consist in blind unthinking reactions; it cannot be ‘‘habitual’’ in that modern sense. This is what Williams means when he writes
that virtue is ‘‘an intelligent disposition. It involves the agent’s exercise of
judgment, that same quality of practical reason, and so it is not simply
habit.’’8 Similarly, von Wright argues that ‘‘the specific virtues do not
answer specific act-categories’’ because they require judgment about the particular act;9 therefore ‘‘To regard the virtues as habits would be to misunderstand the nature of virtues completely.’’10
How we are to characterize virtuous disposition is tricky. Broadie rightly
urges that we understand acting ‘‘for the sake of the noble’’ as doing the
act in a particular spirit, that is, with ‘‘a sense of owing it to oneself to do
what is right or best even when this is costly’’ or otherwise difficult.11 But
she adds:
It may be that an agent who responds in this spirit will generally
respond in this spirit, but on no occasion does this manner of response depend per se on the agent’s seeing himself at the time as one
who generally responds this way, or on seeing himself as ‘‘exercising
a virtue.’’ Clearly he must take himself to be doing what is appropriate, and in some sense he knows that he cares about that. . . .
Virtue entails general dispositions to act in this way, and with this
knowledge [that it would be shameful not to], in particular cases. But
to have this disposition, it is not necessary that one think of oneself
as having it; and to exercise it, one need not see oneself as having it,
or value one’s action as the exercise of a virtuous disposition.12
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This perhaps needs some clarification. The virtuous agent must make
use of some kind of thick ethical descriptor in evaluating the act as ‘‘noble,’’
and this will correlate with our external description of her motive as virtuous; for example, when the agent thinks, ‘‘If I don’t rescue him, he will
die,’’ or ‘‘Because important principles or a person’s welfare are at stake, I
must stand firm despite the danger,’’ we call her first-order motive courageous. But she need not think, ‘‘It would be courageous to stand firm,’’ since
this is really a second-order reflection on the first-order motive just described. This is what Broadie means when she says, ‘‘The agent in action
must focus on the objects and circumstances of his action, in a manner that
cares that his response to them is right. This is different than focusing on
his own engagement in virtuous activity.’’13 In this sense, the agent avoids
having ‘‘one thought too many’’ in acting on virtuous motives. The agent
is focused on the world and on judgments concerning the outward-looking
properties of his various possible actions, rather than focused on his own
moral self-image. As Pincoffs argues, then, the virtuous person is not moved
primarily by what John Dewey called ‘‘spiritual egotism.’’14
Yet this also must be further qualified. As the two thoughts above suggest, there are different levels of articulation in virtuous intentions. In some
cases, discernment of the right action may require more reflection on self,
that is, on what we can or should undertake, given our personality, past
track record, and so on—and this could involve at least tacit judgments
about our own moral worth. In a more general sense, if virtuous action
requires choosing the act primarily because of the thick ethical descriptors
that the agent applies to it, then he will always-already have a tacit (or
nonthetic) understanding of the virtuousness of this act—in much the same
sense as a person engrossed by the chessboard in front of him may at that
moment be entirely devoid of explicit Cartesian second-order judgments
about his own consciousness and yet remain tacitly or nonreflectively aware of
his own concentration on the game.15 As a result, the agent acting on the
motive of virtue in a given case will always be in a position to reflect on the
virtuousness of this act, should such reflection be occasioned or demanded.
As Broadie puts it, ‘‘if acting from a prohairesis is taking a practical stand,
anyway on this occasion, as to the goodness of acting so, then presumably
the stand includes recognition, in some sense, of the goodness of the disposition for such action.’’16
I think we can strengthen this point: the agent may not be focused on
her own virtue, but she would not be disposed to choose the act for the
sake of its thick ethical qualities in the circumstances were she not the kind
of person who believes that choosing actions for this sort of ethical quality
is morally more admirable than acting for first-order pleasure or material advantage. She may not be making this judgment in choosing the particular act,
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but she must be disposed to this second-order reflective endorsement of
her first-order motive if she is really choosing the act primarily for its noble
qualities. If this is right, it explains a bit better than Broadie’s own analysis
how Aristotle’s conception of acting on the motive of virtue coheres with
the account he gives of magnanimity and its unifying role among the virtues
(which I discuss in sec. 3).
2. Annas and Kraut on the Motive of Virtue in Friendship
Given this interpretation of clause B in our definition of virtue, we can
examine the central problem it raises: namely, how can virtuous motivation
in this sense constitute the agent’s performing her natural function and thus
attaining (the most important part of ) her eudaimonia? For it seems that
the motive of virtue defined in B is not a D3 desire: although it involves an
objective evaluation of a good to be obtained (and perhaps even a good
that is always related to the well-being of some person or group of persons),17 this good itself is not necessarily apprehended as part of the agent’s
own flourishing or chosen under this agent-relative description. Does this
mean that my earlier analysis of Aristotle was unfair in concluding that
orexis includes only the type of states I have described as D1, D2, and D3
desires? Should we now say that his Ethics implies that other non-erosiac types
of ‘‘desire’’ are possible that, unlike D3 desires, do not even formally involve concern for the agent’s own flourishing?
Julia Annas perhaps comes closest to raising this question in trying to
make sense of the good person as ‘‘self-loving’’ in Aristotle’s account of
friendship—a discussion that she rightly sees as having fundamental implications for Aristotle’s understanding of all the virtues (not only friendship).18 She begins by arguing that Aristotle’s point in comparing the
agent’s relations to himself and to his friend (in true friendship of noble
character) is not to reduce the latter to the former. Although ‘‘self-love is
psychologically primary,’’ since Aristotle says that we wish good to ourselves ‘‘most of all’’ (NE VIII.7 1159a12–13), we still care about our
friends for their own sake as well; thus ‘‘Concern for others for their own
sake is thus not reduced to a form of self-love.’’19 I agree, since Aristotle is
clear that in common parlance, ‘‘To a friend, . . . it is said, you must wish
goods for his own sake’’ (NE VIII.2 1155b31) and in his own view:
complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue;
for they wish goods in the same way to each other insofar as they are
good, and they are good in their own right. . . . Now those who wish
goods to their friend for the friend’s own sake are friends most of all,
for they have this attitude because of the friend himself [i.e., because
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of his virtuous character], not coincidentally. Hence these people’s
friendship lasts as long as they are good; and virtue is enduring (NE
VIII.3 1156b8–13).
Notice Aristotle’s emphasis here on the idea that when friendship arises
from such reciprocated goodwill, it fits the security-against-misfortune criterion of the ultimate good. This is precisely because such friendship is a
paradigm species of pure love of the noble for its own sake; in this case, we
value our friend’s well-being and character simply because of his own ethical nobility or moral worth. Aristotle also famously contrasts this pure
concern for the good of a deserving friend with any merely instrumental
concern for others as a means to one’s own pleasure or advantage: ‘‘Clearly,
however, only good people can be friends to each other because of the other
person himself [i.e., for his sake]; for bad people find no enjoyment in one
another if they get no benefit [from the other]’’ (NE VIII.4 1157a19–20).
The entire analysis of noble friendship in Book VIII draws on the account
of virtuous motivation developed in Book II.4–6 and especially on condition B: the pure desire for the noble as a final end. As Aristotle says, ‘‘in
purpose lies the essential element of virtue and character.’’20
But then, Annas asks, why in Book IX.8 does Aristotle seem to agree
that loving oneself ‘‘most of all’’ would imply the sort of blameworthy
egoism that always puts one’s own interests first in any conflict? Annas
suggests that although this does not follow, and hence there is no conflict
between ‘‘the psychological primacy of self-love’’ and the importance of
‘‘moral and altruistic action’’ when circumstances call for them, Aristotle
allows the connection because many people will assume that if self-love is
our strongest motive, ‘‘then it seems reasonable to put one’s own interests
first.’’21 So Aristotle allows at least the appearance of conflict here and needs
to make sense of the idea that the virtuous person is a moral self-lover in a
sense quite distinct from vicious types of selfishness or material egoism.
Aristotle diffuses the apparent conflict, according to Annas, by arguing
‘‘that true self-love consists in loving, and identifying yourself with, your
practical reason, rather than loving bodily or external goods.’’ Since the
good of this rational part of ourselves is compatible with the same good in
the friend, there is no zero-sum trade-off in the ‘‘competition’’ between
virtuous persons for the fine or noble; competing for this ‘‘will be just what
it is to act because of the noble, in a virtuous and unselfish way. . . . Thus
true self-love is compatible with virtuous action aimed at the noble.’’22
Yet when Aristotle tries to explain how the proper self-love involved in
virtue is compatible with the good person sacrificing life, money, honors,
or other luck-subject goods for his friends, Annas admits that Aristotle’s
description of altruistic heroism implies an underlying desire for the agent’s
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own moral glory.23 And she is (rightly, in my opinion) not satisfied with
Kraut’s resolution of this issue, which says that the virtuous person will not
unjustly aim to deprive his rivals of opportunities for noble action. The
problem remains that Aristotle seems to make self-love more basic to
human motivation than altruistic motives: ‘‘The more we stress the point
that Aristotle has redefined the content of self-loving behavior, the more
striking it remains that self-sacrifice is explained as being, formally, selflove.’’24 I think this becomes more understandable if Aristotle is trying to
reconcile his own demanding conception of virtuous motivation with the
eudaimonist moral psychology he developed as a framework for his normative theory. But this does not mean that he succeeded.
On the contrary, Annas recognizes the seriousness of the problem about
how virtuous motivation can count as formally egoistic or self-loving in the
ideal eudaimonist sense. How, she asks, can these fit together in the agent’s
thought or motive process from the first-personal point of view?
Is the agent supposed to think ‘‘I’ll sacrifice this money so that my
friends can gain more, for that is a generous action, and so noble; and
I’m sacrificing mere money and gaining the noble, so I’m assigning
myself the greater good, and so come off best after all’’? There is
clearly something wrong with this thought; the second half undermines the first. The agent cannot give as his end in doing something
both that he is helping his friends for their sake, and that he is assigning
himself the greater good of acting virtuously.25
Annas is right that something is deeply awry here, but she does not fully
capture the problem. So it is easy for Kraut simply to deny that there is any
inconsistency between the two parts of the virtuous agent’s experienced
motive as Annas described it. In his reply, Kraut says, ‘‘there is nothing
incoherent or morally questionable about mixed motivation: one can be
aware of the fact that one is acting both for the sake of others and for one’s
own sake.’’26
Now, Kraut is entirely correct if he is speaking about cases in which the
agent has as her intended goals two (or more) first-order goods, one of
which is materially related to her own well-being and another of which is
not (say, because it is solely a part of another person’s material welfare).
Such cases are entirely familiar and unremarkable in human life. For instance, suppose that I lobby my township to replace the crumbling curbs
on the block where my house sits. It would be perfectly intelligible if I had
multiple motives for doing this: partly for my own aesthetic satisfaction,
partly to improve the value of my home, and also partly for my neighbors’
benefit. A pure egoist, by contrast, would not care about the latter but
would lobby for new curbs only for his own material and psychological

................. 16406$

$CH7

05-23-07 10:56:15

PS

PAGE 208

The Paradox of Eudaimonism: An Existential Critique

209

gain, accepting the benefit to his neighbors as an unintended (albeit probably expected) side effect. But suppose that in my case, the neighbors’ good
really is one of my final ends. Probably one sufficient condition of this
(although perhaps not a necessary one)27 would be the truth of the following kind of counterfactual: if I lost my self-interested motives for this action, all else being equal, I would still lobby for new curbs, given my
intention to do this for my neighbors’ benefit. If so, then it seems reasonable to say an altruistic motive was in fact operative in my action alongside
self-interested motives.
In addition, I think we can also make sense of cases in which the agent
acts to produce some first-order good belonging to another person (or
constituting part of his or her welfare) both as an end-in-itself and as an
instrumental means to some further first-order good that might be selfrelated. Although such double-motive cases are a little less familiar and
perhaps occasion more doubt, on reflection I think they prove intelligible.
For instance, suppose I decide to take a business associate out to lunch
both to thank him for his work on a project that I have been involved in
and because I hope that his enjoying a nice meal will encourage him to
want to work with me again in the future. Of course, there is no perfect
introspective certainty about one’s own motives; I might wonder whether I
really care about this person as a friend. But suppose, again, that in fact I
would still be moved to take him out for a nice meal as a means to bringing
him pleasure and communicating my gratitude even if he told me he was
retiring and moving to a small island in the South Pacific, never to be heard
from again. If so, then in the present case, in which I do expect him to
remain in business and nearby, it seems that I aim at his gustatory pleasure
and his enjoyment of my gratitude partly for their own sake and partly as
a means to my own future opportunities. Although this might not seem as
virtuous as acting solely on my other-regarding motives, it also seems clear
enough that my action on these asymmetrical mixed motives is quite different from an action motivated solely by opportunistic desire for my own
advantage with no concern at all about the business associate’s welfare for
its own sake.
This shows that Annas has not pinned down the problem, but not that
there is no problem, as Kraut holds. For if the agent has two entirely independent motives, as Kraut suggests, then how can they be unified in the
desire for eudaimonia? As we saw in discussing the weak transcendent principle, it would be implausible to postulate that desire for any noncomprehensive end must also be desired as an instrumental means to the
comprehensive good. And this is clear in the case of virtue: many acts that
I might choose just because they are noble will have predictable results that
do not add to my material well-being. So it is hard to see how they could
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also be desired as a means to my eudaimonia quite separately from (or in
addition to) their nobility—as if I would still have some incentive to do
them quite apart from my virtuous motivation. Rather, it is only plausible
that their nobility itself will contribute to my eudaimonia. This illustrates
again why the weak transcendent principle cannot by itself guarantee unification, and so the idea of an embracing self-sufficient good must do that
work. For this to succeed, the pure part of a mixed motive must somehow
be brought under the embracing desire for eudaimonia.
To see what this would require, imagine that we try to describe our
example differently, as follows: the agent intends to fete her business associate in style in order to bring him enjoyment as a final end and chooses this
as her final end so that he will appreciate how much she cares about him and
hence give her more business. If this worked, it would avoid the problem
of unification arising from the separability or independence of double motives,
for now the agent’s motives are not genuinely mixed, in the sense that either
would give the agent some incentive to action if the other ceased to operate
(even if it might not by itself move her all the way to decision or action).
This counterfactual condition is not met in our unusual case where we try
to produce motives themselves as a means to some further end. But, having
grasped the unification horn of the dilemma, we now run into the other
horn: in our revised description, the case is no longer intelligible because it
tries to tell us that the agent intends a certain (other-regarding) end as final
yet does this as a means to another (self-regarding) goal.
Our unintelligible case is one of the unusual class in which motives, or
some aspect of them, are used as a means: our agent seems to want the very
finality of one of her ends to serve as a means to something else. But this
makes no sense; I can certainly intend some end G as a final end and as a
means to some further end H (then I have two independent motives) but I
cannot intend the finality of G itself as a means to H. In that case, my Gseeking motive is not independent of my H-seeking motive, and thus G
cannot be final after all. The attempt to use G’s finality as a means to H is
a pragmatic contradiction.
We could perhaps render our case intelligible if we imagine that the
agent plans to condition her own psyche in some way to produce genuinely
altruistic interest in her business associate’s good, knowing the benefits that
her altruism will bring her. For this to work, she would have to forget
the original reason why she began the process calculated to generate her
altruism—which means that in unforeseen circumstances, it could lead her
to act in ways inimical to the outcome that was her original goal. In such
cases of psychological self-manipulation, as we may call them, the agent simply
acts on one motive at the outset (in this case, a self-interested motive) and
as a result, she later acts on an entirely different motive (in this case, an
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altruistic one). The two relevant motives are temporally separate and causally sequential, not simultaneous mixed motives. But this kind of self-manipulation could hardly be what Aristotle has in mind in his account of
formally self-loving yet virtuous action.
3. The Paradox of Eudaimonism: Desiring Eudaimonia as a By-Product
of Virtue
This last case points toward the real tension in Aristotle’s account of virtuous self-love, which Annas’s description of the agent’s thought did not
quite reveal. The problem is analogous to the paradox of egoism as we
analyzed it using Feinberg’s and Elster’s concept of satisfaction as a derivative side effect of willing other ends for their own sake. More specifically, the
problem is that in explaining why the virtuous person can be considered a
kind of decent self-lover (as the formal egoism of his eudaimonism requires), Aristotle appeals to types of fulfillment that are essentially by-products
of virtue or that can arise only as effects of pursuing ‘‘the noble’’ for its
own sake. For example, when he argues that the virtuous person ‘‘more than
the other sort, seems to be a self-lover’’ since ‘‘he awards himself what is
finest and best of all, and gratifies the most controlling part of himself,
obeying it in everything’’ (NE IX.8 1168b29–31), he is manifestly conflating by-product effects with intended goals.28 The fulfillment that comes
from being true to one’s natural function, or from ruling oneself in a way
consistent with the dignity of one’s human status, can only be the result of
pursuing other goods for their own sake. Similarly, in the passage on which
Annas focuses, Aristotle writes, ‘‘And so the good person must be a selflover, since he will both help himself and benefit others by doing fine actions. But the vicious person must not love himself, since he will harm
both himself and his neighbors by following his base feelings’’ (NE IX.8
1169a12–14).
Many times in his discussion of friendship, Aristotle emphasizes Socrates’ chief idea that evil persons ‘‘destroy themselves’’ (e.g., because they ‘‘are
at odds with themselves’’ and akratic because enslaved to addictive appetites;
NE IX.4 1166b7–14). Yet it is clear that Socrates meant that evil persons
do this inadvertently as a by-product of their motives, not intentionally (for
that would contradict the fundamental postulate concerning human motivation in the Meno and Euthydemus), and Aristotle could not have thought
otherwise. But then the parallel sense in which the good person aids himself
must also be inadvertent rather than by design—and this explains the rather
Socratic air of paradox that critics have found in these passages. For the
true difference between the two kinds of ‘‘self-love’’ which Aristotle distinguishes is that the base sort involves intending everything as a means to
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one’s own material well-being, while the noble sort involves desires for the
noble in which the agent has no intention to benefit himself at all. Yet
Aristotle’s way of explaining the distinction seems to obscure rather than
clarify this key difference.
In this crucial error, Aristotle is in good company, for he is simply
following Plato’s statements in the Republic IV that because the virtuous
person achieves a kind of psychic harmony by ruling his appetites with his
reason, he counts as a ‘‘friend to himself ’’ (Republic IV 443d)—or as bringing himself good much as one brings benefits to one’s friend. Although this
is meant to conclude Socrates’ answer to Glaucon and Adeimantos by
showing finally that the just persons will be better off internally than vicious
persons no matter what their external circumstances may be—and so justice
is intrinsically valuable—Plato either does not see or wishes conveniently
to ignore that taking this by-product psychological benefit of justice itself as
our final end would be self-defeating, since this is not compatible with
choosing just actions simply for their justice as an end-in-itself. Yet, even
more than Aristotle, he thinks that clear knowledge of our telos will assure
us happiness. As Socrates says to Thrasymachus in the Republic I, ‘‘Do you
believe this is a small thing you try to define? Is it not rather the whole
conduct of living, how each one of us may live the most profitable life?’’
(344E). This sounds very close to Aristotle’s metaphor of the archer seeking a clear target to shoot at.
Likewise, Aristotle often speaks as if we could directly pursue such byproduct fulfillments or desire them in the D3 sense as parts of our eudaimonia: ‘‘if it is more proper to a friend to confer benefits than to receive
them, and it is proper to the good person and to virtue to do good . . . the
excellent person will need people for him to benefit’’ (NE IX.9 1169b11–
13). Strictly speaking, however, if the agent tried to do something for another person as a potential friend because he felt such a ‘‘need’’ or ‘‘desire’’
for something lacking in his life, then the other would rightly feel put off
by being treated as a mere means to the agent’s eudaimonia. By contrast, if
I am truly acting for my friend’s good as an end-in-itself, I am not doing it
because ‘‘I need friends to benefit’’ (in order to be the kind of person I
aspire to be or to gain the satisfaction I typically derive from helping my
friend do well in some worthwhile endeavor—or however we care to characterize the relevant agent-related by-product goods of friendship). In sum,
the right version of Annas’s question would be: Is the agent supposed to
think, ‘‘I’ll sacrifice this money so that my friends can gain more, for that
is a generous action, and as a result I’ll gain the fulfillment that naturally
comes from such generous action (for people disposed to desire the noble
for its own sake), which is the greater good’’?
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To this version of the question, Kraut’s response cannot apply, for the
second part of the imagined thought unquestionably does undermine the
first part. And this is because the agent proposes to pursue directly a selfrelated good Z that can arise only as a by-product of pursuing an independent other-related good Y as an end-in-itself. But outside of self-manipulation, there is no way the agent can make pursuit-of-Y as a whole into a means
to anything else. She can pursue Y as a means to Z; but Y itself is not a
product that brings about Z (since, by hypothesis, only the pursuit of Y
for its own sake can bring about Z). Indeed, Aristotle himself sometimes
seems to recognize that the pleasure that comes from virtue is a by-product
that cannot be directly desired or pursued. Commenting on Aristotle’s idea
that the pleasure that ‘‘completes’’ virtuous activity is ‘‘a sort of consequent
end’’ (NE X.4 1174b33), Paula Gottlieb says:
According to Aristotle, true pleasure is not a directly motivating goal
for the good person—it does not provide the reason why the good
person enjoys the things she does. Rather, according to Aristotle,
pleasure comes about as a result of the good person’s having the
appropriate attitudes to what is independently good. It is not the
cause but the result of the good person’s caring about good things; it
is a supervenient end (epigignomenon telos).29
As a point about the pleasure that forms a part of eudaimonia for the
lover of virtue (NE I.8 1099a6–20), Gottlieb is right that it shows that
Aristotle is not advocating any hedonistic form of material egoism, and
Alasdair MacIntyre has made a similar point.30 However, since the paradox
of eudaimonism does not charge Aristotle with hedonism, the idea of byproduct pleasure would have to be broadened to address that paradox.
This is what Annas does in the answer she gives to her own version of
this paradox—an answer that recognizes the nature of the problem better
than her explicit formulation did. She says that virtuous motives simply
have the unintended effect of being in the agent’s own best interests, and
hence, from an external (third-person) perspective, we can understand the
agent to be ‘‘doing’’ an action that is both noble and self-beneficial:
The solution is surely that the agent’s aim is just acting for the sake
of others; in doing this he is in fact getting some good for himself,
but this is not part of his aim. It is what he is doing in his whole life,
which is directed at virtuous actions, and we could say that it explains
his actions, but it is not his aim. Self-love of the right kind explains
and justifies what the agent does, but it is not what motivates him.31
In other words, the virtuous agent’s fulfillment is psychologically a byproduct of her virtuous activities.32 Strictly speaking, however, an agent only
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‘‘does’’ an action under a description in which it is intentional for her, so
on this account, it could only be in a metaphorical sense that what the virtuous
agent is ‘‘doing’’ when she pursues the noble for its own sake is ‘‘realizing
her own eudaimonia.’’ It is also unclear in what sense we should say that this
by-product benefit ‘‘explains’’ the action, since erosiac (or orektic) desire for
it played no causal role in the agent’s decisions, on Annas’s solution. Nor,
apparently, could the retrospective justification it provides come to play
any motivating role without becoming self-defeating again. Hence although
Annas’s proposal is an entirely reasonable hypothesis about what actually
happens in virtuous action and it accurately reflects Aristotle’s demanding
conditions on the ‘‘motive of virtue,’’ as described above, it does not reconcile these phenomena with the system of A-eudaimonism. Rather, it implicitly rejects formal egoism and implies that an agent’s acting for the sake of
the noble is projectively rather than erosiacally motivated.
4. Why the Paradox Cannot Be Solved by Denying that Eudaimonia
Motivates Virtue
To see that Annas’s solution cannot save the A-eudaimonist project, we
need to understand in more detail exactly why virtuous motives, as Aristotle
himself describes them and as Annas explains them, are incompatible with
the notion that all our motives are embraced by an underlying formally
erosiac desire for eudaimonia as our all-inclusive end. To begin, let us recall
that in chapter 5 we defined a ‘‘pure’’ motive as one that aims at some selftranscending first-order end for its own sake. Now, the pursuit of ‘‘the
noble’’ involved in virtuous actions according to Aristotle (and the entire
subsequent tradition of virtue ethics in Western philosophy) is clearly a
pure motive in this sense, as condition B in the above definition of virtuous
motivation implied.
This is Annas’s main point in her fullest argument that ancient ethics is
not objectionably egoistic, although all the main schools do hold that ethics
begins in the agent’s reflection on her own life and what is needed to improve it:
For what I have to develop, in order successfully to achieve my final
good, are the virtues. . . . Some have a direct connection with the good
of others, most prominently justice, which may involve surrendering
goods I want to others because they have a just claim on them; but
all the virtues are dispositions to do the right thing [for its own sake],
where this is established in ways that are independent of my own
interests.33
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Annas’s point is not that according to ancient eudaimonists, it would be
rational from the therapeutic perspective of an agent interested in improving her own life to forget this self-regarding purpose and develop altruistic
or other-regarding motives instead—just as it might be rational in cases of
deterrence to acquire and display to one’s enemies an irrational D2 desire
that prefers mutual destruction (even at the price of one’s own demise) to
submission to certain attacks.34 Rather, in The Morality of Happiness, Annas
again tries to resolve the paradox by arguing that a state or activity can
form part of my good without my intending it for this reason : ‘‘There is no
reason, prima facie, why the good of others cannot matter to me independently of my own interests, just because it is introduced as something required by my final good.’’35 Similarly, in response to remaining doubts
about egoism, she writes: ‘‘But it is no part of the theories we have seen so
far that its forming part of my good is the reason why I should care about the
good of others.’’36 Thus the formal egoism involved in eudaimonism as
Annas interprets it is entirely consistent with the purity of the motive of
virtue:
The straightforward claim that an ethics of virtue is egoistic, since
the agent is concerned about developing her virtues as a way of
achieving her final end, is straightforwardly mistaken. . . . An ethics
of virtue is therefore at most formally self-centered or egoistic; its
content can be fully as other-regarding as that of other systems of
ethics.37
In other words, a pure virtue ethics can rest on a ‘‘formally egoistic’’ moral
psychology, but only if we reduce formal egoism to a mere speculative
thesis about the effects that the agent’s virtuous motives and actions have
on her own happiness, although knowledge of these effects plays no motivational role in the agent’s psyche.
The main problem with this solution is that it means that recognition
of the reflexive value of virtuous activity for its agent can do no practical work
structurally or developmentally in making the agent virtuous. But then,
what will be the point for me of recognizing, as Annas puts it, that ‘‘Achieving my final good, happiness, or whatever that turns out to be, will involve
respecting and perhaps furthering the good of others’’?38 On her solution,
it would seem that this discovery made while reflecting on my life could
only be of speculative interest for me, because if it becomes one of my motives
for respecting other persons, it will defeat itself by robbing my respect for
others of its purity. This respect must be independent from any self-regarding
motives of mine if it is to improve my own character as a reflexive byproduct. So unless we imagine the agent engaging in a strategic game of
self-manipulation, the recognition of the eudaimonistic value of pure or
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non-egoistic motivation is practically impotent from the agent’s perspective,
on Annas’s reading.
At this point, we should recall the distinction between psychological
eudaimonism (PE) and rational eudaimonism (REu) introduced in chapter
1, section 3.2. Annas’s solution seems to be to affirm REu without PE: the
eudaimonistic by-product value of virtuous motives justifies these motives,
but the agent does not pursue her noble ends for this reason (even if she
recognizes it). I will call this combination external eudaimonism (EEu), since
it holds that the practical reason justifying virtuous motivation (namely, its
by-product contribution to the agent’s happiness) is external to the agent’s
own motives for acting virtuously. Any version of EEu faces the thorny
problem of explaining how the range of motives on which people act links
up with the practical reasons for action that there are according to REu. In
particular, it faces the problems of explaining how virtuous motives are
generated and whether the agent acting on such motives has to see the ends
pursued as justified for their own sake, apart from the by-product benefits
that their pursuit might have for him. For example, one way to answer this
question would be to concede that virtuous motives involve the projection
of goals qua noble. This would yield a version of EEu that combines REu
with the existential conception of willing. The main problem with this
combination is that the projection of ends by the striving will assumes some
practical reason for setting these goals, and it seems unlikely that the practical reasons to which the striving will responds in every kind of care or
commitment it can form are eudaimonistic reasons.
In any case, Aristotle does not seem to consider such external eudaimonist options. As I emphasized earlier (chap. 6, sec. 1.1), Aristotle explicitly
asserts that a philosophical reflection on the nature of the highest good will
have the highest practical value in helping us shape our lives, just as a clear
sight of the target helps the archer shoot in the right direction (NE I.2
1097a24–26). And this makes perfect sense if he holds the eudaimonia
thesis, according to which the desire for eudaimonia pervades and embraces
our desire for every other type of final end, including the noble. For if this
is right, an understanding of our material telos will show us what we ought
to pursue or what we ought to care about. So Gottlieb is correct when she
responds to Annas that ‘‘it is implausible to deny that Aristotle thinks that
the desire for happiness is a motivating as well as a justifying and explanatory factor in human reasoning.’’39 Similarly, Kraut says:
I am not sure that we can find good textual grounds for attributing
to Aristotle’s moral agent the kind of self-forgetfulness that Annas’
interpretation requires. On her reading, the excellent person does not
take into account the point that the heroic action he is about to
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perform will be good for him. . . . But as I read Aristotle . . . a moral
agent should not be oblivious to comparisons between himself and
others, but should instead try to outperform them. If this is correct,
then it is perfectly in order for the moral agent who is sacrificing
some good for others to reflect that in doing so he is winning something for himself that is better than what others get from him.40
I will support this reading with some independent evidence in the next
section. But if Aristotle’s virtuous agent is more self-conscious about the
benefits virtues bring him than Annas’s solution allows, then the main problem returns. As Williams says, the problem concerns the agent’s attitude
toward his own ‘‘excellences of character or virtues’’:
A center of doubt gathers . . . on the point that when Aristotle seems
most removed from modern ethical perceptions, it is often because
the admired agent is disquietingly concerned with himself. Aristotle
does allow that the good man needs friends, and indeed that friendship is part of the good life; but he finds it necessary to argue for this
in order to reconcile friendship with the ideal of self-sufficiency.41
So Annas’s EEu solution is not open to Aristotle, given his belief that
the desire for eudaimonia can somehow motivate persons to a life of virtue.
But aside from avoiding the disquieting self-concern implied by formal
egoism, Williams has another reason for thinking that Aristotle should not
have believed that the eudaimonist insight that virtues benefit their agent
can do any dialectical work in the agent’s deliberations. Perhaps the virtuous
agent engaging in a philosophical review of his whole life can retrospectively recognize that the ‘‘state of well-being’’ is ‘‘constituted in part by the
virtuous life’’:
But this is not a consideration that one could use to any radical effect
in practical reasoning, as he seems to suggest. One becomes virtuous
or fails to do so through habituation. One should not study moral
philosophy until middle-age . . . [because] only by then is a person
good at practical deliberation. But by then it will be a long time since
one became, in relation to this deliberation, preemptively good or
irrecoverably bad.42
In effect, then, Williams thinks Aristotle’s own account of moral development ought to move contemporary Aristotelians toward Annas’s proposed
solution—even if this means modifying some of Aristotle’s central claims.
But an account of virtues in which the desire for eudaimonia plays no
dialectical role in moral development will no longer be eudaimonist in Aristotle’s sense since it will reject the idea of an all-embracing desire for a
holistically unified comprehensive good.43
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5. Magnanimity as Aristotle’s Answer to the Paradox
One reason to agree with Kraut that Aristotle could not accept Annas’s
proposal is that Kraut’s moral competition model strongly agrees with Aristotle’s own description of ‘‘magnanimity’’ (meglapsychia) as a special unifying
second-order virtue involving a clear-eyed appreciation of our own character’s moral worth along with the desire to be treated accordingly.
The interpretation of this virtue is controversial, since ‘‘one who thinks
himself worthy of great things’’ may seem to have one thought too many
(in Williams’s famous phrase), even if he ‘‘is really worthy of them’’ (NE
IX.3 1123b1–2). Surely some ways of dwelling on one’s worthiness can
reduce it. Yet Aristotle clearly implies that the virtue of magnanimity depends on other first-order virtues as dispositions to choose other first-order
forms of ‘‘nobility’’ for their own sake: he says that ‘‘Magnanimity . . .
would seem to be a sort of adornment of the virtues: for it makes them
greater, and it does not arise without them. This is why it is difficult to be
truly magnanimous, since it is not possible without being fine and good’’
(NE IV.3 1124a1–4). Here Aristotle is trying to give this quality—like
each of the other virtues he discusses—a deeper moral meaning than it had
in the common parlance of his culture (see NE IV.3 1124a20–b6): he
wants his contemporaries to transfer the term they used for a particular kind
of pride or sense of honor exemplified by aristocrats (and especially by
timocratic warrior-chieftains in archaic times) and their admiration for this
aristocratic quality to a very different quality that could be possessed by any
moral person who consistently loves ‘‘the noble’’ (in the philosopher’s new
moralized sense). His logic is evident enough: since such a person loves the
noble in all its forms, and the first-order dispositions to choose various
kinds of noble first-order goods are themselves noble goods (of persons), he
will naturally develop a second-order love of this kind of second-order
noble good in himself and in others. (And since this love, which is what
Aristotle means by meglapsychia, adds to his virtue, it makes his moral worth
even greater, which in turn makes the goodness of his character all the more
desirable for its own sake to him, etc.)
This conception of magnanimity is crucial to our analysis for two reasons, I think. First, it helps explain why Aristotle believes that the motive
of virtue and the desire for eudaimonia are closely related. As a kind of
inner sense of one’s own worth that is resilient against being dishonored by
worthless people, magnanimity is absolutely essential to the mature agent’s
eudaimonia, helping him be as secure from misfortune as possible and thus
as self-sufficient as possible. For example, Socrates exemplifies magnanimity
in Plato’s Apology: his sense of self-worth is insulated from the jury’s injustice. The central place of magnanimity in Aristotle’s account is a clear indication, then, that eudaimonia is composed in part of a kind of reflective
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awareness of one’s own virtue. As a result, the virtues consisting in stable
dispositions to choose acts with various kinds of first-order nobility for
their own sake will also contribute directly to the agent’s subjective sense
of his own life going well overall (a key part of his eudaimonia) when magnanimity is added. And since this awareness is also a stable disposition to love a
particular sort of noble good and thus a virtue in its own right, it might
even suggest to Aristotle that the fundamental desire for one’s own eudaimonia could just be the desire to be able to be magnanimous, which would
be the desire to love the noble in all its first- and second-order forms, or
the desire to have all the virtues. This would provide one way of understanding how the desire for eudaimonia could radiate into the desire for noble
actions, as the eudaimonia thesis requires.
Second, magnanimity, as analyzed here, is also the self-love that Aristotle
connects so intimately with friendship, especially in the passages that
brought us to the paradox of eudaimonism. In the discussion of friendship,
once again Aristotle argues that only the agent who is good in the moral
sense (choosing from pure motives) can truly have the excellence of friendship when it is properly understood (as opposed to popular conceptions of
it). And he emphasizes that what a morally good person loves in his friend
is precisely that friend’s moral character (as opposed, say, to other features of
his personality that might make him interesting or unique to us)—which is
why Aristotelian noble philia sounds austere to contemporary readers.44 But
this is exactly what the magnanimous person also loves in himself and it is
why he justifiably cares for his own good as an end-in-itself. This explains
why Aristotle would say that the ‘‘decent person’’ has the same relationship
to himself as he has to his friends (only more so) and that the friend is
‘‘another himself ’’ (NE IX.4 1166a30–32), for the virtue of philia is roughly
the same motive toward another person as magnanimity is toward oneself,
in Aristotle’s analysis. In both cases, it is a second-order love of first-order
virtues of character. This reading also saves Aristotle from appearing to
make the narcissistic claim that we can love only persons who are like us
in contingent details of personality; rather he means that philia is shared
magnanimity.
Magnanimity, the reflexive version of this love for the noble friend, is
more fundamental only because Aristotle holds that being wholehearted,
unified, self-controlled, secure in one’s own identity, and comfortable with
oneself (NE IX.4 1166a14–29) are prerequisites for being the best friend
possible to others. But this is not only because, as Aristotle says, a person
without these qualities will tend not to be controlled by desires for noble
actions and hence will tend to use her friend for pleasure or advantage (as
long as he can supply them) rather than loving him for his character, which
is more permanent. It is also because a person with a secure sense of her
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own worth will be less needy and hence more ready to be openly giving to
others.
There is a significant irony in this for eudaimonism, because it implies
that it is precisely those who do not need friends to complete them who
find it easiest to be true friends to others. Yet, interestingly, Aristotle inadvertently admits this in defending his answer to the puzzle in the Lysis (i.e.,
that similar persons make better friends than those with opposite qualities).
He says, ‘‘The friendship that seems to arise most from contraries is friendship for unity, of poor to rich, for instance, or ignorant to knowledge, for
we aim at whatever we find we lack’’ (NE VIII.8 1159b13–15, emphasis added).
Thus friendship of utility is no problem for the erosiac model. By contrast,
the person of complete virtue, being magnanimous, is as self-sufficient as a
human being can be and hence lacks nothing (or as little as possible), and
this is precisely what best suits him to act on a pure motive of philia toward
his friend. Likewise, in the polis, where philia is extended to civic relationships, the ideal king (as opposed to the tyrant) ‘‘is self-sufficient and superior in all goods; and since such a person needs nothing more, he will
consider his subjects’ benefit, not his own’’ (NE VIII.10 1160b5–7). This
should be compared to Plato’s statement in Republic I that ‘‘no art or rule
provides what is a benefit to itself ’’ and that this is why craftsmen have to
be paid a wage quite separate from the end of their craft (Republic 346E).
No wonder, then, that when he tries to apply the logic of magnanimity to
solve the puzzles about friendship left by Socrates, Aristotle finds that the
tension between eudaimonism and the pure-motive model of virtue becomes harder to avoid.
At any rate, the central role of magnanimity makes clear that Aristotle
thinks of conscious desire for one’s own eudaimonia not only as among the
virtuous agent’s motives but also as reinforcing them through the satisfaction
gained in magnanimous love of the enduring states that constitute one’s
own character, and the deep sense of allegiance to the best part of oneself
that this affords. That virtuous dispositions will allow me to feel that I am
affirming the best in myself is crucial to our desire for the noble, on this
view. But here again, we find the confusion of by-product and intendable
goal. For we cannot desire virtuous motivation itself in order that we may feel
magnanimous about it. As Broadie concludes, if ‘‘the great-souled person’s
self-esteem refers to his other virtues,’’ then it is in an important sense
derivative, and so, ‘‘insofar as he acts from those other virtues, his actions
do not express self-esteem.’’45 This is exactly right, but Broadie does not
see the problem it creates for Aristotle: the desire for eudaimonia, which is
partly satisfied by magnanimity, cannot reinforce virtuous motivation by
giving us another reason to be virtuous, as Aristotle apparently thought.

................. 16406$

$CH7

05-23-07 10:56:22

PS

PAGE 220

The Paradox of Eudaimonism: An Existential Critique

221

This error lies at the center of Aristotle’s own answer to the paradox of
eudaimonism.
Yet the importance of Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in understanding his account of friendship and its problem is usually overlooked in the
critical literature. For example, in his otherwise insightful analysis of Aristotle on friendship, Vasilis Politis questions Aristotle’s claim that each person rightly loves himself above even his best friends.46 Politis accepts the
idea that ‘‘to aim at being virtuous’’ is a kind of proper self-love distinct
from selfishness since it ‘‘involves an important altruistic dimension.’’47 But
he thinks the claim that one should cultivate such proper self-love as much
as possible (which he calls the ‘‘weak supremacy thesis’’) should not lead
Aristotle to the ‘‘priority thesis,’’ which says that each should love himself
more than he loves anyone else.48 Specifically, ‘‘aiming as much as possible
at performing fine and noble actions is a kind of self-love’’ since it perfects
one’s rational soul, which is, for Aristotle, our true self. But why does this
intrapersonal perfection of self lead Aristotle to claim at NE 1169a34 that
the virtuous or excellent person awards himself a ‘‘greater share’’ of noble
actions, which requires an interpersonal comparison?49
Vasilis argues that the inference from the weak supremacy thesis to the
priority thesis is invalid unless some further premise is supplied.50 He considers but dismisses Kraut’s suggestion that Aristotle is endorsing a competition for virtue in which each tries to outshine the other.51 He also
considers the suggestion that one can award only external goods (ones over
which there can be a zero-sum competition) to one’s friends, but he rightly
rejects this because Aristotle insists that we can help each other to become
virtuous.52 Lastly, he considers the point that sacrifice of one’s true good
appears to be impossible in Aristotle—a point that I note follows directly
from the formal egoism in Aristotle’s conception of human motivation.
Politis finds this idea both coherent in itself and rightly attributed to Aristotle but insufficient to justify the priority thesis.53
I think we already have the answer to Politis’s mystery: since A-eudaimonism implies that ultimately all a human agent’s motives are expressions
or parts of her embracing desire for her own eudaimonia, there is necessarily
an asymmetry between one’s concern for elements of one’s own eudaimonia
(such as virtue) and elements of anyone else’s eudaimonia. One can pursue
the friend’s good, in the end, only if that good itself, or the pursuit of it, is
seen as an aspect of one’s own comprehensive good. I think this explains why
it is crucial for Aristotle that friendship is ‘‘self-referential, i.e., a friend is
my friend,’’ as Nancy Sherman has emphasized.54 Hence it is impossible for
the agent to make any sacrifice for the other that she would not see as
enhancing her own eudaimonia. Aristotle gives no independent argument
for the priority thesis because it follows from his first principles.
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However, Aristotle is concerned to show that this implication of his
eudaimonism holds up in a phenomenology of friendship; but to square his
theory with experiences of altruistic motivation in friendship, he has to
attribute to the agent a reflective concern with her own virtue that is highly
problematic in its own right, as we have already seen. Although Politis
ignores these difficulties, it remains paradoxical to call the virtuous person
a self-lover.
6. Why the Paradox Cannot Be Solved by Second-Order Desire
Subsuming First-Order Desire
I have argued that Aristotle errs in thinking that the paradox of eudaimonism can be explained by (1) treating the desire for eudaimonia as a secondorder desire for certain kinds of pure first-order motives; and (2) holding
that the second-order desire embraces these first-order desires. But since it is
so crucial to my argument, this point deserves further examination to ensure
that it is completely clear. I begin by considering Richard Kraut’s treatment
of eudaimonia in an insightful and justly famous paper in which he argues
that for Aristotle, ‘‘Eudaimonia involves the recognition that one’s desire for
the good is being fulfilled, and therefore one who attains eudaimonia is necessarily happy with his life.’’55 He explains how this sense fulfills a desire
whose satisfaction is itself part of eudaimonia:
We human beings . . . would never be able to attain our good with
any regularity, unless we had effective desires for what we think
worthwhile. Since we are creatures with strong desires for the good, as
we variously conceive it, it is natural and inevitable for us to develop a
deep interest in whether or not such desires are being satisfied. An
animal with first-order desires, but no strong second-order interest in
whether those first-order desires are being fulfilled, would not be fully
human. Put otherwise: no person would choose a life in which he
remains continually unaware of whether or not he possesses the
good. . . . So a major human good is the second-order good which
consists in the perception that our major first-order desires are being
satisfied. And this second-order good is one we must have in order
to be eudaimon.56
This description is perhaps slightly misleading, since any orektic desire
for an end is eo ipso a desire for what is anticipated to satisfy the desire; it is
not a desire for satisfaction as an effect distinct from the object itself but
rather a desire for the object as good for the agent or as satisfying some salient
lack (as I have argued). Hence to be distinct, the second-order desire that
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Kraut mentions must be something like a desire to know that my deepest or
best first-order desires are and probably will continue to be satisfied.
It is clear that the satisfaction of this second-order desire could be a
major part of human happiness, as Kraut convincingly argues, but it is
equally clear that this prospect cannot itself be what inspired the relevant
first-order desires. On the erosiac model, they must arise from my sense
that their ends are either means to or part of my well-being—not from my
sense that a desire for them is one I can satisfy and know it. For if the latter
were my reason, then what I desire is the satisfiable motivation to pursue
certain first-order ends rather than these ends themselves. But that would
be tantamount to desiring2 to desire1 some object X just because I know I
can get some X.
This comes close to what Callicles proposes in the Gorgias when he argues that the happiest person is the one who constantly desires new things
as soon as his prior desires are satisfied, just so that he can have more
experiences of gratification (491e–92a).57 If this were the recipe, eudaimonia could be achieved simply by fostering within ourselves a desire for
the most diverse range of objects to which we happen to have easy access
(e.g., blades of grass) and no others. But this would amount to a perverse
kind of self-manipulation that is almost the opposite of what Aristotle
advocates. The mere availability of some X by itself does not make X
desirable in any D1-D3 sense. To be moved toward some X without having
a prior desire1 for X would imply that I had projected X, but it is doubtful
that I could do this just because I believe I’ll be able to satisfy this firstorder motivation once I have it, as Callicles’s proposal seems to require.
What Kraut says, then, must be interpreted as follows to make sense:
1. The eudaimon person cares about several worthwhile goals for
their own sake.58
2. The eudaimon person’s (prospective and retrospective) knowledge of his success in realizing these goals that he pursues for their
own sake contributes crucially to his overall eudaimonia.
So put, 1 and 2 can obviously both be true, but 2 still remains practically
inert, or incapable of motivating the agent, just as in Annas’s solution.
For although 2 is a psychological experience from the agent’s first-personal
perspective, it cannot explain the truth of 1 for the agent, because even
though 2 fulfills his natural second-order desire (as Kraut described it), the
goals mentioned in 1 are by hypothesis not pursued because their realization
will make 2 true. In other words, these first-order goals are not chosen
because recognition of their achievement will satisfy the agent’s secondorder desire for eudaimonia. Indeed it is only because of their independent
significance that the agent’s successful pursuit of these goals does satisfy this
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second-order desire: the first-order desire must remain independent of any
second-order desire that its own agent-regarding by-products can satisfy, if
the successful pursuit of the first-order ends is actually to yield this byproduct. In light of this example, we can define an important type of relationship between motives as follows:
The Subsumption Relation between Motives: A first-order motive M1
(for end X) is subsumed by a second-order motive M2 (for end Y) when
Y is either
(a) the mere existence of M1; or
(b) the satisfaction of M1 by the realization of X.
In simpler terms, the second motive subsumes the first when the process
of experiencing, acting on, or satisfying the first motive realizes the goal of
the second motive. We can say that the relation between these motives is
‘‘open’’ subsumption when (a) is true, and ‘‘closed’’ subsumption when (b)
is true. However, both these relations presuppose that M1 and M2 are really
distinct desires that could exist independently of each other; otherwise the
second-order motive becomes just another way of expressing the first-order
motive, in which case the former does not truly subsume the latter. We can
explain this notion as follows:
The Independence Relation between Motives of Different Orders: M1
and M2 are motivationally independent if and only if M2 does not even partially explain the existence of M1 by motivating the agent to acquire,
develop, or foster M1 as a means to satisfying M2.
I can now formulate my response to Kraut more clearly. I have asserted the
following:
The General Principle of Subsumption (GPS)
Part 1: Subsumption of a first-order motive M1 under a second-order
motive M2 entails the motivational independence of the M1 from M2.
Part 2: Subsumption of a first-order motive M1 under a second-order
motive M2 entails the metaphysical dependence of M2 on M1.
In other words, the first-order motive can arise without the second-order
motive, but not vice versa.59 If GPS is true, it will now be fully clear why
treating the desire for eudaimonia as a second-order desire that subsumes
various pure first-order desires will not solve the paradox of eudaimonism.
Yet GPS is a fairly strong principle because of its generality, and full defense
of it is beyond the scope of this book. However, I will defend a narrower
version of it that will serve for my present purposes.
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Is there any way that Aristotelians could argue, against GPS, that subsumption does not entail independence of the first-order motive from the
second-order motive? As we have seen, it makes perfect sense for both of
the following propositions to be true in conjunction:
3. Alfred cares about Jane for her own sake, or as an end-inherself; and
4. This caring makes Alfred’s life better, happier, or more fulfilled
and thus partially satisfies Alfred’s natural desire for his own
eudaimonia.
But can the truth of 4 somehow function as Alfred’s motive for caring about
Jane in 3? Can his presumably ultimate desire for his own eudaimonia or
flourishing motivate or explain his caring about Jane in a way that makes
him prepared to sacrifice other good things of his, such as external pleasures, power, or perhaps even his life itself, for Jane’s sake?
A simplistic argument that this is impossible starts from the assumption
that it is just contradictory for concern about any terminal end involving
another’s good to be related motivationally to the agent’s own eudaimonia.
I am not making this unsound argument, since my reconstruction of Aeudaimonism was meant to show why this assumption is mistaken. To say
that M1 somehow depends on M2 in this case is not necessarily to say that
Alfred undertakes the care described in 3 only as a means to his own happiness or flourishing—that obviously would be contradictory, since 3 says
that he cares about Jane for her own sake. Rather, the relevant issue is
whether he can come to care about Jane as an end having intrinsic or terminal value (as 3 says) and yet do this because he recognizes that caring about
her as a final end will be a constitutive part of his happiness or flourishing
(as per 4).
The question, then, is whether motivation to pursue agent-transcending
goals that constitute no direct part of the agent’s eudaimonia (such as Jane’s
well-being) can itself be caused or brought about by recognition that such
a desire (at least when stable and acted on) will be part of the agent’s
eudaimonia. This proposal, according to which the pure first-order motive
is subsumed by, yet also dependent on, the second-order desire for eudaimonia seems to be the best possible way of preserving the eudaimonia thesis
without giving up on the possibility of pure motives in virtuous agents. It
probably represents the best hope for reconciling Aristotle’s erosiac theory
of motivation in the De anima with the claims he makes in his Ethics about
the pure motivational structure of the virtues.
Contrary to the assumption in the simplistic argument above, it seems
quite possible for me to come to desire some end E as completely final (for
its own sake and also not as a means to anything distinct from E) and yet
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to acquire this desire because I realize or judge that this end E itself will be an
integral part of my good life (in the sense of a happy, fulfilling life that
exemplifies the proper use or development of my full human potentialities).
In such a case, however, the motivating intrinsic value of E is agent-relative.
The belief that achieving E will contribute to my eudaimonia may be sufficient for judging that it has a kind of intrinsic value—namely the kind that
triggers D3 desire because it is needed for my completeness. Responding
to this kind of intrinsic value does not imply that the end is valued only
instrumentally; on the contrary, I judge that realizing this end will make
my life better in the holistic sense, and no other function it might serve is required
to make it desirable to me (even if I recognize that it has other effects that
may be good in other senses). In my terms, this just amounts to recognizing
that we can have a D3 desire for an end that has an agent-benefiting intrinsic value: we desire it because we see it as a constitutive part of our eudaimonia.
Thus a D3 desire for E hardly implies that we value E only instrumentally,
as a means to the distinct, separate end of our own flourishing.60 On the
contrary, D3 desire is one of the basic ways in which we acquire goals that
are desired for their own sake, or pursued as ends-in-themselves. So it is
perfectly intelligible that:
5. Jane values something E intrinsically, or pursues it for its own
sake; and
6. E became an end-in-itself for Jane because she judged it to be
a constitutive part of her eudaimonia, that is, her overall well-being
or flourishing over a complete life.
There are many instances of E where this conjunction could plausibly
hold. And furthermore, we must also grant that they include a number of
cases where E stands for some activity, for example, running a mile in under
five minutes, or studying galactic astronomy, or tutoring foreign students
in English. These activities could be pursued as pure (agent-transcending)
ends-in-themselves, or instead as parts of Jane’s own eudaimonia, or even
both (in which case Jane would have two independent motives for these
activities). In short, E’s having intrinsic value, or being pursuable for its
own sake, does not entail that E’s value is agent-transcending; for there is
also the agent-related kind of intrinsic value that something may have as a
direct constituent of one’s well-being.
But as we have seen, in the mixed or double-motive case, there is no
sense in which the desire for eudaimonia embraces the other pure motive; for
A to embrace B seems to require the right kind of dependence of B on A.
Alternatively, in the second option, a pure motive is not subsumed and
dependent on the desire for eudaimonia, because there is no pure motive at all;
although the agent desires E for its own sake, E is not desired purely, or as
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an agent-transcending end, but rather as part of the agent’s own eudaimonia. We
must be careful not to confuse these two quite different ways of specifying
end E that the agent is pursuing for its own sake. So even though E can be
pursued as unqualifiedly final (not an instrumental means to any other end)
and as part of the agent’s eudaimonia,61 this does not amount to an agenttranscending end being pursued qua part of the agent’s eudaimonia; that
would be an outright contradiction.
Therefore, although a first-order pure motive to pursue an agent-transcending end E can certainly be subsumed under a second-order desire for
eudaimonia, we cannot then make the former dependent on the latter by interpreting E itself as part of the agent’s eudaimonia. If M1 toward E is pure,
then, by definition, E is not pursued as part of the agent’s eudaimonia.
Hence M1 is not dependent on the desire2 for eudaimonia in the way that
a desire for Y as a part of Z is dependent on the desire for the whole of Z.
This does not suffice to prove GPS but it does strongly support a narrower
version of it:
The Special Principle of Subsumption (SPS): If first-order motive M1 is pure,
and M2 is the second-order desire for eudaimonia as a whole, then if M1
is subsumed under M2, it follows necessarily that M1 is motivationally
independent of M2.
And this is enough to show that no subsumption model can resolve the
paradox of eudaimonism.
7. The Existential Solution: Pure Motives as Projects of the
Striving Will
We have seen that the eudaimonist cannot preserve the jointure thesis by
subsuming first-order motives under the desire for eudaimonia. Hence the
eudaimonist instead needs some way of construing the pure motivation toward
and pursuit of some agent-transcending E as itself an ‘‘activity’’ that she can
desire for its own sake, just because it is part of her eudaimonia. Desire for
this activity (of being motivated1 itself ) would then be dependent in the
required way on her desire for eudaimonia. But, unfortunately for the eudaimonist, this does not make sense: a state of pure first-order motivation to
pursue E cannot itself be construed as an ‘‘activity’’ for which we can have
a second-order D3 desire because we recognize that the state of pure firstorder motivation will contribute to eudaimonia. For the reason we can find
plausible instances of E in the form given by 5 and 6 above, including some
in which E is a familiar kind of activity, is that in these instances the activity
can be intrinsically rewarding even if it is chosen simply for this reason and
not purely for the sake of some agent-transcending product-good that this
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activity helps bring about. For example, activities that are forms of play are
like this—chooseable just because they are enjoyable—whereas practices
are not.
Now, states of virtuous motivation aim at bringing about intrinsically
valuable products or results whose value exists quite apart from the agent’s
eudaimonia. This does not mean that the value of virtues themselves is
measured simply by their consequences but rather that an agent acting virtuously must believe that her goal is noble and take this as reason for her
action.62 Virtuous activities animated by such motives are intrinsically rewarding only if the relevant agent-transcendent product or result is chosen
purely for its own sake. Virtuous activities are therefore unlike other types
of activity that can, without self-defeat, be chosen solely because of their
direct psychological benefits to the agent. In these cases, the self-concerned
form of the activity itself—as opposed to any motives or purposive pursuits
that would be internal to a pure form of it—can be chosen as part of
eudaimonia. I examine these points in more detail in the next chapter.
Moreover, we should remember that whenever the end E that is chosen
for its own sake as part of eudaimonia (as in the conjunction of 5 and 6)
is best described as an activity rather than a product, we must still distinguish between pursuing E and E itself. For we can aspire to an activity and
desire to perform an activity without yet being able to perform this activity
or engage in it fully or in the right way. In those cases, we are motivated to
pursue a given primary activity for its own sake (which can be because it is
part of our eudaimonia or not) but we have not yet realized our goal since
we are not actually performing the activity. Aspiring actors and actresses
are well aware of this important distinction, as are applicants for all sorts
of different social roles involving activities and the desires and emotions
they characteristically involve. Of course, we could say that the aspiring
dancer auditioning for parts in different musicals and operas around the
city is indeed already performing a kind of secondary activity, namely, the
activity of training and auditioning, which is not done for its own sake
but only as a means to E (i.e., the primary activity of dancing in public
performances). Her secondary activity is motivated by desire for the primary activity, which could be desired just because she knows she will enjoy
doing it (although then it will not be the pure form of this primary activity,
as I have suggested). But merely desiring some primary activity E cannot by
itself constitute a ‘‘secondary activity.’’
Certainly some of the secondary activities involved in pursuing activity
E might also come to seem intrinsically rewarding or instrumentally valuable for other purposes than securing E. For example, suppose our budding
actress discovered that she enjoyed auditioning for the thrill of it and because she enjoyed meeting people in the process, whether or not she got
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the part. Then auditioning would be desired both for its own sake and as
a means to meeting people and to getting parts, and so with these independent motives, she might continue auditioning even once she had lost most
of her interest in the activity of playing the part in (say) a movie or drama
production. It often happens in human life that what begins as our means
to some distinct end becomes an end-in-itself for us, and this may often be
a sign that projective motivation is at work (see chaps. 9 and 10). But these
are not cases of desiring2 the mere experience of some desire1 for its own
sake.
Nor could state A, defined as the mere desiring of some product-like
end B, itself count as a primary activity that we could find intrinsically
rewarding or desire for its own sake. An independent second-order desire
for A as a final end does not compute, because the mere experience of
desiring something in the orektic sense is never by itself fulfilling; for by
definition it involves the feeling of being unfulfilled or lacking some good.63
Hence desiring an end E cannot by itself count as a desirable activity, whether
E is an intrinsically valuable activity or product.
With this in mind, let us return to the schema illustrated by the conjunction of 5 and 6 above. It should be clear now why, in this schema, E can
be neither the primary activity of pursuing the noble for its own sake nor just
the pure motivation to pursue the noble as an end-in-itself. We can generalize
this point for all self-transcending ends that people typically pursue for
their own sake. In all such cases:
A. It does not seem plausible that the end E (whether it is an activity
or not) itself adds to the agent’s well-being or eudaimonia, since
E mainly concerns the state of other persons or other things
separate from the agent or not naturally connected to her wellbeing prior to her caring about them. Or if E is naturally connected to (some part of ) the agent’s well-being, E is not chosen
only for this reason (i.e., is not simply the object of a D3 desire).64
B. But being motivated to realize E, pursuing E, and achieving E could
(separately or together), as a by-product, cause or constitute part
of the agent’s eudaimonia.
Such ends cannot be instances of E in the 5 and 6 schema. For the result
of substituting them for E in this schema to be intelligible, it would have
to be changed in the way illustrated in the following case:
7. Jane cares about Alfred’s well-being (E) as an end-in-itself.
8. Commitment to E and the related pursuit of E (and possibly the
achievement of E as a realized end) contribute directly to Jane’s wellbeing or constitute part of her eudaimonia.

................. 16406$

$CH7

05-23-07 10:56:26

PS

PAGE 229

230

Will as Commitment and Resolve

But in this case, 8 cannot explain 7. The conjunction of 7 and 8 can
certainly be true, but within this schema, desire for eudaimonia cannot
explain how Jane acquired her first-order end E or became motivated to
pursue it. She cannot pursue Alfred’s doing well both for its own sake and as
a means to her own eudaimonia, since it is not Alfred’s well-being itself (prior
to her concern about it) that could serve to promote her eudaimonia; rather,
it is her willing and pursuing Alfred’s well-being that may make her a happier
person, or at least a person with a fuller sense of personal meaning in her life.65
Nor, as we have seen, can Jane pursue Alfred’s well-being as a terminal end
just because she reflects that being moved by a desire for this end will be
good for her or improve her life. For this would be ‘‘one thought too
many,’’ because it could only mean that Jane really saw Alfred just as an
occasion to develop in herself a character trait that is integral to a happy life
(perhaps because it can inspire her magnanimity) rather than seeing Alfred as
an end-in-himself at all.
Yet unless its by-product benefits somehow motivate Jane’s first-order
motive, then her coming to value and pursue Alfred’s well-being for its own
sake cannot be a result of orektic desire at all. For the realization of this end
itself, as abstracted from the pursuit of it, is not any part of her simple
being, and thus she cannot prepurposively apprehend its being unrealized as
something she lacks, as the erosiac model requires. Once she acquires E as
her end, pursuit and achievement of it can certainly have eudaimonistic
consequences for her; but this cannot cause any prepurposive desire for this
end so it cannot explain how she came to pursue E. Rather—and this is
the most striking aspect of these examples—it seems to be precisely because
her first-order motivation toward E is pure and hence not easily explained
on the erosiac model that 8 is plausible. Otherwise put, the truth of 8,
which we are commonly disposed to grant in many such cases, presupposes
that Jane acquires her goal by projective motivation: rather than responding
to any prepurposive attraction to her goal, she wills it.
So Annas and others are absolutely right that for Aristotle, virtue must
involve certain ‘‘pure motives,’’ but, contrary to the impression they give,
his eudaimonistic moral psychology is inadequate to explain how these pure
motives are possible. It is precisely because his analysis of the virtues correctly perceives the need for pure motives that it leads him beyond the
resources of his desiderative theory of motivation and thus into a deep
though rarely perceived inconsistency. Hence it is only half true to say that
‘‘charges of egoism made against ancient ethical theories because of their
eudaimonistic form miss the mark completely’’ and are ‘‘radically mistaken.’’66 Such theories are not egoistic in content, as Annas says, because
they ‘‘give virtue a noninstrumental role in achieving happiness.’’67 But while
this is true, the problem is precisely that the dominant orektic conception
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of motivation in eudaimonistic theories, which is the reason for their formal
structure centering on the agent’s own highest good, is inconsistent with
the existence of just the sort of purely virtuous or moral motivation we find
in the content of these theories. Thus modern critics are not entirely to
blame for their confusions about ancient eudaimonistic ethics!
8. The Paradox as One of Several Related Objections to Eudaimonism
In light of this critique, it becomes clearer what is required to solve the
paradox of eudaimonism: one must provide an intelligible psychological
story, or coherent model, that preserves both the eudaimonia thesis and the
purity of virtuous motivation. The foregoing analyses suggest that this is
impossible within A-eudaimonism—although in the next chapter I ask if
this system can be varied in any plausible way to address the problem. If
the paradox is unresolvable, as I claim, this does not show that A-eudaimonism itself is incoherent, but it does show that A-eudaimonism cannot
consistently serve as a foundation for virtue ethics.
In conclusion, it will be helpful to contrast this critique of A-eudaimonism as a traditional foundation for virtue ethics with other closely related
objections to the A-eudaimonist system, several of which can be found in
Bernard Williams’s work, among others. I list the main criticisms of Aeudaimonism as follows:
1. The Conflict-among-Goods Objection: There can be no comprehensive highest good for human life as formally defined in A-eudaimonism, because it is practically impossible consistently to pursue all the
different first-order final ends it would have to embrace, even if they
are prioritized in some principled way.
2. The Metaphysical Objection: Defining the virtues as qualities of character that allow us to realize our real interests requires a metaphysical
account of the human good as based on objective human nature. The
basis for this ideal of normal human functioning could only be in
sociobiology or in psychology. But no psychological or sociobiological account could be both independent of the moral content of this
ideal of normal human functioning and yet provide a noncircular
empirical ground for it.
3. The Paradox of Eudaimonism: The pure motive of virtue conflicts
with the formal egoism involved in the eudaimonia thesis. Virtuous
acts do not aim at eudaimonia, which can at most be an unintended
by-product of virtue.
4. The Moral Luck Objection: Virtues as Aristotle conceives them cannot be voluntarily acquired or developed by the agent but depend
entirely on the surrounding culture and actions of her educators.
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5. The Circularity Objection: The doctrine of the mean does not provide an independent definition of the noble. Without such a definition, we cannot adequately specify the objects of virtuous motives.
6. The Apollonian Objection: the conception of virtues as ‘‘intermediate’’ states of passion and desire is unduly rationalistic and models all
virtues on temperance as gratification-postponement and control of
the appetites.
These objections are closely related in several cases and hence, unsurprisingly, they have not always been clearly distinguished. Without giving them
the detailed analysis they deserve, I briefly explain what each is about and
where the existentialist should stand on each.
1. I explore the first objection in another work, where I argue that by
itself, this objection provides the existentialist with a strong reason to look
for a non-eudaimonistic basis for virtue ethics.68 An alternative existential
model of the will involving projective motivation can hold that achieving
existential coherence or practical unity among a limited subset of first-order
goods to be pursued can be vital among rational desiderata for forming our
identity-constituting commitments and cares, and I return to this idea in
chapter 14. In his later treatment of this problem,69 Bernard Williams runs
this issue together with objection 2, since these are closely related. He argues that Aristotle’s ideal of normal human functioning assumes the possibility of harmony among ends that are instead likely to conflict, so there
may be no coherent and complete good.70 He adds that contemporary psychology will not support the possibility or desirability of coherence among
pursuits of radically different kinds of goods, which is ‘‘a problem . . . for
any program that wants to connect the ethical life with psychological health
through notions of integration, or reduction of conflict.’’ Even when possible, Williams says, the reduction of psychic conflict may not always be
entirely good for the person anyway.71
Now, these objections to the eudaimonist project cut so deep precisely
because they refute the jointure thesis, and I know of no successful Aristotelian answer to them. Moreover, Williams’s conflict-of-goods objection and
the conclusion of objection 3 that virtuous motives are not embraced by the
single desire for eudaimonia are mutually supporting and confirming. The
existential alternative to the jointure thesis tries to show that the right understanding of the striving will by which we form life projects and selfdefining commitments reveals reasons (internal to its structure) to value
practical coherence and wholeheartedness as elements of an ‘‘authentic’’ life
without requiring us somehow to balance or harmonize every significant
kind of first-order good that humans can pursue.
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2. The second objection involves the whole question of a functional
analysis of human nature, and the version I give of this objection is Williams’s argument against an inference from psychological facts to valueclaims.72 Williams’s objection—that we cannot read off the human function from those capacities that human beings alone possess among all the
other animals—may be decisive against Aristotle’s own version of the function argument if it treats peculiarity to human life as a sufficient condition
for being part of our function, but not if it regards such peculiarity only as
a necessary condition.73 In any case, there are other possible ways of defining the human function in terms of rationality: for example, by arguing that
the notion of a function is required to make sense of the ineliminable concept of an animal’s biological flourishing.74
These alternatives have their own problems, but whether the function
argument can be defended or successfully reconstructed is a difficult question that I leave aside here. I have suggested before that Kierkegaardian
existentialists, at any rate, will not reject altogether the idea that there is a
natural human telos: rather, they will define that telos in terms of a more
minimal set of conditions than characterize the formal telos as defined in
A-eudaimonism.75 However, this disagreement reflects the fact that existentialism takes persons to be defined essentially by their freedom and hence
not to be a natural kind definable as a species of the genus ‘‘animal’’ at all;
according to all existentialists, persons have no ‘‘nature’’ in that sense. Although there is an essence of personhood in the sense of structural features
that are true of all persons qua persons, individual persons are not multiple
instantiations of this ‘‘essence’’ in the same way that either instantiations of
substantial forms work in medieval metaphysics or instantiations of essences work in contemporary analytic theories of modality. The existentialist version of objection 2 therefore requires working out an alternative
ontology of personhood—a task that has to wait upon an adequate understanding of the striving will and the freedom it must have if it is to make
us responsible for our own character, long-term commitments, and life
projects.76
3. The third objection has obviously been the subject of this chapter,
but it is closely related to objections 1 and 2. The paradox of eudaimonism
supports objection 2 by suggesting that it will be impossible to ground a
virtue ethics on a eudaimonist metaphysics of personhood and, as I said, it
supports objection 1 by suggesting that the fundamental project of being a
good person, or being moral, may conflict outright with the pursuit of one’s
own eudaimonia—an idea I’ll explore further with Kant. As we saw, my
version of this paradox is closely related to remaining questions about how
reflection on the role of virtues in one’s life can have any practical value for
the agent, and this question will be explored in the next chapter.
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4. The objection that virtue as a basis for evaluations of moral worth
will involve moral luck is also due to Williams,77 but Aristotle evidently
disagrees in NE III.5, where he argues that we can exercise some control
over the development of our own motivational dispositions. On this point,
the existentialist will side with Aristotle in holding that we must have some
kind of free control over those aspects of our character that can be morally
evaluated (or by which our whole self can be morally evaluated). In a recent
article, I have sketched one possible version of this libertarian control based
on Harry Frankfurt’s work on the higher-order will,78 but the full existential
argument for a kind of libertarian freedom in the formation of moral character depends crucially on reconceiving the will to include the striving and
commitment-setting functions of projective motivation. For it is mostly
through these capacities, I believe, that people are capable of autonomously
working on and reforming their volitional character. If so, then here again,
Aristotle’s view depends on projective motivation without recognizing it.
5 and 6. I mention the final two objections for the sake of completeness
and because I think they, too, will support accounting for virtuous motivation in terms of projective willing. But I leave this argument for Chapter
11, in which I consider how the projective conception of a deontic will
developed in late-medieval and modern philosophy. Chapter 10, sec. 1, also
briefly analyzes Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. In chapter 8, I argue that
contemporary neo-Aristotelian accounts of friendship, practices, and habituation also implicitly presuppose projective motivation.
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Contemporary Solutions to the Paradox
and Their Problems

Overview. Beginning with two commentaries on Aristotle, this chapter focuses on themes in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, including
MacIntyre’s accounts of practices and common goods. The evaluation of these theories, which shows that they support the existential
conception of striving will, is most relevant for anyone interested in
this genre of work on ethics and psychology but it is written to be
accessible to undergraduates. Several parts of the discussion are also
relevant for basic issues in political philosophy.
Introduction
In this chapter, I explore several other ways of trying to resolve the paradox
of eudaimonism described in the previous chapter while hanging on to
central features of the A-eudaimonist model of human motivation. My critique of these alternative proposed resolutions will help clarify both the
nature of the central problem and why postulating the possibility of projective motivation (and thus abandoning the eudaimonia thesis) provides a
more elegant solution to the relevant motivational paradoxes. I begin with
analyses by John Cooper and Paula Gottlieb, which directly address the
paradox of eudaimonism, and I add to the list of possible alternatives my
own, Parfitian version of indirect eudaimonism. After critiquing these proposed solutions, I turn to analyses of friendship, practices, and perfectionism by Sherman, MacIntyre, and Watson. These analyses were not written
specifically to address the paradox of eudaimonism but they shed light on
this paradox in their attempts to steer around its central conundrum.
235
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1. Cooper’s Solution: Virtuous Motivation as a Constitutive Means to
Eudaimonia
John Cooper addresses substantially the same paradox of pure motivation
in his early book responding to D. J. Allan’s version of the objection.1 As
he notes, Allan believes Aristotle’s theory of deliberation in Nicomachean Ethics
(NE) III includes only what we would today call instrumental reasoning
and hence cannot explain how we choose a virtuous action for its own
sake.2 Now, in this book, Cooper accepts that for Aristotle, all practical
deliberation begins from a maximally inclusive end:
We have seen that, according to Aristotle, reasoning that leads to
action must start from the assumption of some end to be realized in
or by acting, and that ultimately for each person such ends must
themselves be means to a single highest end, which in the last analysis
all his actions are aimed at achieving.3
But since this comprehensive end is the agent’s own eudaimonia, we have
the problem of explaining how practical deliberation could lead an agent
to act ‘‘for the sake of the noble.’’4 For example, Cooper asks, how could a
decision to defend one’s homestead against marauders ‘‘both be the outcome of deliberative reflection and involve the recognition of moral value
inherent in the courageous action itself.’’5 Cooper considers the possibility
that Aristotle could regard ‘‘nobility,’’ or the fine, as a final end quite independent of the agent’s other ultimate end (his conception of happiness as
maximum pleasure, for instance), but he recognizes that this would probably lead to the kind of conflicts that the virtuous agent’s non-maximizing
conception of his ultimate end is supposed to avoid. Yet Cooper rejects the
idea that Aristotle’s comprehensive conception of the ultimate end could
be inconsistent with ‘‘constant and steady commitment to virtuous action
as such,’’ which requires valuing various species of the noble for their own
sakes.6
Instead, Cooper thinks we can resolve this problem by recognizing that
Aristotle’s concept of deliberation from given ends to ‘‘means’’ is not narrowly instrumental but also includes what we would call constitutive and
specificatory judgments about what an end consists in and what is an instance of it. As Cooper puts it, Aristotle’s conception of ‘‘means’’ is broad
and includes:
constituent parts of complex ends and particular actions in which the
attainment of some end may be said to consist. Morally virtuous
action may then be a ‘‘means’’ to the ultimate end of [the agent’s]
flourishing, not in the sense that it tends to bring it about, as doing
favors for the right people makes a government functionary rich, but
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in the sense that it [virtuous action] is one constituent part of the
conception of flourishing which constitutes the virtuous person’s ultimate end. On this view there would be no contrast . . . between
regarding an act of virtue as a means to obtaining one’s ultimate end
and choosing it for its own sake. For the ultimate end is something
desired for its own sake (indeed it is desired for itself alone) and if
morally virtuous action is one of the constituent parts of this, it . . .
will thereby also be desired for its own sake.7
Cooper is insightful here; in my judgment this is probably what Aristotle
thought he meant, as evidence in his account of friendship suggests. Moreover, Cooper is right to point out that the firm disposition to choose (the
different species of ) the noble for its own sake, which Aristotle identifies
with virtue(s), implies ‘‘permanent and inviolable principles’’ of morality
that are inconsistent with any consequentialist definition of the morally
right as the maximization of some set of goods.8 Aristotle is certainly not
a consequentialist: he does not (contra W. D. Ross’s reading) hold that
virtuous actions are only instrumental means to the agent’s eudaimonia.9 Instead, Cooper says:
although [Aristotle] does hold that virtuous action is a means to eudaimonia, or human good, eudaimonia is not itself specified independently of virtuous action; on the contrary, eudaimonia is conceived as
identical with a lifetime of morally virtuous action (together perhaps
with other activities as well).10
This explanation finds much support from other Aristotle scholars. For
instance, Alasdair MacIntyre writes that for Aristotle, ‘‘the virtues are both
partly constitutive of the supreme human good and to be possessed not
only for their own sake as genuine excellences, but also for the sake of that
[supreme] good.’’11 In other words, virtue is included holistically in eudaimonia. Similarly, Jonathan Lear writes:
The . . . virtues are only virtues because they encourage and help to
constitute a full rich life. Thus acting ethically is ultimately in one’s
own best interest. Acting ethically may involve acting well towards
others, but that is because acting well towards others—friendship,
citizenship—is part and parcel of human flourishing.12
As long as ‘‘acting well towards others’’ means caring about their good
for its own sake (or just because it is one species of the ‘‘the noble’’), then
this resolution agrees exactly with Cooper’s. Nevertheless, I do not agree
with Cooper, MacIntyre, or Lear that this refutes Allan’s objection that
Aristotle’s ‘‘recognition of the value inherent in moral action . . . conflicts

................. 16406$

$CH8

05-23-07 10:56:37

PS

PAGE 237

238

Will as Commitment and Resolve

with his analysis of deliberation’’ and with the embracing eudaimonist motive it requires.13
Cooper is right that one way we can acquire a final end of action X is
to recognize it as constituting something Y that we already regard as an endin-itself, or as intrinsically worthwhile objective that we already intend as
our purpose. If I want to help a child learn to read, then I should want to
help him learn to sound out simple printed words, which is not distinct from
the activity of reading but is rather its first form. And, closely related to
this, another way we can acquire a final end X is by recognizing it as a
specification of Y in the circumstances. Likewise, we can become motivated
to seek X for its own sake because we see it as part of some more general
end Y that we are already motivated to pursue for its own sake, or we see
X as the relevant specification of some such part of Y in the present case. Arriving
at such judgments about the relation of some X and Y is one important
form of practical deliberation. And as far as these relationships go, it does
not matter whether the original motivation to pursue the more general final
end Y is erosiac in structure or not (whatever kind of motivation it is, it
will transfer to X). Therefore the agent’s erosiac desire for her own eudaimonia can certainly transfer to some part or specification of this eudaimonia without rendering that part or specification a merely instrumental means
to her eudaimonia; rather, it can still be desired for its own sake. I entirely
agree with this, but it will not solve the paradox of eudaimonism.
First of all, the specificatory and part-whole relationships determine the
kind of intrinsic value found in the specified end or part end by the kind
found in the general or whole end: X is intrinsically valuable only as a
specification of Y or as a part of Y and not outside these qualifications. For
example, suppose I think that the natural environment or biosphere of the
Earth has intrinsic value and there is, generally speaking, reason to preserve
it for its own sake (perhaps not always an overriding reason, but some reason). Now, I might say that preserving natural biodiversity is part of this
end, and that saving the Amazon rain forest (with its incredibly rich biodiversity) from further decimation is a specification of this part of my general
final end. If this is how I deliberate, then I value ‘‘the Amazon’’ not as a
singular object (i.e., this particular forest, however vague its borders), but
rather as a haven of natural biodiversity and speciation, which, in turn, I
value as part of the overall intrinsic value of the biosphere. And this is not
trivial, since it is a serious question whether other ‘‘parts’’ of the biosphere
that we might value for their own sake can all be coherently valued together
(without irreconcilable conflict) as parts of a single overarching intrinsic
value; those who think not will find themselves holding that the intrinsic
value of, say, biodiversity is an independent value and not just an aspect of
some larger intrinsic value of ‘‘Nature.’’ In short, there are more and less
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holistic ways of relating these values, and the serious debate between them
has practical implications.
Likewise, in social life, the intrinsic value of my friend’s well-being (either as a singular and unique individual or as an instance of the set of ‘‘my
virtuous acquaintances’’) may not seem to lie in the fact that his good is part
of my overall good. In every case where we wish to derive the intrinsic value
of the part from the intrinsic value of the whole, we have to hold that the
value of the whole is explanatorily (and perhaps metaphysically) prior to the
value of the part.14 But it seems impossible to imagine that the ‘‘nobility’’
(a species of intrinsic value) of certain sorts of actions, which makes choosing them for this value count as virtuous, derives from its being part of the
value of the agent’s own flourishing, which each agent values above everything else. If my friend’s good were literally part of my good, just as my arm’s
good or my memory’s good is part of my good, she would have to be
literally a part of me, just as my arm and my memory are parts of me.
As soon as we put it this way, we see the mistake. Cooper could doubtless reformulate his claim to say that the agent’s pursuit of his friend’s good
for her sake (or as an end in herself ) constitutes part of his own good
whether he realizes his goal or not. This formulation makes much more
sense, but as soon as we put it this way, we are recognizing that the value
to our agent is a by-product of his taking his friend’s good as his first-order
final end. And as we saw in our discussion of egoism in chapter 5, such a
second-order good (which is constituted just by pursuing a first-order good)
may not be directly willable at all. It is certainly incorrect to say that we
desire for its own sake this by-product advantage to ourselves in desiring
the first-order final good of the friend, because in the pursuit of her good,
our advantage is a by-product. For the relationship between Z and X when
Z is an intrinsically valuable second-order good that it caused, realized,
or constituted by pursuing for its own sake a distinct first-order good X;
is completely different from the relationships we considered earlier, in
which
Y is the intrinsically valuable whole of which X is a part or a particular
specification.
For in the first case, it is completely wrong to describe X as a specification
or part of Z. Except possibly in a narrow and highly unusual set of cases,
intelligible first-order goals are not normally parts or specifications of the
second-order goods that may derive causally or constitutively from the pursuit of these goals.15
Sometimes we see both kinds of relationship quite distinctly in a single
case. I may see the happiness of a particular relative of mine as having a
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specific value X because it is part of the more general intrinsic value Y of
the class of ‘‘my family members,’’ and working or sacrificing for her good
conceived this way may produce a particular result Z in my psyche (for
example, further disposing me to help other family members)16 —whereas
had I pursued her good as a value X independently of its relationship to Y,
quite a different side effect might have been produced. But I then pursue X
neither as an instrumental means to Z nor as a constitutive or specificatory means
to Z (which would be equally self-defeating). Rather, Z results from aiming at X
as a specification of Y and pursuing Y for its own sake.
Given these distinctions, we can sum up the problem. Cooper’s solution
requires eudaimonia to occupy the Y place in our schema, with the various
forms of nobility that virtuous acts pursue for their own sake occupying
the X place. But in fact, Cooper gives us no reason to think that eudaimonia
can occupy the Y place; its relationship to the values pursued for their own
sake in virtuous acts still seems to make sense only if eudaimonia occupies
the Z place. But a reflective desire for a final end in the Z place (however
comprehensive it may be) cannot transfer to desire for any final end in the X
place, or the Y place for that matter.17 This is a more formal statement of
the nontransferability of desire for by-product satisfaction. Desire for a
final end in the Y place can (and usually does) transfer to desire for a more
specific final end in the X place, but this is irrelevant to the problem at
hand. We are still left with the paradox: pursuit of eudaimonia as a final
end in the Z place of our schema will necessarily be self-defeating. As Elster’s
analysis suggests, to avoid this problem, the desire for eudaimonia must
somehow be isolated from the first-order motives and pursuits that tend to
fulfill it as a by-product. This is the direction in which Paula Gottlieb looks
for a solution.
2. Gottlieb’s Solution: Pushing Desire for Eudaimonia into the
‘‘Background’’
After concluding, rightly, that Annas’s proposed solution to the paradox of
eudaimonism will not work, Gottlieb comments: ‘‘What is needed, therefore, is an account of the desire for happiness which explains how the desire
can motivate the agent while not appearing in the forefront of the agent’s
deliberations.’’18 Gottlieb then offers such an account, framed in terms of
Aristotle’s notion of the practical syllogism. Although some commentators
include the agent’s operative motives in the practical syllogism when fully
expanded, Gottlieb’s construction emphasizes the idea that although ‘‘Aristotle . . . assumes that any rational agent will have a desire for her own
good (boulēsis),’’ this desire itself does not appear as a thought in the cognitive process of practical deliberation that leads to her choice:
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Most important, reflection on one’s own desires is no part of Aristotle’s practical syllogism. The practical syllogism enshrines the information the agent needs in order to act correctly, but not the desires
themselves. Thus, although the virtuous person is originally motivated by a desire for her own happiness, the desire itself does not
appear as the content of her deliberation. Nor does the desire into
which it is channeled, deliberative desire (prohairesis).19
Given this, Gottlieb thinks it follows that the virtuous agent does not suffer
from ‘‘one thought too many’’ in his deliberations. ‘‘What counts as the
agent’s main reasons for action will be those aspects of the situation which
he finds salient because he has such and such a character.’’20
This solution misconstrues the nature of the problem. Williams’s description of the ‘‘one thought too many’’ objection to utilitarianism may
give the impression that we need be concerned only about what occurrent
thoughts the agent thinks in justifying her action or coming to intend that
action, but this is not the central question in the paradox of eudaimonism.
The question is rather: What are the agent’s ultimate motives for choosing
virtuous actions, and can these be made to agree with the core eudaimonist
thesis that eudaimonia is our embracing or all-inclusive motive, on any
reasonable construal of that thesis?
In a case like the one Gottlieb discusses, where a friend is in need, the
agent may be focusing on the friend’s good and on the fact that helping
her friend is the decent, friendly, or (using Aristotle’s generic term) noble
thing to do in the present circumstances. As I argue above, this first-order
belief involving such an objective judgment that an agent-neutral good is
obtainable (in this case, the good of another person who is a friend), as
opposed to agent-relative pleasure or advantage/utility, must be part of
virtuous motivation for Aristotle. But the agent acting ‘‘for the sake of the
noble’’ need not attend to any second-order reflective thought that it is virtuous to care in this way about what is noble (e.g., the friend’s good) as a
final end.21 So I agree with Gottlieb’s suggestion that ‘‘From a first-person
perspective, the central explanation/justification/motivation [of the agent’s
choice] will be the thought that the situation called for fine action.’’22 A
fortiori, then, I also agree with Gottlieb that the virtuous agent need not
think, nor be moved by, the third-order thought that the virtuousness she
displays in caring about the noble for its own sake is going to be beneficial
in her own life. For this third-order thought depends upon the presence of
the second-order thought about the virtuousness of her motives. But then
we face the paradox: How can eudaimonia still function as our embracing
or all-inclusive motive, when virtuous motives seem to operate quite independently of it?
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It is no help to say in response that ‘‘the content of the original desire
remains in the background’’ rather than in the occurrent thoughts leading
to the agent’s choice.23 For the problem is how this original eudaimonist
desire can motivate the agent to virtuous action, whether it motivates by
entering into his deliberation or not. Note that if it cannot be said in any
sense to motivate or stand behind his virtuous action, then it seems that the
eudaimonia thesis is false. Gottlieb notes that Kraut seems to be going in
this direction, since he concludes that ‘‘Aristotle’s theory must not be egoistic in any sense whatsoever’’—including purely formal egoism. Kraut reaches
this conclusion, according to Gottlieb, because ‘‘Aristotle allows that people
can be (and indeed ought to be) influenced by factors other than maximizing contemplation,’’ which Kraut takes to be ‘‘happiness par excellence’’ for
Aristotle.24 In terms of my reconstruction, we can say: Kraut holds that
maximal contemplation is our material telos (M), yet he also holds that virtuous motives aim at ends that are no part of M. As a result, Kraut must
hold that for Aristotle, acting upon virtuous motives is not aiming at what
constitutes or realizes our formal telos (F). But understanding the nature of
M would not eliminate these virtuous motives; since morality requires us
to act on such motives, human beings are in general capable of developing
such motives and sustaining them when enlightened about M. Therefore
the eudaimonia thesis is false; some of our final ends are not final because
of their role in realizing F.
Gottlieb does not seem inclined to go in this direction, since she rejects
Kraut’s claim on the grounds that virtuous motivation is, for Aristotle, a
necessary condition of being able to contemplate well. Whether this is right
or not, however, if virtue’s being a necessary condition of M is not the motive
behind virtuous choices, then these choices aim at ends independent of M,
even when M is known as such, and so the eudaimonia thesis is false. Thus
Gottlieb has not refuted Kraut’s idea that maybe Aristotle’s normative ideal
of virtue is not egoistic at all. But neither has Kraut shown that this is
compatible with A-eudaimonism, since, as Gottlieb rightly says, Kraut’s
idea that we can just have ‘‘the noble’’ and our own happiness as two distinct ends in virtuous action fails to answer Annas’s version of the paradox
of eudaimonism.25 In response to Kraut’s own ‘‘mixed motive’’ resolution,
I add that there is no problem per se with an agent being moved by desire
for two (or more) distinct ends in intending a single action. Sometimes
agents are even irrationally moved by two (or more) desires for ends that
they know conflict with one another—such motivation can happen even if
the achievement of either end tends in fact to undermine the achievement
of the other end and the agent knows this.26 The problem is, rather, how
one of the ends we are discussing, namely eudaimonia, can be the all-inclusive
or embracing end. This seems to require us to take the noble as our final
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end in choosing a virtuous act, and yet to do so out of desire for our eudaimonia. It is not merely that two distinct motives exist in a virtuous action
but rather the incorporative or sublative relationship of one to the other that
leads to the paradox of eudaimonism.
If we wish to keep the eudaimonia thesis intact, then, we have to say
that the agent’s fundamental boulēsis, desire for her own happiness in the
most holistic sense, does somehow motivate the action under its virtuous
description and not just an action that is also virtuous under another description (i.e., as pure desire for ‘‘the noble’’). This must be true whether or not
this fundamental boulēsis motivates by entering into her practical syllogism.
But in that case, any species of ‘‘the noble’’ as our final end must be apprehended as part of the agent’s eudaimonia, valued intrinsically for this reason,
and desired for its value to her eudaimonia. And that does not seem to be
coherent, because the ‘‘nobility’’ of my act, as a description of it, does not
seem to make any essential reference to my well-being. This is why trying
to see it as a means to or even as part of my own happiness undermines the
finality of ‘‘the noble’’ as an end for me.
The problem is somewhat similar, as Gottlieb suggests, to Parfit’s point
that consciously taking the maximization of collective human utility as
one’s ultimate end tends to undermine one’s ability to act on ‘‘nonutilitarian motives and fixed moral dispositions.’’ Even if utilitarian reasons
could provide a functional justification of such motives, which value things
other than the maximization of utility as ends-in-themselves, once this justification becomes the agent’s internal reason, his more particular first-order
motives are altered.27 Before moving on to Annas’s formulation of the problem, Gottlieb suggests that this version is solved simply by recognizing that
Aristotle does not endorse any form of material egoism, since his virtuous
person pursues many things ahead of his own sensual pleasure, subjective
desire satisfaction, money, honor, power, and so on. Given that Aristotle
rejects material egoism, Gottlieb says:
the agent’s thought that the ultimate justification for virtuous action
is that it promotes the agent’s happiness will not undermine, in the
manner suggested above [in the utilitarian example] the thought that
he is acting, for example, generously because it is the virtuous thing
to do. The awareness of the rationale for acting virtuously will not
make him reconsider and act viciously instead.28
Presumably that is right: the virtuous agent will not reconsider. But does
that rescue A-eudaimonism? Suppose (1) the Kantian who started to see
regularly acting on the ‘‘motive of duty’’29 as an effective means to maximizing utility and started to choose her actions for that reason would find that
her new goal conflicts with her old goal in many cases; whereas (2) if the
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Aristotelian who chose actions for the sake of their nobility started to see
this as an effective way of achieving eudaimonia, her new and old goals
would still point to the same action, and hence her two motives would be
mutually reinforcing. This seems to be Gottlieb’s solution, if I have understood her correctly.
But in the paradox of utilitarianism, the material disagreement between
the actions recommended by direct utilitarianism and some alternative
deontic standard (whose general observance by the agent happens to increase collective well-being) is not the only problem. There is another,
deeper problem, namely, that direct utilitarianism, like eudaimonism, allows
only one ultimate goal or embracing end for human action; a moral person,
on this normative theory, must do everything for the sake of or as part of
maximizing collective utility. If one sees intrinsic values that are independent
of collective utility in more particular goals and hence desires them or projects them as final ends quite separate from maximizing utility, then one
would already be in violation of the direct utilitarian supreme principle.
This would be the case even if the same actions would also be chosen by an
agent in the same circumstances acting solely on the desire to maximize
utility. As a result, indirect utilitarianism can only work if the agents acting
for the sake of nonutilitarian standards either do not know about or do not
care about the utilitarian justifications for their actions.
The indirect utilitarian, then, faces several difficult objections concerning
whether such a scheme is psychologically possible, and if so, whether it
could ever be morally justifiable—for example, Williams’s objections to
‘‘Government House’’ utilitarianism, and Rawls’s arguments for the publicity condition for principles of justice. But the eudaimonist faces a much
harder problem as a result of the analogous formal (not material) conflict
between eudaimonia as our all-embracing ultimate end and the motivation
to pursue final ends whose value is apprehended or cognized without any
reference to the agent’s own eudaimonia. This problem seems unsolvable
for the A-eudaimonist because the relationship between eudaimonia and
the other ends it purportedly subsumes is supposed to be direct: as MacIntyre said, they are desired at least in part for the sake of the agent’s own
eudaimonia, and the agent is not ideally meant to be unconscious of their
happiness-making role.
3. Indirect Eudaimonism: A Possible Parfitian Solution?
Gottlieb’s defense of Aristotle might suggest that the psychological eudaimonist can avoid the paradox by reconstructing A-eudaimonism to mimic
the structure of indirect utilitarianism or indirect egoism, as described by
Derek Parfit. For Gottlieb wants to push the desire for eudaimonia out of
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the agent’s foreground focus in deliberation and into some kind of ‘‘background’’ (that is, either unconscious, or conscious but not reflected on, or
otherwise outside the agent’s center of attention).
This recalls the position that I called ‘‘external eudaimonism’’ (or EEu;
chap. 7, sec. 4), according to which all our practical reasons are ultimately
eudaimonistic, but we are capable of intrinsic concern for first-order goods
that are not prepurposively connected to our own eudaimonia. In Gottlieb’s
version of EEu, knowledge of the conditions of eudaimonia would indirectly
motivate2 the formation of pure motives1 for the sake of their by-product
benefits; agents would arrange things so that they acquire these pure motives1 and lose their previous desire2 for them, which would be selfdefeating if it remained. Let us call this version of EEu ‘‘indirect eudaimonism’’ or IEu.30 This approach contrasts with the other proposed solutions
we have considered, since it is developmental rather than structural. Several
EEu models try to resolve the paradox by distinguishing historical stages
of a sequence in which both the pure motives and their eudaimonistic benefits play significant practical roles in the agent’s psychology. Let us construct IEu by analogy with Parfit’s construction of indirect rational egoism
and indirect consequentialism.
Defending rational egoism against its paradoxes of self-defeat, Parfit famously argued that a consistent self-interested conception of practical reason (S) tells an agent ‘‘to cause himself to have, or allow himself to keep,
any of the best possible sets of motives, in self-interested terms.’’31 If this requires
him sometimes to have and act on self-denying motives that count as irrational if directly judged by the standards of S, then S tells him to acquire
motives that are irrational in self-interested terms. This licenses forms of
self-manipulation that may require self-deception, since ‘‘It is hard to
change our beliefs when our reason for doing so is merely that this change
will be in our interests.’’32 This could even include giving up active belief
in S, in which case S would be ‘‘self-effacing,’’ but Parfit denies that this
would make S unacceptable.33 Similarly, in discussing consequentialism (C),
Parfit allows that given the central role of love and emotional attachment
in human psychology, if all members of the relevant community act directly
on the motive of maximizing good consequences (however these are defined), they would probably all enjoy less happy lives as ‘‘pure do-gooders.’’
And, given our propensity to rationalize unjustified conduct when it suits
our existing desires, we might all be better off if we acted on agent-centered
prohibitions, for example, against killing innocents.34 But C does not fail
in its own terms any more than S, because C tells us to cultivate whatever
motives have the best overall effects, even if this requires manipulation or
cultivation of first-order motives only for the sake of their by-product results, which are by definition not intended by agents acting on those
motives.35
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This defense of S and C depends on Parfit’s argument that both rationality and morality are not level-transitive as applied to motives; it can, without
contradiction, be rational according to some theory T to act on motives
that count as irrational on T, or moral according to T to act on motives
that count as immoral on T, or blameless on T to act on motives that are
wrong according to T.36 Parfit even argues that in sophisticated indirect
forms of consequentialism, C applies to acts of moral judgment and related
moral sentiments along with everything else: ‘‘we ought to blame others,
and feel remorse, when this would make the outcome better.’’37 Hence these
theories regard acting in a way that is subjectively moral, or blameless given
the agent’s best judgments in the circumstances, as merely a means to the
formal goal of maximizing good states of affairs rather than as a substantive
goal of practical reason in its own right.38
While this might be defensible for S or C, by contrast, all traditional
eudaimonistic theories of virtue require that virtuous activities are not a
mere means to eudaimonia as the best outcome. As Parfit himself acknowledges, on many nonconsequentialist moral theories, ‘‘the avoidance of
wrong-doing is itself a substantive moral aim.’’39 Indeed, for Socrates and
Plato, as for Kant, this is an overriding substantive aim, trumping the pursuit
of any other first-order end or constraining the means by which such ends
may be pursued. Now, Parfit argues that treating rational or moral motivation as an end-in-itself, never as a mere means, is not a valid requirement
on theories of rationality or morality; but, notably, his argument for this
turns on a faulty example. In his case, ‘‘Murder and Accidental Death,’’ it
seems morally better to save person Z from a forest fire rather than to try
to prevent person X (who is himself about to die anyway) from murdering
another person Y.40 This case could be improved if we also assume that Y
is about to die of natural causes. Parfit thinks that if moral wrongs can
stand in such a trade-off relation with other harms to be avoided, then
morality is not an independent end. He is apparently assuming that we can
interpret the thesis that morality can never be a mere means to other good
consequences as entailing the thesis that we ought always to minimize instances of wrongdoing by anyone in the world, for his example refutes only
the latter thesis.
But, as Williams has shown, this latter thesis is certainly not what the
Kantian or Aristotelian anticonsequentialists endorse; on their theories, we
are primarily responsible for the moral quality of our own actions and only
secondarily responsible for the actions of others whom we can influence.41
The theory that morality can never be a mere means should not be interpreted, then, as the consequentialist doctrine that wrongdoing by anyone is a
bad state of affairs that we must always strive to minimize above all else. It
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is perfectly consistent with Aristotle’s and Kant’s views to hold that sometimes it would be better, all things considered, to save one person from
accidental death rather than trying to prevent another from doing some
grievous wrong, like committing murder. This does not prove, pace Parfit,
that ‘‘the avoidance of wrongdoing is a mere means’’42 on these theories.
This point shows that an indirect eudaimonist theory would indeed involve a fundamental departure from the traditional eudaimonist project as
a justification of the virtues. For IEu would have to hold that (a) what it is
most rational for us to do, all things considered, is whatever will maximize
our (individual or collective) eudaimonia; and that (b) this may sometimes
require cultivating and acting on motivational dispositions that are irrational
since they do not aim at maximizing eudaimonia. Among these could be
the dispositions of choice called the virtues. On such a view, virtue could
be regarded ultimately as a mere means. We could decide (individually or
collectively) to adopt virtue standards for the moral worth of persons and
to train ourselves and our children to have and exercise virtuous motives,
doing this only because we expect it to maximize our eudaimonia. In order
for this to be effective, we might have to forget our original motives for
launching this program of self-manipulation, so that at the later stage, our
concern to do what is right or ‘‘noble’’ (in any of its various species) will
be pure—since only such pure motives will have the desired by-product
effect, as we have seen. This would show that IEu could be self-effacing
but not that it would fail in its own terms, according to this Parfitian
reasoning.
Yet this conclusion actually shows only that such an indirect eudaimonist theory is not really in accord with the tradition of rational eudaimonism after all. For it is one of the hallmarks of Aristotelian moral theories
that they hold objective-list conceptions of the goods worth having or pursuing, and these lists all include being virtuous and acting virtuously as
states and activities that directly improve the agent’s life. As Parfit says, for
a consequentialist who holds such a theory, acting morally and avoiding
wrongdoing are not a mere means,43 and eudaimonists must be able to say
the same if their position is coherent. The paradox of eudaimonism suggests that it is not ultimately coherent, but to avoid this paradox by allowing virtue to serve as a mere means to eudaimonia is to give up one of
the distinctive elements of the A-eudaimonist project and adopt a form of
consequentialism instead.
This analysis suggests that we should add to the definition of rational
eudaimonism a clause expressing a kind of publicity principle: the selfcritical capacity for accurate assessment of one’s life, or knowledge of one’s
own eudaimonia, and its secure basis in virtue is essential to enjoying eudaimonia. In rational eudaimonist conceptions worthy of the name, the practical reasons there are cannot guide us toward our material telos through
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deception about our own being and/or the value of our activities, motives,
and psychic states. As we have seen, Aristotle’s own account of magnanimity confirms the central role that honest self-assessment independent of peer
recognition plays in his conception. The desire to know the truth about
oneself may be, as Harry Frankfurt has said, ‘‘the faintest passion’’ in the
human psyche,44 but its virtuous development is nonetheless essential to
flourishing on all eudaimonist moral theories.
Thus indirect eudaimonism as a legitimate version of EEu is impossible,
since the rational eudaimonist clause in EEu requires that the virtuous agent
be able both to recognize reflectively the ways that virtuous activities contribute to his own fulfillment and to endorse and reinforce his virtuous
desire for the noble as a result of this reflexive evaluation. This is true for
Aristotle but it is perhaps even clearer among later Hellenistic philosophers,
of whom Martha Nussbaum writes, ‘‘there is in this period broad and deep
agreement that the central motivation for philosophizing is the urgency of
human suffering, and that the goal of philosophy is human flourishing,
eudaimonia.’’45 As she explains, the procedure of ‘‘therapeutic argument’’
aimed at shaping a healthier psyche depends on the fundamental assumption that ‘‘the ethical truth is not independent of what human beings deeply
wish, need, and (at some level) desire.’’46 While our actual desires and emotions may be unhealthy or inimical to eudaimonia or opposed to our ‘‘nature’’ in its normative sense, without the underlying desire for eudaimonia,
the philosophical therapist would have no ‘‘hook’’ by which to help motivate self-reform in the student-patient. Hence the Hellenistic philosophers,
like Aristotle, suppose that reflection on the agent-related benefits and
harms of different kinds of desires, emotions, and (in general) motives can
play a practical role in shaping the self. This would be ruled out on any
indirect virtue ethics, just as it was in Annas’s proposed solution. I will
consider other versions of EEu in section 5.5 to see if they fare better.
4. Sherman on Friendship
Let us now return to friendship and the practices as contexts in which the
practical importance of the paradox of eudaimonism becomes especially
clear. I have already argued that Aristotle’s account of friendship and kindness implied the possibility of pure motives that are in fact inconsistent
with his eudaimonist moral psychology. As Nancy Sherman argues in her
valuable study, for Aristotle, ‘‘both friendship and goodwill require the
non-instrumentality of our beneficence.’’47 But she, like most commentators, regards this as consistent with interest in eudaimonia as the ultimate
wellspring of human motivation. As she explains, self-sufficiency is a mark
of eudaimonia for Aristotle, ‘‘But since friends are among the goods which
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make a life self-sufficient, self-sufficiency is relational and the good life is
dependent upon and interwoven with others.’’48 To realize the agent-related
benefit of these relationships, we must value our friends for their own sakes.
In the friendship relation, in particular, this means pursuing ends together,
developing the ‘‘capacity to share and co-ordinate activities over an extended period of time.’’49 This sort of loyalty involves a kind of constraint
on our acquisition of ends: ‘‘Ends are co-ordinated not merely within lives,
but between lives. Thus, just as a particular choice I make is constrained by
my wider system of objectives and ends, so too is it constrained by the
ends of my friend.’’50 This means that our friendship involves the joint
development of a conception of our joint eudaimonia.51 The ‘‘consensus’’ between friends does not simply precede and ground their relation, as it might
for parties contracting for mutual self-interest:
In true friendship, we might say, friends realize shared ends which
develop through the friendship and which come to be constitutive of
it. Specific common interests are the product rather than a precondition of the relationship. Together my friend and I develop a
love of Georgian houses, having had no real interest in them earlier.52
I agree with Sherman’s point here: friends often do begin to take an
interest in some activity or pursuable object simply because their friend
cares about this object or pursuit. The question is whether this development
can be explained in terms of D3 desires on the erosiac model. Rather than
choosing the friend’s goals because I see them as part of my good, it seems
more likely that I project these ends on the basis of my friendship and only
then, as a result, come to regard them as part of my good.
To illustrate this with her own example, let us imagine that Professor
Sherman knows her friend has started to take an interest in the history,
aesthetics, and architectural characteristics of Georgian houses (perhaps
after buying one). This ‘‘taking an interest’’ on the friend’s part may itself
be (partially or wholly) a projective act or it may result from some prior
desire (e.g., a D3 desire based on the evaluation of aesthetic or historical
knowledge as valuable for one’s mind). Sherman herself, we postulate, has
no antecedent desire to learn about Georgian houses: the fact that her friend
is taking an interest does not represent a sense on Sherman’s part of any
lack of well-being or deficiency in her own life (if it did, this would be
motivation by envy, competitiveness, or a comparative sense of inferiority
rather than by friendship). Instead, in a kind of freedom from prior desire for it,
Sherman projects the end of learning about Georgian houses, visiting them,
and preserving them on the grounds that this will allow her to join in her
friend’s new activities. It is precisely the absence of any prior attraction to
this sort of good which shows that in this case, as we would say, ‘‘friendship
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is the motive.’’ Or better, in terms of the existential conception of the
striving will, friendship is rather the ground for motivating oneself to pursue this end.
But, the response comes, does not Sherman’s motivation instead derive
from the more fundamental desire to pursue joint activities with her friend,
which she sees as part of her eudaimonia? At this point, several ways to
work out this alternative to a projective explanation confront us, but none
of them succeed. First, we could say that pursuing joint activities is valued
simply as a means to the terminal end of building the friendship, which the
agent values intrinsically as part of her flourishing. This fails because it
encounters the paradox of eudaimonism: if this were Sherman’s real motive,
she would not really care about Georgian houses, nor would she be acting
in a friendly way after all. If she only wants to be the kind of person who
has a successful friendship because this is good for her, then she will not
be concerned for her friend’s needs and interests for their own sake, that is,
in the way necessary to have the sort of relationship that often adds to
eudaimonia.53
Second, we could instead say that (i) the agent desires ends that she can
pursue jointly with her friend for their own sake, which is what is necessary
for the real sharing of pursuits constitutive of friendship; and (ii) she came
to value these ends intrinsically because of recognizing (perhaps in deliberation with her friend) what realizing them would contribute to the good shape
of her own life as a whole. This suggestion fails because Sherman’s point is
rather that our motives are sufficiently plastic that we can conform some of
them to our friend’s motives just out of friendship and not because we have
any prior independent desire for the relevant objects or goals. It is very
unlikely, for example, that Sherman thinks becoming an expert on Georgian
houses itself will improve her life very markedly or that even if she did, this
is why she came to value this knowledge for its own sake. In friendship, as
Sherman’s account makes so clear, it is not so much the particular goals,
however independently valuable they may be, but rather the shared pursuit of
them in joint activities that we regard as especially valuable. This implies
that we can will2 to be motivated1 to engage in these activities.
On the erosiac model, the first-order interest would have to be some
kind of desire for the relevant knowledge and aesthetic experience, and the
second-order motive to cultivate this interest would also have to be some
kind of orektic desire. But desiring2 in the orektic sense to experience an
orektic desire1 is impossible; feeling the lack of some attractive object cannot itself be something to which we are attracted, something whose absence
involves a disturbing sense of incompleteness in our being. We must therefore suppose instead that the second-order motive, at least, is projective in
form: the agent projects the end of the first-order motive because of what
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that motive and the activities it motivates will contribute to a particular
friendship.
Finally, the eudaimonist could try the following explanation (another
version of the 7–8 schema in chap. 7, sec. 7): (i) Sherman is noninstrumentally motivated to learn about Georgian houses, and (ii) pursuing this end
in conjunction with her friend will contribute directly to her eudaimonia. This
has a good chance of being right, but as I have argued, the truth of (ii)
could not be the basis of a noninstrumental desire for the learning mentioned
in (i), because this end itself is not what is singled out as eudaimonistically
valuable (or likely to help complete the agent) in (ii). Instead, the motivation mentioned in (i) is probably projective.
5. Practices, Virtue, and External Eudaimonism
5.1. Four Kinds of Practice
A similar conclusion might be drawn with regard to MacIntyre’s wellknown treatment of goods internal to practices in After Virtue.54 MacIntyre
begins with the notion of a ‘‘practice’’ as a ‘‘coherent and complex form of
socially established cooperative human activity’’ that involves a certain kind
of reflexive attitude, or self-conscious concern about its history and mutual
recognition between practitioners. This attitude is analogous, in fact, to the
reciprocal recognition of other-regarding interest that Aristotle takes to be
a necessary condition of noble friendship. Specifically, MacIntyre says that
in a practice, (1) the activity of practitioners is teleologically constituted in
the sense that it involves ‘‘standards of excellence which are appropriate to,
and partially definitive of, that form of activity’’; and (2) the goods brought
about in trying to realize the ends of the practice in an excellent way, or
‘‘trying to achieve those standards of excellence,’’ include the systematic ‘‘extension’’ or enrichment of its participants’ conception of the ends of the
practice, and the goods involved in devoting oneself to them.55
Applying this analysis to one of MacIntyre’s examples, ‘‘Planting turnips
is not a practice [but] farming is,’’ because the former activity is not reflexively constituted in the way that the latter is: putting turnip roots into the
ground in a customary way is simply a behavior done with the intention of
growing turnips, while ‘‘farming’’ is a more complex project that, if we
devote ourselves to the end of farming well (and all this involves), will
enrich us through a better understanding of what farming can achieve, what
its possibilities are, and what joys it can bring quite apart from making a
profit. Practices are reflexive in the sense that in addition to their primary
aim, they involve a second-order goal, namely, in conjunction with others
(both in the past and the present) to redefine and extend the first-order
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goals that the practice can encompass. Thus the telos of a practice is somewhat plastic: ‘‘practices never have a goal or goals fixed for all time.’’56
The reflexivity that distinguishes ‘‘practices’’ from simple or first-order
activities depends on the phenomena that MacIntyre calls ‘‘goods internal
to practices.’’ His famous example of teaching a slightly recalcitrant child
to play chess offers a preliminary explanation of this notion:
Notice however that so long as it is the candy alone which provides
the child with a good reason for playing chess, the child has no reason
not to cheat and every reason to cheat, provided he or she can do so
successfully. But, so we may hope, there will come a time when the
child will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of
a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not
just for winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in
whatever way the game of chess demands. Now if the child cheats,
he or she will be defeating not me, but himself or herself.57
MacIntyre’s example is both plausible and persuasive. In this case, the good
internal to the practice of chess is the good of rule-constrained strategic
excellence, or winning through fair and cunning moves. The child must aim at this
goal for its own sake in order to count as truly playing chess rather than only
going through the moves to get some candy, prize money, or other external
reward. Since chess is a game, this requires a kind of ‘‘suspension of disbelief,’’ or perhaps ‘‘secondary belief,’’ by which we enter into the frame of
the artifice and imagine therein that the goal of the game is all-important
in its own right. In nongame practices, we must acquire the same conviction
about the value of the end in the primary world, outside any artificial contexts more specific than culture itself.
Let us call this producible good G, which incorporates the currently
accepted standards of excellence in the practice P and which the agent must
pursue for its own sake for her activity to count as engaging in P, the end
definitive of the practice, since the intention to bring about this end is essential
to actions that qualify one as a practitioner. Since practices are defined by
their ends, we can draw some important distinctions among types of practices by distinguishing different genera of practice-defining ends.
First, it seems to be distinctive of practices that involve in some kind of
game or sport that their defining end is one with no independent material
value to the well-being of the practitioner or anyone else in society. Rather,
these ends are purely conventional, set up so that the pursuit of them will
require the development of rare talents and the demanding exercise of various human capacities. Checkmating the opponent’s king, or winning a marathon, or hitting a small leather ball with a wooden bat and running around
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some bases does not in itself add much to anyone’s well-bring. Rather, we
set up these artificial goals because we known that earnestly pursuing them
in the right ways tends to generate what Elster called valuable by-product
benefits, including, for example, physical and mental health, the enjoyment
of practitioners and spectators, and perhaps the camaraderie of teammates
and spectators who enjoy each other’s company. Notice, however, the crucial point that these good side effects will be lost if they replace the
practice-defining ends as the practitioner’s intended goals. A showman is
usually less interesting to spectators and valuable to teammates than a player
motivated to cooperate by his pure interest in playing the game well; ‘‘team
spirit’’ depends on striving for excellence in the sport as an end-in-itself.
David Miller calls this kind of practice ‘‘self-contained’’; by contrast,
‘‘practices which exist to serve social ends beyond themselves’’ he calls ‘‘purposive.’’58 His point is that the second kind of practice has both a utility
and often a crucial function in supporting social structures that make its
conception of its definitive product-good (or excellence in producing it)
subject to external critique.59 These are the sort of practices that Plato
called ‘‘crafts’’ (techne), which have as their defining end some material social
good that transcends the immediate material interests of the practitioner but
serves the good of a larger community, including most proximally the ‘‘patients’’ served by these practices. This is why such practices provide useful
examples in Plato’s arguments against egoism (e.g., in the famous argument
against Thrasymachus in Republic I). Socrates’ examples of the horseman,
the ship’s pilot, the doctor, and the statesman show the practitioner as
aiming primarily at the good of horses, the safety of the ship and her crew,
the bodily health of the patients, and the common good of the entire state,
respectively.
In other words, these practices are defined by what I have called pure
commitments to agent-transcending first-order goods. Plato emphasizes
this by having Socrates suggest that no art seeks any ‘‘advantage’’ for itself
or its craftsmen, ‘‘since it needs nothing’’ (Republic I 342D). Likewise, in his
rejoinder to Thrasymachus’s insistence that the shepherd fattens the sheep
for his own profit, Socrates urges in its pure form, ‘‘the art of shepherding
. . . cares simply and solely for what it is set over . . . since for itself, all
has been sufficiently provided’’ (Republic I 345C). These phrasings certainly
suggest that need or lack is not the practitioner’s motive; rather, her interest
in the end definitive of her practice is non-erosiac. This suggests that the
artist or craftsman volitionally projects his end, but Plato does not recognize
this implication. In the case of sports, the practice-defining first-order end
is only conventionally a good, so the agent projects participation in the
game as her end. In the case of professional arts and crafts, the defining end
is some natural good either of individuals or collectives of persons. (In
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some cases, such as veterinary medicine or environmental preservation, it
would be the flourishing of nonhuman animals and plants instead.) The
would-be practitioner must presumably recognize this natural value, at least
in outline, to project the goals of her practice (although her understanding
of these goods will also deepen with experience).
Third, what today we call the social and natural sciences are practices
that have as their defining ends various forms of knowledge, valued for their
own sake. These forms of knowledge may have all sorts of practical benefits
to human and nonhuman life, including technical applications to laborsaving devices or to better design of educational systems, and so on. But it is
essential to the conception of the sciences that their practitioners should
not be motivated primarily by these possible material benefits but rather by
the search for truth to fundamental questions about physical and human
nature themselves. Experience has shown that over time, this kind of ‘‘pure
research’’ often has more profound by-product benefits by way of technology and institutional applications than inquiry that is primarily instrumental in motivation. Indeed, where scientific research is constrained by the
special interests of different for-profit enterprises with a financial stake in
the outcomes, the unbiased search for truth is compromised and its longterm by-product benefits to the entire human community are thus undermined. A scientist hired by either the coal lobby or the Sierra Club to
investigate global warming probably cannot practice climatology in its pure
form. This is the main reason why disinterested government sources, along
with universities that remain neutral about the outcomes, ought to be the
main funders of scientific research related to controversial policy questions
that may also impact corporate profits.
Fourth, we might wish to distinguish the fine arts as a group of practices
that aim not so much at material goods of individuals or communities but
rather at the creation of beauty for its own sake—although human enjoyment of this beauty is generally also taken to be a subsidiary end in these
practices, which are therefore essentially expressive or communicative in structure. If this is right, a particular fine art such as sculpture will involve two
defining ends: the making of a beautiful sculpture (however this may be
conceived) and the expression to other human persons of something that
only this sort of work can express—something that often cannot be put
into words, which is precisely why it must be ‘‘said’’ in a sculpture instead.
Fine arts, as a genus of the practices, would also seem to be distinguished
by the fact that beyond the technical skills required for (say) good dancing,
or painting, or sculpture, which concern knowing how to work with the
‘‘materials’’ of the art, standards of excellence for the products themselves
tend to be much more plastic, fluid, and constantly in contention among
practitioners than in the case of other practices. For example, striking out
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in the ninth inning with the bases loaded, or making a specious argument,
or infecting a patient with a poorly cleaned instrument can never count as
great baseball, or sound philosophy, or excellent surgery. By contrast, I may
think that Finnegans Wake is nonsense masquerading as literature or that a
Jackson Pollock painting is just random paint spilled on a canvas, expressing nothing but the artist’s pretentiousness, yet I know that others will
passionately disagree and respond with all sorts of arguments for the excellence of these products. This tends to give the impression that the objectivity
of evolved standards, which MacIntyre points out as a hallmark of the
practices,60 does not apply to the fine arts.
But the fact that these questions of excellence are not (at least among
practitioners) demoted to questions of brute subjective preference (or D2
desire) tends to suggest that an imaginary convergence toward universal
standards of excellence does operate as a heuristic ideal in the fine arts,
motivating the communicative process of seeking to define and redefine
what counts as great art. To the extent that artists seek to persuade us and
each other that their works give us good reasons for interpreting excellence
in artistic products one way or another, they are not simply trying to impose their tastes by force. The historicity of practices is simply more evident and constantly on the surface in these practices (suggesting that they
may involve further levels of reflexivity absent from other practices).
Hence in the fine arts too, the defining product is an agent-transcending
first-order good that is internally constrained by standards of excellence,
although there are more varieties of excellence and the standards are both
vaguer and more contentious than in sports, the social crafts, or the sciences. Here again, pursuit of the defining first-order goal can have several
kinds of by-product benefits, but only if the artist pursues beautiful, meaningful, or otherwise excellent art as her primary end. Art produced simply
to please a mass market or even to flatter a highly elite market is not fine
art at all but merely its simulacrum. It may be that originality is sometimes
overvalued in the fine arts as a sign of the purity of the artist’s motives, and
that too many artists fall into the self-defeating trap of being more concerned about their purity than about their product’s values. Yet MacIntyre’s
analysis suggests that the artist will be more successful and fulfilled if he
does not focus obsessively on himself but instead focuses on the work to
be made, trying to make it the best it can possibly be.
5.2. MacIntyre on the Structure of Practices
This brings us to MacIntyre’s distinction between two different kinds of
goods internal to practices—a distinction that really needs more emphasis
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than it receives in After Virtue. He initially distinguishes external and internal
goods as follows:
On the one hand there are those goods externally and contingently
attached to chess-playing and to other practices by the accidents of
social circumstance—in the case of the imaginary child candy, in the
case of real adults such goods as prestige, status and money. There
are always alternative ways for achieving such goods, and their
achievement is never to be had only by engaging in some particular
kind of practice. On the other hand, there are the goods internal to
the practice of chess which cannot be had in any way but by playing
chess or some other game of that specific kind.61
But ‘‘internality’’ to a practice does not rest primarily on that practice
being the sole means to a good. It has to do more directly with the way an
internal good is realized. Someone acting much as a practitioner of a given
practice, but doing so only to gain an external good, treats the practice
merely as a means and thus does not authentically engage in it. Someone engaged
in a practice pursues its defining internal goods by striving to meet standards of excellence for the practice’s producible object with their intrinsic
worth in mind: as we have seen, the authentic participant must pursue such
excellence for its own sake. To aim at excellent production of the goods
defining a practice, then, is to act on a kind of pure motive, in which
eudaimonia is not the agent’s direct aim. As Iris Murdoch put it in a famous
essay that influenced MacIntyre and other authors in the twentieth-century
revival of virtue ethics, ‘‘In intellectual disciplines and in the enjoyment of
art and nature we discover value in our ability to forget self, to be realistic,
to perceive justly’’—in other words, to transcend ourselves toward a world of
real values.62 This is why Murdoch talks about ‘‘the absolute pointlessness
of virtue’’ and finds in art ‘‘a love which is unpossessive and unselfish.’’63
Therefore, if the agent also benefits from engaging in a practice, this is a side effect of
pursuing the goals defining the practice for their own sake.
Thus we must distinguish between two kinds of goods internal to practices. In MacIntyre’s interesting example of portrait painting as a practice,
‘‘There is first of all the excellence of the products, both the excellence in
performance by the painters and that of each portrait itself.’’64 It is by
aiming to paint a good portrait (and, at the second-order level, aiming to
interpret what should count as ‘‘good’’ here) that the artist realizes another
good in himself as agent:
it is in participation in the attempts to sustain progress and to respond creatively to problems that the second kind of good internal
to the practice of portrait painting is to be found. For what the artist
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discovers within the pursuit of excellence in portrait painting—and
what is true of portrait painting is true of the practice of the fine arts
in general—is the good of a certain kind of life.65
This agent-related good of ‘‘a certain kind of life’’ we could understand
as the fulfillment that comes from mastery of particular skills and their
employment in creating particular forms of beauty, together with the relationships (with other artists, with customers, subjects of the portraits, etc.)
that this involves. It seems plausible that such an agent-related internal
good is possible for virtually every kind of practice—though its realization
surely depends in part on the social status of the relevant practice, the just
or unjust state of the institutions that sustain it, and how engagement in
the practice fits into the individual’s overall life. But the crucial point is
that the agent-related goods internal to a practice are not targetable: they are,
in Elster’s sense, essentially by-products of targeting the internal goods definitive of the practice. It is only via a sustained commitment to the practicedefining internal goods (and their further articulation), which are always
agent-transcending in nature, that the practitioner realizes the agent-related
goods internal to the practice. Calling them both ‘‘internal goods’’ usefully
emphasizes their difference from external or commodity goods that are
realizable without practices, but it also obscures the fundamental difference
between these two types of internal goods.
However, MacIntyre does recognize this difference and also finds it in
Aristotle: ‘‘As Aristotle says, the enjoyment of the activity and the enjoyment of the achievement are not the ends at which the agent aims, but the
enjoyment supervenes upon the successful activity in such a way that the
activity achieved and the activity enjoyed are one and the same state.’’66
MacIntyre’s analysis of practices perhaps warrants a small modification to
Aristotle’s formula, since MacIntyre shows that not only the successful
achievement of the practice’s defining goals but also the purified pursuit of
excellences may generate such enjoyment as an agent-related internal good.
We can diagram the main distinction as follows, again using single arrows
for intention and double arrows for the causation of unintended side
effects:
The Structure of Practices
Agent-related goods internal to the practice (personal fulfillment, enjoyment of one’s products, companionship, and other goods of the kind of
life that centers around the given practice).
Agent

⇑

V

Excellent achievement of the producible, agenttranscending internal good defining the practice.
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This diagram does not say whether the by-product internal goods related
to the practitioner’s own eudaimonia are themselves targetable or not, and
it seems reasonable to suppose that at least some of these benefits realized
in the course of authentically engaging in a practice could also be directly
pursued, once their value is understood. Among these, for example, might
be the formation of friendships with copractitioners who, given their pure
concern for the producible good defining the practice, ought naturally to
cooperate in various ways, depending on the nature of the particular practice (another point that Plato makes at Republic I 349A–50B). One could
easily imagine two copractitioners, on discovering that they had grown into
a friendship through cooperation in pursuit of shared goals, performing a
‘‘Diotimian switch’’ and directly willing to develop their relationship as
valuable for its own sake, beyond its value for mutual engagement in the
same practice. But once again, directly pursuing such a good that was only
contingently a by-product of engagement in some practice will require pure
motivation to pursue a new kind of agent-transcending final end, which in
turn will have other by-product benefits. Thus the structure of friendship
looks like this:
The Structure of Friendship
Agent-related goods internal to the friendship (enjoying company, improving one’s character, fulfillment in helping the other person, etc.)
Agent

⇑

friend’s good as an agent-transcending internal
V The
good defining the relationship; and
V
The cultivation of the relationship itself, including any
relations with third parties it may involve.

As this diagram suggests, the structure of friendship is analogous to that
of practices, except that we probably have to distinguish two producible
agent-transcending internal goods that define the ‘‘quasi-practice’’ of friendship, the second of which indicates an additional layer of reflexivity internal
to friendship. Friendship also lacks the sort of formal institutional framework that sustains the other practices and, being more universal (a quasipractice that no worthwhile life can lack), its standards of excellence are
more fully ethical than are the aesthetic, scientific, and professional standards of the other practices. But beyond these differences, the basic structure is very similar.
It seems plausible, then, that engaging in practices will tend to produce
some benefits to the practitioner that are essentially by-products, and
among those side effects that can be directly targeted in turn, the most
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significant of these will, when pursued for their own sake, produce yet
further types of second-order satisfaction. This regress must come to an
end in side effects that are essentially by-products, which can never be pursued as producible goods without self-defeat. However, MacIntyre does
not see the problem this implies for his neo-Aristotelian reconstruction of
the virtues; the fact that we can engage in practices with the kind of pure
motivation needed to realize their agent-related by-product goods is really
incompatible with the Aristotelian idea that all of a human agent’s motivation is governed (even if only formally, as Annas urged) by the flourishing
or eudaimonia of the agent as her highest good or telos.
5.3. Marx on Unalienated Labor
I have argued that the agent engages in a practice by dedicating himself to the
pursuit of its defining end products irrespective of any prior need for them
rather than pursuing his chosen profession, art, or craft simply because he
finds himself drawn to it as part of a eudaimon life (as in D3 desires). This
point is also implicit in one nineteenth-century conception of labor as vocation that is among MacIntyre’s most important sources: Karl Marx’s early
work on human nature and alienation. Following Hegel, Marx recognized
the will as Geist at work in the creation of culture: ‘‘In creating an objective
world’’ of institutions and artifacts ‘‘by his practical activity, in working up
inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species being.’’67 By this
Hegelian term, Marx means that we can aim at social and abstract ends,
such as beauty for its own sake. We are therefore also free to motivate
ourselves in ways not open to other animals: ‘‘an animal only produces what
it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst
man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical
need, and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.’’68
In other words, our shared species nature is to engage in what I have
called projective motivation; when this is expressed in free labor, we live
authentically in accord with our nature and thus also in solidarity with each
other. As Erich Fromm says, ‘‘work is for [Marx] the active relatedness of
man to nature, the creation of a new world, including the creation of man
himself.’’ Capitalism alienates the laborer from his products by turning
them into private property valued in terms external to the will and selfexpression of the worker.69 In my terms, Marx’s view is that capitalism
destroys authentic or free labor by forcing the worker to act on D1-D2
desires, making his product only as a means to a paycheck rather than freely
projecting his work as valuable for its own sake. Then ‘‘labour does not
appear as an end-in-itself but as the servant of the wage.’’70 As Alan Gilbert
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says in his impressive chapter on ‘‘The Aristotelian lineage of Marx’s eudaemonism,’’ Marx inherited from Aristotle the idea that alienation from our
human nature arises from ‘‘work only as a means of life, not as its varied
expression.’’71 For Aristotle also, ‘‘humans conduct the highest activities—
non-productive ones—not under the pressure of necessity but by choice.’’72
These activities may produce knowledge, friendship, and beauty rather than
material comforts, food, and pleasure.
Marx’s original goal, then, is a form of social life that allows the fullest
cooperative expression of the striving will in its existential sense. As Fromm
says, his main goal is not ‘‘the equalization of income’’ but rather ‘‘the
liberation of man from a kind of work which destroys his individuality,
which transforms him into a thing.’’73 It is important to recognize this, even
if Marx’s goal is actually more difficult to realize than his proposed solutions implied—government ownership of major industries, for example,
will not do the trick. In the twentieth century, we have learned that the
problems of materialism, consumerism, and status-seeking, which discourage people from projecting more important goals for their lives, cannot be
overcome by collectivizing all private property. Radical social reforms may
help persons oppressed by poverty get the opportunity to pursue other
ambitions besides material survival and help stop the artificial stimulation
of acquisitiveness and egoism by ratings-driven media, but beyond that,
each individual has to face hard questions in deciding what to live for. We
cannot be forced to be free.
Though I have given it an existentialist gloss, Marx’s own explanation
of his concept of Homo faber implies a eudaimonistic motive that is ultimately
erosiac in form. After talking about motivation free from material needs,
he still describes his ideal eudaimon man as follows: ‘‘The rich human being
is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human lifeactivities—the man in whom his own realization exists as an inner necessity,
as need.’’74
For Marx, this includes even ‘‘poverty’’ as the experience of dependence
on others, for it is valuable for us to experience ‘‘the need of the greatest
wealth—the other human being.’’75 Marx contrasts this proper spiritual
need with the artificial appetites that the capitalist tries to create in a consumer ‘‘to find satisfaction of his own selfish need.’’76 Marx’s alternative to
such material egoism is thus still an Aristotelian formal egoism of selfrealization. The requirements for this kind of self-realization oppose material egoism only because he believes (like Plato) that unalienated work will
naturally tend to foster solidarity with others.
Thus Marx runs into the same problem as MacIntyre. His central idea
of creative work not motivated by material need is most easily understood
in terms of projective motivation, but as a (left) Hegelian, he wishes to
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interpret it formally in terms of self-realization. Yet in creative work, we
are not primarily aiming at self-perfection or even self-expression; although
we often do express much of our own mind, thought, and character in our
works—and sometimes even intentionally communicate through them—
we grow and gain self-worth by expressing our will through our creative
work only because when engaged in it, we devote ourselves to values beyond
our own eudaimonia. The world is not our mirror, not Narcissus’s pool;
rather, we realize ourselves by mirroring in our devotion the possibilities of
value opened for us by the world itself. Why it is that the world offers us
such values by devotion to which we can define an authentic self is a metaphysical question of the first order that I do not address in this work. But
the existential account of striving will at least allow this problem to come
into view, whereas the eudaimonist model obscures it.
5.4. Rawls on Practices
The same point applies to Rawls’s ‘‘Aristotelian principle’’ (AP) as a criterion for the full deliberative rationality of life plans. AP says that:
other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their
realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its
complexity. . . . For example, chess is a more complicated game than
checkers, and algebra is more intricate than elementary arithmetic.
Thus the principle says that someone who can do both generally
prefers playing chess to checkers, and that he would rather study
algebra than arithmetic.77
Now, AP is a plausible principle for human psychology and it is obviously
related to MacIntyre’s conception of practices; but as Rawls states it, AP
conflates two different kinds of motivation: simple D2 preferences for different kinds of entertainment or play, and projective motivation to pursue the
complex goals of a demanding practice for their own sake. This corresponds to the difference between a casual chess player and grand master or
a casual reader of mathematical books and a professional mathematician.
We also see this conflation in Rawls’s defense of AP:
Presumably complex activities are more enjoyable because they satisfy
the desire for variety and novelty of experience, and leave room for
feats of ingenuity and invention. They also evoke the pleasures of
anticipation and surprise, and often the overall form of the activity,
its structural development, is fascinating and beautiful. Moreover,
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simpler activities exclude the possibility of individual styles and personal expression which complex activities permit or even require.78
Some of the goods Rawls refers to here are certain kinds of first-order
pleasure that also explain why we might prefer to see a new movie rather
than one we have seen before or a thriller rather than a documentary. But
such desires for entertainment and novelty can take us only so far, and
other values in Rawls’s description refer to intrinsic goods in the products of
complex and challenging activities, which are achievable for the most part
only if we project them for their own sake. Finally, originality of individual
style or uniqueness of personal expression is not something that we can
desire in the D2 sense of a simple pleasure, and if we think of it as part of
holistic happiness and thus desirable in the D3 sense, it is not clear how
directly it can be pursued. It seems, rather, that the chance for originality
and development of one’s individual distinctness in an activity would be
among the agent-related by-product goods of pursuing a practice in MacIntyre’s sense. It could also be among the grounds for getting into a practice,
without any prior desire for it motivating our activities in the practice. Rawls
misses this point when he writes:
If we ask why we are willing to undergo the stresses of practice and
learning, the reason may be (if we leave out of account external rewards and penalties) that having had some success learning things in
the past, and experiencing the present enjoyments of the activity, we
are led to expect even greater satisfaction once we acquire a greater
repertoire of skills.
This seems to explain our engagement in practices as the result of egoistic maximization of our rationally expected utility: ‘‘there must be some
level of achieved ability beyond which the gains from a further increase in
this level are just offset by the burdens of the further practice and study
necessary to bring it about.’’79 But such a calculating motive will be selfdefeating; the agent will give up whenever the returns are not forthcoming
quickly enough and thus will be unable to commit himself wholeheartedly to his
endeavor whatever the consequences (within reason). The projective resolve
that puts the whole self behind a priority for action is not only non-egoistic
but also non-maximizing in form (see chap. 13).80
In sum, there is good reason to think that no one can be entirely fulfilled
without engaging in some practice-like activities; this is implied by both
AP and Feinberg’s example of Jones the abstract egoist (see chap. 4, sec.
2.3). But this truth could at most provide some type of retrospective justification for getting into a practice, not any prepurposive motivation to take up
a practice. For the same reason, the fact that life is incomplete without
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developing one’s talents in some practice can provide only an objective,
third-personal reason for the virtues that practices require, not any firstpersonal motivation to be virtuous. An agent reflecting on the eudaimon life
might be able to see that the virtues, as dispositions of pure motivation in
their own right, are essential preconditions of the kind of cooperation required by the pure pursuit of internal goods definitive of the practices; but
she could not be motivated to become or remain virtuous because this would
enable her to gain the fulfillment that comes from engaging in practices.
This fulfillment, like the joy of friendship, may be an essential component
of human eudaimonia, but these components are experienced only by agents
who care about goods unconnected to their eudaimonia. We seem to be
left, then, in the same position reached by Annas’s proposed resolution to
the paradox of eudaimonism.
5.5. Hursthouse’s Habituation Version of External Eudaimonism
Notably, this is also the position defended by Rosalind Hursthouse, who
argues that virtues typically benefit their possessor (at least better than any
other ‘‘candidate ‘regimen’ ’’), and that this provides part of their objective
justification.81 But she denies that this truth provides any part of the agent’s
internal reasons for virtuous action: ‘‘I do not regard their role [in benefiting their possessor] as providing a motivating reason for being virtuous.’’
But this question of motivation, she says, is entirely distinct from the ‘‘separate issue’’ of providing objective justification of the virtues: ‘‘So I put the
motivation question aside here as a red herring.’’82
This position rejects psychological eudaimonism but endorses rational
eudaimonism, which makes it a version of external eudaimonism, like Annas’s proposed solution to the paradox of A-eudaimonism. However,
Hursthouse’s version of EEu is not an indirect eudaimonism; on her account, practical reasons concerning eudaimonia do not recommend any selfeffacing manipulation. Rather, they motivate one set of agents to cultivate
virtuous motives in another set of agents. While reflection on the eudaimonistic value of the virtues, friendship, and practices may play no motivating role in the life of the flourishing individual (e.g., it does not move him
to develop friendships, engage in practices, or reform his vices), this reflective knowledge does play a practical role over time at the interpersonal level:
persons enlightened by this knowledge are motivated by it to habituate others
into the virtues, friendship, and practices in order that they may achieve
eudaimonia, even though this will not be their motivating goal. These others, in turn, will eventually be able to recognize the eudaimonistic retrospective justification of this kind of life and be motivated by it to bring up
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the next generation with the types of pure motivation required for their
eudaimonia. Call this the habituation version of EEu.
Hursthouse clearly favors this solution; she writes that our knowledge
of the agent-relative benefits of virtuous dispositions motivates us, as good
parents who ‘‘have their children’s interests at heart,’’ to modify and redirect
our children’s self-interested impulses toward more noble ends.83 We, not
they, are motivated by an understanding of the by-product benefits that
their virtues will bring them. Thus the parent or guardian in this model is
motivated by pure concerns for the child’s or student’s eudaimonia and for
their moral goodness, even when it does not make them happier. Such pure
adult motives derive in turn from the habituative care of their parents and
teachers in the past. The desire for one’s own eudaimonia remains external
to the set of motive-states that tend best to bring about holistic happiness
or ‘‘self-realization’’ for the individual living a good life.
Now, one immediately obvious question about this habituation version
of EEu will be: What is the motive of the teacher who, based on her
enlightened reflection on the various kinds of by-product fulfillment essential to human eudaimonia, decides to train others to develop the types of
pure motivation that give rise to such fulfillment? Evidently it cannot be her
own eudaimonia that motivates her; rather, she is acting to help secure her
student’s eudaimonia. It is compatible with the habituation model to say
that the agent’s concern (as parent, teacher, friend, etc.) for the ideal psychological development of her subject is a form of pure motivation that she
herself developed under the tutelage of a similarly motivated guardian in
the past. She is habituated to show loving care for those who need her
direction to learn the motives necessary for eudaimonia. By hypothesis, she
will certainly understand that this activity—the ethical education of young
persons by habituation into the virtues, friendship, and the practices, which
is itself another kind of quasi-practice as ubiquitous and essential to flourishing human communities as friendship itself—is likely itself to be highly
fulfilling for her overall (though often frustrating in the details and at given
moments). And she can verify that in fact the activity of moral education
is rewarding in her life.
But this contribution to her own eudaimonia need not be her motive; in
pursuing the other’s ethical education, she may act quite purely for the sake
of this agent-transcending end. Rather, this potential to achieve part of her
happiness through acting as a good parent or ethical teacher would be part
of what motivated her teachers and parents in the past to fit her with the
kinds of pure motivation required to engage in this quasi-practice. The
objection only applies to this dynamic interpersonal model in the form of
the question: How did this whole process get started with the first ethical
teacher? But the objection in this form is so speculative that it is of little
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interest; perhaps, for instance, the original (untaught) ethical teachers acquired the pure motives necessary to be good ethical teachers by some kind
of accident or by luck or divine intervention?
Leaving this chicken-and-egg conundrum aside, however, there is a more
subtle and important objection to the habituation version of EEu that requires attention. It concerns the problem of how, precisely, the ethical
teacher is supposed to cultivate the requisite types of pure motivation in
her children, students, or (generally) subjects. The habituation model necessarily assumes that this can be done by appealing only to prior desires of
the D1-D3 varieties, without requiring the subject actively to project agenttranscending goals for herself. For without this assumption, the theory of
habituation ceases to be recognizably eudaimonist and turns into an existential theory describing how to encourage the child’s striving will to care
about or commit itself to the right sort of ends. This, of course, is the sort
of theory of moral education that I think we need.
The objection challenges the assumption that D1-D3 desires can do all
the work by arguing that if Aristotle’s broadly desiderative (or orektic)
moral psychology were correct, it would be impossible for someone to get
into a practice, or into a virtuous interpersonal relationship, in the right way.
The theory of habituation must explain how the young (or uncultivated)
subject can transition from motivation primarily by self-interested desire
for the external goods contingently realizable through the practice or relationship to an (apparently non-orektic) motivation to pursue the agenttranscending end(s) definitive of the practice or relationship for their own
sake(s).
As we have seen, this transition cannot itself be motivated by desire for
the agent-related goods internal to the practice without becoming selfstultifying, because these internal goods are (at least in part) essentially byproducts. So it appears after all that this transition requires a moment of
reckoning within the subject when he becomes an agent in the full sense
and projectively motivates himself to pursue the pure goal, leaving behind interest
in the external good as irrelevant, or at least as only of secondary concern.
The subject is not learning new motives by rote repetition of actions that a
virtuous person would do, nor simply taking a ‘‘bait’’ to act in ways that
will awaken higher desires, but rather discovering the desire-independent
value of agent-transcending goods and projecting them as his ends or striving toward them.
To return to the example that MacIntyre says is the most important in
After Virtue:84 What exactly happens in the crucial transition from playing
chess for the sake of getting candy or money to playing it ‘‘for its own
sake’’? It is, of course, plausible that a child who first plays for money might
notice certain targetable by-products of doing this, such as the thrill of
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anticipating the next moves and the pleasure of capturing the opponent’s
piece, and begin to play more for this kind of excitement or entertainment
value or even as a means to build up technical skills. But this will not
constitute pure devotion to the goal of the game.
We might imagine that the transition occurs because the child next recognizes that the internal goods of exercising strategic imagination are inherently enjoyable or (more eudaimonistically) that they add to a well-rounded
life. But notice the problem with this suggestion: if the transition occurs
only because the child recognizes its incompleteness without these forms of
second-order satisfaction and conceives what I have called a D3 desire for
the difficult strategic engagement that playing chess well provides, and then
plays chess for the sake of attaining that end, her motives will become selfdefeating (in very much the same way that becoming reflectively aware of
one’s focused concentration on something ruins the whole gestalt of that
concentration). The child has to play with winning fairly—or perhaps playing
well—as a terminal end of her activity if she is to realize the full agentrelated internal goods, some of which are not directly targetable (or are
achievable only in pursuits that are not undertaken for the sake of experiencing or possessing these goods).
As a result, I say that the child learning to play chess must at some point
set himself the goal of playing chess well as a terminal end if he is ever to rise
above playing merely for external reward and enter into the practice in a
way that might eventually yield all of its agent-related internal goods. This
may not be a fully conscious process and it usually will not be reflectively
articulated; he may recognize only later how fundamentally his motives have
changed, but the change still requires projective commitment at some level,
whether clearly introspected or not. Moreover, the child can have a variety
of grounds for doing so, for example, the inherently interesting nature of
the challenge involved in chess or the chance to exercise his capacities, to
form friendships, and so on, but these grounds cannot consist simply of
D3 desires.
Theories of habituation are characteristically vague about this crucial
transition of motive precisely in order to finesse the difficulty I have emphasized. If we imagine that this transition occurs by pure conditioning—that
there arrives a moment when the chess-playing child has played enough
games that he simply begins to play chess for the challenge of playing well
and possibly winning through skill—we would have to accept the incredible tutelage thesis, which holds that no one can ever voluntarily enter into a
practice in such a way as to realize its internal agent-related goods. The
emphasis on habituation in MacIntyre’s chess-playing child example coheres all too well with this tutelage thesis, which is one of its weaknesses.
For even if, in the case of training a young child to enjoy complex activities
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(like chess), we think that the child can involuntarily acquire pure motives
that will be valuable to him, due only to the initiative of others guiding
him, this cannot be true in every case of entering into practices in such a
way as to realize their internal goods.
To refute the tutelage thesis, consider the example of the agenttranscending value of answering a difficult and important philosophical
question as grounds for taking up this task, quite independently of any prior
orektic desire for it. It is true that participating in the practice of philosophical inquiry and cultivating its virtues may add to my eudaimonia (despite
having other more frustrating side effects as well). But my motivation to
enter into this practice cannot be explained on the basis of my desire for
my eudaimonia (even if this desire is innate in every human being) or any
other more specific D1-D3 desire by which I could be encouraged to perform some of the same actions that philosophers perform. For the encouragements I received to engage in this practice, while significant enough,
were certainly insufficient by themselves to get me to start pursuing philosophical goals on my own. Rather, I had to transcend these incentives and
promptings by deciding to enter into this practice (despite deep concerns
about its likely financial effects) and devoting my energies to it.
And such cases are common; entering into a practice often involves a
strong sense of risk, which is accepted only because the agent projects the
ends to which this practice is dedicated, thinking them important enough
to be worth the risks involved in devoting a substantial portion of her life
to them. This point is sufficient to refute the tutelage thesis as a universal
generalization, but I would venture the stronger suggestion that the tutelage
thesis may be false in every case of authentic engagement in practices. Even
if one’s initial motives for getting involved in a practice were ordinary ones
like the desire to follow in a parent’s footsteps, or the desire to feel that
one belongs to a group, or the desire to learn a lucrative trade, one’s motivation for continuing involvement in the practice becomes projective in time,
and this is the key to realizing the agent-related goods internal to that
practice. There comes a point where no further management by others can
do more by way of making the goals of the practice seem desirable, and the
agent has to move over the threshold by her own will-power. This is precisely because what really makes these goals worthwhile is not any material
or formal relationship to her own well-being that could cause her to desire
them in the orektic sense. Their intrinsic value is independent of such relations and calls to us without luring or attracting.
Finally, let us take up a case that will help distinguish this projective
motivation relevant to practices from closely related D3 desires. Suppose
someone becomes involved in a practice because she has D3 desires for the
ends that the practice serve; for example, someone resolves to become a
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doctor out of a desire to reduce death and suffering in her community.
This is a D3 desire because it depends on her visceral horror or aversion
to needless loss of life and suffering; prior to forming her intentions, she
experiences these evils quite personally as a hole in her world, an incompleteness in her happiness. Let us imagine that she also believes she will
flourish in the role of fighting these evils. Could these agent-related desires
be sufficient for her to enter into the practice of medicine, which requires
valuing its internal goods intrinsically?
It seems that they might come close. For she would care about the health
of her patients as an end-in-itself, as she would not if she entered medical
school simply with the motive of gaining wealth (to satisfy D2 preferences).
But her attitude would not be quite right; the battle against disease would
be too visceral for her. For she would be drawn toward curing her patients
and preventing further disease as a constitutive part of her own eudaimonia—almost as if their bodies were part of her own. But suppose that
in time, with success as a doctor, her own happiness starts to depend less
viscerally on reducing death and suffering, but she nevertheless remains
committed to practicing medicine. Then her motivation for participating
in the practice has outlived the satisfaction of the original D3 desire and
become projective. She remains dedicated to the goal of medicine because
she wills that it be her end and not simply because it satisfies an empathetic
emotion. We might describe her will as compassionate, but it would be a
motive-state quite distinct from empathetic revulsion at disease and injury.
Another person might abhor the same kind of suffering in a rural community, seeing it as wrong and needless, although he does not experience a
visceral reaction to it nor any very strong empathetic disturbance that can
be returned to equilibrium only by making the community more healthy.
He does not desire this goal in an erosiac sense; the value of health does not
call like a Siren to him, drawing him toward fulfillment of a lack. Rather,
he acts on thoughts such as: treating the sick would be a worthy enterprise;
I have the opportunity to get into medical school now; and I have no other
plans that conflict with this. On these grounds, he projects Hippocratic
ends as his own goals and thereby motivates himself to enter the practice of
family medicine. In the process of pursuing this project, he eventually also
develops D3 desires for the internal goods defining his practice, but these
desires are, in Nagel’s sense, ‘‘motivated.’’ He can no longer be fully content
if health conditions are declining in his town, but that is because of his
volitional devotion to improving these conditions.
This shows how projective willing can motivate an agent’s desire for
goods internal to a practice, without the agent’s initial motive for participating in the practice deriving solely from D3 desires for its ends. If this were
impossible, in fact, then the habituation necessary to acquire many of the
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most interesting and important D3 desires would (as Aristotle may have
thought) be wholly dependent on fortunate intervention or benign manipulation by others and could never be self-willed. Accepting this would be a
high theoretical price to pay, especially since many moral conceptions of
responsibility for character do presuppose that a responsible agent can regard herself as capable of self-reform and ordinary effort to develop her
talents and various capacities in better and worse ways without depending
entirely on others.
6. Watson’s Pure Aretaic Naturalism
Another interesting alternative to A-eudaimonism and its problems is what
I will call a ‘‘pure aretaic naturalist’’ account that does not rest the moral
importance of the virtues on more basic concepts of eudaimonia or wellbeing. In his justly famous paper on virtue ethics, Gary Watson offers such
a theory. It emerges from his attempt to distinguish what he calls ‘‘Aristotelianism’’ both from ‘‘character utilitarianism’’ (which holds that the right
conduct is defined in relation to the virtues, and ‘‘a virtue is a human trait
the possession of which tends to promote human happiness more than the
possession of alternative traits’’)85 and from what Rawls calls ‘‘perfectionism’’ (which holds that right action maximizes good outcomes defined as
‘‘the development and exercise of the virtues, these being intrinsically
good’’).86
Both character utilitarianism and perfectionism (in this sense) are consequentialist and count as instances of ‘‘the ethics of outcome.’’ Watson wants
to show that virtue ethics, or ‘‘Aristotelianism,’’ can be formulated as teleological (giving explanatory primacy to the good) without being consequentialist.87 In addition to the primacy of aretaic notions, which distinguishes
Aristotelian moral theory from deontological theories, an ‘‘Aristotelian ethics’’ should give a naturalistic account of the virtues: ‘‘Virtues are (a subset
of the) human excellences, that is, those traits that enable one to live a
characteristically human life, or to live in accordance with one’s nature as a
human being.’’88 Since Watson relates ‘‘flourishing’’ to ‘‘living properly as
a human being,’’ the virtues acquire their natural significance ‘‘by reference
to certain necessities and desiderata of human life, in which case the basic
moral facts would be facts about what is constitutively and instrumentally
needed for that way of life, facts, in short, about flourishing.’’89
Such a theory is nonconsequentialist in its conception of the good—in
one of two senses. The less radical way of explaining this is to conceive the
virtues ‘‘as constitutive of, not merely instrumental to, flourishing’’; whereas
for ‘‘character utilitarianism, virtues are so identified because of their relation to independent values such as happiness.’’90 Virtuous activity is an
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intrinsic part of the flourishing whole. On this approach, we have an ethics
of outcome that is teleological (giving primacy to the good) but nonconsequentialist (yet otherwise like the view that Rawls calls ‘‘perfectionism’’).91
The virtues get their normative status from their relation to flourishing,
understood as the ultimate good outcome.
Here and in other passages, Watson seems to distinguish ‘‘flourishing’’
as an objective evaluation of one’s state of being and its relationship to
one’s ‘‘human nature’’ from eudaimonia as a state that must at least partly
consist in a subjective sense of fulfillment, sufficiency, or absence of any
significant lack in one’s life. This is important because while, on every plausible construal, someone can feel happy and believe his life is going well
without actually enjoying eudaimonia—since the satisfaction of whatever
subjective desires we happen to have is never sufficient for this sort of
holistic happiness—it is sometimes assumed in the recent literature on virtue ethics that eudaimonia can be conceived as the object of an entirely
third-personal judgment with no first-personal reflexive conditions of recognition or experience of satisfaction at all.
But understood this way, eudaimonia is a purely metaphysical, and not
a psychological, state. Both well-being (construed as not requiring any subjective experience of first or second-order satisfaction, e.g., construed as enjoying sufficient primary goods) and flourishing in Watson’s sense, as a state of
one’s motivational psyche that realizes certain natural potentialities, can be
understood as the objects of detached or impersonal metaphysical judgments. This does not seem to be the case for ‘‘happiness’’ in any modern
sense nor, I think, for what anyone in the Socratic schools of philosophy
understood by the eudaimon life. Hence a tree or an animal incapable of any
reflective recognition that its life is going well can be said to flourish. Although there are third-personal speculative judgments about how happy
someone may be, their truth-conditions depend in part on phenomena that
are essentially first-personal, or inseparable from the practical perspective
of agents. Thus Hursthouse also distinguishes between the metaphysical
thesis that ‘‘The virtues make their possessors good human beings,’’ or
flourishing members of their natural kind, and the more psychological thesis that ‘‘The virtues benefit their possessor,’’ although she believes that
Plato and his followers link these two theses.92
On the more radical approach, virtue ethics is nonconsequentialist because the normative status of virtues is not based at all on realizing outcomes already conceived as good. Unlike perfectionist theories, which also
hold ‘‘the fundamental moral facts to be . . . about people’s desires, ends,
and dispositions,’’ or ‘‘to be facts about virtue,’’93 Watson says that the
more radical virtue ethics is not an ethics of outcome in which conduct is

................. 16406$

$CH8

05-23-07 10:56:58

PS

PAGE 270

Contemporary Solutions to the Paradox and Their Problems

271

evaluated by reference to ‘‘states of affairs or outcomes deemed to be intrinsically good or desirable on their own.’’94 Instead, this theory starts from
the idea that ‘‘Living a characteristically human life (functioning well as a
human being) requires possessing and exemplifying certain traits’’ or motivational states, and outcomes like misery and well-being take their moral
significance from the fact that virtuous people care about them in certain
ways rather than these concerns being virtuous because they respond rightly
to states that are ‘‘intrinsically good or bad.’’95
I call this view pure aretaic naturalism to indicate its radicality in rejecting
any basic moral facts about the goodness of certain states, definable prior
to the virtues, as a foundation for the normative value of the virtues. As
Watson emphasizes, this theory does not even allow any foundational role
to ‘‘the idea that living a characteristic human life is intrinsically good.’’ It
does not hold that the desire for a normal life is virtuous because such a life
is supremely good and thus to be our highest aim; rather, such a desire is
virtuous because it is essential to living a characteristically human life.96 In
other words, while a characteristic human life and flourishing are interdefined, ‘‘the evaluation of such a life as a final end is derivative from, rather
than foundational to, the theory of virtue.’’97 The relevant motivational
traits count as virtues because they are constitutive of and instrumental to
such a life but not because they help secure or instantiate some independently defined ultimate good. Even flourishing is not such a good, for ‘‘On
the second account, the theory of ultimate good is dependent on the theory
of virtue.’’98 As a result, we are not committed to maximizing any good,
and so the psychic traits essential to distinctively human life can include
observing nonconsequentialist or agent-centered restrictions on various
kinds of act.
This sort of pure aretaic naturalism certainly vindicates Watson’s hope
of showing that there can be non-outcomes-based teleological moral theories, but at a very high price. The central claim in this theory is much
stronger than the modest epistemological thesis that there may be no neutral viewpoint from which the egoist and the virtuous agent can agree about
the elements of a happy life and proceed to argue over whether virtues do,
in fact, on the whole, tend to bring more of these elements to their agents
than vices do.99 For this modest thesis is consistent with holding (as in
external eudaimonism) that their value for well-being or eudaimonia (both
directly and by way of making possible friendship and engagement in practices) is the primary justification for the moral authority of virtues—
although perception or sensitivity to this value will be diminished the more
thoroughly one’s motives are corrupted by vice. In the most extreme form
of aretaic naturalism, which I think we find in Michael Slote’s ‘‘agent-based
virtue ethics,’’ the good is simply defined as whatever virtuous agents may
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value, and we lose any independent criteria for recognizing what sorts of
dispositions make one count as a virtuous agent. His theory has been widely
criticized on this basis.100 Slote also recognizes that this theory is not Aristotelian, since Aristotle grounds the authority of virtues in eudaimonia.101
In Watson’s version, the pure aretaic naturalist holds that the authority
of the virtues derives not from their helping bring about an independently
good outcome,102 but rather from their role in making us fulfill the good of
our kind. As he acknowledges, this approach faces both the difficulty of
providing a sufficiently robust functional conception of the human species
(or living a characteristically human life) and the more fundamental objection that unless living such a life is prescribed or endorsed as good or valuable
by an independent moral judgment, we have no particular reason to care
about ‘‘living naturally’’ relative to the capacities of our species.103 This
objection could be understood in two ways: (a) as a challenge to the aretaic
naturalist justification of the virtues holding that it involves an illicit reduction of ethical values to quasi-biological facts or to premoral metaphysical
facts; or (b) as the objection that on such a conception, we would lack any
clear motive for living virtuously (for the possibility is left open that virtue
may not make us happy at all).
However, I will not pursue these questions here, since I am not directly
concerned in this book with the central problem of moral theory, that is,
to explain the kind of justifying rational foundation that should we accept
for basic moral norms and ideals of character. Rather, my concern is with
the central question of moral psychology (as the indispensable groundwork
for moral theory), namely, what kinds of motives exist in the human repertoire? For this purpose, what is relevant is that pure aretaic naturalism neither presupposes nor grows naturally out of the erosiac model of human
motivation on which A-eudaimonism was based. Hence this theory poses
no real obstacle to my argument in chapter 7 that if human beings are
capable of virtuous motivation, then our motives cannot all be formally
erosiac in structure and so they cannot all be embraced in the unifying
desire for eudaimonia.
Instead, the pure aretaic naturalist would seem to require a motivation
to flourish qua human, in the natural or premoral sense of doing what is
most characteristic or distinctive of our species. This could be construed
either as an internal motive for cultivating the virtues in ourselves, or (along
the lines of the habituation model of EEu) only as our motive for inculcating them in young persons whom we have in our care. The pure aretaic
naturalist could argue that such a motive is itself innate in our nature or at
least develops automatically if our upbringing is not wholly corrupt. But
either way, this would be a strange motive. How exactly could we describe
the desire to be natural or to be fully human without invoking some already
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normative conception of our function as one among rival conceptions? Especially given modern interests in distinguishing ourselves as distinctive and
original, who would be inspired by the ideal acting in the standardly human
way?
A full positive argument against such radical aretaic naturalism requires
developing the alternative, rival, existentialist conception of personhood
and a defense of some kind of libertarian freedom as one of the conditions
of moral responsibility. I leave this task for later work, since Watson’s pure
aretaic theory rescues virtue from the paradox of eudaimonism only by
rejecting the eudaimonia thesis. This paradox points toward the need for a
non-eudaimonistic virtue ethics, and pure aretaic naturalism of both Watson’s
and Slote’s varieties will be one species of this genus, which also includes
character utilitarianism, intuitionist theories of virtue, Kierkegaardian existential virtue ethics,104 and Nietzschean theories according to which virtues
are those motivational dispositions that best express or embody the will to
power or the will to life (as opposed to any formally egoistic desire for my
own happiness or eudaimonia).105
I include in this genus every type of moral theory that both (a) gives
virtues a significant role in normative ethics independent of the right (not
reducing virtues simply to dispositions to do one’s duty or making ethical
evaluation of characters and lives entirely derivative from deontic concepts),
and (b) does not seek to base the authority of the virtues, or the criteria of
moral worth for characters and lives, entirely on their relationship to the
eudaimonia, basic goods, or well-being of individuals and communities.
Although the value of virtuous actions is often related to promoting such
goods, they are not the whole story, according to non-eudaimonistic versions of virtue ethics.
7. Social Holist Eudaimonism as a Radical Solution?
Finally, I briefly explore the possibility of another radical response to the
paradox of eudaimonism, which is based on Aristotle’s famous statement
that our ‘‘complete’’ good must not only extend to our whole life but must
also include the good of other members of our family and community (NE
I.7 1097b8–14). In the literature on eudaimonism, it is sometimes suggested that Aristotle’s conception of our social nature implies that an individual agent’s good, rightly understood, simply includes the good of family,
friends, and perhaps fellow citizens (although not the whole human race).
If so, this approach suggests, then the paradox of eudaimonism is an illusion; the virtuous agent’s desires for jointly enjoyed communal goods are
also validly describable as desires for ‘‘his own’’ eudaimonia, when this is
understood in the true, most expansive sense. So the distinction between
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agent-transcending and agent-related goods is itself transcended in the right
conception of eudaimonia.
7.1. MacIntyre’s Joint Goods
Something close to this idea often seems to be at work in MacIntyre’s
Dependent Rational Animals, for example, when he writes that
the practical learning needed, if one is to become a practical reasoner[,] is the same learning needed, if one is to find one’s place
within a network of givers and receivers in which the achievement
of one’s individual good is understood to be inseparable from the
achievement of the common good.106
MacIntyre also emphasizes the idea that there are significant goods that can
exist only as shared, and thus there are activities ‘‘in which the goods to be
achieved are neither mine-rather-than-others’ nor others’-rather-than-mine,
but instead are goods that can be mine only insofar as they are also those
of others, that are genuinely common good, as the goods of networks of
giving and receiving are.’’107 His main point is that we cannot (without selfdefeat) seek to sustain and participate in such networks simply as a
Hobbesian contract,108 because we can receive the aid we need in youth, old
age, disability, and periods of illness only if we are members of a society all
(or most) of whom act virtuously or ‘‘who make the good of others her or
his good, and this not because we have calculated that, only if we help
others, will they help us, in some trading of advantage for advantage.’’109
As this makes clear, however, the common good essential to the flourishing
of humans as vulnerable, bodily/animal beings emerges from the joint activities of many virtuous agents in a community who are acting on pure
motives
to participate in this network of giving and receiving as the virtues
require, I have to understand that what I am called upon to give may
be quite disproportionate to what I have received, and that those to
whom I am called upon to give may well be those from whom I shall
receive nothing. And I also have to understand that the care I give to
others has to be in an important sense unconditional, since the measure of what is required of me is determined in key parts, even if not
only, by their needs.110
As an analysis of social virtue, this seems entirely right; we have to regard
needs as grounds for setting goals. But it looks as though the easiest way of
understanding MacIntyre’s proposal is just that the common good of mutual flourishing is essentially a by-product of the pure motives of ‘‘just generosity’’ involved in virtue as such.111 If so, then the common good itself is not
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the virtuous individual’s intended purpose; rather, she aims at more particular goods, as required by circumstances and her place in the network, and
thereby helps produce the common good. And to participate in this social
system by making the good of particular others her own good then requires
projective motivation, just as engaging in a given practice requires projecting as one’s final ends the goals definitive of this practice. This brings me
to three important distinctions.
(1) Projectively Determined Conditions of Eudaimonia
First, as I explained in the discussion of second-order satisfaction in chapter
5, once an agent-transcending goal G is projected as the agent’s own, she
may then derive satisfaction from achieving it and even see it (somewhat
metaphorically) as ‘‘part of her own good’’ since she will be unhappy to the
extent that G is unrealized. Such satisfaction depends on a purposive motive
rather than being the intentional object of a prepurposive motive. That G
contributes to the agent’s satisfaction, or to her eudaimonia as a whole, is
psychologically dependent on her prior volitional projection of G and her striving
to attain it; thus this satisfaction plays no initial role in motivating the
uptake of G. In this sense, then, I readily agree that a virtuous agent ‘‘expands’’ her sense of what her own eudaimonia includes, but she does this
by her own striving will and hence not in a way consistent with the eudaimonia thesis. The scope of the agent’s eudaimonia, or what sorts of shared
goods it includes, is the determined rather than the determining variable, as
eudaimonism requires.
Thus the paradox of eudaimonism remains, and its resolution still requires the existential capacities of striving will.
(2) Abstract versus Concrete Goals
Second, we ought to distinguish between abstract goals, such as adhering
to moral ideals or principles or sustaining social systems of expectations
and joint activity, and more particular or concrete goals that agents may
pursue either as specifications of the abstract goals or as particulars not
subsumed under more general concepts. A loyal baseball fan may continue
to buy season tickets to his local team after a couple of bad seasons just
because he loves the game, not because he believes in the ideal of fan loyalty.
However, his doing so may inspire other fans to stick with the team. A
venture capitalist acting on a motive with a highly determinate end, for
example, to earn a certain amount of money per year by setting up a forprofit company, may also be participating in and helping to sustain a system
of market competition that produces certain common benefits, but that is
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not the capitalist’s aim; that he functions this way is a by-product of acting
for the sake of other goals, and in general the ‘‘invisible hand’’ of the market
is an unintended by-product of the aggregation over time of millions of
individual consumer and producer decisions that have no structural economic goal in mind.
MacIntyre is clear that the ‘‘common good’’ is not the aggregate result
of this kind of self-interested motive, nor is it simply a mereological ‘‘summing of individual goods.’’112 Yet MacIntyre’s account is a bit ambiguous
about when the ‘‘common good,’’ as he understands it, can or should be
anyone’s intended goal. It is probably true that ‘‘it is only through the acquisition and exercise of the virtues that individuals and communities can flourish in a specifically human mode,’’ as required by our bodily dependencies,
our need for love and recognition, and our capacities for independent practical reasoning.113 But should we think of this judgment as motivating any
virtuous agent’s actions?114
Perhaps we could if we thought of these agents as aiming at the abstract
good of sustaining a network of giving and receiving such as MacIntyre
describes. But notice what this would mean in a particular instance of, say,
aiding an ailing elderly neighbor with no children who needs transportation
to doctors and hospitals. It would mean that I help her because I believe
that such actions are part of a network from which we all benefit (from
which I have benefited and may benefit again), not because I have any
special love for her as a particular individual.
Now, such abstract motives do play an important role in human life and
should not be discounted. Politicians and educators, in particular, may have
to act explicitly with such abstract ends in view. Likewise, a wealthy alumnus of Fordham University may say to himself, ‘‘well, I have benefited from
the institutions and resources built up by the collective generosity of past
alumni, and I ought to carry on this tradition by making a substantial gift
to the university’s endowment so that future students will be able to get an
education, recognize their dependencies, and eventually make their contribution according to their abilities.’’ This would be a perfectly reasonable
and admirable ground for such philanthropic activity, and indeed it would
count as virtuous, as exhibiting the kind of asymmetric reciprocity characteristic
of the central virtue that MacIntyre calls just generosity.115 For, as MacIntyre argues, even though this virtue demands ‘‘unconditional care for the
human being as such, whatever the outcome,’’ it is ‘‘nonetheless in virtue of
what we have received that we owe.’’116 But still, many of the virtuous
activities necessary to sustain the network of giving and receiving are surely
not aimed at such abstract goals as those of the philanthropist but rather
focus on the good of particular people or organizations or on reforms
called for by a particular political issue, and so on. In such attentive care
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focused on particulars, it seems that the common good as a whole is once
again the unintended by-product rather than the goal.
(3) Targetable and Nontargetable Common Goods
For the social holist alternative to get off the ground, then, it has to argue
instead that the agent’s expanded sense of her own eudaimonia as necessarily including the flourishing of others can motivate her virtuous actions. It
is not clear that MacIntyre’s analysis, despite its many insights, will support
this strong claim. He argues that ‘‘participants in networks of giving and
receiving are only able to identify their individual goods in the course of
identifying their common goods,’’ and because this requires ‘‘shared deliberation with those others whose common goods they are,’’ understanding our
own flourishing requires political reasoning. Moreover, ‘‘my decisions about
what part certain goods are to play in my life’’ will affect my relationships
and must depend in part on how my community values these goods.117
But although MacIntyre is surely right that no individual could intelligibly understand her own flourishing without relation to networks of giving
and receiving in which she is involved from her beginning, to see her good
as joined with the well-being of any particular range of other persons requires
a commitment to them or to the network of relations which is never simply
given as part of her facticity. For the person always has the option of defining her good instead as merely parasitic on the background of supporting
social relationships, which she will make as little sacrifice to help sustain as
she can strategically get away with. The eudaimonist can say that this egoistic strategy is mistaken and cannot lead to happiness, but that remains
debatable. It seems instead that the gestalt shift whereby the individual
comes to see her good as inextricably joined with others in various social
networks must depend crucially on her own projective engagement in these
relationships for reasons other than certainty that her own happiness depends
on it. She fuses the good of others to her own, deciding in the process which
kinds of caring networks are most relevant for her attention.118
Moreover, insofar as one agent’s eudaimonia is inextricably bound to
another’s, their joint eudaimonia may not always be directly targetable for
either (e.g., in friendship). When joint eudaimonia is a nontargetable common good, it may nevertheless derive in part from the joint action of agents
for the sake of other kinds of targetable common goods (e.g., the goods
definitive of practices). One ground for such a projection of some genuinely
common or joint good may be, as Rawls suggests in his account of reciprocity, that others are willing to coproject it with us. For example, a sense of
justice (expressed in a public conception of the principles defining fair
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terms of social cooperation) is such a joint good: one of its key requirements is that everyone can accept it, provided that each knows that all (or
enough) others accept it and do so in part because they share this very
knowledge.119
The motivation for such a joint action must be projective in cases where
each party requires the willingness of others as a condition of their own
willingness to act, yet no party requires this primarily because they believe
the willingness of others promises any direct contribution to their own
material or psychic well-being. Unlike egoists making a Hobbesian contract, their joint willingness is seen by each agent as a condition for serving
some higher purpose, for example, establishing fair institutions, or ending
an injustice affecting some minority, or creating together a legacy for future
generations, even if it also promises them some material gain. In such cases,
person A is willing to sacrifice for some good G as long as the other person
B will sacrifice for it with him, since without their mutual efforts G cannot
be achieved—but G still transcends the material welfare of both A and
B.120 Their motive is not self-interest that overlaps contingently with the
self-interests of other cooperating parties but, rather, making common
cause for a noble goal that extends beyond the material interests of either
party.
Many of the most important moral and political goals require such joint
or unified commitment, because they cannot effectively be pursued alone.
The distinguishing characteristic of such joint ends is that they are only
mutually targetable. Unlike values that are essentially by-products of activities
not directed toward them, these goods can be pursued intelligibly as one’s
end, but not by a single isolated actor. Think, for example, of building a
Stone Age temple, which required raising stones that no would-be builder
could have moved at all by himself. Among such goods that can be pursued
only in concert with others will be some whose intrinsic value is recognizable quite apart from the well-being of the agents pursuing them, for example, the religious value of the temple, or the beauty of a choir singing in
unison, or the dignity bestowed by the rule of law. These are mutually
targetable but agent-transcending goods. This also explains why the continuation and deepening of networks of giving and receiving that I recognize
can sometimes justly demand much more from me than I will ever receive
from them; the joint good of these networks is targetable only by mutual
projection.
My ground for caring about such social goods, whose fundamental
status MacIntyre rightly emphasizes, would seem to be intrinsic values that
I, like others who join me in sustaining the networks in which these social
goods are realized, can appreciate as valuable quite apart from their (immediate) relation(s) to my own good. It may also be that a complete human
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life requires a kind of satisfaction that can be gained only from devoting
oneself to such mutually targetable goods that often include but still transcend each cooperating agent’s interests; for the sense of ‘‘fraternity’’ or
‘‘solidarity’’ that results from being part of such a joint quest is among the
most ennobling experiences in human life. But this satisfaction is a byproduct of concern for common goods sustained by systems of justice and
generosity. Such concern is formed in a willing that is pure of erosiac attraction, although the devoted agent can then see common goods as linked to
her own flourishing.
This will be clearer if we consider John Drummond’s similar account of
intending essentially shared goods, which preceded MacIntyre’s. Starting
from Husserl’s conception of evaluative motives, which are D3 desires in
my scheme,121 Drummond argues that Aristotelian generosity involves ‘‘the
identification of the good of the other and the good of oneself.’’122 This
identification appears to be an achievement of the will. Drummond tries to
explain its possibility by saying that we recognize goods that
make their claim on us independent of our particular desires because
they are a priori goods, and, insofar as part of the sense of these goods
is that they are good for humans as such, they also obligate us to seek
them not only for ourselves but for all humans.123
It is not clear how this obligation can motivate an Aristotelian agent. Intending a good G because I recognize that it is part of the human good
certainly commits me to the judgment that it is also good for other persons,
but that by itself cannot cause me to desire that they also enjoy G. If my
enjoying G will also benefit others, then I might intend it solely for my
own sake and regard the benefit to others as a mere side effect. But if G is
essentially joint, such that it will benefit me only if I pursue it for the good
of others as a final end, then pursuing it this way and thus identifying our
goods requires projective motivation. Thus if the a priori status of essentially joint components of the human good obligates me to seek them for
others’ flourishing as an end-in-itself, this obligation cannot be an erosiac
motive. It will function more like Kant’s categorical imperative, namely, as
a ground for setting new ends that transcend the agent.
7.2. Brink and Spinoza
If the social holist is to defend his theory as a real solution to the paradox
of eudaimonism, he must argue that we are capable of expanding our sense
of self prior to and independently of motivation to pursue noble goals
defining the virtues and motivation to pursue craft goals defining the practices. The virtues would then find their place in a kind of transformed
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egoism. Probably the best contemporary defense of this idea is given by
David Brink in his analysis of rational egoism as a basis for ethics, which
he identifies as ‘‘A Neo-Aristotelian Approach.’’124 Brink follows Parfit in
basing his ‘‘egoist justification of other-regarding concern’’ on controversial
models of branching psychological continuity, or fission cases:125 the good
of intimates who share my projects, plans, and commitments is also my
good, in the same way that the good of later minds psychologically continuous with mine is my own good.126 In addition to the dubiousness of this
analogy, this model also has the same problem we noted in MacIntyre’s
account, namely, that it presupposes that I can form projects and plans or
commit myself to life goals that others can share. Since such projects or life
goals frequently involve agent-transcending goods, however, it seems that
projective motivation is required to form them. In that case, a social holism
based on Brink’s model will not rescue the eudaimonia thesis.
However, there are also prominent examples of the social holist position
in the history of philosophy that do not rely on such psychological continuities. The most notable is Spinoza’s enlightened egoism, in which moral
sentiments are supposed to be modifications of self-interest in a self that
ultimately identifies with the Whole (not only with all human beings but
with the entire cosmos as the One Substance, of which we are all modes).
This paradigm version of metaphysical holism was taken up in the twentieth century by J. Baird Callicott and Arne Naess as a basis for their environmental ethics; according to their accounts, the motive for caring about the
Earth and its life-forms as ends-in-themselves is simply part of the selfinterest of a vastly expanded self that sees no border between its own identity and the planet (if not the entire universe, as Spinoza would have it).127
Technically, if one accepts its premises, this kind of social holism does
solve the paradox of eudaimonism by showing how virtuous motives are
embraced by the agent’s desire for ‘‘his own’’ eudaimonia. It works, in other
words, by making trivial or empty the self-reference in ‘‘formal egoism.’’ I
think this is quite telling, because it helps confirm a crucial genealogical
point: Socratic eudaimonism traces its historical origins to the Hindu sages
and was always deeply indebted to their ideas about the transcendence of
self. Now we see—what was always the case, although it was often forgotten—that for the eudaimonist project to work, it requires something like
the holistic metaphysics of the self that stands at the center of the Hindu
and Buddhist traditions. This is a much stronger premise than MacIntyre’s
recognition that a eudaimonist account of the virtues cannot be independent of metaphysics and biology altogether.128
However, admitting that social holism can resolve the paradox is not
much of a concession, since the metaphysical premises of this view are so
radical that they are wholly implausible, at least to most contemporary
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audiences. It is also clear that most of the ancient Greek proponents of
eudaimonism did not accept anything like the kind of radical denial of the
separateness and freedom of individual selves that their ethical project really
requires. For example, when Aristotle argues in NE IX (in the passage that
so worried Annas) that in sacrificing for their friends, the virtuous agent
gains the greater good, he clearly still recognizes a real difference between
the two persons, and so he clearly does not mean that the friend as ‘‘another
self ’’ will literally become part of the virtuous agent. That is not his own
intended resolution of the problem, even if it may be Spinoza’s. If the
eudaimonist project requires mystical holism of the strongest metaphysical
variety imaginable, then I consider it defeated for all practical purposes in
the twenty-first century. As a famous U2 song says, ‘‘We’re one, but we’re
not the same.’’129
Moreover, even the radical metaphysical rejection of individuality in the
Eastern mystical traditions going back to the Hindu sages cannot be regarded as any independent evidence against the existential alternative to eudaimonism. For, as I suggested in chapter 2, that radical metaphysical position
was itself motivated primarily by moral suspicion of the striving will, whose
full capacities and existential significance the existentialist tradition alone
has recognized. This radical suspicion is understandable enough, given its
time and place of origin: in cultures so full of suffering that any sustained
endeavor seemed likely to lead only to the agent’s misery by involvement in
hopeless causes—cultures so full of corruption by warlords and princes
who cared nothing for this suffering of the masses that they would do
anything to secure their power. How, in such an environment, could the
positive potential in the striving will give any hope for a meaningful life or
even be recognized as having any positive significance by reflective persons?
But these historical circumstances are greatly changed today, at least for
the roughly 40 percent of human beings not living in the poverty of underdeveloped nations. We can now recognize third-world conditions as those
in which the rejection of the striving will in the Eastern metaphysical ideal
of non-individuality had a practical point and even made a good deal of
sense, despite being in the end simply a form of rational despair. For two
thousand years, this kind of metaphysical holism could be placed in a new
religious context in which again it might make sense to mystics, and in the
eighteenth century, it offered a kind of escape from the endless religious
wars and suffering of the modern European misérables. But today, outside of
these contexts, it makes virtually no sense against the fundamental fact of
the distinctness of persons that both Kantian ethics and the existential tradition following Kant take as their starting point. Recognition of this fact
need not lead to solipsism nor to a flat denial of Hegel’s insight that a
sense of our own identity requires social relationships,130 but it does require
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admitting that there can be real conflicts of interest and that the individual
uniqueness of selves in their freedom is not altogether an illusion.
8. Conclusion: Toward a Rejection of the Transmission Principle
By now it appears likely that the paradox of eudaimonism is unresolvable
within the terms allowed by any metaphysically plausible variant of eudaimonism, where the minimal conditions of plausibility include recognizing some
form of the individuality of persons rather than subsuming all selves into
one all-embracing organic whole or Overself. This means that the eudaimonist project of providing an adequate account of virtuous motivation
grounded in a eudaimonist account of human nature and motives must fail,
given its own internal contradictions, on plausible metaphysical premises.
This result has far-reaching implications for theories of well-being and
value, for it implies that happiness is not our highest good. As Raymond
Belliotti argues, happiness is an important value but it ‘‘is not everything’’
and should not be overrated: ‘‘Happiness remains valuable in most cases,
but it is not the most important human aspiration.’’131 Happiness is not the
aim or end in the pursuit of other worthwhile values, such as ‘‘truth, art,
creativity,’’ and so on. Rather, happiness is largely a by-product of pursuing
such values, and some measure of happiness is also frequently sacrificed in
such pursuits.132 The existential view that a meaningful life is more fundamental than a happy life is thus supported by Belliotti’s arguments that ‘‘we
reasonably value a life replete with enduring accomplishment, high creativity, powerful social effects, and unparalleled excellence more than a minimally meaningful, happy life.’’133 This view validates the paradigmatically
Western conception of the aspiring will as potentially positive and constructive rather than grasping and self-aggrandizing (see chap. 2).
The failure of the eudaimonist project also has implications for normative ethics, since it entails that some other sort of foundation will have to
be given for the virtues if we wish to give them a fundamental role in
normative theory. The alternative non-eudaimonist grounds for virtue ethics will become clearer in my existential account of striving will. My extended critique of eudaimonism opens the door to the existential alternative
by undermining the Transmission principle (TP). This result can be summarized in a natural deduction as follows. Suppose, as is very likely, that
despite the failure of the eudaimonist project, we still affirm that:
1. There are pure motives of the sort that Aristotle and his followers praise as virtuous.
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It follows from 1 and the paradox of eudaimonism that:
2. The eudaimonia thesis is false.
Yet, as we saw in chapter 6, section 3, the eudaimonia thesis is the
conclusion of the valid ‘‘A-eudaimonist core argument,’’ which starts from
several premises. As a result, it follows from 2 that at least one of the
premises in the A-eudaimonist core argument must be false. Looking back
over these premises, the most vulnerable or least obviously sound is TP,
which, together with the weak erosiac thesis (WET), entailed the conclusion that all human motivation must be formally erosiac in its psychic structure. If TP is the weak link in the A-eudaimonist core argument, then the
paradox of eudaimonism probably implies that:
3. TP is false [by reductio, from the conclusion of the Aeudaimonist core argument and 2].
A critic might hold that it is the jointure thesis rather than TP that
ought to be rejected among premises in the A-eudaimonist core argument.
For this reason, it is important to emphasize that 1 and the paradox of
eudaimonism together support the rejection of TP in another way, namely
by inference to the best explanation. As we saw in chapter 4, section 1.2, if we
grant the simplifying assumption that all prepurposive motive-states are
erosiac in form (WET), but we can find purposive motives that are nonerosiac, then TP is falsified. The best explanation we have found for the
paradox of eudaimonism is that virtuous motives aim at final ends (various
species of ‘‘the noble’’) that are often materially unconnected to the agent’s
good and sometimes even to his entire community’s good, prior to his
forming an intention to pursue these ends. Thus the ‘‘noble’’ cannot attract
the agent or cause her to experience erosiac desire for noble action. If the
paradox of eudaimonism is best explained by the non-erosiac structure of
aretaic motivation, and WET holds, then TP must be false.134 This opens
up the possibility of an existential account of aretaic motivation as a projective effort or activity of the striving will.
Such an account neatly avoids the paradox of eudaimonism by rejecting
the idea that we desire to do the ‘‘noble’’ (i.e., just, generous, temperate,
friendly, etc.); here ordinary language misleads. We do not take the relevant
actions that appear to have agent-neutral aretaic value to be filling up some
lack in our well-being at all (or if we do, we do not choose them for this
reason). Rather, we project ‘‘the noble’’ itself as our goal, which is to say that
we use our self-motivating power of striving will to set some species of kalon
action as our final end. This is what really happens when we resolve to do
the noble thing for its own sake. The existence of action done from ‘‘the
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motive of virtue,’’ then, turns out to be a primary piece of evidence both
for the existential conception of the will and against the eudaimonist account of willing as logos-eros, or rational appetite. This suggests the need for
an existential virtue ethics.
Although developing such an ethics is a task for another book, the case
studies explored in subsequent chapters help define its parameters. While
their primary aim is to illustrate and help clarify the projective model of
striving will, the examples generally have ethical significance. We can regard
the Levinasian conception of agapé discussed in chapter 9 and the related
Kantian conception of duty discussed in chapter 11 as attempts to specify
the master virtue of an existential ethic. I argue that these attempts fail
because they do not recognize many other kinds of projective willing.
Among these are radical forms of malicious motivation, which are analyzed
in the existential theory of volitional vice developed in chapter 10. The
remaining chapters explore the wider realm of human cares whose normative criteria need to be incorporated into a complete existential virtue ethic.
Norms and virtues defining ethically good wills have to take into account
the full scope of the will’s motive-powers.
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9
Divine and Human Creativity:
From Plato to Levinas

Overview. This chapter describes the emergence of a new concept of
motivation from Neoplatonic speculations on why the divine principle generates the physical universe. The first half of the chapter is
generally accessible and potentially useful in a philosophy of religion
course. The later sections on Arendt and Levinas will be most relevant for those with some background in these philosophers but can
also serve as interpretative introductions to some of their main
themes. The last section, which is slightly more technical, completes
the description of projective motivation in the terms of contemporary
action theory, picking up where chapter 3 left off.
1. Thick and Thin Concepts of Motivation
In previous chapters, I have repeatedly suggested that an existential conception of striving will implies a kind of human motivation that (a) contrasts
with erosiac desire, and (b) violates the Transmission principle (TP), since
it arises only within what Pink calls volitional agency, that is, the activities
in which intentions, plans, or purposes are set by the agent. Although decision is the paradigm of such activity, forming and executing intentions is
not the only function of volitional agency. However, as I note in chapter
4, contemporary theories of motivation in analytic philosophy are usually
committed to TP, and they usually ignore the phenomenology of motivation as a subjective experience of the agent, conceiving it abstractly as whatever state plays certain formal roles in explaining or rationalizing intention
and action. I call this the thin sense of ‘‘desire.’’
For example, in a recent work on value theory, Robert Audi treats experienceable intrinsic value as motivating because it can be the ‘‘the object of
287
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desires and intentions . . . the experience of hearing a sonata can be precisely
what I want to hear, and hence, in prospect, can motivate me to act.’’1 This
sounds as if the prospect of an aesthetic good moves the agent as in a D3
desire, but the description is too ambiguous to be certain. It could also be
that the agent projects the goal of learning a certain style of music and
‘‘wants’’ to hear the sonata as a means to that goal. Both these kinds of
motive have the ‘‘world-to-mind direction of fit’’ of practical attitudes;2 so
that it is not enough to distinguish between them. This problem goes back
at least to F. H. Bradley’s attempt to define volition as ‘‘the alteration of
existence so as to agree with the idea.’’3 Note that this definition applies to
any ‘‘practical relation’’ or pro-attitude motivating intentional action. But
Bradley fails to see that not all pro-attitudes are autonomous, and hence
when the world is changed in accordance with an idea, it does not necessarily follow that this ‘‘realises for me my inmost being which before was
ideal.’’4 This approach identifies the self with all of its motives.
The ubiquitous use of ‘‘desire’’ in the thin sense thus makes it harder to
state adequately the existentialist’s thesis that the will includes a projective
capacity. For the thesis that we can motivate ourselves in ‘‘non-desiderative’’
ways to make sense, it has to be made relative to a thick account of ‘‘desire,’’
such as the erosiac analysis in the eudaimonist tradition. This is not to deny
that, as Pink says, ‘‘there surely is . . . a sense of ‘desire’ that applies whenever we are motivated to act’’;5 for we could define ‘‘desire’’ in a maximally
formal or abstract fashion as ‘‘any state in which an agent is motivated to
pursue some goal or end.’’ Similarly, we could conceive ‘‘teleology’’ in a
minimally thin sense merely as any psychological state in which an agent
‘‘conceiv[es] of the future as including a state of affairs which is an end to
be produced, where this end is provided in the propositional content of a
belief or desire.’’6 For example, Alfred Mele defines ‘‘wanting’’ this way: ‘‘to
want to A is to have some motivation to A, the content of which features
a representation of the agent’s (current or prospective) A-ing.’’ As Mele
says, this does not differentiate among types of motives, such as ‘‘appetitive
versus nonappetitive wants.’’7 In fact, it says nothing at all about how the
motivation is experienced or what kind of representation of the object is
involved. In this thin sense, it is vacuously true that all motivation is teleological or desiderative.
Hence substantive theses about motivation like Hume’s or Aristotle’s
require the addition of further terms. To express their views, we need thick
senses of desire; for example, Hume holds that all motivation derives from
D2 desires, relative to which reason plays only an instrumental function,
whereas Aristotle holds that motivation includes D3 desires in which reason
plays an end-prescribing function.8 The erosiac model of desire as ‘‘lack’’
that I introduced in chapter 4 also gives a substantive sense to teleology as
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a structure of motivation, or a way of having ends; it is not just any type of
goal-directed state that could inform intention-setting. Now that the erosiac model and the eudaimonist framework that incorporates it have been
explained, we have a sufficiently substantive foil for the existential account.
Projective motivation contrasts with ‘‘desire’’ in its classical erosiac sense
but not in its contemporary thin sense.
It is perhaps ironic, then, that the original idea of a fundamentally different projective form of motivation can be traced back to Plato himself—
although it was much less influential than the erosiac model, and its
significance was largely covered over by the more dominant eudaimonist
tradition. Historically, the projective idea first developed in theological contexts and passed, by way of Stoic and Franciscan moral philosophy, to
Kant’s ethics and finally into existential philosophical anthropology and
twentieth-century phenomenological realists (Scheler, von Hildebrande,
and their disciples). In this chapter, I consider several illustrations of projective willing in this countereudaimonist ‘‘tradition,’’ beginning with the notion of divine creativity, and I take up Arendt and Levinas before presenting
a general schema for projective motivation. Later chapters will test this
schema in case studies involving existential psychoanalysis, deontic moral
motivation, radical evil, and contemporary conceptions of caring and identity-forming commitments.
It will be especially useful to trace in outline the original theological
inspiration for the idea of non-erosiac or projective motivation—not because the significance of the projective concept for contemporary moral
psychology or ethics depends on any form of traditional Western theism, but
rather because (1) the theological case provides a clear paradigm instance
from which we can read off the general form of projective motivation; and
(2) as a bonus, it will show why an agapic ethics requires a projective model
of striving will. Thus the relevance of this conception of volitional striving
for central themes in existential ethics will be clarified by starting with the
problem of divine motivation.
2. The Neoplatonic Projective Model of Divine Agapē
2.1. The Erosiac Thesis and Perfection in Republic II
The germinal thought behind the countertradition arises from the problem
of creation, or the metaphysical relationship between the Divine, as foundation of reality, and the everyday universe we inhabit. That the Divine is in
some way the source or basis of this universe’s reality is implied in the
most primordial archetype of the sacred in all human mythology9 —a point
certainly not lost on Plato, although, of course, there is little evidence that
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he understood the cosmogenic principle as in any way personal.10 Yet if the
perfection of the divine being (whether conceived as a personal entity or an
impersonal principle) implies lacking nothing, or being completely selfsufficient and whole in itself, then it follows from the erosiac model that
the divine being would desire nothing and hence apparently not be moved at
all. But why, then, would less perfect grades of reality emerge from it, since
it certainly does not need them? Mark McPherran sums up this point as
follows:
[B]oth the early and middle dialogues, and especially the Lysis, make
it clear that love (as a desire for what is lacking) is irreconcilable with
perfection, and that therefore the (perfect) gods cannot love anything.
Furthermore, if they cannot love anything, and since all rational activity is rooted in rational love, they cannot act at all.11
We can see the theological form of this problem emerging in Plato’s
conception of what theologians eventually came to call ‘‘divine impassibility,’’ meaning that the Divine is not affected or moved in any way by anything outside it or (in Christian theology) by any created substance. For
example, in discussing the religious education of his guardians, Socrates
(Plato’s character) presents a sustained diatribe against the anthropomorphic divinities of Homer’s and Hesiod’s mythologies, insisting that these
gods of the poets completely fail to embody the form of the Divine discerned by the philosopher. For the Divine must by definition be perfect:
‘‘But think, God and what is God’s is everywhere in a perfect state.’’12 Yet
the gods and goddesses of the Greek pantheon not only get angry and
jealous, and act unjustly, and trick one another; they also change in intrinsic
accidental properties. In response, Socrates makes a justly famous argument
for divine immutability. Assuming that being changed involuntarily by another is contrary to God’s power, then only God could change himself. Yet,
Socrates argues, he would have no reason to do so:
‘‘Does he change himself for the better and more beautiful, or for the
worse and more ugly than himself?’’ ‘‘He must change for the worse,’’
said he, ‘‘if he does change, for I suppose we shall not say there is a
lack in God of beauty or virtue.’’ ‘‘Quite right,’’ said I, ‘‘and if thus
perfect, do you think, Adeimantos, that anyone, God or man, would
willingly make himself worse than this in any respect?’’ ‘‘Impossible,’’
said he. ‘‘Then it is impossible,’’ I said, ‘‘that God should wish to
alter himself. No, as it seems, each of them, being the best and most
beautiful possible, abides forever simply in his own form.’’13
It is worth reconstructing this argument to bring out its two key premises more clearly. It is tempting at first to ignore the psychological elements
in the passage and offer this simple construction:
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1. God is perfect [definition of divinity];
2. if God changes, he must change for the better or the worse
[premise based on an implicit definition of change as alteration in
some intrinsic value-significant property];
3. if God changes for the worse, he would be imperfect [selfevident premise];
4. if God changes for the better, then he improved [definition of
improvement];
5. if he improved, he was not perfect before he improved [allegedly self-evident premise?];
6. hence, if God changes for the better, he was not always perfect
[from 4, 5, by hypothetical syllogism (HS)];
7. hence, if God changes, he is imperfect [2, 3, 6, by disjunctive
syllogism (DS)];
8. hence God does not change [1, 7, by modus tollens (MT)].
But this construction seems to be question-begging, for premise 5 seems
to presuppose that perfection is an absolutely static state that cannot grow
or develop. There is an alternative conception of perfection as a process of
ever-expanding richness in which the values that are added are such that
they cannot all be realized together from the beginning. On this process
view, improvement from state A to B does not entail imperfection at A;
rather, God would be imperfect if he did not constantly change for the
better. This process theory is precisely what Plato’s argument needs to disprove. We can come closer to this goal, however, if we add in premises
embodying the erosiac model of motivation:
1. God must be perfect [def. divinity];
2. if God changes, he must change for the better or the worse [def.
change as alteration in some intrinsic value-significant property];14
3. if God changes for the worse, he is imperfect [intuitive
premise];
4. if God changes for the better, then either he is changed by
another or he changes himself [intuitive premise];
5. if God is changed by another being, he is imperfect [for perfection entails causal independence];
6. if God changes himself for the better, he must be moved to
this improvement [no agent-caused change without a motive];
7. if he is moved to change for the better, then there is some
possible good that he lacks when moved by this desire [the erosiac
premise];
8. but to lack some possible good is to be imperfect [intuitive
premise];
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9. hence, if God changes himself for the better, then he was
imperfect [6, 7, 8, HS];
10. hence God cannot change himself for the better [1, 9, MT].
This argument can be extended to show that God cannot change at all.
This second reconstruction is much better, because premise 8 seems to be
part of any neutral preconception of perfection that we could non-question-beggingly use as a starting point. At any rate, unlike premise 5 in our
first reconstruction, it does not obviously beg the question against the process conception of perfection.15 Now, however, our new premise 7 seems
to be doing most of the heavy lifting (although new premise 5 is also
important in the history of conceptions of a maximal or greatest possible
being, for example, in Spinoza’s Ethics). The weight borne by premise 7 in
this version of the argument suggests that Plato’s conception of perfection
as an immutable state rests squarely on his idea that a perfect being would
be motivationally impassible, since such a being would lack no good that could
attract it. The Republic interpretation of perfection as immutable and impassible is thus dependent on the erosiac model of motivation.
2.2. Plato’s Late Alternative: Overflowing Superabundance as Projective Motivation
The problem with this conception of the Form of the Good, or the perfect
being, is precisely its apparent lack of reason for doing anything, or initiating
any change in itself, on the erosiac model. If we think of it instead as the
highest soul, or Demiurgus, then since it is complete in itself, needing nothing, it would seem to have no reason to produce or give rise to anything
less perfect than itself. Other things, if they already exist, might be moved by
the presence of this perfect being (e.g., by being attracted to it), but it could
never be moved to create them. Anders Nygren put the point most simply:
‘‘An Eros that was rich, that had everything it wanted, would be a contradiction in terms.’’16
Arthur Lovejoy explains this convincingly in his famous William James
Lectures: with his first conception of perfect being, Plato found himself
unable to explain why there should exist a mundane world of sensible particulars rather than simply an eternal world of Forms or only the highest
Form itself. To overcome this problem, in the Timaeus, Plato tried to explain
why a perfect being would (atemporally) generate a lower-value world of
time, which is the moving image of its own higher value, despite the fact
that its absolute goodness demands total self-sufficiency:
The ‘‘best soul’’ would clearly, upon this Platonic principle, not be the
best if it had need, for its own existence or excellence or happiness,
of anything other than itself. Yet when he sets about telling us the
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reason for being of this world, Plato exactly reverses the essential
meaning of ‘‘good’’ [as self-sufficient]. In part, no doubt, he is taking
advantage of the double-signification which the word [agathos] had in
Greek, as in modern usage. But the metaphor which he employs in
making the transition suggests that he was attempting to reconcile
the two senses, and indeed, to derive the one from the other. A selfsufficient being who is eternally at the goal, whose perfection is beyond all possibility of enhancement or diminution, could not be ‘‘envious’’ of anything not itself. Its reality could be no impediment to the
reality, in their own way, of beings other than it, alike in existence and
in kind and in excellence. On the contrary, unless it were somehow
productive of them, it would lack a positive element of perfection,
would not be so complete as its very definition implies that it is. And
thus Plato, tacitly making the crucial assumption that the existence
of many entities not eternal, not supersensible, and far from perfect,
was inherently desirable, finds in his other-worldly Absolute, in the
Idea of the Good itself, the reason why that Absolute cannot exist
alone. The concept of Self-Sufficing Perfection, by a bold logical
inversion, was—without losing any of its original implications—
converted into the concept of a Self-Transcending Fecundity.17
From this crucial inversion in the Timaeus arose the Neoplatonic conception of the One that remains eternally unchanging and unmoved but nevertheless is so ‘‘superabundant’’ in perfection that its own being ‘‘overflows’’
into all those levels of possible reality with lower potential value, actualizing
them and thus realizing every possible form of metaphysical value—from
highest to lowest—on the ontological scale, or Chain of Being. And, of
course, from this in turn comes the abiding paradox in Christian theology
of a God who is philosophically conceived as absolutely impassible but
who, according to Scripture, nevertheless freely chooses to create a world
including creatures made in his own image.18
The problem for Christian theology is even greater because, as Lovejoy
rightly emphasizes, the Neoplatonists conceived the generative activity of
the One as following necessarily from its essence, thus implying the kind
of absolute cosmic determinism we eventually find in Spinoza’s pantheist
holism and arguably also in Leibniz’s monadology. In reaching this conclusion, the Neoplatonists were simply reasserting the logic of the erosiac
model: everything seeks completeness, only now the complete Whole must
be the entire Chain of Being with all its levels of actualizable value, not
simply the being at the top of this chain (who acts for the sake of this
Whole as much as everything else). For if each level of being is valuable,
the whole is incomplete without them all.
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So, as Spinoza saw, if instead we take this complete Whole with maximal natural/metaphysical value to be the Divine, the God-substance is once
again at rest and impassible. For this reason and others concerning the
personal picture of God in biblical scripture, it is now widely recognized
that impassibility, as a central feature of the ‘‘God of the philosophers,’’ is
in deep conflict with key themes in Judaism and Christianity as historical
religions—especially those concerning God’s love for persons and his care
for His creation in general.19 Impassibility can probably be secured for the
necessarily existing source of contingent beings at the cost of not only
divine determinism but also pantheistic holism.
However, Lovejoy’s analysis implies that the conception of goodness
as infinitely self-diffusive and creative really contradicts the conception of
goodness as impassible. There is something to this charge if we take impassibility in its strong sense as signifying the property that X has when it is
metaphysically impossible for X to be motivated in any way to act; for this
would rule out overflowing generosity. But it is probably fairer to say that
the original idea behind impassibility as a divine attribute is that God cannot find himself lacking anything or in need of some good in the way that
human beings are when experiencing desires of type D1, D2, or even D3.
For, since God is creator and hence divine owner of all things, there is no
good that he does not possess, so he could not experience erosiac yearning
(except perhaps metaphorically). If it is construed in this weaker sense, then
impassibility only entails total absence of all motivation to act if we also
assume the strong erosiac thesis (SET):
1. God is (weakly) impassible in the sense good or of not being
able to experience a salient lack of some value needed for God’s
completeness;
2. but all motivation is generally erosiac in form, that is, caused
by the experience of some value-needed-for-the-agent-to-be-whole as
lacking or not securely possessed;
3. so God cannot be motivated to act at all [from 1 and 2 by
Barbara syllogism].20
Here premise 1 states the weak impassibility thesis, and 2 states SET. It is
clear in this argument that we can avoid the unwanted conclusion 3 if we
relax SET, which provides the most attractive way out of the theological
dilemma. This solution requires us to conceive of non-erosiac motivation, that
is, a state of motivation to act in which the agent actively focuses on an end
or goal, but not because it is desired in the D1, D2, or even D3 sense. If
such motivation is based on any reasons concerning its ends or the process
of pursuing them, these reasons must be different in kind from the eudaimonistic value of attractive goods seen as ‘‘completing’’ us.
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Such motivation would in a concrete sense be superabundant, since it
would ‘‘overflow’’ the agent’s completeness: although initially lacking and
hence ‘‘desiring’’ nothing (in the erosiac sense), he would take on a new
task or pursuit as an expression of this very perfection and for the sake of
any other intelligible value in its goal. Given the obvious resemblance between this sketch of superabundant motivation and the notion of ‘‘projective motivation’’ outlined at the end of chapter 3, we may call this the
‘‘projective model’’ of divine creativity. On the projective model, then, God
could be weakly impassible (or immune to desire) and still be self-motivating, concerned about his goals, and active in working to realize them—
perhaps by creating or generating worlds and bringing them to their end.
So if this is what Plato intended, he can escape Lovejoy’s criticism as long
as he abandons the strong erosiac thesis.21
Some evidence that he did abandon it can perhaps be found in the portrayal of ‘‘soul’’ in several dialogues as self-moving, rather than static like the
Ideas. T. M. Robinson discusses this idea found in the Phaedrus and the
Laws, concluding that the model that the philosopher is supposed to imitate
is now ‘‘living and moving, as well as divine.’’22 A divine soul can be moving
because it is self-motivated or ‘‘a source of motion,’’ and, Robinson notes,
Phaedrus 246B6–7 makes sense of this by saying that ‘‘it is a characteristic
of any soul that it should care for that which is deprived of soul.’’23 If this
is so, then divine souls could care for the material world, helping to shape
and order it, without having any erosiac need for it. ‘‘Caring’’ as the soul’s
function may then be a prototype of projective motivation.
Certainly Plato denies that the gods feel bodily pleasures or pains;24
therefore they transcend the sort of desires (such as hunger and thirst) that
depend on these.25 And this sort of motivation does seem to be the paradigm on which the erosiac model is based; as Socrates says, ‘‘When one
becomes empty then, apparently he desires the opposite of what he is experiencing; being emptied, he longs to be filled.’’26 Socrates argues that all
such desire must be experienced in the soul (since bodies cannot by themselves be conscious of what they lack, i.e., the correlate of their emptiness).
Thus ‘‘it is to the soul that all impulse and desire, and indeed the determining principle of the whole creature, belong.’’27 This does not imply, however, that the ‘‘determining principle’’ or motive must be erosiac in form,
and the conclusions of the Philebus in fact imply that there must be motives
that do not have this form.
The reasoning is as follows. (1) We know that the divine state must
be devoid of erosiac motivation. As Socrates says, the good differs from
‘‘everything else’’ in that ‘‘A creature that possesses it permanently, completely, and absolutely, has never any need of anything else; its satisfaction
is perfect.’’28 This summarizes the same conception we found in the Lysis
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and Symposium. But (2) no one would choose to live with only pleasure or
intelligence exclusively. So (3) ‘‘neither of the two can be the perfect thing
that everyone desires, the absolute good.’’29 Rather, (4) the divine state
must involve a proportionate mixture of intelligence and pleasure, with the
latter in the ‘‘fifth place.’’ The operations of pure intelligence, then, will not
be erosiac in form; speculative thought, in contrast to practical reasoning,
will not be motivated by desire for any missing good.
As Nussbaum puts it, ‘‘thinking was taken by both Plato and Aristotle
to be something one could love and choose, even without awareness of any
incompleteness, or pressure of any need’’; by contrast, Epicurus took even
philosophical reflection to be practically motivated, and so he had to conclude that the gods do not engage even in philosophical thinking.30
2.3. Divine Agapē and the Open View of God in Christian Theology
Speculative thinking thus became the paradigm for activity without erosiac
motivation in Plato’s philosophy. It is the ‘‘superabundant’’ activity that
would overflow from the total plenitude of a being lacking nothing. In
agreement with this analysis, theological discussions have often portrayed
God’s motives for creating the world as a kind of ‘‘superabundant’’ motivation, albeit not always with adequate clarity. C. S. Lewis, still operating
under the enormous influence of the erosiac model, struggles to suggest
how divine motivation differs from human desire, which, given its erosiac
structure, can fall into egoism or selfishness:
The situation implies a need or passion on the part of the lover, and
incompatible need on the part of the beloved, and the lover’s disregard or culpable ignorance of the beloved’s need. None of these conditions is present in the relation of God to man. God has no needs.
Human love, as Plato teaches us, is the child of Poverty—of a want
or lack; it is caused by a real or supposed good in its beloved which
the lover needs and desires. But God’s love, far from being caused by
goodness in the object, causes all the goodness which the object first
has, loving it first into existence, and then into a real, though derivative, lovability. God is goodness. He can give good, but cannot need
or get it. In that sense, his love is, as it were, bottomlessly selfless by
very definition. . . . Hence, if God sometimes speaks as though the
Impassible could suffer passion and eternal fullness could be in want
. . . this can mean only . . . that God of mere miracle has made
Himself able so to hunger and created in Himself that which we can
satisfy. If He requires us, the requirement is of His own choosing. . . .
Before and behind all the relations of God to man . . . yawns the
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abyss of a Divine act of pure giving—the election of man, from nonentity, to be the beloved of God, and therefore (in some sense) the
needed and desired of God, who but for that act needs and desires
nothing.31
Though, of course, Lewis is not a professional philosopher or theologian
and he writes for a popular audience, it is hard to imagine a better summary
of the erosiac model and the theological paradox it generated. Lewis’s solution is that, unlike us, by actualizing some created good (such as human
beings), God causes a ‘‘lack’’ in Himself that the values realized by the creature’s proper activity (such as our worship) can refill. This is hardly a sufficient answer, though, since it merely pushes the problem back one level: we
now have to ask what God’s motive could be for ‘‘hollowing out’’ in Himself this ‘‘need’’ for creatures? Lovejoy would surely ask whether God’s
creative act should be thought of as being moved by the possible goodness of
some possible combination of entities that He could actualize—a natural
or metaphysical value that is lacking if not actualized. This is Leibniz’s view,
and his interpretation of God’s will as determined by the Principle of Sufficient Reason very clearly reinstates the erosiac model; as a result, it seems
to me that Leibniz’s God is not impassible (as he thought) but rather
moved by a fundamental desire for metaphysical value outside His own
being.32 What is impassible in the Monadology is the whole system of beings,
the totality. The alternative to this sort of divine determinism is to say that
God’s creative act is not motivated by erosiac attraction to the maximal
possible goodness in His creation but is rather a superabundant act of selfmotivated projection into a realm of totally unneeded potential goods, or
values that are in a sense ‘‘superfluous’’ to Him.33 On this alternative, there
is no need to reintroduce by miracle desires with an erosiac structure into
the divine mind: the superabundant divine will can love its creations, and
hence become subject to happiness or sorrow over their choices and fate,
without having literally ‘‘to hunger’’ for them at all. We can say that God
needs us as a result of God’s purposes rather than prepurposively, but this
signifies only that God has taken an interest in us, for example, by projecting our salvation as his goal. If creation is a free act unmoved by erosiac
desire, then God is capable of projective motivation.
It is not clear that this approach avoids every kind of divine determinism, however. In the most thorough recent treatment of this question, Linda
Zagzebski starts from Norman Kretzmann’s argument ‘‘that God was not
free not to create because of the Dionysian principle that goodness is essentially self-diffusive,’’ although God ‘‘was free to select which possibility to
actualize,’’ since he was not moved by desire for a maximal metaphysical
good.34 Zagzebski argues persuasively that such necessity does not make
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God’s motive nonautonomous; nor does it imply that God ‘‘needs to create,’’
which would mean that he is incomplete without his creatures, or that
‘‘there is some lack in God that creating a world fulfills.’’ For human beings
are also essentially active, but not because of our incompleteness.35 In my
terms, then, Zagzebski’s view is that God’s motivation is non-erosiac,
though still metaphysically necessary. Nevertheless, Zagzebski does not understand the alternative positively as projective motivation because she thinks
that God is just pushed or impelled to create by motives that are essential
to his nature without aiming at a result that he already recognizes as good.
In this, I think she perpetuates an error that derives from Anders Nygren.
To understand this error, we have to recognize that the Neoplatonic idea
of superabundant divine motivation was developed in a theological heritage
that extends from the early Franciscans to Kierkegaard, who portrays divine
motivation as a type of love that involves volitional resolve. In Philosophical
Fragments, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, ‘‘Johnannes Climacus,’’ argues that unlike Socrates, who has a reciprocal relation with his learners since Socrates
seeks his own perfection in teaching them, ‘‘the god needs no pupil in order
to understand himself.’’36 Rather, the god appears to the learner because he
moves himself; says Climacus:
But if he moves himself, then there of course is no need that moves
him. . . . But if he moves himself and is not moved by need, what
moves him then but love, for love does not have the satisfaction of
need outside itself but within. His resolution, which does not have
an equal reciprocal relation to the occasion, must be from eternity. . . .
Out of love, therefore, the god must be eternally resolved.37
This description suggests that agapic care for the learner generates its own
sense of need ‘‘within’’ the agent. In this eternal resolve, the divine agent
motivates himself to teach the learner even before the learner exists. This
solution to the paradox of impassibility has been taken up today by the
personalist theory of ‘‘open theism.’’ For example, Richard Rice argues that
A well-known feature of the New Testament writings is the use of
agapē to express God’s love. Unlike other Greek words whose meanings are broadly covered by the English word love, agapē has an unconditional element. It refers to affection motivated by the subject,
not the object of love. God loves us, not because we are lovable but
because he is loving. Spontaneous and unconditional though it is,
God’s love is not a mechanical outpouring, an inexorable natural
process. God’s love can never be taken for granted.38
According to Rice, then, divine agapē is a state of motivation actively
initiated by the agent, and in that sense it is not conditional on anything
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desirable in the object being presented to the agent in advance (even if it
may have other grounds). This paradigm species of projective motivation
explains how God can remain weakly impassible (in my sense) and yet act
as a personal agent: ‘‘God enjoys relationships, has feelings, makes decisions,
formulates plans and acts to fulfill them.’’39 The fact that something similar
must be true of human agapē, if it is possible, explains why a scholastic
philosophical tradition wedded to the strong erosiac thesis was forced to
conclude that human beings could achieve agapic love of our neighbor only
by an act of divine grace.
In his analysis, Rice clearly follows Nygren’s view that ‘‘Agapē is creative
love’’ which imparts value to its object by loving it. And Nygren is influenced
by Kierkegaard when he calls this sort of love ‘‘spontaneous and unmotivated.’’40 However, this formulation obscures part of Kierkegaard’s insight
by assuming that if an action is not orektically motivated, then it is not
motivated at all (as the strong erosiac thesis implies). In addition, although
he only means that God is not moved by orektic desire to acquire a good that
God lacks, Nygren’s way of putting this unfortunately suggests that agapē
can be spontaneous motivation only if the agapic agent is not responding
to any value that the actual or potential object/goal has prior to being
loved.41 In other words, Nygren assumes that if agapic devotion is formed
in light of any value that already exists in its object, then such a value would
be attracting the agent, or motivating in the erosiac sense. This is also
Zagzebski’s assumption when she argues that the only way to avoid implying that God’s motivation to create was self-interested is to say that this
motive is not ‘‘for the sake of an end.’’42 Thus, like Nygren, she concludes
that ‘‘The goodness of the world is consequent to God’s creative act.’’43
The problem with this solution is that it makes agapic projection of the
goal (i.e., the object’s good) entirely arbitrary for the agent: the only reason
we can give for such agapic motivation is that it is just built into the agent’s
nature. Avoiding such arbitrariness requires forms of value that could provide a reason for devotion to some end or goal without necessarily causing
prior attraction to it by correlating with some need or lack in the agent.
Agapic care need not be motivated by the object’s prior value to involve a
rational response to that value.44 Agapic willing can also give the object new
personal value to the lover, but only if this personal value supervenes on its
intrinsic value prior to being loved (see chap. 14, sec. 4.5). For example,
God could see some potential value in the being to be created, prior to
willing its actualization, without being moved erosiacally by this value, as
in Leibniz’s model.45 Note that this view is compatible with the idea that
divine love transcends all earned merit or moral worth, because human persons,
like other creatures, can have inalienable or constitutive intrinsic value that
does not vary with moral worth.46
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The same problem occurs in Alan Soble’s portrayal of agapic personal
love, because he follows Nygren’s formula. In this type of love, ‘‘the attractive properties of y play no role in either the reason or the nonreason causes
of xLy [x loves y] (that is, personal love is neither property-based nor
reason-dependent).’’47 Soble is correct that motivation sharing the agapic
structure is not caused or justified by properties that attract in the erosiac
sense, but he mistakenly assumes that all relevant properties in the beloved
object or person would be of this sort. Hence he concludes, like Nygren,
that agapic-type motivation must not be grounded on any property in the
object: ‘‘Since x values y’s properties in virtue of loving y, y’s valuable properties cannot explain why x loves y. Love, then, is incomprehensible’’48 and
lacks any kind of intentionality involving evaluative judgment that could be
criticized.49 Soble’s portrayal certainly allows agapic love to be a ‘‘pure act
of will,’’ but only at the price of rendering it irrational.50 He is right that
this kind of motivation originates within the agent rather than being caused
by the object, but he interprets this as implying that the object’s qualities
can form no part of the agent’s grounds or reasons for such motivation:
In eros love is elicited by the objective merit of the object, while
agape is freely given love that creates value in its object regardless of
the object’s objective merit. . . .
In the second [agapic] view, nothing valuable, objectively or subjectively, about the object is the ground of love; whereas in the first
[erosiac] view, whether the lover responds to the objective or to the
subjective value of the beloved, something valuable about the beloved
figures into the ground of love.51
This extreme Nygrenian formulation forces Soble to counterintuitive
conclusions, such as that, if ‘‘neighbor-love’’ is based upon some universal
objective value in all human beings, then ‘‘neighbor-love is erosiac love.’’52
What Soble fails to realize is that values in the object could serve as the
ground of an obligation, or at least of an optional reason, for devoting
oneself to the object without this causing any appetitive or passive emotional response to the object. We revisit this problem with Levinas below.
2.4. The Judeo-Christian Heritage of Projective Motivation
These points about agapic motivation help explain why the existential sense
of ‘‘striving will’’ is first philosophically formulated in Judeo-Christian theology, although it is present in prephilosophical notions of heroic courage
in many traditions. As Reinhold Niebuhr says in his Gifford Lectures, the
concept of creation ex nihilo in the Judeo-Christian tradition makes God
both ‘‘the source of vitality as well as of order.’’ And following the ‘‘unity
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of God’s will and wisdom, man is interpreted as a unity of will’’ ordered
by the divine source of value.53 Similarly, Charles Kahn argues that the
‘‘theological concept of will,’’ which ‘‘begins with Augustine and culminates
in Aquinas and the medieval ‘voluntarists’ ’’ [i.e., Scotus], models human
volition on the divine will.54 It inherits from the biblical tradition a notion
of the will as a kind of self-unifying motivation. Kahn summarizes Albrecht
Dihle’s explanation of the origins of this notion as follows:
In his recent and extremely valuable Sather Lectures, Albrecht Dihle
has adopted the perspective of the theological tradition.55 His thesis
is that the concept of the will as a factor or aspect of the personality
distinct from, and irreducible to, intellect and desire or reason and
emotion is completely absent from the Greek tradition, but implicit
from the beginning in the biblical notion of obedience to the commands of God. . . . The appropriate human response is to be seen
neither in terms of rational understanding, nor in terms of emotion
and desire, but as a commitment of the whole person that calls out for the
concept of will for its articulation.56
‘‘Commitment’’ in this existential sense is clearly something more than a
speech-act involving a promise, or a pledge to execute a standing plan that
borrows its motivation entirely from prior desires that moved the agent to
form that plan. As Kahn and Dihle insist, for Augustine and his descendants, the will constitutes a different type of motivation altogether, a type
that is sui generis although also linked to reason and action. In this tradition,
freedom is the liberty of this self-motivating process of setting ends, and
such liberty cannot be reduced to the habit of rightly guiding appetite by
reason. It is rather a way of drawing oneself together to meet the challenge,
steeling oneself to the task, and cultivating passion for one’s end—in short,
a kind of motivational bootstrapping. In its strongest form, it is the absolute commitment of self, or unbreakable resolve, which is perhaps symbolized in the northern mythological figure of the Valkyrie, a being of pure
will. But we can also find this strength of spirit in other less outwardly
‘‘heroic’’ guises: in the quiet perseverance of a single mother caring for her
children despite every obstacle; in the patience of a terminally ill elderly
man determined to die according to his values; in the inward determination
of a disaster victim to rebuild her life, and so on. For in the Judeo-Christian
tradition, the heroism of the striving will moves inward; it is seen in many
forms of spiritual strength, and as Hauerwas says, it is the source of ‘‘character’’ as a set of motive-dispositions that the agent has taken part in forming, rather than a mere set of traits ‘‘which simply happen to him.’’57
Because Jewish and Christian theologies regard human beings as made
in the image of God, it was natural for thinkers starting from the imago dei
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doctrine to hold not only that we share something like divine freedom but
also that we have a capacity for motivation like that which is expressed in
God’s act of creation ex nihilo—an act that is not rationally required or
desired, as if God would be incomplete without the world, but is instead a
voluntary overflowing of His perfection. If so, then in our creative work as
well, we may find something at least analogous to ‘‘superabundant motivation.’’ For example, Martin Buber describes genuine artistic creation as an
act of willing resolve by one who ‘‘commits himself with his whole being’’
to the form that confronts him as his Thou.58 Being true to the form that
calls him may require sacrifice, but he is resolved to overcome external
difficulties in order to express this form. Similarly, Tolkien once argued
that creating fictions for the sake of their intrinsic value—or for sheer
delight in their wonder—is part of the natural function and rightful power
of human beings as ‘‘subcreators’’: ‘‘Fantasy remains a human right: we
make in our measure and in our derivative mode, because we are made: and
not only made, but made in the image and likeness of a Maker.’’59 In other
words, invention is a free expression of the creative will.
For these thinkers, creativity is something much more than ‘‘the happy
choice of the right concept at the right time,’’ aided by a general ability to
recognize unanticipated patterns, as Douglas Hofstadter suggests.60 Programming a computer to get bored whenever it discovers itself in a repetitive pattern of similar actions, or to watch for ‘‘interesting’’ patterns of
change in its data structures, or even to watch itself to make sure it is not
getting ‘‘ruttish’’ or stuck in its ways would not be sufficient to give it a
capacity for true originality;61 that requires the capacity to discover entirely
new things to care about and to respond to them in ways not determined
by one’s past activities. To Tolkien and Buber, that is the divine spark in
human persons. Nietzsche is also indebted to this tradition when he conceives art as a primary expression of the will to power and holds that ‘‘We
are to make ourselves into works of art, self-created,’’ as Charles Larmore
puts it.62 Yet Nietzsche could not recognize agapic love as another expression of creative willpower, the kind that Erich Fromm called the ‘‘art of
loving.’’ Agapē so conceived is not a ‘‘tepid love,’’63 but rather a state of
resolve involving a kind of energy and determination similar to that of the
devoted artist.
In sum, the notion of divine agapē and its human analogs provided the
historical precedent for a countertradition opposed to the classical thesis
that all motivation must conform to the erosiac structure.64 This countertradition reemerged in the work of Duns Scotus and Kant, whom I discuss
in chapter 11, and was exemplified in twentieth-century philosophy primarily in three personalist schools: the religious existentialists, the phenomenological realists, and the Levinasian proponents of alterity ethics.65 Its
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influence is also clear in the more secular existential philosophy of Hannah
Arendt, who wrote the most important work on ‘‘willing’’ in the first half
of the twentieth century. In the next two sections, I consider Arendt and
Levinas as case studies in this broad countereudaimonist tradition before
explaining the general conclusions to be drawn for an account of projective
motivation.
3. Arendt on Creative Work
Between Marx’s ideal of unalienated labor (see chap. 8, sec. 5.3) and MacIntyre’s theory of practices comes Arendt’s highly original reflections on
creativity in human work and the shape of lived time. In volume II of The
Life of the Mind,66 Arendt not only retraces the history of conceptions of
willing from Aristotle through Scotus and on to Nietzsche and Heidegger
but also proposes a novel view of her own.
Arendt begins with the existential relation of will to time: ‘‘the Will, if
it exists at all . . . is obviously our mental organ for the future as memory
is our mental organ for the past. The moment we turn our mind to the
future, we are no longer concerned with ‘objects’ but with projects.’’67
Arendt means ‘‘projects’’ in the literal sense of plans and directives, for
example, those spelled out in a ‘‘Last Will and Testament.’’ But Arendt
follows Augustine and Scotus in conceiving the will as essentially free in a
way that (as we will see) requires the possibility of projective motivation:
‘‘A will that is not free is a contradiction in terms—unless one understands
the faculty of volition as a mere auxiliary executive organ for whatever
either desires or reason has proposed.’’68
By contrast, Arendt conceives the will as a motivational faculty that is
not merely determined by prior appetite or evaluative judgments. Moreover,
she recognizes that volitional motivation cannot have the kind of teleological structure that Aristotle invokes to explain ‘‘making or fabrication—
poiein, as distinct from prattein, acting or praxis.’’ The problem with Aristotle’s
account is that the model in which ‘‘everything that appears grows out of
something that contains the finished product potentially’’ makes time into
a circle, denying genuine novelty:
The view that everything real must be preceded by a potentiality as
one of its causes implicitly denies the future as an authentic tense: the
future is nothing but the consequence of the past, and the difference
between natural and man-made things is merely between those whose
potentialities necessarily grow into actualities and those that may or
may not be actualized. Under these circumstances, any notion of the
Will as an organ for the future . . . was entirely superfluous.69
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Arendt suggests in fact that this explains why any notion of the will more
substantive than mere voluntary action (intentional as opposed to unintentional acts) is missing from Greek philosophy.70 This ‘‘curious lacuna . . .
is in perfect accord with the time concept of antiquity, which identified
temporality with the circular movements of the heavenly bodies and with
the no less cyclical nature of life on earth.’’71
An open future suggests instead the notion of will as a capacity ‘‘that in
principle is indeterminable and therefore a possible harbinger of novelty;’’
it fits with the notion that the entire world had a ‘‘divine beginning’’ and is
therefore a radical novelty. It is against the background of the ‘‘rectilinear
time concept’’ required by the story of Christ’s resurrection and Christian
eschatology that, Arendt says, ‘‘the Will and its necessary Freedom in all
their complexity were first discovered by Paul [the apostle].’’72 And she
adds that the continuing resistance to acknowledging this phenomenon,
manifested in philosophy from the medieval period to the present, shows
how strong the reluctance has been ‘‘to grant human beings, unprotected
by any divine Providence or guidance, absolute power over their own destiny and thus burden them with a formidable responsibility for things
whose very existence would depend exclusively on themselves.’’73 Here we
see Arendt at her most existentialist; she reads every reduction of the will,
including the German idealist tendency to ‘‘equate Willing and Being’’ and
the refusal of free will in Nietzsche and the later Heidegger, as episodes of
bad faith.74
Whatever we might make of her historical analyses of this issue,75 the
innovation in Arendt’s own account lies in her development of the theme
of novelty. For Arendt, the motivational power of volition, its surplus over
desire, is found in its conferring practical meaning on an indeterminate
future. In contrast with liberum arbitrium, which simply picks from preordained options, ‘‘spontaneity’’ as Arendt understands it is ‘‘a power to begin
something really new’’ which ‘‘could not very well be preceded by any potentiality.’’76 She allows that the end that the will gives itself is logically
possible, but denies that it is the agent’s potential in the sense of something
that is teleologically anticipated and unfolds when triggered. Although she
does not contrast the will’s creation of new ends with the relative passivity
of desires, Arendt forces us to see how implausible it is that all the ends we
take up could derive simply from a prior telos: ‘‘Can anybody seriously
maintain that the symphony produced by a composer . . . existed in a state
of potentiality, waiting for some musician who would take the trouble to
make it actual?’’77 The sheer complexity and variety of products of human
willing, ‘‘art objects as well as use objects,’’78 attests to the fact that through
will, we conceive goals for ourselves for which there is not necessarily any
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prior impetus; we conceive new challenges and invent new needs for
ourselves.
It is clear how well this fits my description of projective motivation:
through projective striving we can work up our own motivation, sometimes
over a period of time. Only understanding the will in these terms allows
for the innovations through which historical time becomes linear:
It is not the future as such but the future as the Will’s project that
negates the given. In Hegel and Marx, the power of negation, whose
motor drives History forward, is derived from the Will’s ability to
actualize a project; the project negates the now as well as the past and
thus threatens the thinking ego’s enduring present.79
I think Arendt is right that nothing truly novel in human affairs could
come about, except by sheer accident, if projective motivation were impossible. For the instinctual appetites vary little; the fundamental conditions of
overall human well-being remain largely constant, altering only in the means
necessary for their realization in different historical contexts; and brute
preferences are too subjective or inarticulate about their reasons to extend
to complex and incommensurable options: nobody just finds themselves
‘‘preferring’’ to compose a symphony in a new style rather than to watch
sitcoms in the way that they prefer chocolate to vanilla. We don’t ‘‘have a
hankering’’ to compose a symphony; except in pathological cases, we can
acquire such a goal only by making it our project, by willed aspiration to a great
work. Perhaps we can also project ends that are mundane and repetitive, but
precisely because the will’s resources are greater than this, the suspicion will
naturally arise that what we are really projecting is the goal of living in a
way that requires such modesty in our pursuits or that expresses our rejection of traditional conceptions of excellence (a project that could be based
either on good or bad grounds).80
Arendt does not concentrate on the distinction between act and motive,
but her remarks on the ‘‘tonality’’ of the will reveal her understanding of
the distinctive nature of volitional motivation. There is in Arendt’s view a
fundamental tension between the mind’s two aspects, thinking and willing.81 She quotes Bergson’s suggestion that ‘‘In the perspective of memory,
that is, looked at retrospectively, a freely performed act loses its air of
contingency under the impact of now being an accomplished fact.’’82 In
thought, which is hindsight, our will’s projects seem to flow continuously
out of a preceding series of psychic states as if they were necessitated; thus
the temptation to reduce the will to something else, although from ‘‘the
perspective of the willing ego, it is not freedom but necessity that appears
as a delusion of consciousness.’’83 This ‘‘clash between thinking and willing’’
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is also a matter of the opposing tones or moods of these mental activities.84
Thinking, even in working out difficult questions, is self-contented:
Rememberance [sic] may affect the soul with longing for the past, but
this nostalgia, while it may hold grief and sorrow, does not upset the
mind’s equanimity, because it concerns things which are beyond our
power to change. On the contrary, the willing ego, looking forward
and not backward, deals with things which are in our power but
whose accomplishment is by no means certain. The resulting tension,
unlike the rather stimulating excitement that may accompany problem-solving activities, causes a kind of disquiet in the soul easily bordering on turmoil, a mixture of fear and hope that becomes
unbearable when it is discovered that, in Augustine’s formula, to will
and to be able to perform, velle and posse, are not the same. . . .
Speaking in terms of tonality—that is, in terms of the way the
mind affects the soul and produces its moods, regardless of outside
events, thus creating a kind of life of the mind—the predominant
mood of the thinking ego is serenity, the mere enjoyment of an
activity. . . . The predominant mood of the Will is tenseness, which
brings to ruin the ‘‘mind’s’’ tranquility.85
As I argued in chapter 4, we could describe the ‘‘tone’’ of desire in
Plato’s account as a state of unquiet or dissatisfaction attempting to return
to harmony and inner equilibrium. What differentiates desire from will in
this respect is that in striving volition, the ego willingly takes on such tension,
disturbance, and the risk of having an unrealized end. By willing in the
existential sense, we voluntarily move ourselves from a state of relative pose
or quietude into a state of resolute interestedness that risks frustration and
disappointment—something that is impossible on the erosiac model.
Arendt means to emphasize this point when she writes that
in flagrant contrast to thinking, no willing is ever done for its own
sake or finds its fulfillment in the act itself. Every volition not only
concerns [contingent] particulars but—and this is of great importance—looks forward to its own end, when willing something will
have changed into doing it. In other words, the normal mood of the
willing ego is impatience, disquiet, and worry (Sorge) . . . because the
will’s project presupposes an I-can that is by no means guaranteed.86
This statement could be misread as an affirmation of Aquinas’s view
that the motive for willing must lie entirely in the perceived value of the
end to be achieved. What Arendt actually means is that a motivational
supplement is necessarily involved in the deliberate formation of any intention to act: there is no decision unless the agent is resolved to act in suchand-such a way if possible (even in the face of competing desires). This
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tension, willingly undertaken, is the projective element in all decisions. But
it is especially pronounced if the decision involves setting a new end for
the sake of which the intended act will be done. Projective motivation is
distinguished by the fact that it freely undertakes the uncertainty and tribulation that all motivation involves; through it, we make ourselves dissatisfied
with the actual states of affairs, or bring about an internal ‘‘restlessness’’87
similar to that from which desire starts for Plato.
4. Levinas on Superabundant Will and Volitional Generosity
Emmanuel Levinas follows Plato’s late model of divine creative will as ‘‘superabundant’’ or projective and makes this idea the basis of his famous
phenomenology of ethical experience at the interhuman level. Levinas does
not see God’s creative act as ontologically determined by his superabundant
nature (since he does not think of God as having a nature at all) but he
understands both human moral responses to others and the basic call to
respond in non-erosiac terms. The ‘‘idea of creation ex nihilo’’ suggests the
possibility of a ‘‘relationship between strangers’’ that is not based on need
for each other; moreover, such creation implies that the creature is not
merely a ‘‘part’’ of its creator, giving it the independence necessary for it to
be capable of love not based on neediness.88
As I detail elsewhere,89 Levinas conceives the ideal of agapic love asymmetrically—as a willingness to sacrifice without concern for reciprocity—
and he interprets the categorical imperative to love another person in this
radical sense as the transcendent quasi-experience in which the very existence of others as persons is first made manifest to the self. The person as
‘‘neighbor,’’ or the Face that calls me to agapic love, is contrasted, for Levinas, with all objects of erosiac attraction that the self seeks to appropriate
or possess in order to achieve its completeness. As a result, the originary
experience of responsibility to love another as neighbor must ground an
agapic love that is projective in form. In other words, Levinas’s account requires the existential conception of the striving will.
Levinas himself is not entirely clear about this implicit commitment; at
points, he apparently approaches the paradigmatically ‘‘Eastern’’ suspicion
that all will is willfulness (see my discussion in chap. 2). But in other passages, he acknowledges the creative power of projective willing that his
own phenomenology of ethical experience requires. While there are many
dimensions to Levinas’s thought, often corresponding to the rival views
that he hopes to answer (from Heidegger’s ontological philosophy to Hegel’s analysis of recognition and intersubjectivity), I will focus only on (i)
Levinas’s debt to the Neoplatonic countertradition and the associated
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Judeo-Christian conception of creativity sketched above; and (ii) his own
discussion of willing in Totality and Infinity and related essays.
4.1. The Agapic Revelation of Alterity
Levinas’s philosophy is built on his argument that our encounter with the
other person as a being to whom we owe an absolute responsibility, which
he refers to as being called by the other’s ‘‘Face,’’ has absolute primacy in
the structure of selfhood and indeed is presupposed in the possibility of all
other experience, knowledge, and action. It is in this encounter with ethical
alterity—the Otherness of the other person, who is not constructed out of
our consciousness nor constituted by our intentional attitudes—that we
first encounter reality outside our mind at all. Yet this is not something
added to a self-knowing consciousness that already constitutes a self; rather,
it is only by being appropriated into moral duty to others that the I arises as
a self-aware center of responsible agency at all.
It is helpful to think of this as an inversion of Sartre’s quasi-Hegelian
conception of the I as threatened in its solitary self-absorption by the existence of the other’s look.90 Levinas is specifically opposing the philosophical tradition in which ‘‘conflicts between the [self-]same and the other are
resolved by a theory whereby the other is reduced to the same—or, concretely, by the community or the state.’’91 Instead, the Other is originally
an ethical appeal or obligation that cannot be assimilated back into the self
or mediated in a higher synthesis: in Fichtean terms, the Other is the Anstoss
through which the I comes to have the reflexive capacities of self-awareness
necessary for selfhood and agency to begin with.
On Levinas’s account, this alterity or absolute difference of another person has both negative and positive aspects (which he tends to equate).
Negatively, it consists in the other person’s being unappropriable or unpossessable by the subject of conscious experience: the Other is ‘‘transcendent’’
to my experience, unlike all objects and tools, for ‘‘the distance at which
the object stands’’ from our mental acts of cognizing it ‘‘does not exclude,
and in reality implies, the possession of the object.’’92 This negative thesis
depends on a particular conception of mental intentionality as orektic.
Levinas follows the notion found in Sartre, but going back to earlier
German idealists, of all ordinary modes of consciousness as generically erosiac in form, appropriating the object to the subject by mental acts that aim
at constituting it as an object-for-me. Thus, rightly or not, Levinas sees
Husserlian phenomenology, in which the content thought is the correlate
of the subject’s intentional attitude toward it, as analogous in structure to
ordinary appetitive motivation as lack. On this view, as Alphonso Lingis
says, all intentional direction toward ‘‘a term’’ or ‘‘object’’ is ‘‘a lack aiming
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at a content.’’93 Just as the object desired is proleptically anticipated by the
desire for it, since it is apprehended in terms of its value for the agent’s wellbeing or satisfaction, Levinas believes that in Husserl’s model, all intentional
contents are conformed to the conscious act of the agent (as in Plato’s
maieutic theory of knowledge, the object known is anticipated in the agent’s
trace memory of it; thus recollection is analogous to appetition). In classical
phenomenology, Levinas believes, we never find in the world anything but
reflections or externalizations of what was already within us; that is, we
never encounter genuine otherness without constructing it in our own
terms.94
In contrast to this, our original responsibility for the other ‘‘in nowise
resembles the intentional relation which in knowledge attaches us to the
object’’95 determined by the mode in which the subject intends it, as in
classical phenomenologies. The alterity of the ‘‘Stranger’’ or person-as-other
exceeds my mental grasp: it is ‘‘an idea whose ideatum overflows the capacity
of thought.’’96 This Neoplatonic metaphor of overflowing superabundance
is associated with the projective conception of divine motivation, as we
have seen. And like Nygren, Levinas sees agapic love as the paradigm of
such superabundant motivation not driven by any neediness in the self.
Hence, in distinguishing the impact of alterity from all other kinds of experience, Levinas looks to the projective structure of agapē in contrast to eros.
As in agapē, the Other toward which the agent is oriented is not an
‘‘end’’ in the classical sense of a correlate that fulfills some deficit in the
agent,97 or that addresses some lack that would motivate a self-interested
concern to realize that end. Thus ‘‘the vision of the face is not an experience’’
or an absorbing of objects into the self, ‘‘but a moving out of oneself, a
contact with another being. . . . The infinite is given only to the moral view:
it is not known but is in society with us.’’98 Similarly, in commenting on
Franz Rosenzweig, Levinas describes ‘‘revelation’’ as an ‘‘entering-into-relation completely different from the one that corresponds to a synthesis’’;
since such a revelatory relation is not teleological, it links its terms nonadditively ‘‘in a connection for which language or sociality or love is the original
metaphor.’’99 Likewise, Levinas calls the dependence of personal interiority
on revealed responsibility for others and for the human ‘‘world’’ in general
a ‘‘fundamental non-narcissism.’’100 This leads to the positive aspect of
alterity.
4.2. The Projective Structure of Metaphysical Desire
The comparison with agapē is more than mere analogy, for alterity consists
in a moral obligation or imperative not only not to possess or enslave the
other (not to treat her as a mere thing) but also to show active concern or
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regard for her being as an end-in-itself. This is the positive aspect of alterity. The original preintentional responsibility to the other is conceived not
as a limitation on the agent’s freedom of will but rather as the ground of
his freedom’s possibility outside itself (since the I does not ground itself ). As
Levinas says, ‘‘the other absolutely other—the Other—does not limit the
freedom of the same; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies
it.’’101 As in Kant’s moral philosophy, the agent’s free will is possible only
as already constrained by a categorical moral responsibility.102 Merold
Westphal’s summary of this point brings out its basic similarity to the duty
of neighbor-love in the Judeo-Christian tradition:
He [Levinas] is claiming that the face of the neighbor confronts us
not as a contractual proposal to be negotiated, but as an unconditional obligation. It is unconditional in that its validity depends in no
way either upon our agreeing to accept it or in the Other’s doing
something to evoke or merit our compliance.103
This is correct; as Levinas emphasizes, ‘‘The will is free to assume this
responsibility in whatever sense it likes; it is not free to refuse this responsibility itself.’’104 Even when violating our duty, Levinas believes we are unintentionally acknowledging it. As Jeffrey Kosky says, for Levinas, ‘‘The self
is elect insofar as in responsibility it is chosen for or assigned to itself
before being free to choose or commit itself to responsibility.’’105
Levinas describes this unconditional responsibility for the other person,
of which their ‘‘Face’’ is the revelation, as a ‘‘metaphysical desire for the
absolutely other.’’106 It so happens that Levinas’s choice of terms is singularly unfortunate for my purposes; for, as we have seen, the word ‘‘desire’’
and its cognates inevitably connote the kind of magnetic attraction toward
completion that Levinas believes can never reach alterity. Yet, in fact, what
Levinas means by ‘‘metaphysical Desire’’ is precisely a non-orektic type of
motivation, a practical end-directedness that is not a conatus in the usual
sense of being drawn toward objects to satisfy itself. Like Nygren describing agapē, Levinas characterizes his ‘‘metaphysical Desire’’ specifically by
contrast with Plato’s lack model of erosiac appetition, which, as we saw,
Levinas extends even to speculative cognition:
The other metaphysically desired is not ‘‘other’’ like the bread I eat,
the land in which I dwell, the landscape I contemplate. . . . I can
‘‘feed’’ on these realities and to a very great extent satisfy myself, as
though I had simply been lacking them. Their alterity is thereby reabsorbed
into my own identity as a thinker or possessor. The metaphysical
desire tends towards something else entirely, towards the absolutely
other. . . . As commonly interpreted need would be at the basis of
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desire; desire would characterize a being indigent and incomplete. . . .
It would coincide with a consciousness of what has been lost, a longing for return. But thus it would not even suspect what the veritably
other is. The metaphysical desire does not long to return.107
The ‘‘customary analysis of desire’’ that Levinas describes here comes
straight from Plato’s Symposium (though Levinas also distinguishes his own
unique sense of ‘‘eros’’ that is neither Platonic eros nor agapic response to
the Face).108 Metaphysical Desire, then, is distinct from all erosiac forms of
causality, intentionality, or motivation, which Levinas portrays as violent in
a quasi-Kantian sense: ‘‘the fabrication of a thing, the satisfaction of a need,
the desire and even the knowledge of an object’’ use alterior realities as a
means to self-satisfaction or completion.109
This claim is hardly uncontroversial. William Desmond, for example,
objects that ‘‘a teleology of desire’’ does not ‘‘necessitate a totalitarian tyranny of the self over otherness.’’110 This is fair insofar as Levinas’s references to ‘‘violence’’ suggest material egoism. But Levinas’s claim is really
that we are capable of motives that transcend formal egoism, while Desmond seems to remain locked in the erosiac model.111 For he asserts that
without ends that can attract and thus cause desire, ‘‘There would be purely
inert being, wanting nothing.’’112 Desmond does not reduce all motivation
to ‘‘pure bodily urge,’’ or D1 desire, but he does see the development of
the self as primarily an erosiac process.113 Levinas’s conception of moral
motivation is a radical challenge to this kind of Hegelian picture.
Levinas explains his problematic language of ‘‘metaphysical desire’’ in an
early essay that confirms that this terminology was inspired by the view that
the late Plato discovered a non-erosiac kind of motivation that was already
intimated in ‘‘the transcendence of the Good with respect to Being’’ in the
Republic:114
In the ‘‘Canticle of the Columns,’’ Valéry speaks of a ‘‘faultless desire.’’ He is doubtless referring to Plato who, in his analysis of pure
pleasures, discovered an aspiration that is conditioned by no prior
lack.115 We are taking up this term desire; to a subject turned to itself
. . . we are opposing the desire for the other which proceeds from a
being already gratified and in this sense independent, which does not
desire for itself. It is the need of him who no longer has needs. . . .
The desire for the other, sociality, is born in a being that lacks nothing, or, more exactly, it is born over and beyond all that can be lacking
or that can satisfy him. . . . The movement towards the other, instead
of completing me and contenting me, implicates me in a conjuncture
which in a way did not concern me—what was I looking for here?116

................. 16406$

$CH9

05-23-07 10:56:51

PS

PAGE 311

312

Will as Commitment and Resolve

Here again Levinas clearly contrasts our original ethical motivation to care
for the other with all forms of ‘‘desire’’ in the erosiac sense, in which the
agent wants his end to restore an equilibrium by making up for a perceived
lack in his well-being (see chap. 4, sec. 2, of this volume). Instead, he
thinks of metaphysical Desire in specifically Neoplatonic terms as a kind
of overflowing of an agent who (in this motive at least) needs nothing for herself
but goes freely out of herself toward an end that she was not drawn to
realize by any prior apprehension of an imperfection that the end would
remedy. As he claims in Totality and Infinity, ‘‘Alongside of needs whose satisfaction amounts to filling a void, Plato catches sight also of aspirations that
are not preceded by suffering and lack, and in which we recognize the
pattern of Desire: the need of him who lacks nothing.’’117
In another essay, Levinas explains that he talks about the infinity of
metaphysical Desire ‘‘to mark the propulsion, the inflation, of this beyond’’
since it is
opposed to the affectivity of love and the indigence of need. Outside
of the hunger one satisfies, the thirst one quenches and the senses
one allays, exists the other, absolutely other, desired beyond these
satisfactions. . . . This desire is unquenchable, not because it answers
to an infinite hunger, but because it does not call for food. This
desire without satisfaction hence takes cognizance of the alterity of
the other.118
This formula is repeated in Totality and Infinity: ‘‘Insatiable Desire—not
because it corresponds to an infinite hunger, but because it is not an appeal
for food.’’119 This opaque phrasing may be partly due to Lacan’s related
notion of desire for otherness, which still conceives desire as a consciousness of absence, but one that can never be filled. As Darius Sleszynski
summarizes, ‘‘In Lacanian psychoanalysis, that toward which desire is ‘directed’ has paradoxically a structure of a document of lack. Contrary to
needs, desire is never satiated, [always] unfulfilled: it is an eternal call to
existence. Desire renews itself.’’120
This in turn reminds one of Heidegger’s claim that, as Ben Vedder puts
it, ‘‘For Dasein, not-having and lacking are structural’’ or essential to our
entire practical attitude as ‘‘being after something.’’ Heidegger means that
human beings are essentially purposive or volitional beings, and it is unfortunate that he puts this in erosiac terms implying that ‘‘lacking, deprivation,
and need is inherent in Dasein.’’121 But like Lacan, Heidegger holds that
Dasein is essentially open to new purposes and hence ‘‘can never be regarded as complete and realized.’’122 This rules out any eudaimonist conception of our formal telos, but this negation is not enough to get us to the
projective model. For it is also compatible with a Hobbesian view that we
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have no telos but only indefinitely extendable activity moved by insatiable
hunger for power. By valuing the possible over the actual, Heidegger means
to suggest a nonconsumptive relation to alterity.123 But he falls into Nygren’s error of assuming that if we focus on realizing goals rather than contemplating them as possible and letting them be, then we must be seeking
to possess them in order to complete ourselves. By contrast, projective motivation is the idea of a non-erosiac striving toward ends.
Hence the language of ‘‘insatiable Desire’’ can be misleading in Levinas
and other Continental philosophers. By metaphysical ‘‘Desire,’’ Levinas
means something closely related to volitional striving or projection in my
existential sense, in which we devote ourselves to someone or something
for reasons unrelated to any contribution it might make to our well-being.
The volitional capacity to become so motivated is in one relevant sense
unquenchable because through it, we can acquire ever new ends. Since their
acquisition does not arise from a sense of lack wanting fulfillment, success
does not limit the generation and maintenance of projective motivation.
Levinas means something like this when he writes that ‘‘It is a desire that
cannot be satisfied . . . it desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is thus like goodness—the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it.’’124
Yet one could misread this as meaning that Levinas still has in mind a
kind of mystical eros for an object with which we can never completely
join, whose pursuit must ever continue (like the painted lovers in Keat’s
‘‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’’). Levinas indicates that metaphysical Desire does
not seek union with the Divine but is rather ‘‘a generosity nourished by the
Desired, and thus a relationship that is not a disappearance of distance, not
a bringing together . . . for it nourishes itself, one might say, with its hunger.’’125 Levinas has in mind the idea that our responsibilities are openended, so our awareness of them expands the more we try to fulfill them.126
But the metaphor of food that makes us hungrier is not helpful: it risks
suggesting an ever-expanding eros, which sounds like a Dantean torture,
rather than providing any positive account of duty to the other as a motive.127 Rather than trying to turn eros against itself in a figure of speech, it
would have been much clearer for Levinas to say that he is proposing a
type of motivation that is non-desiderative altogether, and then to explain how
such motivation is possible.128
As I emphasized above, Levinas’s descriptions of metaphysical Desire
are meant not only to contrast it with Platonic eros but also to associate it
positively with agapē (as conceived by Nygren). Although metaphysical
Desire is first and foremost the revelation of a duty to love the other—a
duty to which we freely respond in different ways—Levinas describes this
involuntary experience of categorical obligation as if it were itself a kind of
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neighbor-love. Thus he calls it ‘‘A Desire perfectly disinterested—
goodness. . . . For the presence before a face, my orientation toward the
Other, can lose the avidity proper to the gaze only by turning into generosity.’’129 This sounds like a love pure even of formal self-interest, unselfish
generosity as opposed even to eudaimonistic self-realization.130 As Levinas
puts it later, the ‘‘proximity’’ or relation of the self for-the-other ‘‘is a for of
total gratuity, breaking with interest.’’131 He even refers to the responsibility
that requires substitution of oneself for another—the sacrifice of one’s subjectivity—as ‘‘love without eros.’’132 Such a responsibility ‘‘to answer for
the other is, perhaps, the harsh name of love.’’133
Similarly, near the end of his famous essay on ‘‘Ethics as First Philosophy,’’ Levinas describes our originary sense of responsibility for other persons as ‘‘love without concupiscence.’’ In another essay, Levinas describes
this as ‘‘the binding separation known by the well-worn name of love.’’134
He repeatedly emphasizes that the face-to-face relation in which my responsibility is revealed to me has the same structure that Derrida finds in an
ideal (or, for him, ‘‘impossible’’) gift beyond all ‘‘economy,’’ self-interested
contract, or expectation of a return.135
Nevertheless an experience of responsibility cannot by itself really constitute generosity, disinterested care, or agapic regard. For, as Levinas says
explicitly, in response to ‘‘the gaze of the stranger, the widow, and the
orphan . . . I am free to give or refuse.’’136 By contrast, metaphysical Desire
in Levinas’s account is primarily a sense of responsibility, a ‘‘mauvaise conscience’’ not arising from any action or intention, an originary guilt that
gives us Socrates’ ‘‘capacity to fear injustice more than death, to prefer
to suffer than to commit injustice.’’137 The analogy comparing this
nonoptional moral call itself with the best optional agapic response to it
threatens to obscure the crucial distinction between projective resolve or commitment of the self and the projective motive’s prior ground or rational basis.
Insufficient clarity about this distinction in turn leads Levinas into the
same error that we identified in Nygren’s analysis: (1) Levinas imagines that
for a motive-state to have a grounding reason must be for it to derive from
the attractiveness of its end; (2) but since the latter is ruled out in nonerosiac motives, these must arise without any basis in values subject to the
agent’s rational judgment. The mistaken first premise is evident when Levinas suggests that since metaphysical Desire involves no erosiac ‘‘anticipation’’ of the Desired, ‘‘it goes towards it aimlessly,’’138 as if it has no goal at
all. This paradoxical conclusion would be unavoidable if every kind of value
that could be ‘‘anticipated’’ in an end or goal were the correlate of some
species of orektic desire. But if there are other kinds of values to be found in
some possible goals of human action, then these values may ground commitment to such goals without prior desire for these values. Without some experience of such a grounding value in an end (or in the process of pursuing
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it), metaphysical Desire would be just a blind and arbitrary thrust into
the void.
In fact, Levinas’s account avoids total arbitrariness by recognizing the
alterity of the other as a kind of ‘‘ground’’ for the agent’s projective response. In this sense, Levinas’s model is already superior to Nygren’s.139
However, the call of alterity is not treated as a practical reason (in the usual
sense) for setting oneself the task of serving the other’s good or respecting
the other’s dignity; instead, it is treated as exceeding our rational comprehension. Whether projective willing can be a nonarbitrary kind of response
to such a ‘‘transcendent’’ event is an intriguing question, but it is surely not
limited to this kind of ground. The existential theory of projective motivation provides a more rigorous and broader conception of Levinas’s basic
concept. For as we will see, ‘‘goodness’’ or ‘‘generosity’’ in the agapic sense
as selfless universal love is only one possible species of projective motivation.
Nor is it clear that every cognitive assessment of value in the other reduces
her uniqueness or does violence to her alterity, as Levinas thinks (see chap.
14, sec. 4, of this volume).
4.3. Levinas on the Will
I have suggested that Levinas’s language of superabundance is an apt expression for the phenomena of projective creativity in setting and pursuing new
ends. For, like Arendt, Buber, Tolkien, and others in the Judeo-Christian
countertradition, Levinas recognizes the volitional power of resolve—the
power to devote ourselves to tasks and projects whose ends are not proleptically anticipated as needed for our completion. In this sense, superabundant
motivation functions as if the agent needed nothing, overflowing into agenttranscending objects and goals rather than returning to the agent through
reference to his own needs, wants, or drive to self-realization (however
enlightened).
Levinas’s discussion of the will further demonstrates his place in this
genre of thought. It is in willing that we find the individual’s most intimate
reflexive relation with himself—his capacity to determine the motives on
which he acts: ‘‘When the will triumphs over its passions, it manifests itself
not only as the strongest passion [contra Hobbes] but as above all passion,
determining itself by itself, inviolable. But when it has succumbed, it reveals
itself to be exposed to influences.’’140
Like Butler and Kant, Levinas holds that the will can transcend all appetitive motivation. Thus the I ‘‘can sacrifice to its [metaphysical] Desire its
very happiness.’’141 But, in keeping with the existentialist emphasis on the
factical side of selfhood, Levinas emphasizes that the will characteristic of
persons is always exposed to violence from others, such as threats, pressure,
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coercion, manipulation, hatred that imposes suffering and reifies the will,
and even murder.142 Levinas acknowledges the Sartrean point that the will
is not absolutely determined by such attacks (and is in that sense ‘‘immune’’);143 yet as embodied, it can be influenced: ‘‘Violence recognizes, but
bends the will.’’144 Nor can courage in the face of death give me ultimate
independence from the other’s will.145 In a more general way too, our volitional activity is dependent on relations with others who take up the results
of our work and can by their own activity give a significance to our efforts
that we did not intend. As Levinas says:
this way a will plays in history a role it has not willed marks the
limits of interiority: the will finds itself caught up in events that will
appear only to the historian. . . .
The whole being of willing is hence not enacted within oneself.
The capacity of the independent I does not contain its own being.146
As John Llewelyn says, ‘‘Levinas located will in the lived body,’’ which
connects its works to a shared history in which others act on these works.147
Thus ‘‘the will, whereby a being wields itself . . . is by its work exposed to
the other.’’148 Yet its freedom is restored to the will, paradoxically, by its
being called beyond itself in absolute duty, in ‘‘will as Desire and Goodness
limited by nothing.’’149 It is the presence of nonoptional moral obligations
that allows freedom to be sovereign for the individual, since without this
metaphysical dependence, free choice is arbitrary.150 Yet this conception
does not avoid arbitrariness simply by reducing the will to reason; rather,
employing the Neoplatonic metaphor, Levinas says that will requires ‘‘the
idea of creation which, in God, exceeds a being eternally satisfied with
itself.’’151 Levinas conceives such purely creative motivation as neither simply cognitive nor affective in form but rather as having its own unique
structure that stands in between these two—like Plato’s ‘‘middle part of
the soul.’’
Occasionally, Levinas seems to portray volition more negatively as needdriven and egoistic. In contrast to Marx and Arendt, he does not see human
‘‘labor’’ (for example in building dwellings) as projective: ‘‘Labor characterizes not a freedom that has detached itself from being, but a will: a being
that is threatened, but has time at its disposal to ward off the threat.’’152
Here willing is conceived as Spinoza’s self-interested conatus ascendi: ‘‘To will
is to forestall danger.’’153 Unlike Martin Buber, who sees that a work can
have its own kind of alterity, Levinas does not clearly recognize the phenomena of projective motivation involved in the practices. When he writes
that ‘‘Every will separates from its work,’’ he means only that we are exposed to others in our works (as we saw above), not that we produce a
work purely for a value distinct from our good.154 Similarly, he is suspicious

................. 16406$

$CH9

05-23-07 10:56:54

PS

PAGE 316

Divine and Human Creativity: From Plato to Levinas

317

that in equating autonomous will with reason, Kant’s ideal Kingdom of
Ends reduces all others to identical abstract minds whose difference is
found only in their separate interests: ‘‘The so-called animal principle of
happiness, ineluctable in the description of the will, even taken as practical
reason, maintains pluralism in the society of minds.’’155 Here Levinas probably meant that the desire for happiness is an ineluctable element in Kant’s
description of the human will, not his own. Still, Levinas has sometimes
been misread as equating all willing with violence, bringing him into agreement with Luther and ‘‘paradigmatically Eastern’’ thinking.
It easy to see how this misreading gets started. After all, the ‘‘revelation’’
of alterity, or the Face, is distinguished by our radical passivity; this ‘‘manifestation Kαθ αυτ consists in a being telling itself to us independently of
every position we would have taken in its regard . . . it is present as directing
this very manifestation.’’156 Thus our engrossment in our own projects is
broken by this transcendent ‘‘experience’’ of direct contact by what exists
independently of our will. We are no longer in control, directing our attention where we like; rather, we are gripped by a revelation in which our
mind does not actively disclose anything, as it does in all other conscious
experience.
This may sound a lot like the passivity of receiving grace on the Lutheran model (see chap. 2, sec. 2), with its rejection of all human initiative
or assertiveness as willfulness, pride, or misappropriation. But this reading
is wrong: Levinas not only rejects predestinarian providence as a totalizing
scheme; he also recognizes the possibility of ‘‘a will that is not egoist,’’
whose agent is not ‘‘the I of need,’’ whose desire ‘‘is for the other.’’157 He
insists that ‘‘when I maintain an ethical relation’’ with another, I am actively
doing something in a story of which I am at least part-author, and he denies
that this is willful, hubris or ‘‘diabolical pride.’’158 For the will is active—
and in a founded sense, even autonomous—not only in violating the other’s
interests but also in responding to the neighbor with love: ‘‘In the welcoming of the face[,] the will opens to reason.’’159 The ‘‘rational’’ rightly understood for Levinas is a discursive relation with others in their plural alterity,
not a comprehension of the universal. Finally, without the ‘‘inner life’’ or
subjectivity that the will governs, there could be no recognition of the other’s infinity, or genuine plurality;160 for without will, I would just be an
extension of the other.
Someone may still object that while Levinas equates metaphysical Desire
with an involuntary obligation, a duty that is the very ground of possibility
of agency, my prior sketch of projective motivation described it not only
as voluntary but even as involving agent-control over motivation itself. But
my claim is not that the will is active in the originary revelation of responsibility. I agree with Levinas that agapic love, like all forms of projective
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motivation, requires recognition of an involuntary or unchosen ground or
basis (other than appeal to preexistent desires). This is the grounding thesis
that I defend in all the subsequent chapters of this work. Levinas believes
the agent’s response to this involuntary call to the ‘‘Face’’ can be purely motivated precisely because its ground is a categorical imperative. Hence metaphysical Desire plays the same role in Levinas’s account as the ‘‘inclination
to justice’’ in Scotus’s account (see chap. 11); this call to justice, which is
itself involuntary, is the basis for the will’s freedom to pursue ends not given
to it by the intellect’s apprehension of objects as ‘‘good for itself.’’ And just
like Scotus, who writes about this ground as if it were itself a motive and
who characterizes this motive in nonteleological terms, Levinas transfers the
structure of projective love of neighbor back into his description of the
absolute ethical duty that grounds and makes agapē possible.
Hence the only substantive differences between Levinas’s position and
my own are that (a) my existential conception is clearer about the distinction between the alterity of agent-transcending values and the projective
motives they ground; and (b) I have generalized the category of projective
motives to include devotion to a whole range of ends other than the neighbor-as-Face. Agapē is only the most important species of this genus. The
latter difference brings my existential account of striving will closer to the
phenomenological realist school. As Norris Clarke writes, Scheler and von
Hildebrande held that as an agent, I can respond to a wide range of aesthetic and ethical values ‘‘for their own sake, not just for what enjoyment
they give to me.’’161 Gabriel Marcel writes that ‘‘the proper function of the
subject is to emerge from itself and realize itself primarily in the gift of
oneself and in various forms of creativity.’’162 Like Levinas, Marcel sees free
response to the appeal of an other as a paradigm occasion for such ‘‘selfdonation,’’ but he also recognizes the same self-transcendence in the context
of vocation or devotion to creative work.163 Similarly, John Crosby comes
close to Levinas’s idea of the unique and unrepeatable character of the
neighbor, but without limiting self-transcendence to moral motivation in
response to the basic dignity of the individual.164
Although I cannot do justice to the phenomenological realists here,165
this tradition provides an important precedent for opening up the category
of alterity to include nonmoral grounds for volitional striving.
5. The General Structure of Projective Motivation
We can now return to the point where chapter 3 left off after introducing
projective motivation as a type of willing. For we are finally in a position
to give a more rigorous formal definition of what projective motivation
must be, if it exists. One need not believe in the superabundant generosity
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of a perfect creator to see that agapic love, divine or human, provides both
an ideal counterexample to the erosiac model and a paradigm case through
which the structure of projective motivation can be made clear, in contrast
with the ‘‘lack structure’’ of orektic motivation. The claim that there are
instances of non-erosiac motivation means that a human agent can be motivated to pursue ends because she has given herself these ends or adopted these
goals as her own rather than because she is drawn by their preexisting appeal
or their anticipated contribution to her well-being.
In this largely uncharted structure that I call volitional ‘‘projection,’’166
the motivation is caused not by the intentional object but rather by the
agent actively taking up this object or state of affairs as the goal of his
actions. That is why I have said that such motivation is essentially purposive, arising in the formation of specific intentions (chap. 3, sec. 3.4). Irrespective of any prior need for the intended end (or any prepurposive desire
for it to fill a felt absence in his well-being), the agent takes an interest in it.
As Peter Bertocci argues, ‘‘the quality of purposive activity that a person
undergoes as a feeling-wanting agent must be differentiated from the quality of purposeful experience whereby he organizes his feelings and wants in
accordance with some consciously held goal.’’167 For agency to be ‘‘purposeful’’ in this sense, its goal cannot not be fixed as the agent’s goal or practical
object without her participation, both in forming the intention to act and
in shaping the motivation that endures in that intention.
Lest the paradigm case of divine creativity mislead us, however, it is
important to note that projective motivation is not defined as ‘‘freely created’’ in a libertarian sense and it is certainly not conceived as formed for
no reason at all. As Bertocci suggests, ‘‘will-agency does not occur within a
vacuum . . . [since] the person at choice-point confronts habits, attitudes,
traits within his acquired nature,’’168 which influence both his projection of
new goals and his ability to muster willpower in pursuit of ends already
intended. Moreover, projective striving characteristically involves rational
considerations. Like D3 desires, projective motivation usually has ‘‘reasons’’
in the sense of judgments with objective purport. As we saw in the critique
of Aristotle, D3 desires involve an evaluation of the object or goal of possible
action as ‘‘good’’ in the sense of contributing to our well-being or proper
functioning, broadly understood. By contrast, the judgments underlying volitional projections evaluate the agent-neutral worthiness or value of projecting this or that as an end itself—an evaluation that does not depend (solely)
on whether this end satisfies a want or contributes to the completion of the
agent’s well-being. Hence volitional projection is a conative or motivational
state of tendency toward an end, which is nevertheless not teleological or
‘‘broadly desiderative’’ in any substantive sense. For as Pink argues, ‘‘Desire
formation, characteristically, is passive passion, not active action,’’169
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whereas projection is enacted, actively formed motivation that informs particular intentions or plans of action.170
For example, suppose I have motivated myself to work out a philosophical problem through committing myself to this task, or projecting its solution as my end. The intrinsic importance of the problem furnishes reasons
for this, but these reasons do not cause a prior attraction to this end. Before
making the solution my goal, I do not believe that my well-being will be
less without the solution to this question—or if I do believe this for other
reasons, and so conceive a D3 desire for the solution, my projecting the
solution as my aim is independent of this desire or at least overdetermines
my interest in this project. In most other respects, the motivation formed
by projective striving functions like a desire; for example, it leads me to
form various specific intentions, such as to read an article on the topic in
order that I might better understand the problem I am tackling. But the
motivation does not have the ‘‘lack structure’’ of an erosiac desire: to put it
in dynamic metaphors, the motive originates from the agent ‘‘pushing’’ the
goal out in front of her rather than by a beguiling prospect ‘‘pulling’’ her
toward it.
This distinction between erosiac desires and projective motives can be
framed more rigorously in terms of familiar distinctions in ‘‘direction of
fit.’’ As we saw in chapter 4, Section 1.2, the dominant belief-desire distinction in contemporary action theory makes it appear that cognitive and conative functions are mutually exclusive, since no single state could involve
both without having contradictory directions of fit. But volitional states as
essentially purposive motives are like Platonic thumos and Aristotelian rational appetite in respect of being both cognitive and conative in structure; as
we saw, the Aristotelian composite version of the middle soul avoids this
paradox by distinguishing the rational judgment of value, the attraction to
it in D3 desire, and the choices it motivates. For example, John McDowell
argues that ‘‘a genuinely cognitive capacity can yield at most part of a reason
for acting; something appetitive is needed as well.’’ He distinguishes these
in terms of direction of fit: ‘‘How one’s will is disposed is a fact about
oneself; whereas a genuinely cognitive faculty discloses how the world is . . .
independently of one’s will.’’171 ‘‘Will’’ is conceived here as the appetitive
element, boulēsis. But the existential conception of striving will as self-motivating resolve or determination suggests instead an indivisible psychic state
of motivation that is formed along with one’s intentions or plans of action.
To make sense of this, we have to see that the traditional belief-desire
distinction that McDowell employs here is too simplistic: it considers only
the direction of fit between the intentional content and reality or the world and
fails to consider the relation between the agent of the intentional state and
the content intended. Even though philosophers of mind typically recognize
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the important distinction between a state of believing or desiring and the
content believed or desired, the idea that this relation also has two directions of fit has not been sufficiently considered in action theory. Yet there
is a direction-of-fit distinction to be drawn at the agent-content level, as
well as at the content-world level. The erosiac conception of desire is effectively a theory of the agent-content fit in conative intentions; as we have
seen, classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle recognized the agent’s
being ‘‘drawn’’ or fit to the content wanted as the distinctive mark of desire.
Of course, as Aristotle’s distinction between speculative and practical
attitudes shows, they also recognized the anticipation of fitting the actual
world to the content wanted (or changing reality to fit the agent’s desire)
as the mark distinguishing desire from speculative belief—but this was less
central in their analysis than the ‘‘lack structure’’ or teleological agent-content
fit, which they saw as essential to desires of all kinds (appetites, passions,
or rational desires). In all forms of orexis, the agent’s motivation is fitted to
the content desired (either by the brute ‘‘pull’’ of delicious appearance or
by being drawn toward an objectively judged potential good for the agent).
In diagramming this with triangular arrows to indicate direction of fit (e.g.,
x 䉯 y), the element at the base of the triangle (x) is the one moved or
changed to agree with, or fit, the element at the tip of the triangle (y). Thus
orektic desires have the following schematic form:
Erosiac Desire:

Agent

䉯

Content

䉰

Factual World

The agent is drawn toward the content that attracts her (as final cause or
telos) and is thus motivated to change the world so as to actualize this
desired content, that is, to satisfy her desire.
Despite their doxic (non-conative) content-world fit, factual beliefs are
like desires in their agent-content fit. Hence classical models of knowledge
emphasize the idea that the world ‘‘pulls’’ the mind’s fact-tracking sensitivities into agreement with it, into correspondence with ‘‘the way things are.’’
If this is right, then beliefs are not usually under our direct voluntary control. Plato and Aristotle exploited this similarity to emphasize the links
between desire and beliefs about the human good. As with original (or
nonderivative) desiring, the agent’s believing some content seems to be passively directed by objects or states of affairs in the world impinging on her
belief-forming faculties, which consider different contents eligible for belief
in light of all sorts of evidence. Hence beliefs and judgments have the
following schema:
Factual Belief:

Agent
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By contrast, volitional projection is unlike both belief and desire in its agentcontent direction of fit; in projection, the intended content is ‘‘fitted to’’ or
guided by the agent’s active intending of it, rather than the reverse. In other
words, the agent voluntarily causes this object to become his end or goal, or
to become the intentional content of a purposive motive. Hence we have
the following structure:
Projective Motive:

Agent

䉰

Content

䉰

Factual World

While differing from erosiac desires in agent-content fit, then, projective
motives (or ‘‘projects,’’ for short) share their conative (or non-doxic) direction of fit in the content-world relation.
We can now link this to our preliminary sketch (at the end of chapter
3) of projective motivation as the psychological concept required to explain
the existential interpretation of heroic striving will. Like all orektic states
of motivation, projects can guide the formation of more particular intentions to act. However, because the agent causes the relevant state of affairs
(apprehended first as a potential goal) to become his actual objective or
end, the formation of such a motive-state is an act of second-order agency
in Pink’s sense; like decision, and unlike prepurposive appetites and wishes,
it will always-already constitute a formed intention of the agent. Prepurposive motives that can simply happen to us without necessarily being taken
up into intended purposes must have the passive agent-content fit of erosiac
desires. Since projective motives have the opposite agent-content fit, they
cannot involuntarily happen to us and thus they cannot be prepurposive;
rather, they are essentially volitional motives embodied in actual intentions.
Hence ‘‘projects’’ is an apt abbreviation for these states, since they always
constitute commitments to pursue some projected end. ‘‘Projects,’’ in my
existential sense, are commitments to tasks the agent has set herself, not
mere yearnings on which she may or may not decide to act.
With two types of fit relations, each having two possible directions,
there are naturally four possible permutations, three of which have turned
out to match recognized and hypothesized psychic states. For the sake of
completeness, we should ask if it is also possible to project intentional contents that have doxic or cognitive content-world fit. Perhaps this provides
one interesting way of interpreting states of faith and their difference from
ordinary beliefs (as well as explaining some of the intuitive resistance to
accepting the involuntariness of all ‘‘beliefs’’):
Projective Faith:

Agent

䉰

Content

䉯

Factual World

Projects are active in the same way as states of faith so conceived; they
differ only in their content-world fit, since states of faith are appropriately
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about reality as it is taken on faith to be (actually or possibly, now or in
the future); moreover, faith is usually about states of affairs that we cannot
do anything about and so cannot will or give ourselves as intention-guiding
ends for action.172 We may be able to act in response to faith beliefs,173 but
this will require some further D3 or projective motive based on such states
of faith. In this respect, states of faith have a doxic function, while projects
have a conative one. But both are actively undertaken by the agent and both
have cognitive significance in the distinct sense that they will reflect or
express the agent’s reasons or grounds for such an undertaking. Projective
motives share this feature of making an objective validity claim about value
with their closest conative relative, namely D3 desires.174
This points to the importance of another problem: namely, where to
place evaluative judgments in this scheme. The difference between evaluative and factual judgments raises large questions that cannot be solved with
the distinctions I have drawn alone. A natural way of diagramming the
structure of evaluative judgments would distinguish them from factual beliefs by giving them the conative world-content fit and would distinguish
them from projects and faith by making the agent passive in respect to
them. The problem is that this results in the same structure as erosiac desire.
If we do not think that evaluative beliefs necessarily motivate (even prepurposively), then we might instead diagram evaluative beliefs just like factual
beliefs, replacing the factual world with the ideal world. The problem with
this is that part of the content of evaluative beliefs seems to be that the real
world should approach the ideal. I suggest the following way of capturing
this additional complexity:
Evaluative Belief: Agent 䉯 Content 䉯 Ideal World 䉰 Factual World

However, this may not sufficiently capture the idea that this complex content of evaluative beliefs is itself guided by a ‘‘world’’ of values (whose
metaphysical status will be relevant here). Nor does it capture the idea that
judgments are more active than mere beliefs.
This is only a sketch of how to conceive evaluative beliefs but it is
sufficient to support the direction-of-fit analysis used above in clarifying
how projective motivation can be conative without being desiderative and
how it can respond to—or be guided by—considerations the agent has other
than those that typically arouse some type of appetite in him or draw him
toward the apprehended content. In a volitional project, the agent’s motivational thrust toward the goal she has set for herself is not explained in
terms of any kind of prior attraction to it, for example, because of its perceived power to satisfy preferences, or its inherent value for her well-being,
or its instrumental value for either of these. Rather, the agent’s projective
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motivation to pursue her task (which may vary in strength) is explained by
her determination to make it her end and by the reasons that inform this
projective uptake. For volitional projection never occurs arbitrarily, even if
the considerations on which it is based are not easily introspected or completely conscious.
For example, I have (what appear to me to be) rational grounds for
determining myself to solve my philosophical question: for example, the
question is inherently important and has major implications for ethics, a
commitment to pursuing it is noble and potentially enlightening even if the
question is not adequately resolved, and so on.175 Similarly, perhaps the
needs of other persons can give me grounds for projecting a goal for myself
without any prior desire for this goal or for any other end to which this
goal is instrumental. But if so, then my reasons for setting myself a task
concerning someone else’s well-being are not considerations that connect
with concern for my well-being or foster any desire, even of the D3 kind.
Such cases, if plausible, allow us to isolate volitional projection from other,
familiar forms of prepurposive motivation, namely D1-D3 states. If we add
in the considerations that ground projective motivation, the structure looks
like this:
Projective Motive:

Agent

䉰

Content

䉰

Factual World

⊥
⊥
Grounding evaluative reasons

I include two symbols for the grounding relation, because the reasons that
the agent considers can count in favor of the agent’s goal-content directly
or in favor of the process of pursuing this goal. This structure is related to
the diagrams for noble friendship and the practices in chapter 8, although
we have to add in single-line arrows for intention and double-line arrows
for side effect goods to make this relation clear:

Projective Motive:

By-product Benefits
⇑
Agent
→
䉰
Content
⊥
⊥
Grounding evaluative reasons

䉰

Factual World

This final formulation includes all the key elements of projective motivation in a single schematic representation. Philia, agapic love, creative work,
and striving for excellence in a practice are all instances of this general
structure.
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The cases discussed in this chapter, beginning with the idea of a divine
creator who lacks nothing, were introduced simply as illustrations of projective motivation or possible examples in which we can easily discern the
non-erosiac structure of the striving will. To the extent that they are plausible or believable cases, they help establish the crucial premise 4 of the
existential core argument (chap. 4, sec. 1.2).176 The analysis of moral motivation, the ‘‘will to meaning,’’ caring, and aretaic commitment in chapters
12 and 13 add even stronger evidence for this premise. My positive argument for the existence of projective motivation is both phenomenological
and open-ended, since it depends on adding further examples and arguing
that the existential interpretation best explains them.
In the next chapter, I argue that the projective model of willing solves
two more long-standing difficulties for eudaimonist moral psychology;
namely, the problem of adequately accounting for (1) the phenomena of
radical evil; and (2) other experiences of ‘‘strength of will.’’ My discussion
of these problems is not meant to be exhaustive or definitive but only to
illustrate the relevance of the existential conception of willing to these familiar problems and to clarify further the notion of projective motivation.

................. 16406$

$CH9

05-23-07 10:56:59

PS

PAGE 325

10
Radical Evil and Projective Strength of Will

Overview. This chapter critiques psychological eudaimonism from
another direction, arguing that it cannot explain the reality of several
types of ‘‘radical evil’’—by which I mean not heinous crimes but
willing negative goals, including certain kinds of harm (small or large)
for their own sake. The discussion begins with Aristotle and ends
with Aquinas and Kierkegaard, but the middle sections present a new
existential analysis of distinct levels of evil motivation with literary
examples. The discussion presupposes familiar distinctions in normative ethics and is not a contribution to moral theory so much as an
attempt to face the real volitional strength of evil in its darkest truth.
While the beginning and ending sections assume some familiarity
with eudaimonist diagnoses of vice, the middle sections should be
universally accessible to general readers.
1. Why Eudaimonism Misses Virtue and Vice in Their Most Radical
Forms
The idea that actions can be chosen purely for the sake of harm or wickedness has been rejected for different reasons in ancient, medieval, modern,
and contemporary philosophy. This chapter critiques such attempts to rule
out such ‘‘radical evil’’ and confronts them with motives whose malice does
not consist in the mere absence of the appropriate goodness or justice.
1.1. Aristotle’s Apollonian View of Virtue as a ‘‘Mean’’
It is famously one of the implications of eudaimonist moral psychology in
its classical forms that vice or ethical corruption of the psyche consists
primarily in either ignorance of the good (Plato) or inordinate desires for
external goods resulting from intemperate sense appetites and passions for
326
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status and worldly success (Aristotle). These motivational problems at best
necessitate self-control (enkrateia) to keep them in check or (worse) lead to
unethical action via ‘‘weakness of will,’’ or akrasia. This idea is connected to
Aristotle’s famous doctrine of virtues as ‘‘mean’’ or intermediate states of
motivation, with its strikingly ‘‘Apollonian’’ rather than ‘‘Dionysian’’ construal of good character as a kind of balance (to use Nietzsche’s famous
contrast). Although suggestions of the striving will appear in Aristotle’s
accounts of courage and magnanimity, they are largely suppressed in a
model that acknowledges only practical reason aiming at the agent’s good
(including joint communal goods) and trained sentiments of the sense appetite as springs of controlled action.
This is unsurprising, since Aristotle’s view is that human beings fail to
recognize and pursue the good as they ought primarily because they overvalue
those material rewards, powers, entertainments, and sensual pleasures craved
by the lowest part of the soul—so vice consists in inordinate desire for
those goods that constitute the part of our well-being most subject to luck
and fortune. And this idea in turn derives directly from Socrates and the
Eastern tradition in which striving will is condemned, although this view is
reconceived in various ways by Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics, Augustine,
and Aquinas. In all these authors, the impression persists that the key ingredient in the recipe for happiness in the holistic sense, or distinctively human
flourishing, is to control the appetites and passions; this becomes the primary function of the moral virtues. Their ideal, as Bonnie Kent says, ‘‘is to bring
one’s passions into harmony with one’s values, so that, having acquired
virtue, it becomes easy and pleasant to do what one should.’’1
Against this background, it is not hard to see why Freud took the moral
training or habituation of our psyche to be a matter of generating an Ego
to suppress the Id. Of course, even for Plato and Augustine, the choices of
a morally virtuous person would not be those of a passionless reasoner.
Rather, as we already saw in discussing Aristotle’s ‘‘intellectual appetite’’
(chap. 4, sec. 3.3), practical choice requires motivation that comes from
desires, but these must be modified to follow enlightened practical judgments about the objective good. This model therefore sees the primary proximate cause of ethically ignoble actions as the influence of untrained passions
and animal appetites that resist rational desire in the self-controlled (enkratic) man and overwhelm rational desire in the weak-willed (akratic) man.2
Yet against this, there is the well-known objection: some prohairetic acts of
‘‘choice’’ are wrong not because of recalcitrant D1 or D2 appetites that
oppose D3 desire (boulēsis) but rather because the rational evaluation on
which D3 deliberation or disposition is based is ‘‘corrupted.’’3 To the extent
that Aristotle recognizes this possibility, he seems to suggest that such bad
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judgment would itself result from prior akratic acts, making the agent responsible for his misjudgment of a bad end as noble or as that by which
‘‘he will get what is best.’’4
However, it can hardly be said that Aristotle’s focus is on this possibility
of corrupt boulēsis or D3 desires for ends based on erroneous judgments
about their good; rather, his account implies that the main difference between virtuous and either incontinent or vicious actions is largely a function
of whether or not the agent’s bouletic wishes (rational evaluative desires)
are able to shape and control lower sorts of motive-states so they always
agree with, follow, or support practical reason. As Broadie argues, Aristotle’s virtuous agent not only acts on but even forms correct practical judgments in part because his feelings and sentiments have been trained to
motivate ‘‘intermediate’’ actions; the ‘‘discriminating emotional reaction’’ in
moral virtue thus helps in ‘‘hold[ing] the ring against potentially unbalancing impulses, so that a patterned response has the chance to crystallize’’5
rather than being overwhelmed by chaotic appetites and passions. Aristotle’s conception of virtue as a whole thus takes his notion of temperance as
its model: the virtuous person is one whose practical reason has colonized
her pathē and epithumia (lower appetites), reforming them in its own image.
As Broadie insightfully explains, this colonization of sentiment and emotional dispositions is essential to ‘‘choice’’ in the sense of prohairesis:
what characterizes a prohairetic state (as distinct from, say, a skill) is
that it shows itself in the agent’s acting and failing to act because of
his feelings. . . . if we do assess someone as a bad performer on the
basis of a performance which we know fell short because of fear, lust
or anger, then we are assessing his quality as a prohairetic agent. Emotional excitements, like physical handicaps, tend to excuse the craftsman, in the sense that his skill is not impugned by performances
spoilt by these conditions. But while the prohairetic agent may thus be
excused by physical handicaps, he is not as a rule [excused] by emotions, pleasures and pains . . . it is, Aristotle thinks, the proper business of the prohairetic agent to be in whatever emotional condition is
necessary for him to function well.6
In short, the prohairetic orthos logos is ‘‘the type of logos whose formation
and execution is potentially supported or threatened’’ by the ‘‘basic feelings
and impulses which everybody has’’ in the nonrational part of their soul.7
This is related to the problematic notion of ‘‘virtue as a mean,’’ because:
a virtuous person is dispositionally neither too fearful nor too cautious, cares about wealth, pleasure, the opinion of others, etc., neither
too much nor too little, to make the right responses to particular
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situations. It is not that the right responses are themselves intermediate, although Aristotle, as we have seen, falls into this way of thinking
at times; but rather virtue itself is a disposition [of choice] such that
whoever has it is protected from excesses and deficiencies of feeling
and impulse that lead to the faulty particular responses.8
In other words, Aristotle diagnoses the main species of vicious action as
resulting from excessive or deficient amounts or kinds of the feelings, sentiments, passions, and impulses relative to those that ought naturally to be
experienced in the agent’s situation. The agent either acts from sudden
passion or fails to feel the emotions she ought to feel. Aristotle’s doctrine
depends on the truth of this claim.
Virtually the same conclusion is reached by J. O. Urmson in his account
of Aristotle’s mean: ‘‘in the case of excellence of character both emotions
and actions are in a mean, whatever that signifies; in the case of self-control
[enkrateia], actions, but not emotions, are in a mean; in the case of bad
character neither actions nor emotions are in a mean.’’9 By reviewing several
unacceptable interpretations, Urmson argues convincingly that Aristotle is
not proposing an independent sense of ‘‘intermediate’’ actions or sentiments
as a definition of the noble. Certainly, ‘‘moderate’’ instances of a particular
emotion are often inappropriate to the situation. Rather, ‘‘Aristotle holds
excellence of character to be a mean or intermediate disposition regarding
emotions and actions, not that it is a disposition toward mean or intermediate emotions and actions.’’10 In other words, the concept of a noble act is
more fundamental than the concept of a ‘‘mean’’ state; emotional dispositions are then defined as intermediate, or between excess and deficiency,
because they motivate noble action conceived as what the practically wise
man will recognize as the right act in the situation.11
This analysis implies that vicious acts result from motives that are by
definition not intermediate. But this does not make the doctrine of the mean
vacuous: it tells us that the different species of wrong action each results
from a given kind of emotion (or appetite) usurping the role of prohairesis
and determining our actions without calm forethought. Since each vice involves inappropriate experiences of the relevant emotions and desires called
for in the circumstances (e.g., anger when being insulted), the virtues produce noble acts because they bring the experience of these passions and
emotions into line with prohairesis and its practical wisdom.12 As Philippa
Foot puts it, on this view, the virtues are ‘‘corrective, each one standing at
a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of
motivation to be made good.’’13
But Urmson rightly recognizes that Aristotle has great difficulty proving
this claim, especially when it comes to justice, which does not seem to be
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the contrary of any particular emotion. For unjust actions can arise from
all sorts of motives; they are not especially associated with excessive or
deficient experiences of a particular kind of passion or sentiment. Greed
(pleonexia) is one prominent cause, but virtually any other vice can also lead
to acts that are unjust (even in the narrow sense connected with property
rights).14 Foot concurs: there is ‘‘no corresponding moderation of passion
implied in the idea of justice,’’ because ‘‘Almost any desire can lead a man
to act unjustly, not even excluding the desire to help a friend or to save a
life.’’15 Similarly, Aristotle’s analysis of spite and envy as (respectively) the
deficiency and excess of some particular emotion that could have an intermediate (called ‘‘nemesis’’) is unintelligible, and many different emotions can
lead to an improper level or kind of concern with others’ good or bad
fortunes.16
1.2. From Vice as Ignorance and Akrasia to Radical Evil
These problems noted by Urmson are just the tip of a large iceberg. We
need not detail the difficulties that arise in interpreting each virtue as the
right orientation and strength of a particular emotion, but it is important
to see that these problems arise because there is a fundamental error in
Aristotle’s thesis that it is primarily rational control of the emotions that leads to
virtue—understood not as the difficult ‘‘self-control’’ of the enkratic man
who can overrule resistant appetites and unruly passions but rather as their
full Apollonian colonization, which makes the emotions and appetites into
positive allies of practical reason.17
Although such rational control of the passions doubtless plays a large
role in good character (Aristotle’s account surely captures a key part of what
virtue requires), equating vice with inordinate emotion or unruly appetite blinds
us to the role of the existential striving will in certain forms of evil motivation and action and consequently also to its role in contrasting forms of
virtuous motivation and action. Nor are these omissions corrected by including the state below akrasia in Aristotle’s hierarchy, which Urmson calls
‘‘badness of character, the state of the man who wants to act badly and
does so without resistance, thinking it to be a good way to act.’’18 For it is
here that Aristotle places those forms of corruption that Plato diagnosed
as due to inveterate ignorance of the good, which by modern standards
would exculpate an agent as either too immature or incompetent to understand right and wrong (unless this incapacity itself is intentional or negligent). As Kenny explains, Aristotle argues that ‘‘incorrect volition’’ (boulēsis)
is possible because pleasures and pains can bring us to misjudge the noble:
‘‘Vicious choice results from the uncontrolled pursuit of the objects of the
passions (honor, money, sensual pleasure or the like).’’19
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This means that, according to Aristotle, the apparent goods at which
choice (prohairesis) aims when misled by corrupt bouletic (D3) desire are all
misjudged as noble because materially self-interested passions (appetites and
temper) make them appear to be intrinsically good or admirable. As Reeve
says, unlike the akratic, the fully ‘‘vicious person thinks that what he is
promoting in his actions is [his] eudaimonia.’’20 By contrast, the existential
account of human motivation predicts that there will be vices that do not
result from ignorance about our true good due to poor education or from
misjudgment caused by excesses or deficiencies in self-interested emotions
and sense appetites, nor from mere akrasia in failing to control such inordinate passions. For the existential account holds that agents can devote
themselves to malign or destructive ends that do not appear to offer any
material contribution to their own welfare and that they even recognize as
ignoble relative to some ethical standard. Such projectively willed forms of
radical evil transcend the classical forms of vice in viciousness of motive.
Blindness to such radical evil is not limited to Aristotelian moral psychology, however, for it is also closely related to the common error in
modern philosophy of assuming that the root cause of all evil must lie in
selfishness or unlimited egoism. Like most modern moral-sense theorists,
Bishop Butler affirms Plato’s principles that ‘‘no man seeks misery as such
for himself, and no one unprovoked does mischief to another for its own
sake.’’21 Kantians also fall into this error,22 and it is present in contemporary
virtue ethics too. For example, in trying to defend Aristotle’s idea that good
dispositions are virtues precisely because they correct temptations involving
excesses or deficiencies of emotion, Foot suggests that our strong natural
tendency toward egoism explains the kind of virtues whose status Urmson
questioned:
With virtues such as justice and charity it is a little different, because
they correspond not to any particular desire or tendency that has to
be kept in check but rather to a deficiency of motivation; and it is
this that they must make good. If people were as much attached to
the good of others as they are to their own good, there would no
more be a general virtue of benevolence than there is a general virtue
of self-love. And if people cared about the rights of others as they
care about their own rights, no virtue of justice would be needed.23
In other words, Foot maintains Aristotle’s general idea that virtues correct problems natural to the human psyche by expanding his one-level picture of this process to two levels. Particular virtues modify particular types
of desire and emotion, such as fear of mortal threats, lazy aversions to hard
work, furious reactions to minor slights, and appetites for rich foods—each
of which is self-interested by my Feinbergian definition (chap. 5, sec. 2.2)
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but still quite distinct, as Butler and Kant saw, from more abstract desires
for our long-term material advantage and overall happiness. General virtues,
on Foot’s second level, correct the tendencies toward injustice and failure
to aid that arise from these more general egoistic D2 and D3 desires.
The problem with this defense, however, is that there remain other
forms of evil that are not vices of self-indulgent appetites (concupiscence),
nor of other hostile passions (irascibility), nor even of abstract egoism (putting one’s own long-term material advantage before ‘‘the noble’’ where this
requires significant and possibly irretrievable sacrifice).24 As Richard Taylor
urges in his classic work on ethics, in addition to altruistic motives, ‘‘There
is another side to this disregard for themselves of which men are capable,
and that is the selfless pursuit of and natural satisfaction in injury to others.’’25 Hence if we conceive of justice and benevolence as the virtues that
specifically counter the corrupting influence of prudential motivation (in
Kant’s sense as the general desire to maximize material advantages over a
complete life), we are still left with forms of malign will that transcend
correction by justice and benevolence so conceived, since their root is not
egoism, or inordinate love of what Kant called ‘‘the dear self.’’
In such cases of malign will, we encounter a positive volitional evil that is
not usefully understood on the classical models of a ‘‘privation,’’ which
refers to a decision to pursue a lesser but apparently real good over a higher
value out of ignorance or weakness, giving in to sensual appetites or general
egoistic desires. By contrast, in cases of resolute malice, no sagacious enlightenment about his own eudaimonia as a cure for axiological ignorance,
nor any therapy designed to enhance his self-control or mastery of his appetites, nor even training by example to encourage just and benevolent sentiments will solve the agent’s ethical problem. Following Frankl, only
logotherapeutic confrontation, encouraging or challenging such a person to
find less destructive trajectories for self-expression, to see new goals worth
caring about, and to make an unforced effort to change himself (or perhaps
religious strategies encouraging repentance), stands any chance of success.
2. Toward an Existential Theory of Radical Evil: Six Forms of
Volitional Hatred
My hypothesis is that certain recognizable forms of evil or perverse ends
that have long posed problems for broadly eudaimonistic and egoistic theories of motivation (e.g., Aristotle and Hobbes) become easier to explain if
we accept the possibility of projective motivation. Evil is ‘‘radical’’ in my
sense if its negative or harmful goals are agent-transcending ends posited
by the agent for their own sake. This is not Kant’s sense of ‘‘radical evil,’’
nor does ‘‘radicality’’ in my sense imply ‘‘horrendous’’ evil or a high degree
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of wrongness or mens res.26 For horrific crimes of the greatest gravity meriting the most serious punishments one thinks morally permissible have often
been done out of simple avarice, lust, or bravado. As Susan Neiman says,
‘‘Thoughtlessness may be more dangerous than malice.’’27 She derives this
point from Hannah Arendt’s famous thesis that Adolf Eichmann’s motives
for his evil actions were ‘‘banal’’ careerist interests.28 Although the controversy about Nazi evils arising from Arendt’s book was highly influential
in twentieth-century thought, only two points about it are crucial for my
analysis.
Arendt’s insight is that ‘‘thoughtlessness,’’ incapacity for free judgment,
and narrow bureaucratic mind-sets can combine with such common vices
as greed and intemperance to motivate actions resulting in colossal horrors
such as the systematic transportation of Jews to killing centers. This is
linked with her argument that ‘‘the essence of totalitarian government’’—
like warlord cultures and fundamentalist militias—is to ‘‘dehumanize’’ their
operatives so that they hardly realize what they are doing or to leverage
quite ordinary human motives to bring about terror and atrocity.29 What
is ‘‘barbaric’’ in such phenomena is not the small-minded egoism of the
functionaries but rather their systematic manipulation and brainwashing.
Thus, as Richard Bernstein argues, when banal motives become the engines
of enormous wrongs, this may even require direction by a more radical kind
of evil.30
Thus Bernstein insists that in Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human
Condition, Arendt rejects Kant’s view that evil consists in violating others’
dignity to serve self-interest.31 Not all architects of genocide are like Eichmann; a society in which average people can willingly participate in crimes
against humanity is organized that way by leaders with a will to dominate
others so completely that their moral sense, freedom, and ‘‘singularity’’ as
a person with individual life goals are stripped away. Making humanity
‘‘superfluous’’ by such ‘‘total domination’’ is the core of radical evil on
Bernstein’s reading of Arendt.32
However, this vital insight needs to be situated in a broader account of
radical evil to be fully appreciated. For there are other kinds of evil motivation between Arendtian domination and simple egoism, and they are not
always manifested in great crimes.33 Some offenses aiming at relatively
minor harms that would merit only a small fine are done because the agent
made it his business to upset, shock, or disappoint others just ‘‘for the
pleasure of it.’’ This is the converse of Arendt’s thesis that monstrous acts
can have banal motives; it is also true that small cruelties, gratuitous slights,
and other acts of minor consequence sometimes reveal willed malice of
terrifying potential beyond what Arendt found in Eichmann. Consider an
act that is legally permissible yet done out of perverse will: a miserable old
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millionaire widow gives all her fortune to a worthy charity not for love of
its good cause but only to relish during her dying days the thought of her
surviving children’s disappointment and her hope that they will fight with
each other over who is to blame and ultimately become bitter like her.
Suppose that she hates her children simply because they are living more
exemplary lives than she has, and their greater need for money is partly a
result of choosing nonprofit careers promoting public goods. In such cases,
we see the intention as shocking because of its radically evil nature, even if
the overall moral gravity of the act remains less than violent crimes done
simply for monetary gain.34
Nevertheless, we typically regard the phenomena of radically evil motivations that require philosophical explanation as always intrinsically worse in
form than other types of egoistic motivation, even though the particular
actions chosen for radically evil reasons can be less bad than those chosen
for selfish reasons. As Richard Taylor argues, it ‘‘is not the consequences’’ of
evil actions that especially appall us, ‘‘but what is in the hearts of the
agents.’’35 The existential account of the striving will helps explain why we
intuitively distinguish radically evil motives from ‘‘merely’’ selfish interests
and why we regard the former as intrinsically more mean-spirited, nastier,
or formally corrupt, whatever the specific content of the intended act. But
showing that the existential model can do this important explanatory work
does not depend on developing a comprehensive account of how we access
the overall moral value of actions, which is not my task here. Even a schematic review of the relevant phenomena is so large a task that I can only
survey a few representative examples and suggest how the idea of projective
motivation sheds some light on their mysteries.
Following Bishop Butler, Joel Feinberg conceives ‘‘malevolent’’ motivation as a state in which the agent’s purpose is to cause material harm to
another person just for its own sake rather than as a means to any selfrelated first-order good such as entertainment or monetary gain. In that
sense, he considers it ‘‘disinterested’’ rather than self-interested.36 A man
planning to kill his wife so that he can marry another woman without
losing any of his wife’s fortune would obviously count as egoistic, not as
malevolent, on Feinberg’s analysis. To count as malevolent, he would have
to intend to kill her just because he hates her and wants her to suffer and to
lose all her opportunity for future happiness. The ‘‘merely’’ egoistic husband would be quite satisfied if he could magically teleport his wife away
to another planet in the universe, where she could live in bliss while a
lifeless duplicate of her body remains in the house, apparently killed in a
household accident while he was away on a business trip. But this magical
solution obviously could not satisfy the malevolent husband, who wants her
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(the very person) dead or deprived of joy, not merely out of the way or out
of her role in his life.
‘‘Hatred’’ in this sense is obviously not aversion, by which I mean an
appetite in the D1 or D2 sense to avoid something painful or disliked.
‘‘Aversion’’ in this broad sense is just the negative form of attraction and it
still has the formal structure of erosiac motivation: if I ‘‘hate’’ boiled asparagus in the aversive sense of ‘‘hatred,’’ then I have a D2 appetite to avoid
smelling (much less eating) it; we could explain this by saying that its presence is felt as a harm to me, and while smelling or (perish the thought)
even tasting it, I am lacking the equilibrium I enjoyed without it. Its presence literally makes me sick, and my body wants to distance itself from the
asparagus in order to restore its normal homeostasis. ‘‘Hatred’’ in this classical sense as aversion thus fits the classical Greek schema of orektic desire,
and contrasts starkly with the volitional hatred of a malevolent agent who
wants to remain near her victim, who may even protect her victim’s continued existence so that this victim can be further harmed or deprived again
and again. A paradigm case of this kind of hatred is the character Chillingworth in Hawthorne’s haunting novel, The Scarlet Letter, who lives for nothing
but the humiliation and destruction of Dimmesdale, the guilt-ridden minister who has fathered a child with Chillingworth’s former wife, Hester
Prynne. When Dimmesdale dies, so does Chillingworth, for volitional hatred is (in most cases) parasitic on the existence of the hated person, and
the parasite cannot exist without its host.
Certainly, we might ask whether malevolent hatred in this sense is intelligible. It is ruled out not only by eudaimonist accounts but also by some
contemporary internalist theories of motivation.37 Others admit that
‘‘Harm can be an end in itself,’’ but imagine this merely as a brute attraction
(or D2 desire).38 Still others insist that such pure malice always turns out
to be something else. The abstract idea of pursuing another person’s harm
or suffering for its own sake seems hard to imagine without more explanation; both in literary examples and even more in real life, something besides
pure malice often seems to be going on. However, an account of such cases
in terms of projective motivation does not require that harming others
should be projected as a final end arbitrarily or for no reason at all; as we saw
in the discussion of Frankl, agents must always have reasons for projecting a
goal, but they do not respond to these reasons or values by way of desire in
the erosiac sense. In order to sort out several potential confusions raised by
these complexities, I will divide putative cases of radical evil into six groups
with my own chosen labels39 as follows:
1. Sadistic Cruelty: pursuing the harm of other living beings for sport
or entertainment or for the intrinsic pleasure of seeing them suffer and
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try vainly to escape. If this motive is not satisfied unless the agent
himself causes the desired harm, then it may also include the desire
to discharge his own pent-up aggressions upon an arbitrarily chosen
person.
2. Fanatical Cruelty: projecting the harm or even destruction of innocent person(s) as a means to some ideologically valued aesthetic,
political, or religious cause. The agent can either be totally in the grip
of the violence-legitimizing ideology and project personal goals on
its basis, or will to be in the grip of such a dogma as a meaningconferring identity.
3. Malicious Anger: the vengeful pursuit of others’ material harm
(loss, misery, suffering) as an end-in-itself, based on the idea that this
expresses or is required by prior reasons for anger at them. This hostility toward them as offenders of some kind is cultivated for its
perceived retributive appropriateness. This includes pursuing the
harm of other living animals regarded as a final end or as a means to
harming persons who care about them.
4. Spite: an extreme form of malice, in which the agent projects the
psychological destruction of her hated other at all costs, the communication or expression to the other of her absolute hatred of him, and the
other’s recognition of this hatred and its success as a reason for his
despair.
5. Malevolence: projecting the harm or destruction of others as a
means to or way of expressing one’s superior power to control them,
one’s absolute domination of them, or even one’s possession of them
as slaves or mere things. In this case, the will to power makes pure
ascendance over others or appropriation of them its final end, and
the harm or destruction of others is primarily intended as a way of
denying their alterity or enslaving them to one’s will.
6. Demonic Autonomy: projecting the harm or destruction of others
or even oneself just because it is morally wrong or unjust. In this case,
the final end is a kind of absolute rebellion against moral requirements or limitations, or perhaps against the God who is thought to
embody moral ideals and requirements. As a pure will to rebellion, it
is also a will to reject any limits or external demands on the self. It is
thus closely related to malevolence, differing only in its qualification
of the goal as moral evilness of character.
These different types of malign motivation are often confused or conflated
with one another, but I will show that there are important distinctions
between them that clarify their relation to the existential conception of
striving will.
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2.1. Sadistic Cruelty
Under this heading, I am not concerned with what is sometimes called
sexual sadism (or ‘‘S and M’’), which seems to supervene in complex ways
on desires for sexual satisfaction and other D2 inclinations, in which harm
is allegedly desired only as psychodrama rather than in earnest. Rather, I
am concerned here only with the pure enjoyment of cruelty outside a sexual
context. It is obvious that cruel acts aimed at causing both physical and
psychological suffering can be motivated by a nonsexual kind of D2 desire,
namely, a perverse preference for witnessing suffering and struggle as a
source of amusement, in which some people find a kind of first-order
pleasure.
Although it is not especially complimentary, it is a simple fact of human
psychology that many people are amused, entertained, or given states of
mind they find inherently pleasant (e.g., ‘‘thrill’’ or ‘‘shock’’) to differing
degrees by observing violence, explosions, mortal struggles, and sometimes
suffering and humiliation quite irrespective of desert.40 Most people may
find these tastes odd or appalling, but in seeking these pleasures, those who
crave them are acting in a self-interested, even hedonistic fashion. As a
result, several cases that Taylor discusses fail to prove the existence of nonegoistic malice; for example, the fact that people take gruesome satisfaction
from watching a hanging may be due to their indulging revenge fantasies or
their taste for sheer spectacle. Likewise, the horrible pleasure that some
school-age children take in teasing, reviling, and ostracizing a particular
child who has problems or is in any way different may be moved by nothing
more than a bad habit starting from a desire for some distraction or entertaining spectacle to relieve boredom.41
Among his horrifying catalogue of evils, Dostoyevsky describes a ‘‘voluptuous pleasure from torturing children.’’42 He seems to have in mind a
visceral enjoyment of distress and despair: ‘‘What excites them is the utter
helplessness of the little creatures, the angelic trustfulness of the child who
has no where to turn for help.’’43 Similarly, we recognize the brutal pleasures of Romans watching early Christians be consumed by lions or gladiators condemned to fight to the death as no more than extreme forms of the
same corrupted D2 desires that motivate people to watch boxing matches
today.44 Though these practices go far beyond any kind of violence we find
naturally among nonhuman animals (as Dostoyevsky points out), and
though they deserve severe condemnation, they are not radically evil in my
sense.
Much the same must be said for the strange fascination that somewhat
fewer people have for death itself as a spectacle or even, in rare cases, for
the necrophilious pleasure of watching the destruction, dismemberment, or
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decay of living tissues. Taylor describes imaginary (but sadly, quite plausible) cases of boys pinning insects to trees or lighting a barnyard cat on
fire.45 Acts of such cruelty should evoke revulsion and horror and deserve
the strongest punishments, but the most troubling thing about them is
precisely that the agents do them for fun, that they find the spectacle of
something or someone burning to death in unimaginable agony, for example, to be entertaining—if not sensuously pleasurable, then at least riveting,
thrilling, boredom-relieving. How, we ask, could they possibly have a D2
preference or taste for anything like this—yet they do, just like someone
who finds gustatory pleasure in drinking urine or sensual pleasure in being
pierced by needles. In fact, given the frequency of disgusting burning scenes
in popular Hollywood movies, it would seem that an enjoyment of death
and suffering have become common in our culture.
The extreme end of this sort of perversion is clinical necrophilia, not
just in its sexual form but in its broader sense as delight in witnessing and
causing death and attraction to the lifelessness and decomposition of
corpses. In his landmark study of this syndrome and its variants, Erich
Fromm correlated the cold, dark, and unfeeling antisocial mechanicalness
of the ‘‘necrophilious character’’ with the radical evils of Hitler and Stalin46 —and it may well be that such a set of perverse D2 appetites is often
a result of a life devoted to radical evil in some of the forms I discuss below.
But in its prepurposive motivational manifestation as a basic ‘‘taste’’ for
corpses, dismemberment, and decay, necrophilia is just an extremely bizarre
type of D2 desire, though it occupies the maximally revolting end on the
scale of abnormal visceral reactions.47 Jeffrey Dahmer, despite committing
terrible crimes that made him ‘‘monstrous’’ to most people, was probably
not radically evil in my sense but only a person of highly antisocial temperament moved by the most disgusting and harmful kind of compulsive desire.
Indeed, such was the strength of his compulsive disorder that it is questionable whether he should even have counted as morally sane or as meeting
the conditions required for full legal responsibility for his actions. By contrast, the radically evil agent acts autonomously (and hence ordinarily will
be responsible if he also knows right from wrong); for by projective engagement, he helps generate the motives on which he acts.
Hence sadistic cruelty would not require projective motivation unless
the agent anticipated no inherent sport, entertainment, or fun in it and was
not driven to it by any prior craving for which release of tension could only
be found in cruel acts. This covers most cases, but perhaps not those in
which the agent decides to try cruelty just out of a kind of curiosity—not
out of any prior desire to relieve boredom but merely to exercise his will in
some dramatic way that impresses by its power. So he ‘‘puts on’’ the maniacal emotions that he imagines must be felt by people enjoying cruelty; he
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then plans and tries to execute a cruel act on some randomly chosen victim.
Then, of course, having projected the goal of being cruel, he will derive
second-order satisfaction from it if he succeeds, but this is not what motivated him. To complete the picture, we have to imagine the curiosity that
grounds his projection as simply a belief that this activity will be valuable
in some abstract sense not initially related to his eudaimonia: for example,
that it will provide important knowledge, or introduce meaning into a
meaningless life,48 or prove to him that he has sufficient strength of will to
overcome his own revulsion to suffering or repress a tendency to empathy
that he judges as weakness.
In other words, the curiosity that could ground projective sadism is not
any D2 desire to know a secret, or to find out more information about an
anticipated benefit or harm (e.g., being curious about one’s test score), or
to ‘‘get dirt’’ on someone that it will be fun and useful to have. Instead, it
is similar to the researcher’s sense that the goal of her research program is
inherently important in some agent-transcending way—because of its value
to society or its intrinsic status among questions of science, and so on. It is
precisely this kind of pure reason for projecting an end that would, if it
became a ground for cruelty, make the agent’s motive state radically evil—a
pure will to cruelty for its own sake, as Taylor wanted to suggest. If this is
imaginable or cogent, then we have already identified one type of radical
evil in the existential sense. Let us call it ‘‘volitional sadism’’ to distinguish
this motive from the garden-variety sadistic appetites described in this
section.
2.2. Fanatical Cruelty and Motive Switches
In approaching this category, we should reiterate that many horrendously
evil acts are probably attributable to motives that are explainable in terms
of ignorance or weakness, as held in the Aristotelian tradition. In many
cases, as John Kekes argues, actions that predictably cause avoidable harm
to innocent persons are ‘‘nonautonomous’’ because the agents ‘‘fail to understand or evaluate the significance of the alternatives they freely choose.
They do evil, but they do not see what they do as evil. . . . They are,
therefore, not moral monsters but moral idiots.’’49 Similarly, Kekes suggests
that evil-producing vices may often result from dogmatic belief-systems
that the agents could not avoid and that require ruthlessness, insensitivity,
or unbending expediency from them: ‘‘The choice for them was between
living according to a [distorted] conception of the good life to which they
had no acceptable alternative, and failing by the standards of that same
conception.’’50
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I agree that many kinds of external influences can and regularly do provoke people into hostility toward others that may motivate acts of extreme
cruelty or callousness (as we see in Iraq today). But although indoctrination,
brainwashing, or overbearing influence of authority figures may produce
cruel actions in ways that render the agents less than fully responsible, this
does not mean that the movement from belief to motivation cannot be projective in structure, as I explain below.
In his penetrating study of ways in which ordinary people may come to
commit horrific atrocities, Fred Katz cites three important causes: (1) a
culture of cruelty, in which creativity in being cruel is valued as an art form;
(2) the normalization of cruelty through bureaucratic systems in which
functionaries simply ‘‘do their job’’; and (3) an ideological package or grand
mythology justifying evil in the name of higher callings, collective goods,
or religious concepts such as fate/destiny or (I add) even the divine will.51
The first cause refers to the spread of a deviant pleasure in toying with
people and being ‘‘refinedly and artistically cruel,’’ as Dostoyevsky put it.52
It is not projective unless the agent acts this way to distract herself from
moral concerns, to steel her own psyche against pity, or to create what she
regards as pure aesthetic excellence (see below).
To the second cause in Katz’s list we might add many other ways in
which a culture can desensitize persons to the wrongness of arbitrary violence, thus making it possible to see cruel acts as mere sport (as for the tenyear-old boy with a machine gun who has grown up in the care of an
African warlord like Liberia’s Charles Taylor and thinks nothing of hacking
off another child’s hands).53 Such normalization of violence turns ordinary
desires—such as the desire for acceptance by others, success in career, or
status and honor—into potential temptations to accept malicious practices.
As Katz describes, Rudolph Hess tells in his diary that he lacked the courage to protest the brutality of his first SS boss, Theodore Eicke.54 His own
careerism and discomfort at disobeying authority figures led him akratically
to accept a regime of cruelty, until his protesting conscience was virtually
numbed to its horror.
In these cases so far, we are not forced to cite projective motivation in
the explanation. But things are different when we consider Katz’s third
cause, that is, fanatical adherence to an ethically corrupt ideology that
preaches hatred and violence toward innocents in the name of higher values.
An agent such as Heinrich Himmler, as Katz describes him, resolves to
devote himself wholeheartedly to ‘‘that grand Nazi cause, Hitler’s vision of
a purified and awesomely great Germany, to whose realization these horrendous deeds [of mass murder] made an essential contribution.’’55 Similarly,
Goldberg reports that ‘‘Hermann Göring . . . reluctantly admitted that some
of what went on was extreme, but he grandiosely justified the abuses as
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necessary to carry out his government’s long-term policies for solving serious social and political problems.’’56
I view this kind of fanaticism as a movement of projective motivation,
because the goals to which the agent devotes himself clearly transcend his
own eudaimonia; hence he may even see his work as a kind of moral selfsacrifice, a willingness to dirty his hands for a higher cause when others are
too squeamish to get the job done. In such cases, we do not find a will to
injustice or cruelty as such but, rather, a will to do whatever it takes to bring
about some end conceived as noble through distorted aesthetic, ethical, or
religious values. This is projective identification with a corrupt ideology,
because the agent is not moved by prepurposive attraction to his ends as
pleasurable, advantageous, or intrinsically part of his own happiness. We
could also imagine a person who sees the ‘‘purification’’ of his culture as
essential to his own happiness, but not every ideologue is this narcissistic.
Rather, our agent takes the self-transcending values that the ideology places
on her destructive ends as impartial reasons for projecting the ends.
For example, Kekes’s ‘‘sixteenth-century witch hunter’’ is devout in his
faith; he is supported by authorities, and ‘‘he is sincere, dedicated, and as
just as he can be in following ecclesiastic law.’’57 He suffers none of Hess’s
doubts, but passionately pursues justice and the purification of his community as he conceives them. Nor need he be in bad faith, using his ideology
as a mere rationalization for his sadistic enjoyment of cruelty or for getting
rid of opponents—like the Jesuit inquisitor Bernardo Gui in the famous
movie, The Name of the Rose.58 Instead, Kekes’s witch-hunter is projecting an
agent-transcending goal in the same way as someone devoting himself to a
‘‘practice’’ in MacIntyre’s sense; he differs in being fanatical because his
underlying values are so corrupted and irrational yet he will not question
them at all, even when he has reason to. Thus his will blocks the critical
rationality that authentic devotion to practices require. In other cases, such
as Himmler’s, the agent may believe that both his goals and the necessary
means to them contravene traditional morality (e.g., prohibitions on killing
innocents) yet find other putative values (e.g., racial purity) important
enough to justify overriding traditional mores. So he projects ends that
require cruel and immoral actions as a means. We call such motivation evil
because the values grounding the agent’s projective commitment are so corrupt that he must recognize their injustice according to any traditional standard. Nevertheless, he wills to reject these standards.
In both these cases, then, we find a radically evil will in the existential
sense: the agent intentionally defines his identity and finds meaning for his
life in commitment to corrupt causes. Because he so radically misjudges the
value of his mission, our fanatical agent feels called out of mere egoism to
a ‘‘nobler’’ set of goals, even though they involve systematic violence toward
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innocents. This is the problem with contemporary jihadists, who believe
that they are permitted to kill anyone of a different faith for their distorted
conception of religious purity. In such cases, appeals to the fanatic’s own
best interests will avail little. Where the agent still experiences internal conflict because of moral doubts, as in Hess’s case, he may also strive volitionally to solidify his commitment to the higher cause by repressing or
crushing out these moral qualms and emotional reactions of horror and
pity.59 Eleonore Stump has usefully analyzed this as the phenomenon of
someone trying to harden his heart against mercy or altruistic sentiment
because of his volitional identification with ends inconsistent with these
emotions or related moral motives.60 Arguably in this kind of case, the
radicality of evil is greater, because the agent perpetrates crimes in the name
of causes that he knows to be morally wrong yet he sets his will against his
conscience.
This kind of intentional ‘‘hardening of one’s heart,’’ even against one’s
better judgment, may be one species of a broader volitional phenomenon
in which people decide to project some end E (or actively work up their
motivation to pursue E) in part because they have already been acting on a
weak desire for E or acting as if they had a desire for E. In such cases,
people finally decide to throw themselves without reserve into some project
or activity, forming for the first time an existential commitment to it, because they feel they are already ‘‘involved,’’ or already ‘‘in too deep’’ to do
otherwise, or because this project will give more coherent meaning to their
previous actions. These are backward-looking grounds for projecting evil
ends.
We have already seen something like this in Sherman’s account of taking
up one’s friend’s cares and concerns out of respect for the friend (see chap.
8, sec. 4). In such cases, the first reason or ground for positing E as an end
lies in the past, in the agent’s filial relationship (although she may discover
new reasons once she pursues E). Such backward-looking considerations
are not easily understandable as objects of any D1-D3 desire, for desire in
its erosiac forms always looks forward to some future consummation or to
continuing the possession and enjoyment of some good (object or activity).
Backward-looking considerations are not intrinsically related to the agent’s
expectation of any future gain or satisfaction; hence they count as agenttranscending values or reasons for moving oneself in the relevant way (see
chap. 13, sec. 2).
Backward-looking considerations are also important in understanding
how a person who does not start with strong sadistic desires or emotions
of rage or fury toward innocent victims can be ‘‘drawn in’’ to a system of
cruelty and at some point come to feel that she might as well embrace it
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wholeheartedly, given her past trajectory. This helps explain Katz’s observation that ‘‘The route to evil often takes the form of a sequence of seemingly
small, innocuous incremental steps, in each of which one tries to solve a
problem in one’s immediate situation.’’61 I am suggesting that such a sequence of acts motivated by egoistic desires can terminate in a fundamental
switch of purpose in which the agent projects as a final end something that she
formerly pursued only as means to self-interested goals.
This kind of projective acceptance of one’s fate might even have played
some role in the subjects tested in the famous Milgram experiment, whose
results Katz attributes to the authority of the actors posing as scientists and
to the power of special circumstances to deemphasize the importance of
moral values that are more salient for persons in average circumstances.62 To
this I add that the incremental approach in Milgram’s experiment—getting
subjects slowly to increase the force of what they believed to be electric
shocks administered to persons on the other side of the screens—succeeded
in getting many subjects to feel that they were already invested in this experiment, or beyond the point of no return, by the time that the shocks seemed
to be inflicting serious pain (from the feigned screams of their ‘‘victims’’).
This is a powerful strategy because it forces the agent into a volitional
dilemma. In this dilemma, even willing oneself to trust the charismatic leaders and lay aside reservations may be the ‘‘weaker’’ response, because the
only other alternative—rejecting their commands and turning back when
one already seems to be deeply involved—requires a heroic strength of will
that few can muster.
Sometimes, then, in projective initiative on the basis of prior involvement or even a sense of inescapability, the agent seems to alter his motive
from self-interested appetite to volitional commitment. In such cases, part
of the agent’s reason or ground for projecting his goal is his own past action
on the basis of desires for prosperity and social status. When this happens,
the desiderative states (D1–D3) precede and occasion the projected motives,
but without the former causing or motivating the latter. Rather, the agent has
acquired a personal ethos (in part from established patterns of action, in
part from the kinds of significance that different persons and objects have
acquired for him) which he finally decides to take as a reason for investing
himself fully in the goals that make the most sense for this way of life.
For example, imagine someone who desires to enrich himself and believes the best means to this end is to start a criminal organization. He
dreams of living a life of peaceful luxury and he takes this as a reason to
pursue wealth by establishing an effective and ruthless crime ring. But as
time goes on, other motivations start to appear. Eventually, he projects the
success of his crime ring and his pursuit of criminal activities as a way of
giving meaning to his life—even though he did not originally desire these
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activities for their own sake. The work of building his gang did not itself
make him happy, and its maintenance remains laborious for him, but he
comes to be dedicated to it in a way he never initially envisioned. Because this
projection of criminal ends is motivationally distinct from the desires for
wealth that overshadowed it at the outset, these motives can coexist in uneasy
symbiosis, or one can remain while the other withers.
Imagine that our gangster has attained a vast wealth, and his desire for
riches is sated; or we could imagine that his original dream of living in a
Caribbean paradise fades and comes to appear adolescent and uninteresting
to him in his old age. Either way, after attaining the status of ‘‘godfather,’’
our criminal kingpin loses his initial desire for simple luxury. Yet, notably,
he remains more committed than ever to developing the criminal ring’s
influence. He is no longer moved by a desire for contentment, ease, and
sensual pleasures, since now what he ‘‘really wants’’ is to be involved in the
day-to-day manipulation of people, the exercise of power, the challenge of
planning the next hit, and so on. The thought of retirement no longer
arises; he is bent on pursuing his criminal practice. We might say that
activities that were formerly a mere means to his desired end have taken on a
life of their own for him: they have become ends-in-themselves.
This is a common experience that occurs in many different variations,
yet it is often not very usefully explained just by hypothesizing a new terminal desire for what was formerly just the agent’s method of attaining an
end. Rather, the agent has come to value the evils internal to his or her
corrupt practice by projecting these activities and their immediate goals as
his or her final ends; projective motivation has detached itself from the desires
out of which it developed. The possibility of such shifts in motive from
desiderative attraction to projective striving is also required, as we saw, to
make sense of the progression of ‘‘habituation’’ into virtuous motivation
(chap. 8, sec. 5.5).
I believe that this sort of dynamic is found in many different contexts
in human life because the fundamentally temporal structure of the will
maintains motivation toward the future but is ever pregnant with the past
and thus disposed and conditioned by its own prior decisions. Ends that are
adopted initially as means to satisfy preexisting desires have the tendency to
become projected for their own sake, pursued because of the inherent meaning
the agent finds in this pursuit. Because this enacted motivation is distinct
from desires that prepare the way for it, it can take on a life of its own.
This helps explain the difficulty that people often have in explaining why
they are so committed to the practices in which they are engaged and why
they may simply respond, ‘‘because this is what I do.’’
Such a motive switch may also help explain the related (but inverse)
sense that one has ‘‘lost the point of it all’’ somewhere along the way.
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Sometimes this is a misdiagnosis: when people discover that they are pursuing ends they no longer desire, they often assume they are caught in a mindless routine, when in fact the explanation may be that they have now projected
these ends, though the reasons are ones that they do not want to face or
accept.63 Our godfather figure might fall into this category. But sometimes
it is a correct diagnosis: a person finds that her persistence in some set of
activities is controlled by desires quite distinct from her original projective
commitment to an end that these activities are supposed to serve. For example, a police detective who joined the force out of love for his community
finds that he now lives only for the thrill of the chase, the glory of big
catches, or the vindictive pleasures of interrogation. This policeman has
lost his original projected commitment and is now moved only by D2
desires of a dubious sort. In this case, projective commitment to (something
like) a practice has decayed into simple appetite, and the agent has abandoned himself to his desires. Still, we would have to rate the policeman’s
condition as a lesser evil relative to the godfather’s passion, which shifted
from merely shallow and selfish desires to an active and resolute selfinvestment in violent disruption and manipulation of human lives.
Of course, such motivational shifts can also occur in more fortunate
ways. Harry may adopt the end of becoming Sally’s friend on the dubious
grounds that he wants to sleep with her, and appearing friendly will increase
his chances; but in the process, his initial desire may disappear (or be altered), while his motivation to spend time with her, help her out, talk over
ideas and plans, and so on remains, without any sense that it promotes his
well-being. Rather, Harry now projects Sally’s happiness for its own sake.
Perhaps the latter projection can even grow out of the former desire without requiring a clear formulation of some new justifying ground other than
the fact that he took on the role of being friendly to her in the past. This
suggests that familiarity itself may serve as a consideration for the striving
will: as in the judicial argument of stare decisis, that something was sought in
the past may itself become a reason (if not the sole or controlling reason)
for projecting it into the future.
It should now be obvious why such motive shifts are relevant for understanding fanatical loyalty and unwillingness to ‘‘see’’ or believe evidence of
atrocities (even when, as for Hitler’s followers, such evidence surrounds
one). Those who do not simply follow but, rather, earnestly commit themselves to a monstrously evil regime have usually willed this state of being
because the difficulties of willing justice and truth are in the circumstances so
much greater. The former alternative is not less ‘‘painful’’ or more satisfying
in any sense that appeals to orektic desire but it is less demanding on the
striving will.64 Yet it is still a (weaker) projective commitment of the self,
and so it can move the agent to sacrifice for ‘‘the cause.’’ Consider, for
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example, the Fedayeen militants still loyal to Saddam Hussein in 2004 and
killing innocents in his name long after they must (at some level) have
known how terrible a tyrant he was. Even after his regime’s fall, they were
too far gone to stop. The striving will does not easily give up even when
beaten or revealed as devoted to evil goals. Likewise, despairing of his
‘‘charmed life’’ when all the witches’ prophecies betray him, Macbeth still
summons the will to fight to the end, and forces himself to face Macduff:
Though Birnam Wood be come to Dunsinane,
And thou oppos’d, being of no woman born,
Yet I will try to the last.65
If we sense a vestige of spiritual nobility in this moment, despite Macbeth’s atrocities, it is because he has the will to embrace completely the self
he became incrementally by succumbing to his wife’s goadings and his own
fears. He thus shares a volitional quality found in true heroes. Yet he lacks
real courage, because it would have taken still greater strength of will to
repent—as we see in the resolve that Raskolnikov musters by the end of
Crime and Punishment.
2.3. Malicious Anger
So far, we have identified two major sources of evil devotions: a sense that
one is already compromised beyond the point of return, and a willingness
to subordinate traditional moral norms to a distorted conception of greatness or purity. In my view, however, the most common origin of projective
malice is resentment of perceived wrongs. In other words, this kind of evil
is a perversion of the will to justice.
However, ‘‘anger’’ is a multifaceted phenomenon. Sometimes anger at an
individual or group depends on fanatically projected loyalty to a corrupt
ideology—as when a church mob savagely slaughters a former nun, her
lover, and a baby thought to be theirs, in Kleist’s ‘‘Earthquake in Chile.’’66
We might think of anger in its simplest form as involving both a judgment
that some wrong (or culpable harm) has been done and a desire to express
this judgment to the perpetrator. So understood, the latter could be a D3
desire to engage in expressive or communicative acts, and the agent may
feel somewhat better after getting it ‘‘off her chest.’’ But often such judgments about responsibility for wrongs done and the moral emotions of
resentment or indignation they evoke may become grounds for projecting
the goal of retributive punishment (so that wrongs do not benefit their
perpetrator) and/or getting the wrongdoer to repair in some way (or to the
extent possible) the harm done. Such motives are not necessarily vengeful
in any pejorative sense, but important distinctions must be drawn here.
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It is often assumed that retributive motives are egoistic or that they
somehow aim at satisfying or calming the agent by restoring the psychic
equilibrium she lost when harmed; but when the end really is just deserts,
this cannot be correct. Since they are based on backward-looking considerations and seek to bring about a just state conceived (abstractly) as one in
which the wrongdoer gets what he deserves—which can mean either that a
wrongdoer does not benefit from wrongs or that the wrongness of his acts
is forcefully communicated to him and he is invited to repent67—pure retributive motives seek an agent-transcending end for its own sake. This end
could be described as an aspect of justice, that is, the state of affairs in
which wrongs do not pay, or it could be described as the communication
and upholding of moral requirements such as fair treatment for all. In its
pure form, then, this motive does not seek anything for its agent other than
the satisfaction of seeing justice done—and it is therefore on a par with the
motive of duty, which (as I argue in chapter 11), can only be projectively
willed, not desired in the D3 sense.
The pure will to fair retribution, then, is in principle neither malicious
nor vindictive; it is, rather, simply a specification of the will to justice.
Given human nature, however, when the will to justice motivates retributive
purposes toward others, it is always in danger of corruption, always liable to
become malicious. It does so through another subtle kind of motive switch:
the agent stops seeking the (perceived) offender’s harm only as just punishment or justice-restoring retribution according to impartial standards and
starts seeking it merely as harm suffered by this particular person (or group) who
has offended me or damaged something I care about. The will to the abstract end of redressing wrongs then becomes the essentially particularistic
will to vengeance against this person (or group) just because I have an excuse
and opportunity for using my willpower this way.68
A person willing vengeance thus almost hopes to be wronged so she can
find justification for striving against a wrongdoer; she will delight in making
her hated target suffer some similar harm—not simply because it is just but
only because it is this despised person’s suffering. Even worse, in what I call
spiteful vengefulness, she may especially desire that the person on whom
she is taking revenge know that she is enjoying his suffering and suffer further abasement in this knowledge.69 Of course, this may be rationalized as
simply what the victim deserves, given his past wrongs, and so on, but the
agent’s true purpose is no longer simply justice, even as it appears to her
distorted judgment (we could say that she aims at a conception of justice
twisted beyond recognition by her absolute will to vengeance, but a misconceived notion results from her will).
The literary paradigm for this kind of evil is Madame Defarge in Dickens’s The Tale of Two Cities. ‘‘Citizeness’’ Defarge is not primarily actuated by
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the extreme Jacobin ideology of her group but rather by a will to infinite
vengeance against the Evrémonde family. Although she came from a coastal
peasant family and despises all ‘‘aristocrats,’’ that is because the Evrémondes
belong to this class. Her inexhaustible hatred, it is finally revealed, began
when two Evrémonde brothers killed several members of her immediate
family.70 Throughout the long years, she cultivated and nourished that hatred into a will to ‘‘pursu[e] this family to annihilation,’’ down to the last
woman and child.71 As Dickens says, she does not care that the husband,
wife, and child she is scheming to execute are innocent of ‘‘the sins of their
forefathers’’; she aims to extirpate every last vestige of that family’s being
from the earth.
Were she to succeed, one suspects that even then she would rationalize
the guilt of some new victim (e.g., anyone who had ever helped an Evrémonde) on which to vent her limitless wrath against the world. The disproportion of her malice to the original crime, as heinous as it was, reveals the
contribution of her own will. Dickens describes her as possessed of ‘‘a
strong and fearless character, of shrewd sense and readiness, of great determination’’ to see her purpose through, and finally as ‘‘absolutely without
pity.’’72 Madame Defarge is malice incarnate. Indeed, her strength of will
would almost be an obscene testament to Nietzsche, if she were not finally
mastered by the more poignant determination of Miss Pross to protect
Lucie and her child: ‘‘Miss Pross, with the vigorous tenacity of love, always
so much stronger than hate, clasped her tight.’’73 Thus Dickens affirms the
classical priority of the Good, but only after revealing the true nature of
radical evil.
From the natural law perspective, in which pure, retributive conceptions
of criminal punishment are usually defended, when retribution instead licenses expressions of hatred, it corrupts a citizen’s character by weakening
her concern for justice or her focus on whether the act that caused the harm
being avenged was really a wrong or morally blameworthy. If this attitude
becomes pervasive among enforcers of the law or citizens in general, then
concern for both proportionality and appropriate modality of punishment
also weakens. Then citizens may feel no shame in publicly expressing delight at the thought of convicts being tortured; they may engage in revelry
at public executions. This phenomenon is not limited to extreme contexts
like the French Revolution; it has a subtle presence in our own culture,
which now accepts a high probability of rape in prison as a normal part of
the correctional process; everyone laughs at frequent jokes about this ‘‘penalty’’ on talk shows and in popular movies. Family members of convicts,
who often suffer enormous losses of emotional and financial support despite being entirely innocent, are reviled in public, denied welfare benefits,
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and treated like criminals themselves by the bureaucracies involved in the
prison system.
These are signs that a culture of vengefulness has set in. Righteous anger
at the crime has become hatred of the criminal himself and even open
public enjoyment of such hatred and advocacy for its expression. Even disgust at a repeat criminal bears the seed of this psychological danger within
it. This is why, in The Lord of the Rings, Gandalf warns us to remember that
flawed mortal beings with finite intellects should err on the side of caution
when pursuing retributive justice: When Frodo says that Gollum deserves
death, Gandalf responds, ‘‘I daresay he does. Many that live deserve death.
And some that die deserve life. Can you give it to them? Then be not too
eager to deal out death in judgment.’’74
Tolkien’s insight is that vengeful passions are easily converted into intending harm to others whom we dislike for any reason; almost any slight
becomes a ground or basis for projecting a crusade against them. Eventually, such a will to vengeance can so consume a person that she becomes a
spiritual parasite more focused on others’ faults than her own flaws and on
humbling and debasing others than on pursuing the positive basic goods
achievable with her own talents. Vengeance, like other kinds of volitional
hatred, is thus a perversion of the existential will itself, a focus on negative
grounds for committing oneself to destructive projects rather than on the
many available positive grounds for committing oneself to creative projects,
like friendships, the practices or professions, and the fostering of flourishing communities.
Many cases in literature and life in which it seems that the agent maliciously pursues another person’s harm or suffering as an end-in-itself seem
to conform to this model: they begin with anger at the other for some
actual or perceived harm done, but they move beyond simple desires for
expression and redress involved in such anger and become a self-sustaining
will to a potentially limitless campaign against the offender rather than
against the offense. This involves projective willing, because rather than
letting anger be exhausted by its expressions in speech and punishment
along with the other’s attempt to respond by making some restitution (if
any), the agent cultivates his anger, makes sure to keep it alive against anything that might threaten to satisfy it. Then the last thing he wants is for
the offender to try to make restitution or seek to restore right relations
between them. For his hatred has to be maintained now as part of a larger
project that transcends its initial basis; it has become central to his identity.
For example, in Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, Chillingworth certainly begins
with some (limited) justification for being angry with Dimmesdale, but he
takes up a project of deception and mental torture that extends far beyond
anything that could be explained by desires for his wife or his lost marriage
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or by any legitimate concern for his own well-being and fair treatment.
The classical notion of an ‘‘irascible’’ or ‘‘splenetic’’ character obscures this
distinction between righteous anger seeking restitution and hatred that transcends any interest in right relation with the offender.75 But the existential
conception of the striving will clarifies the difference: Chillingworth resolves with his whole being to destroy Dimmesdale and from thereafter
lives only for this end. He is only the project of driving Dimmesdale mad
with guilt and fear. Thus he no longer loves Hester Prynne, his lost wife;
he is interested only in Dimmesdale, the adulterer.
We find another literary case fitting this pattern in Moby Dick: Captain
Ahab’s absolute determination to destroy the whale certainly begins as
anger at past offenses (though since the whale is a nonrational animal, its
responsibility in Ahab’s mind requires a certain personification). But this
anger progresses to a self-destructive personal quest in which nothing else
matters, so entirely is Ahab’s will bent upon the sole purpose of his enemy’s
death. In this kind of case, unity of purpose involves not only volitional
strength but also fanaticism, since the agent distorts his own awareness of
values outside his purpose, or simply wills to ignore them, in order to
strengthen his motivation to the maximum degree possible for his nature.
As Jean-Luc Marion writes, ‘‘revenge prefers anything to no longer avenging
itself,’’ and thus is essentially suicidal: better death than reconciliation.76
2.4. Envy, Superiority, and Spite
I reserve the term ‘‘spite’’ for malicious anger in its most extreme form. The
extremity of this motive may be indicated by contrasting it with two attitudes that focus on relative differences between my holdings and yours rather
than on the intrinsic value of my holdings absolutely taken.
The first of these two attitudes has been called ‘‘envy’’ in recent social
theory and moral psychology. In this context, ‘‘envy’’ has come to mean a
preference for lowering relative inequalities in holdings, even if this can only
be done at the price of lowering the absolute amount of social goods (on
some set of indices) distributed to the envious agent—in short, envy in this
sense favors greater equality even at the price of ‘‘leveling.’’77 As Rawls
puts it:
we may think of envy as the propensity to view with hostility the
greater good of others even though their being more fortunate than
we does not detract from our advantages . . . we are willing to deprive
them of greater benefits even if it is necessary to give up something
ourselves.78
The ‘‘advantages’’ Rawls refers to here are simple (noncomparative) firstorder goods, like food, clothing, land, and education. Rawls is worried
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about envy because if the worst-off agent were envious, he would not
choose the difference principle (which allows for relative inequality if it
improves the absolute level of primary goods held by the worst-off person).
To make this more precise, we must say that the motive in envy is to reduce
the comparative differences per se, not because they are unjust or simply
because we wish those better off to suffer as a final end, but only because
they are better off than us—that is, there are evident differences in holdings.
Thus, as Rawls says, envy is not a ‘‘moral feeling’’ toward the other; rather,
‘‘we are downcast by their good fortune and no longer value as highly what
we have.’’ By contrast, resentment is a moral feeling or evaluative attitude in
which ‘‘we think that their being better off is the result of unjust institutions.’’79 The goal of envy is instead to bring about relative equality with the
other, even at the price of an absolute loss to both oneself and the other.
Thus envy and resentment are formally distinct, though they often coexist.
As I noted in chapter 5, social envy in this sense is a problem for
broadly Hobbesian theories of rational decision, which presume ‘‘simple
egoism’’ as the desire to maximize absolute preference-satisfaction without
any concern about the preference-satisfaction of others unless it interferes
with one’s own. As we saw, Rousseau was the first thinker in the contract
tradition to explore this kind of problem in depth. But although he discussed envy, he focused on ‘‘the universal desire for reputation, honors,
and preferences, which devours us all,’’ leading to an alienating ‘‘furor to
distinguish oneself ’’ as superior in power and right to others. This desire for
superiority, as I call it, is similar to envy in its focus on relative differences in
material holdings or status (or other objects of simple D2 desires) but
different in seeking maximum comparative advantage rather than equality.80
The superior elite revels in its status, while the masses grovel ‘‘in obscurity
and misery . . . because the former prize the things they enjoy only to the
extent that the others are deprived of them,’’ rather than for their own
sake.81
Although Rousseau traces most social evils, including tyranny, to this
kind of comparative second-order desire to possess X because significant
others both desire and lack X, the desire for superiority can still be considered complexly egoistic rather than radically evil. Its perversion lies primarily in seeing intrinsic value in having more of some mutually desired goods
than others have (when there is no natural value in such comparative advantage) rather than in positing harm or suffering as an end-in-itself. Thus, in
principle, it could be satisfied without the other knowing or caring about
her inferior possessions or status. This changes, however, if the motive turns
into the direct enjoyment of the other’s abasement or misery itself, and the
agent seeks comparative advantage only as a means to make the other suffer
envy. ‘‘Envy-enjoyment’’ usually refers to such an essentially social emotion
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in which the intentional object includes the victim’s painful envy. Rousseau
sometimes conflates envious comparative desires with such spiteful ‘‘pleasure of domination,’’ in which the masters ‘‘thought of nothing but the
subjugation and enslavement of their neighbors’’ as an end-in-itself.82
Around the same time, Scottish Enlightenment thinkers also made some
progress in distinguishing these complex motives. A few years after Rousseau, Thomas Reid argued that ‘‘all the malevolence that is to be found
among men’’ can be traced to the misuse of two natural motives, which he
calls ‘‘emulation and resentment.’’83 Reid follows Butler in dividing ‘‘resentment’’ into the animal instinct to sudden anger in response to any harm
and the more ‘‘deliberate resentment’’ based on rational judgment of ‘‘injuries’’ or wrongs done.84 He does not clearly distinguish this from what I call
malicious anger or vengefulness.85 By emulation, Reid means ‘‘a desire for
superiority to our rivals in any pursuit,’’86 which he distinguishes from ‘‘ambition’’ as the noncomparative desire for power.
In keeping with the Western paradigm, Reid argues that emulation or
ambition is an engine of progress, motivating human beings to great works,
and when ‘‘it is under the dominion of reason and virtue, its effects are
always good.’’87 Here Reid conflates the desire for superiority as a comparative good with pure concern for ‘‘excellence’’ and the volitional strength
that it gives to ‘‘every noble and manly pursuit.’’88 Thus he concludes that
the desire for superiority leads to vice only when it focuses on material
comparisons. What Reid fails to see is that rivalry in the practices is derivative from the pursuit of excellence for its own sake (because one way to
measure excellence is by reference to the performance of other trained practitioners), whereas the desire for superiority is an egoistic motive aiming at
a ‘‘good’’ that cannot be shared, competition for which is a zero-sum game.
Radical evil is often reduced to envy or a desire for superiority. Colin
McGinn has argued that apparently pure interest in another’s pain may, like
seduction of the chaste or browbeating persuasion of the unwilling, appear
attractive as a way of making another person abjure his values (at the extreme, even the value of his own life). This in turn may satisfy the agent’s
‘‘deep existential envy’’ of others for enjoying lives happier than his own:
‘‘His life-project . . . is to reduce the well-being of others to his dismal
level.’’89 This account plausibly describes some malicious persons, but not
all. Coercing a person to give up or invert her values does not seem necessary to attaining the goal of envy; it suggests a deeper will to domination
of her spirit. Nor is causing pain a necessary or sufficient means to this end:
prolonged suffering may cause a person to stop applying the value of life to
his own existence but not to deny this value altogether. Finally, the purely
envious agent does not care if the reduction of the other’s well-being occurs
through his own agency or by accident: as McGinn says, ‘‘painful illness’’
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may bring this about by bad luck. But a spiteful agent will not be satisfied
by this kind of misfortune in the other’s life: he wants to bring about the
victim’s suffering himself.
Therefore spite is more radical than desires for superiority or envy that
take comparative ‘‘goods’’ as final ends. The spiteful agent intends harm to
the other person, but not in order to gain something they have or to punish
them for having it, nor simply to reduce relative differences or gain comparative advantages over them. Rather, in spite we hate the other person for
who they are inwardly, for their very character; we despise their very self.
Thus spite ordinarily focuses on particular individuals (although it can be
directed toward small groups), whereas envy is often directed against large
groups or whole social classes. Spite relishes not only the other’s envy but
all her painful emotions (envy, dread, hate, despair) and communicates this
enjoyment to the victim.
The despiser shares with the envier a willingness to suffer significant loss
of assets or noncomparative goods in bringing the other down; but unlike
the merely envious agent, the spiteful agent does not essentially focus on
reducing the relative differences between his holdings and those of his target in
areas such as financial assets, affections of desirable friends, social position,
political power, or cultural dominance. The spiteful agent’s goal is not relative equality or superiority but, rather, the other’s absolute loss (at virtually any
price). To bring harm, misery, and despair to her target, she may even be
willing to increase relative differences between their holdings of various noncomparative goods in the process of making her despised victim worse off
than she was before. For instance, imagine a woman who is willing to go
into personal bankruptcy in order to deprive her despised rival of the lavish
wedding she was planning (say by a lawsuit that costs her rival $100,000).
After paying $150,000 in fees to her own lawyer, our agent ends up even
poorer relative to her rival than she was before:
Wealth Before

Wealth After

Agent

$150,000

$0

Rival (victim)

$200,000

$100,000

$50,000

$100,000

Difference

In this circumstance, the agent’s preference for the scenario following her
lawsuit would seem irrational to the envious agent who prefers simple leveling, since the predicted outcome involves a larger relative difference between
her holdings and her target’s holdings.
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Thus spite is not compatible even with complex versions of psychological egoism that make room for self-interested desires for relative or comparative goods even at the cost of some loss in noncomparative goods. The
despiser cannot be explained as a complex egoist; she really does sacrifice her
natural interests just as much as a charitable agent who intends no indirect
benefit to herself. But the goal of her sacrifice is the true opposite of a
charitable agent’s goal; namely, to cause her victim a significant loss as
measured absolutely—in my example, to deprive her of her dream wedding.
Spite is like this; it wills to deny the victim his deepest hopes, fondest
dreams, or most important pursuits in order to bring him to despair. It
aims to destroy whatever its victim cares about most, just to spite her.
If spite is a motivational state in which the spiteful agent is bent on
harming another person in this way, even if he can only achieve a little
harm at great cost to everything else that should matter to him in life,
no non-self-deceived judgment about his own happiness can produce such
motivation. Once he is spiteful, of course, the agent can draw satisfaction
from inflicting harm on his target, but only because he is antecedently committed to doing personal damage to his victim, even at a steep price to
himself; thus the anticipated satisfaction is a by-product and cannot itself
be the cause of this commitment. His spiteful motivation is pure in a way
similar to the purity of agapic love: he is prepared to sacrifice his own wellbeing absolutely for the sake of his goal, and his goal is usually focused on
the unique selfhood of another individual. For he attends with care to the
details of the other’s psyche—so as to personalize the harm all the more
piquantly. It is difficult to see how such a goal could become anyone’s end
except by projective willing: spite is a volitional state. Still, the agent starts
from reasons for such a project. The spiteful agent’s mission against the
other person cannot be for no reason if it is autonomous; it must have
some grounds, however inadequate they might seem to third parties. This
can be illustrated by a series of popular examples.
(1) Shakespeare’s King Richard III utters many memorable lines, the
first of which is: ‘‘since I cannot prove a lover / To entertain these fair wellspoken days / I am determined to prove a villain.’’90 Though it seems
unlikely that anyone would so explicitly formulate their negative project,
we could diagnose Richard’s problem as a simple case of envy: since he is
deformed, he thinks that he cannot enjoy the goods of peaceful times, so
he decides to deprive others of their happiness and cause war. At first
glance, this seems to be just a case of complex (comparative) egoism: ‘‘Richard loves Richard; that is, I am I.’’91 But if this character (who is quite
unlike the historical king) is believable at all, then something beyond envy
must be at work in him. For although outwardly he seems to be working
to secure political power and a sexual partner, inwardly he seems to despair:
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‘‘Uncertain way of gain! But I am in / So far in blood that sin will pluck
on sin.’’92 So he becomes haunted and paranoid, drives away Buckingham
unnecessarily, and goes on to crimes that are not essential to his apparent
purpose. His spite is apparent in this, and how much he relishes the sorrow
they cause. He seems happier in drawing others into guilt than in cultivating
their friendship. His initial envy develops into despising others with
abandon.
(2) The agent’s grounds for spite may initially be the same as in less
extreme cases of ‘‘malicious anger.’’ Consider Max Cady (played by Robert
de Niro) in the remake of Cape Fear, who does not want to build any kind
of life for himself after getting out of prison but only wills the destruction
of his attorney, Sam Bowden (played by Nick Nolte) and his family. Cady’s
terrifying determination to pursue this end at all costs is based on his conviction that his attorney betrayed him at his rape trial years before. This is
a typical background circumstance for spite: we believe that the other did
us an injustice, or the other wrongfully succeeded where we failed or in
some other way indirectly harmed us or someone or something we care
about. But then repaying the harm or requiting the injustice becomes only
the occasion for a more radical project; for spite transcends the circumstances out of which it is first born and wills infinite vengeance.93
(3) Likewise, in the film Amadeus, Salieri begins with jealousy of Mozart’s
superior musical abilities and he judges that God has wronged him, since
he is more virtuous and deserving than Mozart.94 As a way of punishing
God, he decides to destroy the musician who has received God’s special
grace so undeservedly. However mistaken this judgment may be, eventually
Salieri’s main motive develops beyond this purely retributive project of
punishing God for his alleged injustice; he comes to despise Mozart himself
(rather than God) for his flippancy, for his open sexual infatuation with his
wife, for his financial neediness, for his spontaneous tendency to suggest
improvements in others’ work, and so on. Through intense concentration
on Mozart to see if he could possibly be worthy of the evident genius he’s
been given, Salieri finds in the complete gestalt of Mozart’s personality a
new basis for projecting the deception and destruction of Mozart—quite
apart from getting even with God. That is, Salieri comes to anticipate and
hate every mannerism, every gesture, every way of being that Mozart embodies. He has to become a kind of connoisseur of this individual, in order
the more perfectly to despise poor Mozart for his every distinctive trait and
even finally to relish this activity of despising as his highest purpose in life.
Of course, Salieri continues to rationalize his project as retribution for
God’s unfairness. But in fact, hating Mozart becomes Salieri’s comprehensive final end, to which misrepresenting himself as a friend, destroying Mozart’s confidence, and worsening the illness that hampers Mozart’s work,
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are his chief means. Hence after Mozart dies, Salieri has nothing left to live
for except the memory of his triumph.
In addition to the motive switch it exemplifies, this example also illustrates how far volitional hatred is from the classical model of an aversion:
for Salieri must become more and more closely involved with Mozart not
only in order to betray him more profoundly but also to build up his spite
by focusing on every nuance of the character he cannot stand. In this respect, he is like Chillingworth in The Scarlet Letter, who needs a kind of
intimacy with Dimmesdale in order to fan the flames of despite or to
harden his heart as much as possible against his victim. This strange way in
which the despiser draws near to his despised cannot be a simple attraction
nor a perverse D2 desire to see the victim suffer in some particular way
fetishized by the agent.95 For in true spite, there is no level of damage,
including even death, which could ‘‘satisfy’’ the despiser or restore him to
an affective equilibrium; each success he experiences in inflicting harm on
his target only provokes him to deeper hatred and thus to drive the knife
in further and further. Hating the other—the pursuit of the other’s suffering
as a final end—is projected as an activity of intrinsic value that may be even
more important than the other’s despair and demise.
Thus perhaps the ultimate despiser would prefer to keep his victim alive
indefinitely in order to go on hating him all the more perfectly—much as
the ultimate romantic lover finds the activity of loving his partner worthwhile in itself and strives to love her ever more perfectly.96 For the ultimate
despiser actively and wholly identifies with his pursuit of the other’s emotional destruction and lives completely in the experience of acting on his
hatred; he relishes it and sustains it by volitional effort, as seen in his search
for ever new ways of expressing it. Thus, unlike any erosiac desire, spite is
open-ended, without any definite consummating end, which is why it can never be
satisfied with just reducing the differences between the agent’s well-being
and someone else’s. This can make spite seem like an insatiable obsession,
as if it were an uncontrollable or compulsive addiction, but it is not. For
the person with a compulsion or obsessive disorder finds her autonomy
compromised and she is at least temporarily placated by performing her
ritual or experiencing that with which she is obsessed. By contrast, the
spiteful person wills to remain obsessed with his victim and maintains this
focus for its own sake. Spite is thus a bottomless volitional obsession from
which there can be no relief without a volitional change in his identitydefining commitments.
If the spiteful person could be fully honest with himself, then, he would
have to recognize that he does not quite know ‘‘what he wants’’ to do to his
intended victim. Although he imagines all kinds of humiliations and harms,
none of these will seem like fully satiating prospects, because what he really
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wills is simply to go on despising indefinitely and to bring about infinite or
endless anguish. In that sense, Socrates would have to say that he wills his
mental ‘‘sieve’’ to have enough holes that it can constantly be refilled with
sweet revenge without ever overflowing and losing any of that nectar.
Yet, paradoxically, this infinity of spite also demonstrates how dependent the despiser remains on the presence and alterity of the other. The
other is hated for his concrete otherness—his unique self, his individual
identity—yet this implies that his otherness has to be sustained if volitional
hatred is to have its object. Thus spite is volitionally contradictory in much
the same way as the self-hating will to inferiority (chap. 12, sec. 9). In
destroying its despised victim, the spiteful will inevitably harms its own
spirit. Salieri ends up insane; Chillingworth dies without Dimmesdale;
Cady, Ahab, and Defarge all unwittingly destroy themselves. Thus radical
evil in this form remains parasitic on the good, but its dependence is different from that of a mere privation.
2.5. Malevolence, Torture, and the Will to Misappropriation
In spite, then, there is no delimitable final goal. The nearest we can come
to it would be to say that the spiteful agent intends to destroy the victim’s
very identity, or to cause her to hate and reject herself for being who she is
(the person with this particular history). In many cases, this involves trying
to show the victim that the despising agent has a certain kind of power over
her—not just to harm her physically but to affect her very psyche (ideally,
forcing her to lose all confidence, to give up on all her hopes, dreams, and
meaningful purposes, abandoning her existential identity). The other killing
herself out of loathing for her own powerlessness is an image that approximates the despiser’s real target (though his true end cannot be specified).
This is why spite in its purest form requires cultivating a personal relationship with the intended victim, and the despiser is willing to sacrifice material welfare or sometimes even his life to gain control over his victim’s
psyche.
In this limit form, spite comes close to malevolence, in which the agent
aims at the domination of others as a pure expression of his own ego. The
crucial difference is that the malevolent agent, unlike the spiteful agent,
need not begin from some kind of anger at his victim’s past actions as a
basis for projecting spiteful ends. Instead, the malevolent agent finds in his
own volitional capacity to appropriate, possess, or control things a sufficient reason for trying to turn everything and everyone into his possession
or slave. In malevolence, the agent’s will to power makes pure ascendance
over others the final end, and the harm or destruction of others is simply a
way of denying their alterity or enslaving them to one’s will. This is the
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kind of radical evil that Arendt originally recognized. I approach it indirectly, beginning with the difficult jurisprudential problem of defining torture and distinguishing it from other crimes.
Torture, even more clearly than the killing of innocents, has often been
held to be unjust or morally illegitimate for any purpose.97 It would be
hard to see why this is so if merely causing intense physical pain without
permanent maiming is sufficient for torture, and it has proven difficult to
draw behaviorist boundaries on this crime. After all, battlefield surgery
without anesthesia is intensely painful but obviously not torture. However,
the proximate intention in the case of torture is different from other crimes,
and this may be the clearest way to set it apart.
For whatever ultimate purposes it is employed, torture involves trying
to bring about a special kind of mental result via physical mechanisms.
Through inflicting agonizing pain, bodily deprivation, terror, repeated or
random shocks to mind or body, or other means of destabilizing the victim,
torture aims to destroy her sense of bodily integrity, the most basic level of
psychophysical security on which the victim’s sanity and ability to act depends. The torturer tries to accomplish his ultimate goal (e.g., extracting
information, getting a confession, beating down resistance to the regime,
etc.) by robbing his victim of the corporeal security necessary for autonomous choice and self-direction. At the extreme, torture aims not just to
‘‘break the will’’ of the victim (in the sense of making him disclose information or cease unwanted political activity) but rather to repress that victim’s
very sense of being a free agent capable of making moral choices. Torture
is an attack upon the victim’s ability to retain his individual identity—his
sense of personal priorities, values, and capacity for initiative—even if it
doesn’t kill or permanently injure his body. At its limit, torture aims to
create—whether more subtly or more explicitly—an enslavement of the
mind to terror through lack of control over one’s own body, a sense of
total powerlessness. All this is what we mean when we say that torture is
‘‘dehumanizing,’’ and arguably it explains why torture may be a crime even
more grave than manslaughter.
In this brief analysis of torture, we have a clue about the kind of volitional hatred I called ‘‘malevolence.’’ Torture as I define it may often be
used merely as a means to some further end, like getting valuable information from the victim or forcing some action. But a person who pursued for
its own sake the dehumanization of others that is the proximate goal of torture (distinguishing it from other actions causing physical suffering) would
count as ‘‘malevolent’’ in my existential sense. A powerful illustration of
such an agent is found in the movie version of the play, Death and the Maiden,
in which the heroine (Sigourney Weaver) has been tortured years before by
a doctor (Ben Kingsley) when she was a political prisoner. This doctor
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reduced her to his plaything, thereby almost destroying her capacity for
agency and a sense of coherent identity, simply because he could. As we discover at the film’s dramatic conclusion, the doctor did not rape his victim
for ordinary sexual satisfaction, or for sadistic first-order pleasure, or for
sport, or to gain information, or for any other external end. Rather, he says
that he found himself placed in circumstances in which he discovered his
capacity to will the absolute domination of a human person, and he did this just
for the sake of affirming his ability to exercise power with impunity. Such torture
for its own sake, or dehumanization as a final end, is a paradigm species of
the will to exercise absolute power over others; it aims to strip them of
their alterity and independence, reducing their being to a mere extension
of our will—like an instrument whose functions we can direct, which will
do our bidding at our command. Here we approach the very essence of evil
in its existential sense.
However, torture is only one way in which such a will to the enslavement
or domination of others’ freedom can be expressed; there are more subtle
methods than dividing a victim from control over his own body. But the
malevolent agent’s goal is always to assert his ascendance over others’ powers of self-direction; so the victims must succumb unwillingly, or else the
element of resistance necessary for conquest is lacking.98 Here is the essence
of tyranny—observable in men such as Nero and Napoleon—which Plato
and the Sophists mistakenly thought was motivated by material greed and
bodily lusts and which even Hegel interpreted in eudaimonistic fashion as
merely a mistaken attempt to gain the free recognition from others that is
necessary for full self-consciousness.99 On the contrary, this radical goal of
dominating the wills and minds of others by force or holding them in
bondage to one’s whim cannot be the object of any erosiac desire, because
there is no prepurposive way to see this as part of our own well-being.
Rather, it can only be projected by the striving will.
But why would anyone do this? What considerations could the malevolent agent regard as reasons for pursuing such an end? Remember that in
asking this question, we are not presupposing, as a Humean must, that
there is some further desire that answers the ‘‘why’’ question. If apparently
malevolent action has an unconscious or ulterior motive, such as a sublimation of the desire for open love or friendship or an attempt to cover up
feelings of inadequacy, then it is not volitional malevolence after all, but
only its simulacrum (just as apparent friendship driven by some hidden
motive is not real friendship). When we are dealing with the real thing,
there is no other desire underlying the limitless assertion of one’s own power
to appropriate, or take things as one’s possessions, to be employed, deployed,
or disposed of at will.
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The grounding reasons for such a projective will to domination are twofold, I believe. First, like the making of artifacts, dwellings, and artworks,
turning bits of the world into possessions through work or claim is natural
to us. Appropriation is an essential power of human nature—its development and proper exercise is part of our existential telos (see chap. 12, sec.
3). This fact is sensed by all persons with the minimum mental capacity
and opportunities to make, build, and appropriate. Even the one-year-old
baby grasps a blanket, stuffed animal, or other familiar object as ‘‘her own’’;
toddlers proudly display a crayoned squiggle or juxtaposed blocks as a masterpiece. Hegel is correct to this extent: we express ourselves in our works.
Second, this power also has an inherent ontological limit: we cannot make
alterity nor determine by our creative powers the existence of freedom in
beings independent of ourselves. Nurturing our children is the closest we
can come to this distinctive mark of the divine, but children are not and
should never become our artifacts.100 The things that we make cannot escape their ontological status as subordinate to their human maker; they
remain human artifacts even when we give or throw them away. Most of
all, they can never acquire a will of their own; to have that would be to
resist appropriation, to face us and answer us as respondents rather than
tools. Hence nothing with this kind of alterity can be our artifact.
This ultimate limit to our creative power is also obscurely sensed in all
responsible human agents,101 and there are two basic responses to it. On
the one hand, most people accept this limit and some even interpret it in
religious terms: nothing absolutely and finally belongs to us but only to the
Creator from whom all being comes. On this view, we are stewards whose
ownership is derivative and provisional; life and being are loaned to us. So
we must release any absolute claim to sovereignty over the products of our
art and work, or our ‘‘subcreative’’ activities, as Tolkien called them.102 On
the other hand, we can rebel against this limit and try to reject the order of
appropriation etched in the ontological limits of our volitional powers, to
insist on the absolute sovereignty of our creative will.
This is what Sartre has somewhat misleadingly called the ‘‘desire’’ to be
God.103 It is in fact the will to claim the uniquely divine right to create and
own beings that are nevertheless also secondarily independent of the power
that created them—beings able to face that power as free respondents. But
we cannot succeed in creating beings independent of our will or other than
ourselves; our works remain extensions of our minds. So we assert our will
to divine power by trying to appropriate, dominate, or enslave the freedom
of other creatures that we have not made, trying to own them while making
them keep their alterity. This futile endeavor is the topic of Sartre’s famous
analysis of ‘‘concrete relations with others,’’104 whose ideal is a being Y who
is other/free in relation to X yet still owned/appropriated by X. If this
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relation is possible for any X, then X is divine. But we are not capable of
bringing about this paradoxical relation.
Combining these points, the reason why the malevolent agent projects
his radically evil end is that (a) he is not God, that is, he cannot create
alterity, yet (b) others exist in their freedom and alterity, which together imply
(c) that he did not create these others and so cannot own or possess them.
The malevolent agent takes these ontological truths as negative, as intolerable offenses to his ontological status, and projects the goal within his power
that comes nearest to tearing down these ultimate laws of being. If this is
right, then there was a good deal of insight in Augustine’s idea that the
malevolent will is based on sheer rebellion against God. However, this is
not rebellion in the sense that a typical adolescent resists oppressive parental
authority; rather, it is the rejection of any limits to one’s being, the will to
infinite appropriation of anything that is not already oneself, the rebellion
against the scandalous possibility of difference, the offense at discovering
that one is not the whole of Being. Augustine’s view tends to make him
suspicious of any human self-assertion, but it also makes him better than
virtually all other thinkers in the eudaimonist tradition at recognizing the
radicalness of some kinds of evil.105
The clearest examples of such malevolent willing comes from fictional
depictions of the devil or other demonic figures—naturally enough, since
they are artistic expressions of this phenomenon, purified by the imagination. For instance, in Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, the dark lord Sauron (a
fallen Maia or angelic spirit) seeks to dominate the minds and wills of his
slaves and his opponents through the creation of the One Ring, into which
he has placed a great part of the spirit or willpower that is native to his
being. As a result, the Ring enhances his ability to possess others and control their thoughts—while paradoxically objectifying Sauron himself, linking
him with a material object that can be destroyed.106
Sauron’s malevolence is clearly not any kind of ignorance nor akratic
concupiscence or irascibility; he is a tyrant but he is not ruled by sensual
appetites or lusts for material gains. His fundamental crimes are perpetrated
for their own sake: the destruction of natural beauty, the twisting of all life
to his malign purposes, the imposition of his will by torture, terror, mind
control, and (most subtly) seduction to submit to his spirit rather than
make the volitional effort to resist, are all inherently pleasing to him because they help maximize his power and ascendancy, which he projects with
almost infinite strength of will. His ultimate goal is appropriation of all
independent life: thus Gollum accurately says that if Sauron regains the
Ring, he will eat up the whole world. The will to power and the will to
possess or dominate are identified in Tolkien’s striking portrait of malevolence in its absolute form.
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2.6. Demonic Autonomy
Malevolence, then, turns out to be based on the rejection of any limits to
one’s will or its power to possess, appropriate, or control. It is just this
perversion of the striving will which, as I argue in chapter 2, the ancient
Hindu and Daoist sages most feared as the root of violence and tyranny—
although, ironically, they were also the first to obscure its true source by
mistakenly diagnosing its cause as untamed sensual appetites and overattachment to material things and particular people (among other goods subject to time and fortune).
Milton sees more clearly than these Eastern sages when he portrays Satan
as willing the destruction of God’s creation and the corruption of human
beings precisely because this is a way of interfering where he has no right, or
doing something intrinsically wrong. ‘‘Demonic autonomy’’ in this sense is
the will to moral wrong or misappropriation for its own sake. But again, this
end is not projected arbitrarily; it is chosen because it expresses an absolute
rejection or refusal of any moral requirements or limits. The will to illegitimate acts just for the sake of their moral wrongness is intelligible only as
an attempt to go ‘‘beyond good and evil,’’ or to defy (at any cost) the authority of moral norms or their source. Milton, of course, was drawing on
Augustinian ideas concerning how to explain the ‘‘fall of the devil’’—a
long-running ‘‘disputed question’’ in Scholastic philosophy. Near the end
of his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine suggested that perhaps
the devil turned from God to himself just because he is a distinct being and
therefore he could will allegiance to himself before God.107 Similarly, Tolkien represents Morgoth (the highest archangel) as falling because he wills
to create in absolute independence from God, and this is denied to him. The
creaturely status that other angels take as a reason for worship he takes as
a reason to set his will against the metaphysical law that all being has its
ultimate source in God.108
In Christian theology, as these literary portraits suggest, the defiance
involved in willing evil per se is often interpreted as an expression of pure
rebellion against God. Since, however, it is also possible for atheists to
achieve this form of will, I define it more widely as an explicit rejection of
any moral limits on the self or its rights to own and control. Such an
agent presumably fixes on moral requirements as the particular object of his
defiance because, in demanding virtues of character, these requirements
reach to the very heart of the self ’s identity. The demonic attitude interprets these requirements of fairness, justice, and virtue as heteronomous
impositions on the self rather than as autonomous expressions of his will’s
own implicit commitments, and rejects them in a will to freedom from morality. For example, the infamous murderers Leopold and Loeb are commonly thought to have killed their victim just to prove that they could flout
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moral standards of decency—allegedly, they had nothing else to gain from
it and no other ulterior motive.
I conclude this taxonomy of evil by considering the necessary Arendtian
objection. As Bernstein shows, Arendt’s later view that ‘‘evil is never radical’’
or spiritually deep, but only ‘‘extreme’’ in its effects,109 was inspired by Karl
Jaspers’s insistence that the Nazis be seen ‘‘in their total banality.’’ Jaspers
understandably feared that talk of radical or even ‘‘satanic’’ evil would imply
a kind of ‘‘greatness’’110 that would actually appeal to people raised on the
highly distorted version of Germanic mythology disseminated by the Nazis,
and Arendt agreed. Thus they would object that my analysis may ‘‘mythologize the horrible.’’111
My response is that Jaspers and Arendt obscured important truths in
effort to prevent evil seeming heroic: in fact, the same kind of willpower that
is essential to moral heroism can be turned to pure destruction, open-ended
spite, or rebellion against alterity and pluralism. This spiritual reality has
to be faced if we are to deal with these forms of evil. Someone may regard
such radical evil as heroic in a quasi-Nietzschean sense, but at least we will
understand that some types of malevolent motivation start from bases similar to genuine heroism. Value concepts and ideals of the same categories
that ground noble and decent projects are used, in deficient forms, as the
grounds for evil projects; considerations of justice, beauty, knowledge, selfreliance, practical autonomy, and even metaphysical finitude can be twisted
into reasons for evil devotions. But in radical evil, this is not due to brainwashing, irresistible ideology, or other involuntary malfunctions of the
practical intellect. Rather, it is the will that forces negative ends to be regarded as noble, or adopted as pure maxims: as Milton’s Satan says, ‘‘evil,
be thou my good.’’112
3. Aquinas and Kierkegaard on Evil: A Response to MacIntyre
The preceding remarks are obviously no more than a sketch of a complete
existential theory of radical evil. A full argument for my thesis that the
reality of radical evil proves the existence of projective motivation would
require, in addition to the existential hypotheses account sketched here, a
rebuttal of the most sophisticated eudaimonist explanation of malice,
namely, Aquinas’s. I believe the above analysis supports my suggestion in
an earlier essay that Aquinas’s eudaimonist moral psychology cannot adequately explain these phenomena.113 In response, MacIntyre has recently
argued that Aquinas can explain the intentional choice of evil actions as
based on inordinate desire for some temporal good, which can lead an agent
to choose unjust or wicked actions despite knowing that he is sacrificing
spiritual goods in the process.114
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The problem with Aquinas’s argument is twofold. First, its hypothesis
that ‘‘evil is nothing other than the perversion of some good’’ requires tracing all corrupt motivation to an overvaluing of some positive intrinsic or
instrumental value (e.g., wealth, honor, sensual pleasure, etc.). This is precisely what the existential analysis of volitional hatred says is implausible;
experience reveals agents who seek some harm or loss of well-being for its
own sake, not as a good apparently related to their own eudaimonia in ways
that could attract orektic desire. Second, Aquinas acknowledges only that
persons can accept evil (i.e., the privation of a spiritual good) as a side effect or
necessary cost of pursuing some temporal good to extremes or in unjust
ways; he does not concede that they can directly pursue the destruction of
their own spiritual goods just in order to reject them or rebel against
them.115 Even in his later discussions of malice, as Carlos Steele says, for
Aquinas, ‘‘no one intends to do evil for the sake of evil. Evil can only be
intended by a rational agent for the sake of obtaining another good or
avoiding another evil. If it were possible to obtain a good without the evil
or immorality, everyone would prefer to do so.’’116 Yet our examples of
spite, malevolence, and demonic autonomy suggest that Aquinas is wrong:
our volitional powers do extend to such extremes.
Similarly, Steele suggests that Augustine’s famous experience of stealing
pears shows the incompleteness in Aquinas’s model: minor though the
transgression was, it was an ‘‘experience of wickedness with no other motivation than wickedness, the fascination for the nothingness of evil.’’117 It
was not done to satisfy hunger, or for profit, or just for sport, or to annoy
homeowners against whom his friends had a grudge, but rather for the sake
of gratuitous injustice. Unsurprisingly, Steele turns to Kierkegaard for an
explanation of the sinful will as intentional defiance of the good.118 In contrast to Kierkegaard’s idea that evil can be willed as a ‘‘position’’ in its
own right, not just as a negation of the good, ‘‘for Thomas, sin remains
fundamentally what it was for the Greeks: a hamartia, to miss the mark, to
fail in one’s purpose, to go wrong, to make a mistake, to err, a shortcoming,
a defect, a privation.’’119 Evil remains a malfunction for Aquinas, even
though, as MacIntyre says, he recognizes the corrupt will as akratic and
self-deceiving rather than merely ignorant about its goal.
Kierkegaard’s critique of this classical diagnosis in The Sickness Unto Death
is supported by cases like the pear theft, in which misappropriation or
violation of right is the final end, and by what he calls self-conscious forms
of despair. Defiant despair is not weak or fearful of selfhood; rather, it
wants to create itself entirely without prior metaphysical direction: it ‘‘recognizes no power over itself.’’120 Hence it tries to bootstrap value into its
goals by sheer will, but its resolve is undermined by the arbitrariness of
this enterprise.121 Understood as sin, radical evil has to be interpreted as a
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‘‘position,’’ rather than as ‘‘something merely negative—weakness, sensuousness, finitude, ignorance, etc.’’122
Radical evil is a ‘‘leap’’ of the will in Kierkegaard’s sense, and this simply
means that it involves the projection of ends that are new to the agent’s
standing stock of motives, which include both prepurposive desires and
already formed purposes. Such a volitional leap would have to be arbitrary or
criterionless on Aristotelian assumptions, for according to A-eudaimonism,
choice of actions is rationally motivated only if it is prohairetic, or moved by
rational appetite (the specification of D3 desires according to the circumstances). As we saw in chapter 5, deliberative choice in this sense simply
transmits general appetite for one’s good into appetite for this or that fully
particular act; at the highest reflective level, it channels our embracing desire
for eudaimonia into motivation to select concrete means to this holistic end.
Aquinas shares this view: reason can motivate only by conveying appetite
for one’s good into an indefinite number of particular acts.123 That is false
according to Kierkegaard’s argument that the commitments we form and
pursue with our wills change our practical character or alter what Bernard
Williams called our ‘‘subjective motivational set.’’124 Kierkegaard’s ‘‘stages’’
of existence (the aesthetic, ethical, and religious—and their many substages)
can each be understood as a distinctive kind of motivational set or constellation of motivational dispositions. Hence his idea that our will can move
us from one stage to another, and have intelligible grounds for doing so,125
implies that we can posit new ends or generate new motives on the basis
of recognized practical reasons without these putative grounds for selfmotivation having antecedently stimulated our desire.
On Kierkegaard’s conception of the will, then, a choice can fail to be
motivated by any desire that is formally erosiac in structure, including Aristotelian ‘‘rational appetite’’ or boulēsis, but nevertheless be grounded in considerations whose objective rational significance the agent antecedently
recognizes. This is simply to say that the will can project new motivation
based on values and consideration that do not themselves already move the
agent in the usual prepurposive sense. Only the leap gives full subjective
force to these considerations as ones on which the agent resolves to act.126
In other words, it is through such projective leaps that the agent autonomously changes practical reasons ‘‘external’’ to her motivational set into
reasons that are ‘‘internal’’ to this set. This internalization of practical reasons,
giving them a motivational role, is grounded but not determined by these
external reasons themselves and their cognitive relation to the agent’s existing dispositions and plans.
Thus Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous books suggest that the will is a faculty with a creative power lacking in Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s conceptions.
Significant life choices that change our inner character do so by generating
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and cultivating new motives for action. Though they are radical in this sense,
such choices are neither causally ex nihilo nor rationally arbitrary; they are
both conditioned by tendencies arising from past choices and informed
(although not erosiacally drawn) by other kinds of reasons and considerations available to us, which may or may not conflict with the tendencies of
our acquired character. Neither our existing dispositions nor available rational grounds for possible new motivations determine the leap, which allows
for novelty even in our deepest motives or longest-term commitments. This
is not ‘‘voluntarism’’ in its Ockhamist sense, that is, the total subordination
of reason to will, but it does transcend the relation assumed by Aristotle’s
model of the practical syllogism (i.e., choice determined by prior states internal to the agent’s motivational set along with the entire gestalt of the choice
circumstance). Kierkegaard posits a new relationship between will and reason that is more subtle than those recognized by either the voluntarist or
eudaimonist pole of this classical dichotomy. It is precisely this new relation
that we have to work out to understand in more detail how the existential
will functions. This chapter points out some kinds of considerations or
reasons that can ground projective motivation without already constituting
or causing orektic desires in the agent, and the full range of such values is
developed in chapters 11 to 14.
4. Projective Strength of Will versus Enkrateia
Because they ignore the role of projective motivation in human psychology,
eudaimonist accounts of moral character remain incomplete in two closely
related ways. In addition to reducing vice to ignorance and weakness in the
face of appetitive temptations and strong emotions, eudaimonist accounts
reduce existential strength of will, or uprightness of character, to simple
enkrateia—the self-control that is the logical complement of akrasia.
‘‘Strength of will’’ in this classical sense as self-restraint and repression of
the Id is supposed to be transcended in virtue through rational sculpting
of the passions. But this negative conception obscures the true nature of
volitional strength in human beings.
4.1. Kierkegaard and Kupperman on Character
As I suggested in introducing the idea of projective motivation in chapters
2 and 3, we are already familiar with a positive sense of ‘‘strength’’ of character that we find in persons who show great loyalty to their friends and
ideals and who display persisting or even aggressive determination in pursuing their goals. Such persons display what I call the ‘‘proto-virtue’’ of ‘‘constancy’’ or existential courage, which Kierkegaard called ‘‘earnestness’’ and
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regarded as a prerequisite to both good and evil character in their fullest
sense.127 This thesis is central to existential moral psychology and reveals
one of its deepest differences from the eudaimonist tradition. Kierkegaardian existentialism recognizes that heroic character is something more than
the self-controlling capacity to resist great longing or ravenous appetite.
Nor is it simply another strong emotion; when Kierkegaard speaks of heroic
‘‘passion,’’ he means caring, ‘‘concern,’’ or the ‘‘prodigious strenuousness’’
of devotion.128 It is a mode of ‘‘spirit,’’129 not in the sense of thumos but
rather of volitional activity. Agents displaying existential courage are moving
themselves, rather than being moved by need or desire. They are not oppressed
but, rather, liberated by the motives that drive them with such passion. This
explains why such existential strength of will (rather than enkrateia) is more
apparent in cases where prepurposive desire for the goal is unlikely or even
unintelligible. For example, someone deeply engaged in a practice or profession that demands sacrifice or someone thoroughly devoted to a political
cause with little apparent relation to his own material well-being exhibits
such strength of will.
As we saw, this kind of constancy and volitional determination is also
exhibited by persons passionately bent on malevolent purposes from which
they stand to gain little if anything that could have prima facie instrumental
or natural value for them prior to being desired. Such malicious obsessions
do not have the character of a bizarre D2 preference (like the desire to eat
some mud) nor a woefully misinformed D3 desire (like the conviction that
God will love us for suicide bombings aimed at civilians). They seem instead to display a hatred that is in one sense quite ‘‘unnatural’’—or which
transcends natural self-interest—since it may even involve full knowledge
of its own self-destructiveness. This helps explain and justify Joel Kupperman’s assertion that:
Strength of character is independent of goodness of character, in that
deeply wicked people have strong characters. Indeed, a strong character is required to be either extremely good or deeply wicked. It is
possible to have a strong character and yet to be fickle or unreliable.
. . . However, it is not possible to have what we would call a strong
character and to have no ongoing concerns or commitments
whatsoever.130
In other words, character-strength in Kupperman’s sense is incompatible
with wantonness; the ‘‘deeply’’ evil person autonomously wills wicked ends at
least in part for the sake of their intrinsic wrongness. Thus Kupperman,
like Kierkegaard, holds that character has less to do with what goals we are
committed to and more to do with how we are committed to them: ‘‘Character has a great deal to do with how we are prepared to maintain, modify,
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or abandon a structure of goals and commitments.’’131 For example, a person of strong character will exhibit tenacious ‘‘loyalty to commitments and
projects’’ and change life goals ‘‘only for her own reasons’’ (not simply to
please others).132 Character in this existential sense is not a sum of traits
nor even a sum of goals, projects, and commitments; it picks out the way
that an agent forms, maintains, and modifies these elements over time, or
the characteristic volitional dispositions underlying this process. The mode
of strong character is resilience, integrity, and wholeheartedness.133
4.2. Roberts’s Analysis
Despite its great importance, this kind of character strength is rarely recognized or discussed in contemporary philosophical literature, which tends to
fall back on the enkratic conception. For example, Robert Roberts divides
virtues into (a) those that are morally ‘‘substantive and motivational’’ (involving intrinsically moral motives), such as ‘‘honesty, compassion, justice,
generosity, promise-keeping, and kindness’’; and (b) ‘‘virtues of willpower,’’ which include patience and courage.134 Only the latter, he argues,
are essentially ‘‘corrective’’ of passions and desires whose extremes interfere
with ‘‘moral and prudential life.’’135 This distinction is insightful, and Roberts is surely right that dispositions like courage and patience can be displayed by persons in pursuit of immoral purposes. I also think he is correct
that some degree of by-product satisfaction is essential to sustaining
the substantive moral virtues, but not necessarily when exercising ‘‘selfmastery.’’136
The problem is that the sense of ‘‘will’’ involved in these virtues of ‘‘willpower’’ remains negative on Roberts’s account: it ‘‘designates not motivations but a family of capacities for resisting adverse inclinations.’’137 By ‘‘motivation’’ here, Roberts apparently means erosiac desire; he does not regard
‘‘efforts’’ of self-mastery as a different kind of motive generated by one’s
agency. Thus he assimilates all the virtues of willpower to ‘‘self-control’’ in
the enkratic sense; they are ‘‘(in large and basic part) the capacities to manage
our inclinations, when they are wayward, to flee dangers and seek pleasures.’’ Willpower in Roberts’s sense is an essentially appetite-corrective
capacity, rather than an end-setting one.138
This misses the positive sense of willpower as strength of commitment
or resolve. People are assessed as heroes and villains not only for their
willpower in the sense of self-control, as Roberts suggests,139 but even more
for their focus on the tasks at hand and their determined effort to succeed.
For example, what Randall Helms calls Aragorn’s ‘‘force of will’’ in his
mind-battle with Sauron and his ability to lead men through mortal danger
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is something more than the power to control his own fear;140 it is a sustained direction of volitional energy on the goal of saving the city of Minas
Tirith. Even an agent who has a pure heart in Roberts’s sense, since he does
not need virtues of self-control to exercise substantive moral virtues, may
be counted more heroic for demonstrating such positive volitional strength
(as we saw in chapter 1, the idea of heroic will contains the idea of selfmotivating effort). A moral ‘‘saint’’ like Mother Theresa is that not primarily because of her great capacity to resist temptations but rather because her
temperance aids her unyielding devotion to her noble cause.
By contrast, a virtuous person in Aristotle’s sense, whose moral dispositions are too strong to need the support of enkratic self-control, might still
fail to exhibit projective willpower in pursuit of greater social goods that
we regard as essential to the highest state of moral heroism.141 Although
such an agent would not count as ‘‘weak-willed’’ in the akratic sense, nevertheless she would still lack existential strength of will. Gaining it requires
not merely the training of passions to follow wise practical judgment but
also an effort to exercise the fundamental human capacity of motivating
oneself toward an end because of its value. This may be experienced as
difficult or as involving inward struggle, not primarily because of the resistance of opposing inclinations and emotions but rather because (a) the task
is inherently daunting, or (b) the agent has not exercised this fundamental
power of her agency enough before now, or (c) both. When the agent is
not used to sustaining earnest dedication to worthy goals, which are often
hard to achieve, awakening from what Kierkegaard calls ‘‘aesthetic’’ slumber
of the will is an effort to rouse a basic spiritual power. But even for those
whose character is marked by long devotions and cares, sustaining these
choices of purpose always remains an effort, no matter how heroic they
become.
Hence the existential account of projective willing solves the longstanding puzzle about why volitional striving or effort seems to characterize
moral heroism, even though a fully virtuous person should not need to
exercise self-control against recalcitrant passions. The explanation is simply
that there is a different sense of volitional struggle, the need for which
never disappears in a state of virtuous habits. This sense of ‘‘willing’’ is
not recognized within eudaimonist models because they reduce all human
motivation to erosiac desire. Only the existential model offers an adequate
explanation of this positive, non-enkratic sense of willpower and its crucial
role in developing our character.
Roberts is correct that struggling against temptations or ‘‘psychological
adversities’’ helps strengthen the will enough to make possible ‘‘an abiding
passion for justice.’’142 But that is because of a complex feedback relation
between enkratia and existential will-strength: (a) trying to gain control
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over one’s prepurposive appetites and passions is itself a work of the striving will, even though it is no longer necessary for the virtuous person; and
(b) some level of self-control or (better) rational sculpting of one’s desires
and emotions is a necessary precondition for earnestly setting and pursuing
noble self-transcending ends.143 This enkratic precondition is not, however,
a sufficient condition for positive caring: the agent must also muster the
volitional resolve to devote herself to the task, which reinforces her control
over opposing first-order inclinations.144
This brief discussion has not surveyed all the main conceptions of
strength of will in contemporary moral psychology; several can be evaluated
only in the context of a broader analysis of autonomy and the different
species of weakness that undermine it.145 But the examples above are sufficient to explain why medieval thinkers before and after Aquinas turned
away from eudaimonism in search of a more volitionalist conception of
moral motivation, as we will see in the next chapter.
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Overview. This chapter argues that medieval critics of Thomism
began to see the free will in which virtues develop as having the power
to generate moral motivation. Kant inherits from Scotus this idea of
projective motivation in the moral realm. Although the chapter is
primarily historical and accessible to nonspecialists, the analysis of
Kant’s conception of the motive of duty reconstructs key arguments
as natural deductions that may be useful in teaching the Groundwork.
The discussion of libertarian freedom in Kant presupposes some
knowledge of Kant’s metaphysics.
1. The Medieval Shift away from Eudaimonism: Scotus
and the Moral Will
The positive existential idea of volitional strength described in the previous
chapter suggests the possibility of conceiving virtuous character in ways
that, unlike Aristotle’s Apollonian conception of virtue (chap. 10, sec. 1),
contrast directly with radical evil on its own volitional level. As accounts
of the virtues of justice and charity developed in medieval philosophy, a
fundamental shift away from the Apollonian conception occurred; it became clearer that to will the good wholeheartedly requires something more
than the right disposition of sense appetites. A radically good will is not
just a corrective to strong or misdirected passions and habits that can lead
to cowardly, ungenerous, dishonest, or intemperate actions.
Thus the key insight in this medieval turn away from eudaimonism is
that the virtues of a good will are not all structurally analogous to temperance; in some cases, virtue requires bringing ourselves to care more than we
are naturally inclined to about selfless ends of several kinds rather than
just desiring self-interested goods less strongly. That the former will not
automatically follow the latter was not emphasized by Socrates and Plato,
371
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whose psychological and ethical analyses were primarily focused on the
problem of government. They rightly saw that the polis is ruined by leaders
who are too timocratic, avaricious, or intemperate to control their own
selfish lusts or to place justice and the common good above their private
pleasures, profit, and glory. The practical philosophy of Socrates and Plato
was from first to last a response to this great disaster for the state, which
still haunts us today. But being a good person turns out to require more than
the character traits that we need to cultivate in future leaders in order to
ensure that they will tend away from tyranny and toward philosophy and
ideal guardianship. It extends to radical generosity beyond concern for harmony in one’s own soul.
1.1. From Aquinas to Scotus: Kent on Virtues of the Will
The move toward a positive volitional conception of virtue has some roots
in the Roman Stoics and St. Augustine, but it begins in earnest in postThomistic medieval philosophy. In her invaluable study, Bonnie Kent explains that Aquinas’s placement of temperance and courage in the sense
appetite as opposed to the will (where he placed justice) was hardly universal: ‘‘In the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, more than a
dozen thinkers,’’ including ‘‘Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Peter Olivi,
Gonsalvus of Spain, and Duns Scotus,’’ defended the view that only ‘‘habits
of will,’’ as opposed to dispositions of sense appetites, can count as virtues.1
Initially, these authors still conceived the will, in contrast to the irrational
or sense appetite, as the faculty of prohairetic choice flowing from intellectual appetite. But as Kent points out, following Augustine, ‘‘will’’ in this
bouletic sense (voluntas in Latin) was no longer restricted to good persons:
‘‘Augustine presented voluntas as the potential expression of either virtue or
vice and so helped lay the foundation for later conceptions of voluntas as a
faculty of the soul.’’2 As we’ll see, this provides the basis for one of Scotus’s
arguments for the autonomy of volitional motivation.
Augustine attributed libertarian freedom to voluntas and employed this
concept in explaining how the will can pursue ends with different moral
values. Since virtue and vice are the basis of moral worth, and moral worth
is now related to libertarian freedom, virtues must rest in the faculty endowed with such freedom: ‘‘It is by the will that we lead and deserve a
praiseworthy and happy life, or a contemptible and unhappy one.’’3
This line of thought is developed by Bonaventure, for example: ‘‘Because
merit is rooted in free decision, Bonaventure argues, the cardinal virtues
must belong to those powers that share in free decision’’; hence temperance
and courage must reside in the will along with justice.4 It might be, as
Aristotle clearly suggests in Nicomachean Ethics III.5, that agents can exercise
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some kind of control over the development of their own virtues; but as
Kent rightly notes, ‘‘he demonstrates an indifference to the ‘moral luck’
necessary for that noble upbringing his theory of the virtues evidently requires.’’5 By contrast, for theological reasons, Catholic medieval philosophers had to conceive virtue and vice as states for which the agent could
justly be held responsible—and therefore as distinct in kind from personality traits that could be fixed by individual nature or nurture (such as habits
of the sense appetite).
Hence Bonaventure ‘‘consistently emphasizes that virtue must lie within
the scope of free decision; it must, in effect, be within the agent’s control.’’6
Kent, like Bernard Williams, attributes this condition on moral virtues to
the ‘‘Stoic restriction of morality to what lies within the agent’s control,’’
or the exclusion of luck-dependent traits.7 But, as I have argued, the tendency in this direction is already present in Plato, and Aristotle also sees
virtue as the most luck-resistant component of our happiness. In that sense,
Bonaventure was simply taking to its logical limit Socrates’ rejection of the
archaic Greek belief that a person’s value is primarily a function of their
birth caste.
Aquinas answers this argument by maintaining that every power that
participates directly or indirectly in reason must have virtuous states (in
which it functions rightly) and vicious states (in which it malfunctions). As
Kent explains, for Aquinas, ‘‘the sense appetite, in being conformed to reason, can have moral virtue begotten in it,’’ and thus the will can help make
the irascible and concupiscible powers virtuous through its ‘‘politic rule.’’8
Yet as Urmson argued, Aquinas seems to recognize that Aristotle’s Apollonian account, implied in his doctrine of the mean, is incomplete (see
chap. 10, sec. 1.1):
Aquinas does not attribute all moral virtues to the sense appetite. . . .
the sense appetite needs only those virtues that moderate the passions.
Because temperance and courage produce an internal order, no additional virtue of the will is needed [for these states to exist]. . . .
Aquinas posits justice in the will because it moderates actions, thereby
ordering the agent’s relations to others rather than to her internal
condition.9
In other words, those virtues that are not correlated with particular passions or emotions that can lead to extreme or inordinate actions (which
reason judges according to the individual’s temperament) go into the will.
Hence justice is not a mean between two vices for Aquinas,10 and the radical
implications of its distinct status are developed by Scotus in his account of
the will to justice. Nevertheless, as Kent emphasizes, Aquinas answers the
familiar argument that ‘‘moral virtues, as habits of choice, must belong to
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the will’’ by insisting that ‘‘[t]he right intention of an end concerning the
passions comes from the good disposition of the sense appetite.’’11 This is
the key issue in the dispute, because Aquinas is denying to the will as
rational appetite the power to choose between different completely final
ends. Our only ultimate end, eudaimonia, is fixed by our nature, and our
essential desire for this formal telos is directed into desire for particular
final ends (as constitutive of our happiness) by the state of our sense appetite and the practical judgments it influences; ‘‘choice’’ is prohairetic, only
determining our selection of particular acts as means to such desired ends.
This is exactly where Scotus thinks that Aquinas’s account goes wrong.
In this he is anticipated by Walter of Bruges, who, according to Kent,
holds that the ‘‘habits’’ of willing that constitute virtues are inclinations
rather than determinations to choose rightly. Moreover, ‘‘Walter argues
that the will needs virtues because it is not determined to act in accordance
with reason even when reason discloses what is good.’’12 In other words, it
retains the power to choose the worse act even knowing it is worse—
something that Aristotle can attribute only to appetite overwhelming reason
but not to self-corrupting boulēsis itself. Likewise, Henry of Ghent replies to
Aquinas that the sense appetite was not naturally rebellious before the Fall,
but ‘‘The will, by contrast, needs virtues by its very nature, for by its very
nature the will is indeterminate’’ in its motives.13 He also agrees with Walter
that ‘‘Because it can choose against the judgment of right reason, it needs
more than a natural inclination to the good’’; in other words, the will needs
virtues that it develops through its own pattern of free choices.14
This shift results in a new account of the unity of virtues. Just as Plato,
Aristotle, and the Stoics regarded sophia or phronesis as master virtues that
allow all other abilities and qualities of character to be used rightly or
deployed for the good,15 both Walter and Henry take the will’s virtue as
primary, without which the sense appetite’s virtues lack moral quality.16 It
is also possible to have real virtue in the will without perfect conformance
of the sense appetites and passions:17 an agent with volitional self-control
may possess the most essential element of full virtue, lacking only its adjunct reflection in a perfectly conforming set of appetites and emotions.
Similarly, Peter Olivi gives supremacy to virtue in the will: ‘‘Habits in
other powers are virtues only secundum quid, that is, only in connection with
related virtues of the will.’’18 Habits of the sense appetite are never enough
without rightly willed choices, because ‘‘beasts and madmen . . . may have
the same habits of the sense appetite that are found in the virtuous’’ but
without acquiring any moral worth from them.19 If its factual premise is
true, this seems like a particularly strong argument against the Thomistic
view. If nonhuman animals and incompetent human beings can indeed display temperate or courageous appetites and aversions without exercising
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rational will in forming or acting on their motives, then either they should
count as morally praiseworthy agents (which is absurd) or the actual virtues
of courage and temperance require something more than these states of sense
appetite. Habits of the sense appetite are insufficient for virtue because they
lack direction by ‘‘a good will,’’ which takes over the role of rational prudence (or phronesis) in Aristotle’s account:
Olivi accordingly argues that the chief part of prudence, insofar as
prudence signifies a virtue worthy of [moral] praise and reward, is in
the will. Only through the will’s rectitude is the intellect rightly applied;
only through the virtue of the will does the intellect come to discriminate properly between good and evil.20
This emphasis on rectitude in the will becomes central in Duns Scotus’s
moral theory as well. As an addendum to Kent’s account, I suggest that the
notion of volitional rectitude as the supreme virtue (or sine qua non for all
the others) grows out of the earlier idea that justice could be the master
virtue qualifying all other candidate states as virtues. We find hints of this
unification theory in Aristotle’s idea that boldness in pursuing an unjust
cause is not true bravery21 and in Plato’s conception of justice as the rule
of wise reason over appetites with the help of spirit.22 As Robert O’Connell
has argued, Plato sometimes presents Socrates as arguing that he should
never do what he knows is intrinsically ‘‘disgraceful and dishonorable’’
(such as betraying his ‘‘divinely appointed duty’’ in Athens).23 But Plato
never moved from this to the Franciscan idea of a just will as one concerned
with something other than happiness as its ultimate goal, because Plato believed in a ‘‘perfect coincidence’’ between fulfilling our deontological obligations and attaining eudaimonia.24
Scotus, as Kent shows, appropriates and develops all the earlier arguments for virtues as dispositions of choice in the will itself, emphasizing
the point that the will can moderate or redirect excessive or corrupt desires
and emotions more effectively than the sense appetite can, since it has no
access to rational evaluation of ends.25 Someone may object that teachers
and parents train a child’s sense appetite using their reason as a guide,
and that the resulting dispositions influence how the child judges practical
options. The Scotian response is that any direct conditioning of the sense
appetite (e.g., operant or Pavlovian conditioning) could not possibly constitute a disposition that qualifies the agent as a morally good person. What
gives us this distinction is neither reason as speculative discernment of the
good, nor sense appetites, but rather the will that operates between them and
generates its own disposition to choose rightly.26 Since this disposition of
free choice is a motive that the will gives itself, it seems that the leading
medieval Franciscan philosopher gives the will what I call a projective
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power. This becomes clear, however, only once we see that Scotus believes
that the will’s self-generated disposition to choose rightly does not trace to
D3 desires for the agent’s own well-being.
1.2. Scotus on the Will to Justice
Duns Scotus’s conception of the will is, of course, a subtle matter, but I
need to touch on only a few of its most important points. Unlike my own
arguments for the existence of projective motivation, several of Scotus’s
arguments depend on libertarian assumptions about the freedom required
for moral responsibility and a closely associated rejection of moral luck. I
am not interested in defending these premises here but only in showing
that Scotus’s conclusions constitute a dramatic move away from eudaimonist moral psychology toward an existential conception of the striving will
and its liberty. I begin with Scotus’s well-known indeterminism and move
to his underlying theory of motivation, which is less widely appreciated.
First, in his famous Oxford Commentary on the Sentences of Master Lombard,
Scotus explicitly rejects the notion that ‘‘will’’ (voluntas) properly so called
is determined by prepurposive motives or desires that exist prior to the
agent’s intention. He attributes this mistaken view to Aristotle: ‘‘In Book
III of the De anima Aristotle lays down an order of what moves and what is
moved, thus: the desirable object is an unmoved mover; the appetite is a
moved mover, moved, that is, by the desirable object.’’27 Citing Augustine,
Scotus argues instead that ‘‘it is in the power of our will to have negative and
positive attitudes to a single object. Therefore these cannot be produced by an
agent naturally; and therefore not by the object, which is a natural agent.’’28
We can view this as an argument that in exercising libertarian freedom to
pursue or reject a given intentional object, the agent (or his will) cannot be
moved to turn one way rather than the other merely by the attractiveness
or repulsiveness of the object itself; therefore, the will turns one way or the
other through its own projective activity. Pursuing this interesting argument
would bring us into contemporary discussions about how to explain libertarian control as more than mere chance or arbitrary swings of will. Scotus’s
position, like Kierkegaard’s, implies that there cannot be a complete contrastive explanation or sufficient reason for choosing this option rather than
that one prior to the choice itself, if we are to avoid teleological
determinism.
Second, Scotus agrees with Aquinas that the will controls the intellect
by being ‘‘able to move the intellect to the consideration of this or that’’;
but in reply, he argues that these shifts of attention cannot be determined by
the will’s natural and involuntary orientation toward the Good, or else ‘‘it
will no longer be in the power of the will so to command the intellect

................. 16406$

CH11

05-23-07 10:57:09

PS

PAGE 376

Scotus and Kant: The Moral Will and Its Limits

377

concerning the consideration of this or that any more than was the first
act’’ of desiring the Good in general.29 Like Augustine, Scotus concludes
that ‘‘nothing other than the will is the total cause of volition in the will’’;
he regards the will as an indeterministic cause of action30 and, unlike Aquinas, he does not rest this indeterminacy in the intellect’s power of attention
to this or that particular good: ‘‘There is a different form of potency which
is still undetermined after the object has been presented to it, which is
perfect, and not diminished. The will is of this kind.’’31 Clearly, Scotus conceives
the will in terms of what Pink called a second-order executive agency, in
which nothing but its own decisions are sufficient to cause it to form intentions to act. He also effectively conceives this as agent causation, with reasons for the various options informing but not determining the choice. As
Allan Wolter explains, for Scotus, ‘‘even by his absolute power, God could
not force the human will to elicit an act of volition or nolition,’’ since this
is metaphysically impossible.32
There is evidence that Scotus amended his teachings on the relation of
will and intellect in later lectures given after his first move from Oxford to
Paris, which were not originally part of his Oxford Commentary.33 In these
lectures (as recorded by reliable students), Scotus no longer holds that the
object of the will is merely a causa sine qua non, but teaches instead that the
object is a partial cause of the will’s movement toward its end.34 The free
decision and the object or goal that the will decides to pursue are independent causes of the action in the sense that neither depends on the other for
its role in influencing the outcome, but free choice remains ‘‘the principal
cause.’’35 Yet even with this modification, Scotus’s position remains original,
as Wolter explains in his discussion of Scotus’s fifteen questions on Book
IX of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.36 In these questions, the Master challenges Aristotle’s principle that ‘‘Whatever is moved is moved by another.’’37 As
Wolter summarizes:
Among other instances of ‘‘self-movement,’’ Scotus singles out the
human will’s ability to determine itself. As an active potency, this will
is formally distinct from, but really identical with, the soul substance,
and is either the exclusive or at least the principal efficient cause of
its own volition. The volition in turn is an immanent action that falls
under the Aristotelian category of quality . . . [so] one can correctly
say that the soul ‘‘moves itself ’’ from a state of indeterminacy to a
positive state or decision.38
Wolter suggests that this notion of the ‘‘superabundant sufficiency’’ of
the will to determine itself refers to a state ‘‘more suitably called ‘positive
indeterminacy’ rather than ‘negative indeterminacy,’ ’’ since it is not arbitrarily determined, but rather determines itself in the light of considerations
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presented by the intellect (including moral reasons) that nevertheless by
themselves underdetermine its choices.39 As Kent argues in a recent essay,
Scotus regards the will as always choosing for reasons; the ability to do
otherwise does not make the choice random: ‘‘It means that the agent herself determines which of various reasons will guide her action.’’40
Formally, Scotus still follows older Aristotelian definitions of the will as
‘‘rational appetite.’’41 He admits the existence of motivating desires and
appetites that are simply natural to the human species, the principal of
which is will’s necessary and thus passive appetite for ‘‘happiness’’ in general, in which the ‘‘infinite good, as man’s ultimate end, occupies the first
place.’’42 But as a free power, the will can also choose to pursue an evil end
(thus making it into ‘‘an apparent good’’) because:
it can choose any being as the object of its desire and make it an
ultimate end, were it not for any reason other than its own pleasure
in abusing freedom and performing an evil act. Thus a rational creature, with full knowledge of what it is doing, can hate God and find
satisfaction in such a hatred, not because God is hateful or because
the hatred of God is not something evil, but because of the pleasure
that even such a hatred can bring to a rational creature in the form
of an apparent good.43
This description of a radically evil will implies the kind of projective
motive I described as ‘‘demonic autonomy’’ in chapter 10. Note how Scotus
retains the letter of the doctrine that what the will seeks must always be
apprehended as an apparent good (or under the aspect of value in general),
but rejects this doctrine’s eudaimonistic spirit. For he implies that the radically evil will’s goal G will appear good to it not because the will’s free
choice itself is motivated or drawn by its natural tendency to happiness,
and G antecedently appears as a means to or some part of happiness, but
rather because whatever end the will gives itself thereby becomes an apparent
good for it. In other words, that the agent apprehends his evil goal as a
good for him is not the prior motive for his choosing it but rather the posterior
result of his motivating himself to pursue it in the very choice that forms
his evil intention. The pleasure he experiences in pursuing his end G is a
by-product of projecting this corrupt goal, rather than an attractive cause
of erosiac desire for G. As Arendt says, it is ‘‘a delight inherent in the
willing activity itself as distinct from the delight of desire in having the
desired object, which is transient.’’44 Hence, while Scotus can still describe
the will as an ‘‘appetite’’ for value, his account implies that it can value and
project ends without any prevolitional apprehension of their contribution
to the agent’s well-being.
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Bonansea notes that this puts Scotus in opposition to Aquinas’s theory
that ‘‘no specific distinction obtains between the natural appetite [for the
good] and deliberate volition, since the latter is for him merely an application to a particular good or the original movement of the will towards good
in general.’’45 As Bonansea explains, Scotus’s main counterargument rests
on the point, which Aquinas concedes, that in its free acts, the will can
divert the intellect from particular goods or prevent the agent from knowing them; then, ‘‘since the will is free in directing the intellect towards its
final end, or happiness in general, it is also free in its tendency towards
happiness as such.’’46 Similarly, against Aquinas’s theory, Scotus objects that
if, in its free or ‘‘elicited’’ acts, ‘‘the will tends of necessity towards happiness as its final end, and it is within its power to apply intellect to the
consideration of that end, it will do so at all times and necessarily.’’ But we
know from experience that the will does not continually force the intellect
to consider the agent’s happiness.47
As Wolter explains, for Scotus, this means not only that every elicited
act of the will is ‘‘free in the sense of its being an act of self-determination
elicited contingently and not deterministically,’’48 but also that the will has
different possible highest motives. Following Anselm, Scotus argues that in
addition to the natural appetite for happiness or the agent’s eudaimonia,
the will has an inclination toward the ‘‘good’’ in a radically distinct agentneutral sense, so that it has two different highest or fully complete ends.
This means that Scotus rejects A-eudaimonism: there is no single allembracing motive or ultimate end (see chap. 6, sec. 1.1). Aside from the
natural desire for the agent’s own happiness, which we share with other
animals, there is a motive that exists only in moral agents capable of free
elicitation of their acts.49 As Wolter says, in addition to the freedom present
in any voluntary intention, whatever its motive, Scotus holds that
there is a prior sort of ‘‘liberty’’ or ‘‘innate freedom’’ possessed by the
will, a liberty that frees it from the need to seek self-perfection as its
primary goal, or as a supreme value. It consists in free will’s congenital
inclination towards the good in accord with its intrinsic worth or
value rather than in terms of how it may perfect self or nature. Anselm calls this higher inclination the will’s ‘‘affection for justice,’’ or
affectio iustitiae. In virtue of this . . . the will is able to love God for his
own sake as a supreme value. But it also inclines the will to love other
lesser goods . . . in terms of their intrinsic worth rather than in terms
of how they perfect one’s individual person or nature.50
This means precisely that Scotus rejects the requirements of formal egoism; the will can directly pursue first-order ends as valuable in themselves
without first perceiving in the pursuit or achievement of them any relationship
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to its own well-being. Hence Scotus can hold that purposive motivation toward
certain final ends (e.g., God’s glory) can be good in itself, whether or not these
purposes seem to promise anything to the agent in return. John Boler puts
this aptly: for Scotus, ‘‘morality cannot be an extension or refinement of a
project of self-realization and/or eudaimonism . . . but requires precisely
going beyond it.’’51 The motivation to justice is non-erosiac in form; in
acting on this motive, the agent is not seeking her own completeness. If
Scotus had made this distinction clearly, he would have said that the ‘‘justice’’ of certain active loves or self-initiated pursuits can give the will grounds
for projecting them rather than an ‘‘appetite’’ for them. Framed this way,
the moral appropriateness of an action becomes an agent-neutral ground
for projecting its end rather than a reason for being attracted to this action
as a means to (or as part of ) the full development or expression of one’s
nature.
Scotus still calls the two highest innate potentialities in the will its two
fundamental ‘‘inclinations’’ and describes them as ‘‘the affection for justice
and the affection for the advantageous,’’52 thus verbally following Augustine’s notion of lower and higher ‘‘loves.’’ But I think this Anselmian terminology is misleading; it suggests a structural similarity between the two
fundamental motives, when in fact Scotus conceives the affectio justitiae as a
radically different kind of motive. We see this when we try to understand
Wolter’s key point that the affectio justitiae is more closely associated with
the will’s libertarian freedom for Scotus. The appetite for advantage or
happiness is the motive natural to all animals as part of their kind-essence:
it is ‘‘simply the inclination the will has towards its own perfection, just as
in the case of other things that lack free appetite’’; indeed, it is the tendency
toward its flourishing or full development that any ‘‘nature’’ must have in
order to be a nature.53
Scotus also clearly understands the natural appetite for happiness or
advantage according to the lack model of desire; he describes it as ‘‘the
inclination the potency has to tend towards its proper perfection. . . . It is
imperfect unless it possesses that perfection to which this tendency inclines
this power.’’ By contrast, when the will ‘‘tends freely and actively to elicit
an act,’’ it is self-moving rather than passively drawn by its object, since it
posits the tendency toward the end rather than merely being a tendency caused
by the need to have this object to realize its own perfection.54 So in arguing
that the agent’s own happiness is not ‘‘the rationale behind all willing,’’
Scotus sums up the two types of motive as follows: ‘‘There is a twofold
appetite or ‘will’: one, namely, that is natural [i.e., necessary], another that
is free.’’55
Although this passage might make it sound as if actions done in pursuit
of happiness are unfree, Scotus is actually referring here to the more autonomous nature of the motivation toward justice. He believes that in agents
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with libertarian freedom, the will must consent to the affectio commodi to
form an intention to act for the sake of the agent’s happiness.56 Although
in nonhuman animals, the appetite for eudaimonia or for the realization of
their natural telos may directly cause an intention to be formed or an act to
be done, in moral agents whose will ‘‘has the ‘superabundant sufficiency’
necessary for free agency,’’ the will must consent to this natural motive to
act at all.57 So if the act is freely elicited whichever fundamental motive the
will follows, why should the affectio justitiae be more closely associated with
freedom? The difference is that acting on this motive means choosing ends
to which the agent is not naturally drawn at all. Thus the affectio justitiae is
not really a form of desire in the orektic sense. This is John Boler’s insight
when he writes that for Scotus, to be a rational agent is to be able to
transcend the mere realization of one’s nature, and ‘‘[o]ne must be careful,
therefore, not to treat the affectio justitiae as a higher appetite that realizes a
higher nature.’’58 Aquinas treats the will simply ‘‘as a special kind of natural
appetite: i.e., the appetite of a rational nature,’’ whereas Scotus’s moral psychology is distinguished by its thesis that:
the will, precisely because of its dual affectiones, escapes all limitations
of natural appetite. This constitutes a radical break—at least with the
like of Aquinas. Scotus is not saying just that the rational will has a
higher and lower appetite; he is saying that the normal (Aristotelian)
scheme, in terms of appetite and proper object, for explaining how
an agent comes to move itself is not appropriate for will.59
The distinction Boler wants to draw can be captured precisely by saying
that whereas the inclination to happiness divides into multiple D2 and D3
desires, what Scotus calls the ‘‘inclination’’ to justice is really the will’s
function of projecting goals because of their intrinsic rightness. Thus Arendt is
right to emphasize that for Scotus, the will’s power extends beyond desire; a
person can ‘‘discount happiness altogether in making his willed projects.’’60
The terminology that Scotus inherits from Anselm obscures this distinction
by making it sound as though he is simply talking about two kinds of
prepurposive motive, to either of which the will can respond by eliciting an
intention or not. But what Scotus really means is that the affectio justitiae is
an essentially volitional motive (see chap. 3, sec. 3.4)—a motive that arises
from the will in the formation of intentions to act for particular purposes.
Hence it would be better to call it ‘‘the will to justice,’’ since this motive is
generated by the will itself in deciding on acts that respond to reason’s discernment of the right, decent, or just in particular cases.
This requires, as Boler rightly notes, that ‘‘the intellect must be able to
determine what is good in itself or ‘just’ prior to the operation of the
will.’’61 Neither the justice of its goal nor the resulting ‘‘rectitude’’ of the
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will is an attractive object toward which the agent is lured in any prepurposive form of appetite. For all erosiac appetites can be experienced by the
agent as alien, or moving him against his will, whereas the affectio justitiae
could not be experienced this way. In modern terms, we would say that
action on this motive is essentially autonomous for Scotus, and this is why such
action expresses the will’s native freedom more clearly or counts as ‘‘freer’’
(see the extract quoted below) even though action on either fundamental
affectio is freely elicited. Thus we have a kind of motivational freedom that is
obscured when the will is reduced to prohairesis. Arendt sums this up crisply:
‘‘The Will’s freedom does not consist in the selection of means for a predetermined end—eudaimonia or beatitudo.’’62
This existential interpretation of Scotus’s doctrine doubtless crystallizes
distinctions that Scotus himself failed to clarify fully, but I think it reflects
the trajectory of his ideas, deriving from Augustine’s belief that the will has
the reflexive power to will its own goodness. Augustine’s reason for giving
such power to the will thus has to do with his conception of morality. As
we saw, Scotus gives some arguments that assume that libertarian freedom
is a requirement of moral responsibility, but I agree with Boler that Scotus’s
primary reason for believing in non-eudaimonist motivation derives from
his view that moral requirements in general do not acquire their authority
or objective moral necessity from the natural requirements of human flourishing. The affectio justitiae must exist because we are aware of moral demands
whose obligatory status transcends any such natural justification: hence, for
Scotus:
it seems clear that affectio justitiae is needed if the rational agent is to
be capable of moral action at all. For example, if eudaimonist or selfrealization schemes are limited by their structure to the analysis of an
agent’s ‘‘natural’’ potential, it follows that they operate only within
the range of affectio commodi and so simply fail to capture what is essential about morality as such and not just Christian morality.63
If the moral law (knowable by nature) requires such ‘‘disinterested’’ motivation, then it must be possible for us.
For example, Scotus thinks that the practical principle that ‘‘what is best
must be loved most’’ is self-evident to natural reason,64 yet ‘‘the intellect
could not rightly dictate something to the will that the natural will could
not tend toward or carry out naturally.’’65 Hence Scotus holds that agapē,
as love of God and neighbor for their own sakes, is a possibility built into
the will’s natural capacity, whereas the A-eudaimonist has to regard it as a
miracle requiring special grace (since in agapē the will would transcend its
formal egoistic structure and desire something completely beyond its own
eudaimonia).66 As Wolter summarizes, ‘‘Scotus, in contrast to many of his
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contemporaries, believed that man by his natural powers could love God
above self or any other created good, and that this capacity was not something he possessed only in virtue of some special grace or the infused theological virtue of charity.’’67 Rather, natural agapic love is an expression of
the will to justice:
The affection for justice is nobler than the affection for the advantageous, understanding by ‘‘justice’’ not only acquired or infused justice,
but also innate justice, which is the will’s congenital liberty by reason
of which it is able to will some good not oriented to self. According
to the affection for what is advantageous, however, nothing can be
willed save with reference to self. . . . To love something in itself [or
for its own sake] is more an act of giving or sharing and is a freer act
than is desiring that object for oneself. As such, it is an act more
appropriate to the will, as the seat of this innate justice at least.68
Pure love in this sense must consist in projective motivation, for it aims
at the other’s good irrespective of the value to the agent of realizing this
good or even of seeking it: ‘‘it is not necessary that the will seek whatever
it seeks because of its ultimate end as a source of happiness.’’69 We see this
even more clearly in Scotus’s description of charity (caritas) as the theological virtue that perfects the natural will to justice. For charity ‘‘is distinct
from hope, because its act does not desire the good of the lover’’ but rather
‘‘tends to the object [God] for its own sake, and would do so even if, to
assume the impossible, all benefit for the lover were excluded.’’70 Thus the
aspect of God that is first loved in charity is God’s essence rather than
God’s loving us in return or God as the source of beatific fulfillment. Scotus
explains this by analogy with friendship between human beings:
For just as in our case someone is first loved honestly, that is primarily because of himself or herself, and only secondarily because such a
one returns our love, so that this reciprocal love in such a person is a
special reason of amiability over and above the objective goodness
such a person possesses, so too in God.71
Secondarily, we love God ‘‘because he shares himself,’’ and only thirdly
because of ‘‘the satisfying happiness God gives as our ultimate end,’’ which
is ‘‘a natural consequence of the elicited act of loving him.’’72 Thus the
ultimate end in Aquinas’s system turns out to be a by-product of projective
love on Scotus’s analysis. Conscience, as synderesis, is the ground of such love
in the intellect, but it does not necessarily move the will.73
Likewise, we recognize moral obligations to love persons or institutions
without regard to our own happiness (e.g., the duty to risk death to save
our country), and so we must have the power to love these objects for their
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own sake rather than for the sake of our own virtue or good.74 Thus, in the
tradition of existential agapē ethics, Scotus agrees with Buber and Levinas,
who also hold that we have a natural capacity to care for others as final
ends not formally assimilated to our own egos.
According to Scotus, the virtue of charity infused by grace simply increases the effect of the will’s own striving effort.75 For as we have seen,
Scotus conceives the will not just as a faculty of decision but also a source
of motivation; Wolter describes it as capable of ‘‘emotions of varying intensities,’’ in which the ‘‘solidity or firmness’’ of commitment to its end is the
measure of its strength or the intensity of its resolve.76 Perhaps because of
his northern cultural background, Scotus began with the heroic sense of
‘‘striving will’’ that I describe in chapter 2 rather than with the generalized,
eroticized, and domesticated version of Platonic thumos that Aquinas called
intellectual appetite.
Unfortunately, however, like Anselm before him and Kant after him,
Scotus sees the will’s distinctive functions (i.e., setting new ends and enhancing our resolve to pursue already-intended purposes) as operative only in
positing and committing oneself to distinctively moral goals whose rectitude
is based on principles that are self-evident to the intellect or knowable a
priori for all agents. Since his primary reason for believing in projective
motivation concerns the pure nature of moral ends, it is only the pursuit of
this kind of value that Scotus recognizes as projective; actions chosen for
any other reason must ultimately trace their motivation to the appetite for
eudaimonia or the natural conatus toward self-realization. It is undoubtedly
because the inadequacy of eudaimonism is most apparent in trying to explain our response to pure moral requirements (of noble character, fairness
to others, and duty to God) that only these became the province of projective motivation in the Stoic-Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. But as I argue
below, this first revolt against the dominant eudaimonist paradigm, while
certainly bold for its time, still claimed altogether too little for the striving
will and thus failed to grasp the full existential significance of projective
motivation. For the striving will can form many different kinds of life goals
and devotions to ideals that make for a meaningful life as a whole.
2. Kant and the Projective Motive of Duty
2.1. From Scotus to Kant
The great significance of Scotus’s analysis can be seen in the answer it
provides to Aquinas’s main criticism of Augustine’s conception of the will.
In Question III of the ‘‘Treatise on Happiness’’ in his Summa Theologica,
Aquinas argues that our eudaimonia (as material telos) consists in speculative intellectual vision of the divine nature and not in the operation of any
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lower faculty. In the process of excluding the operations of each lower
faculty, he comes to the will in the fourth article, where he considers Augustine’s neo-Stoic view that happiness consists in willing well (or ordinately) whatever first-order ends we will.77 Augustine’s idea is that since it
wills this second-order end of rectitude in the first-order will, the good will
can satisfy itself by its own ordinate love of each first-order object.78 Aquinas seems not to understand this idea of a higher-order will to rectitude,79
and he responds that:
the will is directed to the end both as absent and as present—absent
when it desires it; and present when it delights in resting in it. Now
it is clear that desire for the end is not attainment of it, but a movement towards the end. Now delight is in the will as a result of the
end being present; but the converse is not true, that a thing becomes
present because the will delights in it.80
Aquinas’s argument here manifestly presupposes the erosiac conception
of will as intellectual appetite, and he correctly infers from this premise
that simply desiring an absent end cannot produce fulfillment in the eudaimonistic sense. But suppose instead that Scotus is right that human persons
can will as a final end that their acts be just or that their first-order purposes
be ordinate. Now, Aquinas is correct that simply willing this internal state
of affairs hardly guarantees its realization (and Augustine would add that
this requires grace). Nevertheless, Augustine would insist that my intention
to ensure that my first-order purposes are just cannot fail to exist if I so
decide; for in that sense, willing is directly in the will’s power.81 And a
special kind of fulfillment derives directly from forming a good higherorder will in this sense or simply from sincerely pursuing rectitude in our firstorder intentions. The will to rectitude can be a source of its own satisfaction in this manner. Hence we can reject Aquinas’s claim that in every case,
‘‘the object of happiness is something outside the soul.’’82 A person has an
internal source of dignity in the just ordering of her own will. This Stoic
idea finds its way through Augustine into the Franciscan tradition, receiving
particular emphasis in Scotus.
Moreover, the object of the higher-order will to rectitude should not be
‘‘thought of as attracting desire for it,’’ as Aquinas says all goals must.83
Although a good will may be a necessary condition for happiness,84 it does
not reject corrupt first-order motives for the sake of happiness but rather
for the sake of meeting an ideal standard of right intention. Hence Aquinas
misleads when he says that ‘‘rectitude of the will consists in being properly
ordered to the ultimate end’’; while a just person may ‘‘love whatever he
loves in subordination to God,’’ as Aquinas argues, willing this ordering is
distinct from willing to see ‘‘the essence of God.’’85 Scotus’s analysis allows
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us to see that the value of a good will is not reducible to its part in establishing union with God, as Aquinas’s approach presupposes.
2.2. Kant and the Will’s Highest Function
To defend the value of the will as distinct from the beatific vision, we can
follow Scotus’s thesis that eudaimonia is not our formal telos after all. If
the common notion of our telos is identified with our will performing
well its highest function, then, according to Scotus and perhaps some of
Augustine’s Stoic ancestors, the will’s natural function is to will ‘‘justice’’
for its own sake. This is also what Immanuel Kant has in mind when he
argues in the Groundwork that the proper function of practical reason is not
to let the agent secure happiness but rather to make his will good. Kant’s
function argument, as we may call it, involves three premises:
1. ‘‘[N]o organ is to be found for any end unless it is also the
most appropriate to that end and the best fitted for it’’;86
2. Since reason has been imparted to us ‘‘as a practical power’’
that can influence our will,87 it must have a natural purpose or telos;
3. Yet practical reason does not guide us sufficiently in satisfying
our needs and desires or in attaining happiness generally; instinct
would be a more secure guide to eudaimonia;
4. Therefore, practical reason is not designed to make us happy
[from 1 and 3].
It follows from 2 and 4 that practical reason must have a noneudaimonistic telos. But the only other candidate is the Franciscan one:
5. ‘‘[I]ts true function must be to produce a will that is good, not
as a means to some further end [e.g., eudaimonia] but in itself.’’88
The first two premises express Kant’s teleological conception of nature;
his third premise derives from the Romantic tradition (which conceived
‘‘the common run of men’’ as happier because such peasants supposedly
live ‘‘closer to the guidance of mere natural instinct’’).89 This premise is
probably unsound, but it is Kant’s conclusion in which I am interested here.
He says that if our ‘‘highest good’’ (or formal telos) is to form a good will,
then
we can easily reconcile with the wisdom of nature our observation
that the cultivation of reason, which is required for the first and unconditioned purpose [i.e., the right ordering of the will] may in many
ways, at least in this life, restrict the attainment of the second purpose—namely happiness—which is always conditioned [by the requirement of the right]; and indeed that it can even reduce happiness
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to less than zero without nature proceeding contrary to its purpose;
for reason, which recognizes as its highest practical function the establishment of a good will, in attaining this end is capable only of its
own peculiar kind of contentment—contentment in fulfilling a purpose which in turn is established by reason alone.90
This passage introduces Kant’s famous thesis that the Right (or ‘‘justice,’’ broadly speaking) is morally prior to the Good (or happiness, broadly
speaking, including the pursuit of one’s desired ends). The special contentment that he mentions here refers to moral self-respect—the good that can at
least partially be secured by the will’s direct initiative, according to Augustine and Scotus. Kant’s thesis is not a wholesale rejection of teleology, as is
often assumed, but rather a rejection of the erosiac concept of our formal
telos (chap. 6, sec. 3) in favor of the alternative concept derived from the
Franciscan tradition, that is, rectitudo, or the good will. This concept retains
the idea that our formal telos specifies the function implicit in our natural
design but rejects the idea that the motivation associated with this telos
must be formally egoistic; for a person to realize his natural design may
just be good, rather than good for him (in any nontautological sense).91
Kant differs from Scotus and Anselm only in giving a different material
conception of what really constitutes the formation of a right or just will
or satisfies our non-erosiac formal telos. For Kant, this involves willing that
one’s first-order intentions are universalizable, consistent with respect for
the inviolable or superordinate intrinsic value of rational free willing itself;
whereas for the Franciscans, what makes first-order intentions and acts just,
right, or charitable, is not apparently measured by this kind of universalizability test. These are different material conceptions of the same non-erosiac
concept of our formal telos, just as Aristotle and Aquinas offer different
material conceptions of what complete happiness as our formal telos really
consists in or how it can be realized.92
Given this connection, it should not be surprising that what is called
‘‘motivation by specifically moral reasons’’ in the Kantian tradition fits the
structure of projective motivation. In explaining the good will, Kant famously argues that we see this phenomenon most clearly in cases where a
person makes a sacrifice or does the right thing neither for the sake of longterm self-interest (prudence) nor to satisfy more particular desires (e.g., the
gout sufferer’s D2 appetite for fine foods or the suicidal person’s instinctual
D1 aversion to death) but ‘‘for the sake of duty alone.’’93 As in the case of
Aristotle’s notion of action for the sake of the noble, Kant is proposing a
form of pure motivation; the agent-neutral goal is that one’s first-order
ends and the means one intends to use in pursuing them (together constituting an intended plan of action) conform to formal criteria of rightness
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or (what Kant takes to be the same thing) respect the intrinsic dignity of
individual persons as a value trumping all other values, irrespective of the
effects this may have on the happiness of the agent or others he cares about.
Interestingly, he even proposes that the agent’s proper happiness (limited
by conformity with the moral law) can itself be one of the intrinsically
valuable ends projected for this reason, that is, because pursuing it in certain
ways, within certain limits, conforms to the moral law.94
Officially, Kant’s argument for this self-motivational power is that this
motive of duty must be universally available to all morally responsible
agents, whereas other appetites and even sympathetic emotions are not always available or sufficient to move us to action (Kant postpones the final
proof of the possibility of acting for the sake of duty until Part III of the
Groundwork). But whether or not Kant’s ought-implies-can argument for the
universal availability of this motive of duty is convincing, his conception of
this motive clearly frames it as one kind of projective motive, which we can
call the will to rightness. For, as Murphy (following Donagan) notes, Kant
means to claim that persons themselves rather than other ‘‘producible’’
goods (including the various components of human welfare) are our highest
end.95
More precisely, for Kant, strict loyalty to the existence and inherent
dignity of persons (as free rational agents) ought to be our highest end;
thus we always have a trumping reason to choose a plan of action that
coheres with the requirements of justice or fairness to all persons as distinct
individuals. But all our desires in the orektic sense (D1-D3 states) are appetites for producible goods of one sort or another (i.e., states of affairs
related to our welfare in some way), and therefore the motive of duty is no
such appetitive state at all. Acting for the sake of persons themselves means
projecting their existence and dignity qua free, rational agents as a good that
trumps all first-order product-values and doing so because the moral law
requires it, given the inviolable value that moral personhood has.
This point is clarified by Kant’s key distinction between the ‘‘purpose’’
[Absicht] of our action, which we may understand as our intended end or
goal, and the ‘‘maxim’’ or principle on the grounds of which we decide
to form our first-order intention. Although Kant does not use the word
‘‘intention,’’ this is roughly what he means by ‘‘volition’’ [Wollen]. So his
distinction is between:
A first-order intention I: perform behaviors B1 to Bn to bring about
purpose P, and
A principle or maxim: a reason for deciding to form I in circumstances
of kind C.
Kant thinks of the principle that grounds our decision to form a given
first-order intention as mentioning reasons for this intention, which will
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include a sense of its intended purpose as having value for us as either a
proximate or final end. Since different principles endorse different reasons
for forming intentions, two agents could form the same first-order intention on the basis of quite different principles. The reverse is also true: the
same principle or maxim could also ground different intentions in different
circumstances. Korsgaard applies this analysis to Kant’s distinction between
the person who aids another out of sympathy or pity and the person who
aids on the motive of duty: ‘‘They have the same purpose, which is to help
others,’’ but this becomes their intended final end on the basis of different
maxims that respond to distinct springs of action.96
This sheds light on Kant’s otherwise confusing second proposition in
his argument that only the good will has unconditional moral worth:
An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be
attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon; it depends therefore, not on the realization of the object
[or goal] of the action, but solely on the principle of volition in accordance with which, irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire,
the action has been performed. That the purposes we may have in
our actions, and also their effects considered as ends and motives of
the will, can give no unconditioned moral worth is clear from what
has gone before [i.e., the four examples].97
This passage has traditionally confused students because it sounds as
though Kant is saying that it does not matter what results or consequences
a good will aims to bring about, which would be highly counterintuitive.
What Kant actually means is that if the particular goal or purpose P in our
first-order intention (e.g., helping a friend in need) were all that made our
will good, then taking any appetite for P as a sufficient reason for intending
P would give us a good will. And that cannot be true for two reasons:
first, because it would mean that pursuing P by any means necessary in the
circumstances could be morally legitimate, which is counterintuitive; and
second, because in other possible circumstances where we have a duty to
form some intention aiming at P, yet we lack any prior inclination toward
P, we must still be capable of deciding to form this intention on other
grounds.
Kant develops this second point immediately following the passage stating the second proposition in the overall argument of Groundwork I. He
begins with the distinction between formal and material maxims/principles
for deciding to form any intention that is in accordance with the moral law:
Where can this [unconditional moral] worth be found if we are not
to find it in the will’s relation to the effect [or purpose] hoped for
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from the action? It can be found nowhere but in the principle of the will,
irrespective of ends which can be brought about by such an action;
for between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori
motive, which is material, the will stands, so to speak, at a parting of
the ways; and since it must be determined by some principle, it will
have to be determined by the formal principle of volition when an
action is done from duty, where, as we have seen, every material principle is taken away from it.98
A material maxim or principle is one that transfers preexisting desire for
the result or end of the possible action into the intention that makes this
end our express purpose P to be realized by the intended performances. By
contrast, a formal maxim or principle is a reason for forming a first-order
intention that is independent of any prior attraction to its purpose or intended goal.
Such a reason is not based on the agent’s having any prior orektic desire
for the intended result P. Thus a will that decides on the basis of such a
formal principle projects its purpose (in the existential sense), taking an interest in P by its own activity.99 Kant’s modal argument that the motive of
duty must be projective in this sense can be reconstructed as follows:
1. If some plan of action or intention I (which aims at purpose
P) is morally required in circumstances of kind C, then it is right for
any free, rational being (or person) in C-like circumstances to choose
I [from the meaning of moral necessity].100
2. For any intention I that is morally necessary in C, it is possible
that some free, rational being in C-like circumstances lacks any inclination or appetite for P and thus lacks a material principle for choosing I [given the psychological contingency of orektic desires].
3. Thus it is possible for a being without any material or desiderative ground for choosing I to have a moral duty to choose I [conjunction of 1 and 2].
4. But if any personal agent A ought to choose I, then A can choose
I [the ought-entails-can rule].101
5. If any personal agent A can choose I, then A can recognize,
accept or identify with, and act on some maxim or principle that can
ground the choice of I [The Kantian principle of action as rational
decision (KP)].102
6. Thus if A ought to choose I, A can recognize, accept or identify with, and act on some maxim or principle that rationalizes or
explains the choice of I [from 4 and 5 by hypothetical syllogism].
7. Thus it is possible for a person without any material or desiderative ground for choosing I to recognize, accept or identify with,
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and act on some maxim or principle that can ground the choice of I
[from 3 and 6 by modus ponens].
8. Thus it is possible for some responsible agent to act on a formal maxim for choosing I [from 7 and the definition of formal
maxims].
Since the condition in premise 2 applies to any morally responsible
agent, the argument can be generalized to all persons. And since forming
an intention on the basis of a formal maxim is equivalent to projecting
one’s intended purpose on the grounds specified in the maxim, as we have
seen, the conclusion is that morally responsible agents can project purpose
P whenever they recognize sufficient moral grounds for pursing P in the
intended way. At least this argument tries to establish that such a formal
principle (which will be a priori in its most general formulation) for choosing intention I must be available whenever the agent recognizes that choosing I is morally required.
This, in turn, explains Kant’s conclusion that the motive of duty must
involve choice or the formation of intentions on the basis of such a formal
maxim or principle, which he calls reverence: ‘‘Duty is the necessity to act out
of reverence for the law.’’103 Like Scotus’s notion of the ‘‘affection for justice,’’ respect for the law is described as a ‘‘feeling,’’ and this can sound like
a prepurposive motive. But Kant means a motive generated in the agent’s
will in the process of forming a given intention because this intention will
satisfy the requirements of morality. Whatever its emotional by-products,
respect is fundamentally a volitional activity of projecting conformance
with the moral law as one’s highest-order end—an activity with moral obligation as its ground.104 Hence Heidegger is incorrect, for example, to interpret Kantian respect as a type of ‘‘oreksis’’ (although he rightly sees it as a
kind of ‘‘striving’’ like that involved in forming a project).105
Kant adds to this powerful deduction what is really a separate argument
for the distinctive status of this moral motive, which also makes sense once
we understand formal principles as grounds for projective motivation. He
claims that an intendable goal or purpose by itself cannot be the object of
reverence ‘‘precisely because it is merely the effect, not the activity, of a
will,’’106 and he adds that any result (defined by its intrinsic properties)107
that we could take as our intended purpose could, in principle, be realized
through other causal processes:
Thus the moral worth of an action does not depend [solely] on the
result expected from it, and so too does not depend [solely] on any
principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from this expected
result. For all these results (agreeable states and even the promotion
of happiness in others) could have been brought about by other
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causes as well, and consequently their production did not require the
will of a rational being, in which, however, the highest and unconditioned good can alone be found.108
This argument suggests that the value of a good will cannot lie simply in
its intended consequences or its tending to produce certain results by intending these as its purposes.
A reconstruction of this argument must include the supposedly selfevident thesis at the opening of Groundwork I, namely that only the good
will is unconditionally good. Scotus and most of the Franciscan tradition
also affirmed some version of this thesis, which I dub ‘‘the Augustinian
premise.’’ As we saw, Kant’s function argument provides support for this
thesis, but I am not evaluating Kant’s defense of it here.109 With this premise, his second argument for the distinctive status of moral motivation can
now be stated as follows:
1. Any causal process that derives all its value from its consequences C has only instrumental value, which can be no higher or
more valuable than the intrinsic value of C [the derivative nature of
instrumental value].
2. If the value of a good will (W) were simply its instrumental
value in bringing about its intended purposes or ends, then its value
could not be any higher than the value (V) of its ends or products
considered independently of how they were produced [instantiation
of 1].
3. In principle, it is possible for some other non-volitional process
(N) to cause the same results or consequences as the realized purpose
of an intention formed by the good will (W) [uncontroversial causal
premise].
4. Thus N could only have an instrumental value equal to, or
lesser than, the intrinsic value (V) of its products [from 1 and 3].
5. If the value of a good will (W) were simply its instrumental
value in bringing about its intended purposes or ends, then W could
have an instrumental value no higher than the value of N—that is, a
value equal to V [from 2 and 4 by substitution of N for V].
6. The good will is the object of unique reverence, which means
that necessarily, its value is higher than that of any causal process
not involving the second-order agency of the will [the Augustinian
premise].
7. Thus the value of a good will (W) must be higher than the
highest possible value of N [from 4 and 6 by transitivity].
8. Thus the value of W transcends any instrumental value it has
in virtue of bringing about its intended purposes or ends [from 5 and
7 by modus tollens].
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This second argument is a bit more awkward but it establishes that the
good will has an intrinsic value that can exist only in persons capable of
second-order agency, which transcends the value of the will’s intendable
purposes or end products. In the third premise, Kant specifically has in
mind that prepurposive appetites or inclinations could desire the same results or consequences that happen also to be the intended purpose of some
volition adopted by the good will; therefore these PPMs would share any
value that the good will derives merely from its tendency to bring about its
intended goals or ‘‘material’’ ends. Hence, if the four famous examples of
Groundwork I support the Augustinian premise by showing that motive of
duty has a moral value that we do not find in other maxims that ‘‘borrow’’
their motive from prepurposive inclinations attracting the agent to the same
goals, then the intrinsic value of the good will has to transcend the productvalue of these intendable goals.
Hence the second argument shows the same conclusion as the first,
namely, that the good will can have its unconditional worth only if it motivates itself projectively, independently of all prepurposive desire. Contrary to
Humean intuitions, as Ameriks says, ‘‘such willing is precisely not necessitated by any . . . desires in the agent’s prior ‘motivation’ set.’’110 This conclusion makes sense if we see the exercise of projective willing for moral
reasons as having an inherent value in its own right that is distinct from the
product-value of the ends that it can will.
Scotus and Kant support this intuition by treating projective motivation
as freer (in the sense of more ‘‘autonomous’’ or ‘‘self-determining’’) than
desire, in which the agent depends on passive attraction toward the perceived object. If this is right, then even an evil project that sets some kind
of harm to another person or society as one’s absolute end is, while far
more corrupt than conquest motivated by simple lust for riches, still metaphysically nobler in its greater inherent autonomy. Of course, Kant follows
Scotus in imagining that the natural/metaphysical value of our capacity for
projective motivation lies solely in making possible the will to justice, since
this is the only kind of projected goal Scotus and Kant recognize.111 But
the existentialist who recognizes a much wider range of projective motives
can still endorse their conclusion that the capacity for striving will in the
projective sense does have an intrinsic natural value all its own because it
makes possible autonomy and lets us become subcreators of our own identity. This value is distinct from the terminal value of the various possible
goals or ends that provide some of the possible grounds for pursuing them.
For Kant, the good will must also be seen as projective because of the
higher-order regulative function it exercises over all action grounded in
particular desire or the appetite for happiness in general. He concludes
from the four examples in Groundwork I that the pure motive of duty is
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fundamentally unlike any appetite for particular states of affairs or results
and distinct from the general desire for happiness that can be specified in
so many different ways according to different tastes, cultures, and worldviews. The moral motive does not simply focus us on any end or result to
be maximized; rather, it is concerned about how (and within what limits)
other first-order ends may be pursued. This higher-order function suggests
that the motive of duty can operate in addition to other first-order desires.
At the level of imperfect duty, it also operates to require that certain goods
that the nature of our will implicitly commits us to valuing in our own case
(such as assistance in pursuing our legitimate projects and self-development) are valued for other agents as well. To act on the motive of duty or
the will to justice is, therefore, first, to project certain second-order restrictions on the ways and extent to which one acts on natural and learned firstorder motives; and second, where the requisite inclination or emotion is
lacking, to project particular self- and other-regarding first-order ends as
well (e.g., when not feeling empathetic, still projecting the goal of contributing a just amount to worthy charities because respect for the personhood
of others demands it).
This regulative function helps explain why the motive of duty is ‘‘something which is conjoined with my will solely as a ground and never as an
effect—something which does not serve my inclination but outweighs it or
at least leaves it entirely out of account in my choice.’’112 —which is to say
that it cannot be the object of natural desire. For the complex secondorder good that is the goal of the good will is both a minimum-threshold
requirement of decency and a side constraint on the pursuit of first-order
ends; thus it is structurally unlike any goods that we typically apprehend as
naturally attractive (D1), as brute-preferable (D2), or as part of our eudaimonia (D3). For our inclinations and desires are always for states of affairs
or activities that can be pursued or done in different ways, but the good
will aims at a qualitative modification of such first-order pursuits to bring
them in line with justice and respect to persons as ends-in-themselves. As
Augustine failed to grasp but Scotus saw, the second-order end of pursuing
first-order purposes ordinately, or in the right way, or subject to the requirements of fairness to all is an end that can only be projected.
This existential interpretation of the good will—as a regulator that projects the second-order goal of holding our pursuit of other ends to formal
conditions of fairness—also explains why Kant thinks that we can have a
‘‘reverence’’ for an agent acting on the motive of duty (or for a will generating
motivation according to the moral law) that we can never have for any prepurposive desire or inclination, including even the general desire for happiness
that all human beings share. For ‘‘reverence’’ is described as a feeling that is
not ‘‘received through outside influence, but one self-produced by a rational
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concept, and therefore specifically distinct from feelings of the first kind,
all of which can be reduced to inclination or fear.’’113 In other words, reverence is an emotion that responds specifically to projective striving of the
will.
Kant’s description of reverence certainly recalls Scotus and Anselm on
the affectio justitiae: it ‘‘demolishes my self-love’’ because its object is apprehended as based neither on appetite nor on aversion but rather on a law to
which we are subject ‘‘without any consultation of self-love.’’114 In particular, the desire for eudaimonia and objective requirements for attaining it (if
these can be discerned, about which Kant is skeptical)115 cannot be the
objective basis for the authority of this law. Instead, Kant thinks that this
law arises from the nature of our will and therefore can be considered
self-imposed. Hence our ground for projecting obedience to this law (or
conformity of our intentions to its requirements) lies in our own constitution:
we are already implicitly committed to this law in valuing ourselves just for
being free, rational agents capable of moral responsibility (rather than as
agents for whom happiness is possible).
In choosing a plan of action simply because it is morally required or at
least in part because it is morally legitimate, we motivate ourselves by projecting the second-order end of rectitude in our will (or reverence for the
law, as Kant expresses it) rather than acting on any orektic desire for conformity to the law: our reason for obeying the moral law is quite independent
of any relation that the required or permitted actions may have to our
eudaimonia; hence it is not the kind of thing we can ‘‘desire’’ in the classical
Greek sense.
In this analysis, I am not defending Kant’s claim that the objective authority of the moral law is autonomous—although I find much merit in
Christine Korsgaard’s own defense of this conclusion.116 Nor am I endorsing Kant’s argument, which follows immediately upon the passages we have
been considering, that from the unique projective form of the motive of
duty, we can derive (at least in outline) the supreme norm or moral principle that guides the will acting on this motive or provides its ground. Kant’s
suggestion is that we can tell what our duty is, at least in abstract, from how
our motive to do our duty is structured.117 I call this the ‘‘elimination argument’’ for the categorical imperative in Groundwork I, and I reject the dichotomy on which it rests. But my goal here is only to show that Kant’s remarks
on the motive of duty, which he contrasts with all desires or inclinations
for outcomes or results (as the ‘‘material’’ or end of our maxim), become
more cogent when understood as arguments that this motive is projective
in form—like Scotus’s will to justice. Kant exaggerates what can be derived
at the normative level about the requirements of duty from the insight that
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this pure motive has a structure unlike the appetites recognized in eudaimonist moral psychology, but he must at least be credited with the recognition
that there are fundamentally different intentional structures here.
Like Scotus, Kant manifestly struggles to find an adequate vocabulary in
which to formulate his insight precisely because he sees that the will to
justice is not appetitive in structure; but neither the resources of traditional
(eudaimonist) or modern (Hobbesian) moral psychology provide him with
philosophical terminology suited to expressing this distinction. For in this
case, the theory-influenced history of psychological language itself had covered over the rift that Kant was attempting to expose. Like Scotus, who
writes as if the will to justice were an appetite or inclination, Kant also calls
pure practical reason a ‘‘higher faculty of desire,’’ but here the term signifies
‘‘all that contrasts with mere belief,’’ or motivation in general.118 He calls it
‘‘higher’’ to distinguish it from refined desires that he considers still essentially self-perfective—such as intellectual stimulation, intelligent conversation, the desire for power, the development of talent, and the enjoyment of
challenges.119
The lower faculty of desire aims only at agent-relative objects: ‘‘the determining ground of choice consists in the conception of an object and its
relation to the subject, whereby the faculty of desire is determined to seek
it realization. Such a relation to the subject is called pleasure in the reality
of an object.’’120 In other words, Kant thinks that all motives other than the
motive of duty (formed by pure practical reason) aim at pleasure in their
consummation. As the analysis in chapter 5 suggests, it would be better to
modify this into the view that lower desires all aim at some self-related
first-order good or some good that is apprehended at least as appropriable
by the self.121
We find the notion of projective motivation implicit again in Kant’s
compressed reconstruction of this analysis of the good will in the Critique
of Practical Reason, where he argues that desire for the end or goal of our
action is not always its motive. In Theorem III, he writes that ‘‘The material
[or end] of a practical principle is the object of the will. The object either
is the determining ground of the will or it is not.’’122 The material object
or goal ‘‘determines’’ our will or furnishes the motive for our intention (or
‘‘volition’’) when we decide to act on prior desire, inclination, or attraction
toward this object; when we do not, our will is moved by something other
than appetite for the goal of its intended action. However, this alternative
kind of ‘‘determination’’ of the will by a ‘‘practical law,’’ or a formal maxim
(having a universalizable form), does not imply that resulting intention to
act has no end in view (or ‘‘material’’) at all. Kant clearly affirms, ‘‘Now it
is certainly undeniable that every volition must have an object and therefore
a material, but the material cannot be supposed, for this reason, to be the
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determining ground and condition of the maxim.’’123 This just means that
in some cases, appetite for the intended end is not the motive.
Without this point, one cannot adequately understand Kant’s later discussion of the ‘‘Highest Good’’ (i.e., happiness in proportion to virtue, or
nature conformed to the moral law) as the end or object of the will when
it is determined by pure practical reason:
The moral law is the sole motive of the pure will. . . . Consequently,
though the highest good may be the entire object of pure practical
reason, i.e., of a pure will, it is still not to be taken as the motive of the
pure will; the moral law alone must be seen as the ground for making
the highest good and its realization or promotion the object of the
pure will.124
In other words, the highest good is projected as the end when the agent
forms intentions on the basis of moral reasons or wills moral motivation.
While it is true that for Kant, without ‘‘reference to outcome, to results, to
materia, to ends,’’ there can be ‘‘no willing,’’125 this does not mean that all
motivation is erosiac or desiderative in this substantive sense. Rather, it
means only that intentional action must always be goal-directed. But the
adoption of the intention or ‘‘volition’’ [Wollen] can involve projection of ends
for which we have no prior appetite; a certain class of pursuable ends can
be projected on grounds other than their potential value for the agent’s
happiness.126
Underlying this view is a conception of the will and a theory of action
that though not fully articulated, radically resists older erosiac models of
motivation.127 It can be summarized in three points. First, as Ameriks argues, it is central to this theory that there be gaps between desires for some
state of affairs S, reasons for pursing S, and the formation of any actual
intention to pursue S. Even when the agent has an all-things-considered
judgment that it is best to do A in pursuit of S, her will ‘‘still has the task
of determining itself in that direction.’’128 This commits Kant to the idea
that intentional purposes are actively formed by decisions that are themselves an active/agentive process (see chap. 3, sec. 3.3).
Second, willing always has some normative content; agents form intentions through their ‘‘will, i.e., [a] faculty of determining their causality
through the representation of a rule’’ or ‘‘according to principles.’’129 These
intentions will always have a form such as ‘‘I will do A in order that X,
because . . .’’ When Kant says that ‘‘we must make it our maxim to act on
[a] desire,’’ he means, according to Korsgaard, that ‘‘the reflective mind
must endorse the desire before it can act on it: it must say to itself that the
desire is a reason’’ for it.130 This is right as long as we remember that even
immoral action can be ‘‘endorsed’’ in the sense required for the intention
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to count as self-formed by the will, though it cannot count as fully
autonomous.
Third, Kant seems to see all purposive motivation (on which the agent
acts intentionally) as projective in the minimal sense that it is never simply
caused by prepurposive desires combined with beliefs. Often, as in maxims
following from the principle of happiness, ‘‘an object of choice is made
the basis of the rule and therefore must precede it.’’131 Yet even in such
heteronomous acts, in which desire for the object is taken up into the
agent’s purpose, the desire is first sanctioned in cognitive form by the will.
Hence decision adds something not present in the inclinations or impulses
on which it works: ‘‘the will is never determined directly by the object and
our representation of it; rather the will is a faculty for making a rule of
reason the motive of an action that can make an object real.’’132 Thus the
decision-as-agency model, combined with the normative conception of decision, suggests the idea that between prepurposive motives and intended
purposes there is always a (weaker or stronger) projective supplement. This
supplement is conceived theoretically as ‘‘spontaneity.’’ In some cases, it
only incorporates a desire into an intention; in others, it generates the moral
motivation (in place of prepurposive motives) for the intention.
Since Kant distinguishes practical ‘‘rules’’ from ‘‘laws’’ (i.e., rules that are
rationally universalizable or that enjoy lawlike form) and likewise distinguishes ‘‘will’’ from ‘‘pure will’’ (which is motivated only by laws), his remark that the will is never determined directly by its object clearly applies
not only to action from the motive of duty but to heteronomous acts as
well.133 The operation of the will is thus the domain of spontaneity, which,
as Henry Allison says, ‘‘concerns rational agency in general, that is, the
capacity to determine oneself to act on the basis of general principles
(whether moral or prudential).’’134 This idea is sometimes expressed by saying that Kant does not even regard prepurposive desires and inclinations as
constituting motives to act but only as grounds for possible motives;135 only
when the will gives them the discursive form of reasons do they acquire
motivating force.136 In his insightful review of Barbara Herman’s work, Paul
Guyer summarizes this point:
On an empiricist [i.e., Hobbesian/Humean] conception of agency,
feelings, desires, and other naturally occurring and empirically given
conditions are, as such, motives, functioning as causes for action. So
here the idea of action in the absence of feelings or desires does not
make any sense to begin with, and actions can instead be expected to
arise only from an agent’s strongest feelings or desires in any particular situation. . . . Kant’s conception of moral worth seems paradoxical,
Herman suggests, because we approach it with such a picture in mind,
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but Kant’s conception of agency is not at all like this. For Kant, no
naturally occurring and empirically given condition such as a desire
or inclination is ever itself a motive for action; a motive reflects an
agent’s ‘‘reasons for acting,’’ or his decision, for example, to accept a
desire as an adequate ground for action in light of his underlying
principles and other relevant circumstances.137
This will seem surprising to English-language philosophers accustomed
to using the term ‘‘motive’’ in its prepurposive sense. Does Kant imagine that
animals which lack a ‘‘will’’ in the sense of decision-making or intentionforming agency but which have quite sophisticated desires do not have any
motives strictly speaking? Even if such animals are naturally determined to
act on their strongest desires, as Hobbes suggested of human beings, we
can intelligibly speak of their motives to act.138 So Herman’s gloss makes
sense only if we take ‘‘motive’’ in the more restrictive purposive sense, as the
motivation on which the agent is actually trying to act in intentional action.
Herman does not make this distinction explicitly, but she implies it:
Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent’s motives
reflect his reasons for acting. An agent may take the presence of a desire
to give him a reason, as he may also find reasons in his passions,
principles, or practical interests. All of these, in themselves, are ‘‘incentives’’ (Triebfedern), not motives, to action. It is the mark of a rational agent that incentives determine the will only as they are taken up
into an agent’s maxim.139
Thus ‘‘incentives’’ (Triebfedern) are like ‘‘prepurposive motives’’ or Davidsonian pro-attitudes, except that they cannot simply combine with beliefs to
cause intentions; they have to be adopted by the agent to become purposes.
This clarifies Kant’s reasons for holding that heteronomous action is
also spontaneous or free in the transcendental sense, since it is never directly
determined by prepurposive desires along with instrumental beliefs. As
Charles Nussbaum puts it, ‘‘Though heteronomous and conditioned, empirical practical reason is spontaneous, even if not, strictly speaking, autonomous.’’140 Similarly, Allison argues that for Kant, it is essential to the very
concept of a self that we actively form our purposes through the agency of
the will: ‘‘To think of oneself as a rational agent requires presupposing that
one is capable of projecting ends, acting on the basis of self-imposed general principles (maxims) and in light of objectively valid norms.’’141
For Kant, this implies that nothing moves us to intentional action until
it is adopted or formed by the will as our purpose, and thus our intentions
are always underdetermined by our prepurposive incentives; as Allison says,
‘‘It is not that one’s desires are irrelevant to the determination of what one
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chooses to do (they are obviously the source of reasons to act); it is rather
that they are not sufficient reasons.’’142 Or, as we might better put it, our
desires become practical reasons or motives for us only through spontaneous
incorporation. In that weak sense, all the motivation that informs settled
intentions is projective; decision is inherently projective in function.
The existential conception of willing that I defend does not need to
endorse this Kantian claim that the ‘‘transfer’’ of prepurposive appetites or
inclinations into intentional purposes always involves the projective adoption of a rule with normative content. In some cases, it might involve no
more than tacit consent to act on immediate impulse (or utterly singular
prescription, at best). But Kant’s view that all human purposes adopted by
the will in forming intentions are minimally projective includes one insight,
namely, that various types of incentives, such as D1–D3 desires, and emotions involving such desires, in addition to drawing us toward objects or
states of affairs, may also serve as the grounds for projecting various ends.
For one thing, when a desire plays a negative role in our lives, this can be a
reason to project its alteration or even its elimination.
But we also sometimes take the existence of certain desires as positive
reasons for projecting desired ends or lending our volitional support to
these desires. For example, when someone desires (D2) to obtain a college
degree in order to have more opportunities to get higher-paying jobs, the
fact that this end draws her, in combination with other considerations (such
as the value of challenge), could give her grounds to project this end as well.
In that case, she no longer merely desires it but also commits herself to this
goal on the ground or basis of some more agent-neutral consideration such
as ‘‘it is healthy to want a good job employing one’s best talents.’’ Through
such resolve, she aims to gain admittance to a good college and to graduate
as a means to her projected end. We could regard this as a case of overdetermination, in which the agent has two different types of motive to pursue
this goal of graduating. It would be more Kantian to regard her as having
only one purposive motive, which combines prepurposive desires and other
considerations as its grounds.
2.3. The Limits of Deontic Projection: Kant’s False Dichotomy and
Practical Identities
If this reading is right, then the idea of projective motivation permeates
Kant’s account of moral agency. As Otfried Höffe summarizes, ‘‘Practical
reason, as Kant says for short, means the capacity to choose one’s action
independent of sensible determinations such as instinct, desires, passions,
and sensations of pleasure and pain.’’143 But interpretative care is needed
here, for there are two different senses in which actions might be motivated
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‘‘independently’’ of impulses arising from our sensuous nature as an empirical being.
In the first sense, as we have seen, even heteronomous acts are independent
of causation by desire, since they make inclinations into motives only by
incorporating them voluntarily into the maxim on which our intention is
based or by accepting the satisfaction of these impulses as our end.144 In
the second sense, which corresponds to Kant’s notion of autonomy, to be
independent requires that our intention to do A for end E not be derived
even in this indirect fashion from inclinations for E or desires for happiness
arising from our sensuous nature.145 This reading agrees with Frederick
Rauscher’s argument that the ‘‘freedom’’ found in any empirical will involving ‘‘transcendental decision’’ is distinct from a stronger sense of freedom
that applies to the will ‘‘only when it is following the moral law.’’146
Yet, as Rauscher says, Kant’s equation of will with pure practical reason
(which may or may not fully determine the subjective will) tends to obscure
this distinction and to give the impression that only moral motivation is
independent of natural inclination in any sense. Hence readers often think
that for Kant, autonomy just means motivation by pure practical reason, and
only autonomous motivation is ‘‘projective’’ in the weak sense of not being
caused by prior desires for the ends of one’s actions. Although this is not
the correct reading, it accounts for the frequent misunderstanding that only
action done for the sake of duty counts as ‘‘free.’’147 Even Korsgaard, for
example, writes that ‘‘the will must be autonomous: that is, it must have its
own law.’’148 This is right only if ‘‘autonomy’’ is used in its contemporary
sense to mean ‘‘self-determined’’ (which is included in what Kant calls
‘‘spontaneity’’), not if it simply means ‘‘motivated primarily by duty.’’ For
although the moral law ought to be our primary motive, we often act on
conflicting nonmoral motives that still count as ‘‘autonomous’’ in the contemporary sense and that Kant would count as spontaneously accepted. The
will may have the capacity for autonomy in Kant’s sense, but it does not
always employ it when voluntarily forming intentions or incorporating motives into its maxims.149
Even with this clarification, however, a serious problem remains in
Kant’s account of autonomous motivation. As Allison points out, it seems
that some actions whose motive or grounding maxim is neither derived
from desires nor from strictly moral considerations could be ‘‘strongly independent’’ of sensuous impulses.150 This undermines Kant’s ‘‘exclusivity
postulate,’’ that is, his implicit assumption that autonomy, or strong independence, occurs only in the form of deontic motivation, that is, adoption of
a maxim because of its universalizable form. Yet this premise—that projective motivation responds exclusively to deontic grounds—underlies the key
dichotomy in the elimination argument for the categorical imperative in
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Groundwork I.151 Likewise, this exclusivity postulate is presupposed in the
argument by dilemma in the second Critique, which says that since the end
or object of an intention or volition cannot determine the will in moral
motivation, only the lawlike form of the maxim remains as a ground for the
intentions formed by the dutiful will:
Since the material of the practical law, i.e., the object of the maxim,
cannot be given except empirically, and since a free will must be
independent of empirical conditions (i.e., those belonging to the
world of sense), and yet be determinable, a free will must find its
ground of determination in the law, but independently of the material
of the law. But besides the latter there is nothing in a law except the
legislative form. Therefore, the legislative form, in so far as it is contained in the maxim, is the only thing which can constitute a determining ground of the [free] will.152
This passage says that if a motive is strongly independent of ‘‘empirical
conditions’’ such as natural appetites or inclinations toward objects, then
this motive can only be concerned with lawlike form. But the argument for
this point seems to beg the question.
It is easier to see the problem if we translate Kant’s dichotomy into my
terms: he holds that an intended purpose can be volitionally projected only if
an evaluation of its maxim’s deontic form is the primary ground for its
projection; all other intentions borrow their motive from orektic desire. Let
us call moral motivation based on a rational evaluation of possible maxims
by formal nonconsequentialist criteria of justice (such as universalizability
tests) ‘‘deontic projection.’’ In deontic projection, the agent intends some
act A as a means to some intelligible first-order end E and forms this
intention because doing A as a means to E is universalizable in his circumstances (or because it is just to all relevant parties, or for similar formal
reasons). If the authority of such reasons for deontic projection rests on
the implicit commitments essential to all free rational willing, then deontic
projection may be considered a special case of projective motivation in
which the grounding reasons are neither forward- nor backward-looking
but rather transcendental.
This translation has the advantage of clarifying that ‘‘autonomy’’ for
Kant is a concept distinct from the motive of duty; it signifies strong independence from the contents of prepurposive desires. But then why think
that deontic projective motivation exhausts ‘‘autonomy’’ in this sense? Kant
seems uncritically to take over the Franciscan dichotomy: if the motive isn’t
based on the rectitude of the act, then it is derived from appetite for the
material goal. My own account diverges from Kant’s on this crucial point:
although deontic projection constitutes one important kind of projective

................. 16406$

CH11

05-23-07 10:57:24

PS

PAGE 402

Scotus and Kant: The Moral Will and Its Limits

403

motivation,153 I hold that it is hardly the only kind. Kant deserves credit for
being the first philosopher to try explicitly to formulate the notion of projective motivation, but he links its structure with the derivation of a formal
principle of morality and hence he tends to suggest that all other motives
aside from deontic ones are formally self-loving because appetitive in form,
or even materially hedonistic. Kant’s crucial error lies in supposing that the
only alternative to the will’s choosing first-order ends on the basis of their
attractiveness to the agent’s prepurposive inclinations is for the will to
choose them on the transcendental basis of their universalizable form. By
ignoring agent-transcending but non-deontic values, Kant repeats Scotus’s
mistake.
This exclusive focus on moral duty as the sole motive that escapes eudaimonist strictures prevents Kant from exploring in any detail the manifold
other considerations that are neither objects of desire nor moral considerations in his strict formal sense, but which can supply grounds for projecting
ends. Hence the world did not learn from Kant about projection as a broad
type of motivation with subcategories that are neither eudaimonistic nor essentially
deontic. In eliding the possibility of autonomous volitional projection without a formal deontic ground, Kant prevented the full potential of his break
with the eudaimonist paradigms of Greek antiquity from being realized.
The Scotusian-Kantian dichotomy in which every motive is assimilated either to justice or to happiness as our highest ends obscured the practical
importance of many other non-egoistic, agent-transcending values that can
ground volitional projection of practical ends.
Korsgaard effectively concedes this point in her account of ‘‘practical
identities’’ that are formed in large part by particular commitments and
social roles whose normative authority for us is only partially grounded in the
deeper normative authority of our universally shared moral identity as
persons capable of socially conditioned practical identities.154 Such an identity functions as ‘‘a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions
to be worth undertaking,’’155 which can include a wide variety of valuedescriptions. As she says, ‘‘Part of my intention in invoking the concept of
practical identity is to break down Kant’s overly harsh . . . division between
natural impulses that do not [automatically] belong to my proper self and
rational impulses that do’’ (i.e., moral motives).156 Practical identities occupy a middle ground; they consist in large part of commitments that are
typically neither deontic in ground nor merely the expression or development of sense-appetites or other appropriative desires.
Yet Korsgaard still fails to provide any substantive account of the nondeontic grounds for such thick practical identities. She argues effectively
that communitarians must recognize that the obligations arising from the
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particular ties and loyalties defining their selves-in-community ultimately
depend on the universal importance to all human beings of developing such
group memberships: ‘‘Someone who is moved to urge the value of having
particular ties and commitments has discovered that part of their normativity comes from the fact that human beings need to have them.’’157 But
beyond this point, she uncritically accepts Sandel’s picture of such socially
constituted identities as radically contingent: ‘‘You are born into a certain
family and community, perhaps even into a certain profession or craft. You
find a vocation, or ally yourself with a movement. You fall in love and make
friends.’’158 The contrastive fact that this family, community, religion, craft,
lover, friend, political identification, and so on, rather than others, are constituents of your practical identity seems to be largely a function of chance of
birth and temperament, on this picture. Korsgaard admits (as her picture
of human agency requires) that these ties and the projects and relationships
they involve are open to critical reflection. But other than considerations of
consistency and prudence, she offers no substantive reasons for endorsing
and maintaining them or rejecting and changing them. The only objective
requirement she mentions is the need for some conception of your practical
identity, without which ‘‘you will lose your grip on yourself as having any
reason to do one thing rather than another.’’159
Thus Christopher Gowans rightly complains that Korsgaard does not
explain how practical identities can be fully normative rather than just morally permissible or ‘‘weakly normative’’:
from the standpoint of the agent deliberating about how to live, a
standpoint that is central to Korsgaard’s entire argument, choices have
to be made among the weakly normative practical identities that are
possible [for us]. Moreover, in thinking about this, we do not ordinarily suppose that any such identity is as good as any other: we
believe there is more to a good life than a morally permissible life.160
Gowans defends this claim with examples contrasting apparently important
and challenging undertakings with relatively trivial activities aimed at entertainment. He concludes, naturally enough, that for practical identities to be
more strongly normative, they must be not only morally permissible but
also ‘‘truly valuable.’’161 Without such an objective basis, ‘‘the will provides
no critical force’’ in shaping our practical identities; they end up determined, like desire in Kant’s account, ‘‘by contingent circumstances outside
the will.’’162 Gowans suggests that the solution is to look for ‘‘some objective understanding of values,’’ perhaps grounded in a variety of realism,
that can support the diverse kinds of identity-components that Korsgaard
mentions.163 He goes on to consider and critique Rawls’s constructivist
solution to this question in his theory of ‘‘good plans of life.’’164
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In short, it appears that Korsgaard recognizes the lacuna in Kant’s moral
psychology but does not find within her own tradition the resources needed
to fill it. This is not her fault. Two hundred years after Kant, moral philosophy and psychology have made many advances, but a detailed phenomenology of different grounds for projective motivation has never been rigorously
worked out, precisely because Kant’s approach led later philosophers to
take it for granted that deontic projection is the only conceivable alternative
to those moral psychologies that uphold both the strong erosiac thesis and
the Transmission principle—for example, traditional eudaimonism,
Hobbesian egoism, and Hume’s mixture of egoistic and altruistic sentiments (which formed the basis for utilitarian moral psychology).
Today, ideas relevant to mapping out the rational bases for projective
willing are scattered throughout discussions of other questions in moral
psychology, normative theory, virtue ethics, and the theory of autonomy.
The diverse realm of possibilities comprehended under the basic motivational structure of projection has remained largely uncharted because philosophers since Kant have assumed that any motivation supposedly
transcending the erosiac structure of desire could only be what Habermas
calls ‘‘the weak force’’ of impartial reasons, with its (frequently alleged)
unappealing abstractness. As a result, it is also now commonly assumed that
among systematic theories of ethical norms, the field is exhausted by Kantian deontology, utilitarianism (along with more complex forms of consequentialism), and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Hence mainstream
philosophy ignores the possibility of a rigorous existential agapē ethics that
could be developed on the basis of a more adequate moral psychology
recognizing the full range of projective motivation. This large preliminary
task must precede any rigorous development of an existential theory of
good lives.
I approach this problem in three stages. First, in the final section of this
chapter, I survey questions about the freedom of deontic projection that
are inevitably raised by Kant’s account, as by Scotus’s. Second, in the next
chapter, I take up contemporary ideas in psychoanalytic theory that bring
us to the question of what grounds human beings may find for projective
motivation. Some possible negative grounds are indicated in the analysis of
radical evil in chapter 10, but in subsequent chapters I am more interested
in positive grounds for constructive and creative projects rather than
grounds for destructive willing. Third, in Chapters 13 and 14, I argue that
contemporary accounts of caring and their problems reveal the importance
of objective axiological reasons for projective motivation. In sum, my defense of existential objectivism attempts to provide some answers to Gowans’s pressing questions.
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3. Projective Willing and Libertarian Freedom
3.1. Projective Motivation Is Not Necessarily Libertarian
Following Thomas Pink, in Chapter 3 I argue that the ability to will that is
distinctive of persons is the capacity for second-order agency through
which persons not only form intentions to perform first-order acts but
sometimes in the process also generate new motivation for their intentions
(or sustain existing motives) by projecting ends quite independently of preexisting desires and incentives. Although I argue that such self-motivating
agency always has reasons or grounds for positing the final ends on which
it decides, I also suggest (contra the rationalist tradition) that projection is
not an automatic result of practical reasoning and its evaluations. Given
this, it might look as though my thesis is that projective motivation means
freely giving oneself a practical end in some suitably libertarian sense of
‘‘freedom.’’ The claim that Kantian moral motivation is a paradigm kind of
projective motivation makes the question of freedom inevitable since it is
linked so closely to the motive of duty in Kant’s analysis. In this section, I
briefly consider this issue.
It is not my thesis that the distinction between ‘‘desire’’ in the Greek
sense and projective motivation is primarily a contrast between the involuntary formation of orektic desires and the metaphysical spontaneity of projective
commitments. Although I think it is natural enough to interpret projective
motivation in terms of some theory of ‘‘agent causation,’’ as we see in Scotus and Kant, I am not defending any such metaphysical explanation here.
Moreover, I have emphasized that we always project ends for ourselves for
reasons that do not themselves depend for their status as grounds on the very
same projective efforts of striving will. Contrary to the familiar Humean
picture, we recognize the importance of various sorts of reasons and values—deontic, informally ethical, aesthetic, religious, and other personal or
existential considerations—that transcend our existing set of motives, and
the projection of new ends is never without some rationale or basis of these
sorts.
The distinction between erosiac desires and projected motives is recognizable in the way this motivation is experienced, whatever metaphysical account we give of its emergence from prior reasons/grounds. For projective
motivation does not involve the experience of attraction that we find in
orektic motivation because of its different agent-content direction of fit
(chap. 9, sec. 5). By itself, this seems to be compatible with an intentional
account of agency according to which, given the grounds she had (including
internal features of her character, such as personality, dispositions, and past
commitments, as well as features of the world), a competent human agent
could not have projected otherwise than she did.
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Thus the phenomenological distinction I draw between important
classes of motive might be explained by their having different sorts of causal
origin; for example, one might hold that a projected motive is distinct from
a desire (and from other types of motivating emotional states) because it is
agent-caused, whereas desires and prepurposive passions typically are not.
Similarly, a libertarian who does not explain how free choices count as selfdetermined by recourse to a concept of agent causation might still hold that
in the case of projective motivation, the agent could have motivated herself
otherwise. But my analysis does not depend on adopting either of these
explanatory strategies, and it remains at least facially compatible with the
possibility that even though we might never know how, our projective efforts of striving will could be determined by the initial state of the universe
along with the laws of physics and laws governing any emergent properties
at the neurochemical and mental levels. I hold that an analysis of the conditions of responsibility for character might show that such psychological
determinism is incompatible with responsibility for the sort of person we
will to be, but that requires a separate argument. In other words, the phenomenological analysis of projective motivation should not beg the question against every form of compatibilism; otherwise it cannot provide
evidence for the metaphysical level of explanation.
Further phenomenological analysis of reflexive projections (in which we
commit ourselves to establishing and maintaining certain first-order psychic
states rather than others in our motivational character), along with an analysis of the conditions on responsibility for character, will probably support
the hypothesis that the striving will generally has the capacity for a significant range of alternative identity-defining commitments, and that this liberty
of the projective will165 distinguishes it both from rational deliberation per
se (which may not motivate) and from desiderative motivation.
Others have already taken steps in this direction. For example, Pink
argues that the main reason for accepting a second-order agency account of
the will is to recognize the ordinary intuition that we have alternatepossibilities freedom not only of action but also of the will or decisionmaking.166 This freedom of the will is transferred to the level of action; we
‘‘always retain a continuing freedom not to act as we have decided,’’ because
‘‘decision-making is a method of future action control which is essentially
non-manipulative,’’ or freedom-preserving.167 Thus Pink holds that the will
is not a deliberative but an ‘‘executive agency,’’168 since the intentions that
it forms
are quite distinct from practical judgments. One can form intentions
which are not accompanied by any conviction that what is intended
is desirable. One can form intentions which are not actually explained
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by concomitant practical judgments at all. Nevertheless, the capacities
for practical judgment and intention are still possessed together, because the core function of intention formation is to apply or execute
our practical judgments about how we should act.169
In other words, the fact that one ‘‘can decide akratically’’ goes along with
the fact that ‘‘It is very much more intuitive that we have freedom of decision than that we have a freedom of practical judgment.’’170
Similarly, in his own less sophisticated but still interesting treatment, the
neo-Hegelian Rudolph Steiner holds that the most important question
about freedom cannot even be framed unless we talk in terms of decisional
agency and its motives for forming intentions:
Should it matter to me whether I can do a thing or not, if I am forced
by the motive to do it? The immediate question is not whether I can
or cannot do a thing when a motive has influenced me [freedom of
action] but whether only such motives exist as affect me with compelling necessity. . . . The question is not whether I can carry out a
decision once made, but how the decision arises within me.171
On this basis, Steiner is skeptical, for example, of Eduard von Hartmann’s
model, which holds that the motives determining our decisions follow from
the interaction of our environment with the individual ‘‘characterological
disposition’’ that makes us who we are. Hartmann’s theory is a precursor
of contemporary psychological models of action as a function of ‘‘personality type’’ (clusters of dispositional traits) and situational variables. Such
models leave us no liberty in the determination of our basic motives,
whether or not we enjoy liberty in transferring these motives into specific
intentions or in acting on them.
But it does not follow analytically from my existential conception of the
will as a decision-making agency that forms intentions and projects new
ends that the will normally enjoys libertarian freedom (in the agent-causal
or leeway senses). That such freedom is required for the existential will to
play its distinctive role in the ethos of a person requires a further argument
going beyond the proleptic phenomenological analysis in this book. Such
an argument will have to contend with the objection that if the will not
only operates as executing agency in making decisions but also forms the
primary motive for some intentions, libertarian freedom at this level would
result in a regression that is unstoppable except by arbitrary choice. While
I have tried to forestall this objection by introducing the idea of grounds
for projective motivation (rooted in such aspects of personhood as the
agent’s historical acquisition of character and volitional dispositions, her
moral reasoning, and the kinds of missions or purposes that she can find

................. 16406$

CH11

05-23-07 10:57:28

PS

PAGE 408

Scotus and Kant: The Moral Will and Its Limits

409

meaningful), it remains to be shown that grounds sufficient to avoid arbitrariness in projective motivation are compatible with libertarian freedom
of the will.172
3.2. Allison and Ameriks on Freedom in Kant’s Practical Philosophy
In support of this distinction between phenomenological and metaphysical
levels of analysis in motivation theory, it will help to consider how far my
reading of Kant is consistent with two others which address Kant’s argument that human motivation is both projective and free in a libertarian
sense that would be impossible if temporal nature (as a causally closed
deterministic order) were the whole of reality. In his critique of novel interpretations by Henry Allison and Allen Wood, Karl Ameriks argues that
although ‘‘Allison does a good job of showing how Kant himself was
attached to this conception’’ of agent freedom,173 neither Kant nor Allison
provide sufficient grounds for this conception against compatibilist
alternatives.
I briefly evaluate three aspects of Ameriks’s argument in light of my
analysis of projective motivation. First, I consider his argument against Allison’s view (following Kant) that the conception of ourselves as agents who
act for reasons requires us to conceive our acts as involving libertarian freedom. Second, I consider Ameriks’s reasons for holding, pace Allison, that
even if it could be established, the practical necessity of postulating libertarian freedom cannot stand by itself without prior metaphysical conditions
(which, for Kant, are provided by an ontological rather than merely epistemic version of transcendental idealism). Third, I consider Ameriks’s argument that actions that seem to us not to have desiderative motives could in
fact still be determined by unconscious impulses (and this issue is divided
into three subpoints). While I am largely sympathetic to Ameriks on all
three issues, I raise questions about each in hopes of clarifying the kinds of
freedom to which the existential analysis of striving will is committed.
1. Projective Agency versus Libertarian Spontaneity
Ameriks recognizes that Kant interprets transcendental freedom as leewayliberty: as Rauscher puts it, ‘‘we must have been able to have chosen otherwise to be subject to praise or blame.’’174 But Ameriks maintains that Kant’s
own argument that leeway-libertarian freedom is required by the common
or ordinary understanding of conditions for moral responsibility is inadequate.175 Thus he agrees with Allison about
Kant’s basic belief that, even if humans do universally seek pleasure,
they are still rational and in some sense spontaneous agents who do
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so because of maxims that they have a ground for in a nonmechanistic sense. We can even agree, as Allison also stresses, that
Kant believes these maxims have an expression in our empirical, temporal being, and that, as Kant says, this expression takes the form of
‘‘laws of freedom’’ (A802/B830), e.g., about what ought to be done
even for the sake of prudence. But we need not agree that the mere
capacity to act according to such laws already defines us as having
free agency in an incompatibilist sense.176
In my terms, Ameriks’s point is that being moved by giving oneself
maxims as opposed to being moved directly (or ‘‘brutum’’ in Kant’s sense)
by desires and impulses is to be ‘‘spontaneous’’ only in the sense of projective
self-motivation, which does not necessarily imply libertarian freedom, either
as leeway to project alternative maxims or as the power to initiate an uncaused causal sequence. That ‘‘on the Kantian theory of agency, one’s maxims must always be not sheer givens but ‘taken as one’s own’ ’’177 only
requires that maxims are willed responses to incentives and practical reasons
that give them at least a minimal normative status.178 Hence a general capacity to form intentions and project their ends does not by itself entail libertarian freedom. In fact, the notion of projective motivation helps clarify the
crucial distinction between three different senses of freedom:
Sense 1. That intentions are not efficiently caused by prior motives, since these have to be incorporated into maxims (the weak projectivity of decision as executive agency);
Sense 2. That motivation is actively generated without derivation
from prior desire (full projective motivation, which I follow Kant in
labelling ‘‘autonomy’’);
Sense 3. That one acts as an ultimate cause in making decisions
or adopting maxims (Kant’s primary sense of ‘‘spontaneity’’ as ‘‘transcendental freedom’’).
Rauscher agrees with Ameriks that the moral law’s arising a priori does
not require the ‘‘will as power of decision to be transcendentally free. Kant
fails to exclude the possibility that the moral law can motivate a determined
will in inner sense within the confines of a deterministic nature.’’179 Yet
Rauscher does not fully distinguish the weak independence of executive
agency and the strong independence of ‘‘autonomy’’ from both libertarian
freedom and moral motivation. Thus he does not consider that an a priori
ground or reason for acting may at least entail that the will possesses the
power to transcend naturally given motives through projection of new ends.
The gap in Kant’s account is between ‘‘autonomy’’ in this sense and libertarian spontaneity or transcendental freedom.
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Since Ameriks’s critique was published, Allison has acknowledged that
‘‘the practical necessity of acting under the idea of [libertarian] freedom
leaves in place the epistemic possibility that I am deluded in believing that I
am acting,’’ and this is a doubt that ‘‘cannot be exorcised by any theoretical
means.’’180 But though this correctly reflects Kant’s view that the practical
perspective cannot provide us with metaphysical knowledge, it does not
explain why the idea of oneself as a rational agent capable of adopting
maxims even requires one to think of oneself as free in an incompatibilist
(rather than merely projective) sense. Which sense of freedom is required
by the practical standpoint of agency itself? As Allison himself said in an
earlier essay, ‘‘Why, after all, should the capacity to project ends, act on the
basis of reasons, or even independently of desire, require the assumption of
a mysterious contracausal faculty? Could it not rather be the outcome of a
cognitive process that is completely explicable in naturalistic terms?’’181
Allison’s response to his own question is that libertarian freedom is not
‘‘introduced in an attempt to provide something like the best explanation
for the ‘phenomenon’ of rational agency,’’ but rather is conceptually essential
to the idea of an agent who deliberates and chooses maxims.182 This conception of ourselves as agents requires not only that our decisions are projectively independent of ‘‘passions or overwhelming urges’’ but also that they
are ‘‘not . . . merely causal consequences of our antecedent states.’’183 In
effect, then, Allison claims that the first sense of freedom in my list, which
is essential to the standpoint of agency, also entails freedom in the third
sense. But since he does not explain why this additional condition follows
from our volitional capacity to incorporate given desires or inclinations into
the maxims on which we act, he leaves it unclear why libertarian freedom
should be vital to our sense of ourselves as responsible agents.
As a result, Ameriks is right: Allison has not shown that the conditions
of moral agency require us to regard ourselves as free in any libertarian
sense. Like Kant, Allison has not given ‘‘adequate attention to the possibility of a sophisticated compatibilism.’’184 This result supports my claim that
the phenomenology of projective motivation does not include or directly
require libertarian metaphysical premises. But it leaves the door open to
other arguments that the standpoint of agency requires the idea that our
decisions involve libertarian freedom. Consider the following sketch of an
argument from the epistemology of modality:
The Modal Argument for Leeway-Liberty
1. The ability to see ourselves as projecting our purposes for
deontic reasons is essential to the standpoint of moral agency [shown
by Kant].
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2. Deontic projection would be impossible if the significance of
moral necessity were not accessible to us [shown by Kant].
3. Yet in order for the concept of moral necessity to have meaning
for us, we must be able to apprehend the modal significance of counterfactual possibilities of action and motivation [from possible-worlds
semantics of modal concepts].
4. Such counterfactuals would be epistemically inaccessible to us
if we did not enjoy leeway-libertarian freedom [from?].185
5. Therefore the standpoint of moral agency requires libertarian
freedom [1–4, hypothetical syllogism].
One might be able to defend the crucial fourth premise as follows: since
awareness of moral necessity depends on seeing some volitionally possible
motives in the circumstances as required, some as permitted, and some as
not permitted, moral necessity would be unintelligible to us unless we were
able to see both moral and nonmoral motives (and related intentions) as
volitionally possible for us in a given circumstance—which is just to see
ourselves as enjoying morally significant libertarian leeway. To see our different options only as physically or nomologically possible would be insufficient to provide a basis for our understanding of moral possibility and
necessity, which concerns volitional possibilities, i.e. possibilities of motivation and action that are voluntarily accessible to us. If this is right, then we
must at least see one moral and one nonmoral purpose (along with their
different grounds) as volitionally possible for us whenever we see ourselves
as responsible agents aware of moral modality, rather than simply as nodes
in a causal nexus. In Allison’s terms, our incorporation of a desire or incentive can be morally significant only if we act under the idea that we can also
refrain from forming our actual intention or its maxim and form others
instead.
Note that this proposal does not interpret premise 4 as a version of
the ought-implies-can principle (although that would be another strategy).
Rather, the idea is that the epistemic conditions of responsibility include
being able to use the concepts of moral necessity and possibility, which in
turn include the concept of volitional modality—and in particular the idea
of nonactualized volitional possibilities.186 Hence to satisfy the epistemic
conditions of moral responsibility is to act under the idea of leeway-liberty:
the standpoint of agency is incompatible with psychophysical determinism.
This is only a sketch of a transcendental deduction of leeway-liberty from
the concept of moral obligation, but it is clearly Kantian in spirit.
2. Practical and Metaphysical Standpoints
Along these lines, one might be able to rescue Kant’s deduction of libertarian spontaneity from the basic ‘‘faktum’’ of moral obligation, on the premise
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that moral necessity has to be a significant concept for us. This transcendental deduction would still leave open the possibility that our concept of
moral necessity, along with the ‘‘practical point of view’’ to which it is
essential, is an illusion.187 But what of Allison’s neo-Kantian position that
we can focus on how persons who take themselves to be moral agents must
regard themselves and ignore the metaphysical question of whether their
actions and motives really are undetermined by the past and the laws of
physics and psychology? Ameriks argues convincingly that for Kant, even if
we can demonstrate a practical requirement to regard ourselves as having
liberty, this would not be enough if theoretical metaphysics did not leave
open the possibility of undetermined agent-causation: ‘‘surely, any actual determining must itself be regarded ultimately as either caused naturally or
not so caused. If nature is the closed system that Allison allows, then the
latter option appears excluded, even if, as he claims, we ‘can’t help’ but
think ourselves free ‘regulatively’ in a practical respect.’’188 Thus, for Kant,
a practical requirement to regard ourselves as having liberty can have a grip
on us only if we can independently establish that ontologically there are ‘‘two
aspects’’ to reality, including a ‘‘timeless’’ noumenal aspect in which freedom can underlie spatiotemporal causal processes.189 Ameriks clarifies this
point in a more recent paper:
Kant properly indicates that, at the common sense level, even positive
unanimity [about our liberty] from the practical perspective could
not save the claim of our freedom if it were to come into conflict
with what can be established about nature, either by science or metaphysics (KrV Bxxviii–xxix); in this one respect there is precisely not
a ‘‘primacy of practical reason.’’ . . . The doctrine of transcendental
idealism is especially significant for him here because it means not
merely that there might be some ‘‘non-natural’’ room for uncaused
causing; it shows that there always must be some such ‘‘room,’’ given
the antinomies that arise from taking determined spatio-temporal nature to exhaust reality.190
This is correct as an interpretation of Kant, and it also seems right more
generally that if our knowledge of nature is not ultimately dependent on
our practical perspective,191 any alleged practical requirement to regard our
actions and motives as involving liberty depends for its pragmatic force on
its consistency with metaphysical and scientific knowledge.192 It is less clear
that we need a metaphysical guarantee that scientific evidence can never undermine the practical standpoint, as Kant thought. If there is a sound argument that responsibility entails a form of libertarian freedom incompatible
with psychophysical determinism, then perhaps we can only say that our
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a priori knowledge of moral obligation entails that determinism must be
false.193
3. Moral Responsibility Entails Projective Capacity
But in responding to Allison, Ameriks also challenges Kant’s evidence that
regarding ourselves as moral agents implies accepting our capacity for projective motivation (whether or not projective motivation would in turn require us to regard ourselves as free in an incompatibilist sense).194 Ameriks
says that despite Kant’s ‘‘great reversal,’’ his error in Groundwork III is similar
to his mistake in the Critique of Practical Reason. In the former, Kant invalidly
infers
from the psychological absence of a particular causal content in one’s intentions (i.e., one doesn’t see that one is acting as the ‘‘mere’’ effect
of a particular force [or desire]) to the metaphysical absence of any
natural cause as the efficient ground of the act which has that content.
Similarly, in moral contexts, the fact that certain maxims involve a
rule whose content makes no essential reference to human desires still
does not show that the actual adoption of such maxims . . . is not in
fact caused by desires. . . . The compatibilist hypothesis is not that
‘‘rules’’ about sensible ends, or even beliefs about such rules, need be
what cause our actions, but rather just that there can be desires present which in some, perhaps totally hidden, way are their ultimate
efficient cause.195
Three things are suggested here. First, even if heteronomous and autonomous motivation appear to be alternatives of projective agency or existential
willing, the experienced choice of either alternative may in fact be determined by hidden causes, for all we know: ‘‘The ‘phenomenal’ fact that the
maxims permeating our moral life appear as ‘self-imposed’ rules hardly settles the question of whether this imposition is free of natural determinism.’’196 Second, intentions grounded in pure moral considerations might
not really be projective; they might have desires as their hidden causes. Third,
Ameriks demands proof that viewing ourselves as agents who can respond
to moral obligation requires that ‘‘there is moral autonomy in the sense of
‘motivational independence’ from all our needs as sensuous beings’’197 (i.e.,
full projective autonomy). In response to the first point, I agree that Kant’s
argument fails to rule out the possibility that decisions are really determined
by hidden causes; moreover, the agent’s full grounds for setting various ends
and striving to reach them may be only imperfectly introspectable—even
though deciding to intend a first-order act is itself something done for reason(s), and therefore the agent must always (however unreflectively) have
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something ‘‘in mind’’ in forming any intention—including those in which
the end is posited projectively rather than suggested by prior desires. The
agent must have in mind reasons or values that make her intended act
voluntary under one set of descriptions (or intentional designations) and
not under others.198 But the sense of ‘‘having reason R in mind’’ in which
this is true does not entail that the agent can successfully introspect R or
identify all its contents as her reason for projecting some end that informs
particular intentions. She may not even recognize that the intentions on
which she acts are motivated by interest in this projected end.
In response to Ameriks’s second point, it is important to note that not
just any kind of hidden causation by desires can serve the compatibilist’s
purpose, for some will obviously undermine responsibility. If desires cause
my intentions by way of deviant causal chains, or if my intentions are often
caused by desires that I cannot recognize, which are therefore completely
beyond the reach of critical reflection, then my intentions might not be
sufficiently responsive to practical reasons for me to count as morally sane.
Similar doubts would arise, I think, if all my apparent activities of projective motivation were illusory because my ends were all being set by unconscious desires.199
In any case, projective motivation is certainly not compatible with causation by hidden desires; for in such instances, I do not really act on a maxim
whose true content is independent of prior desires. The projective status of
a motive M aiming at end E requires that M is caused by an agentive
process that can operate in nearby possible worlds where the agent lacks
prepurposive desires for E. But I agree with Ameriks that this requirement
does not entail that the agentive process that sets new goals and/or consolidates existing motivation must also be an ultimate cause involving transcendental freedom. The compatibilist is better off emphasizing this point
rather than the suspicion that hidden desires may be operative everywhere
or that projective motivation may always be illusory.
Moreover, Ameriks has not shown any incoherence in distinguishing the
psychological grounds of decision and/or projective end-setting from their
efficient cause in the classical sense; the reasons and values one has in mind
(introspectably or not) when coming to commit oneself to some moral
principle, political cause, professional excellence, or any final end whose
significance transcends one’s material interests may rationalize one’s volitional
resolve to strive for these life goals without causing or necessitating the psychological processes involved in this striving. Kantians and existentialists
may regard the generation of this volitional effort in our psyche as simply
uncaused (in the sense of natural event-event causation), although it is an
activity of the same executive capacity that makes decisions;200 or they may
regard projective willing as agent-caused, as suggested above.201
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As Allison suggests, holding that our decisions and acts are not ‘‘causal
consequences of our antecedent states’’ is not to ‘‘deny that there is any
connection between an agent’s antecedent condition or underlying character
and the ensuing action, but it is to deny that the connection can be understood in strictly causal terms.’’202 Choice need not be indifferent between the
agent’s options for it to involve a casual ‘‘leap.’’ Of course, if decisions and
projective motives are not ‘‘caused’’ in this nomological sense it remains
possible that they can be determined in some nonphysical way by noumenal
states of affairs—for example, our fixed atemporal character, or divine decree, or God’s choice of the maximal compossible set of monads that make
up the actual world, and so on.
I have not tried to rule out such Leibnizian scenarios; although I hold
that the conditions of moral responsibility for one’s volitional character
require libertarian freedom at least in the higher-order will (understood in
existential terms as the capacity for reflexive projection of ends concerning
our own motives or first-order dispositions), I do not defend that claim
here.203 However, in response to Ameriks’s third suggestion, I do defend
the weaker claim that the practical standpoint requires us to see ourselves
as capable of projective motivation in the formation of intentions whose
purposes are independent of prior motives that we did not actively shape.
For this follows directly by the ought-implies-can principle if Kant is right
about the pure content of our moral obligations and their universal scope
of application (as I argue in sec. 2.2 above).204
Finally, even if the compatibilist were right that moral responsibility for
a given act does not require anything more than that its maxim is freely
adopted in the first sense (i.e., decision as an act distinct from desiring/
believing), there might still be other reasons for positing libertarian freedom.
For example, our capacity to form intentions standardly seems to superintend multiple and often conflicting motives: if we can adopt maxims with
either autonomous or heteronomous motives (or both), this suggests leeway
in deciding which first-order intentions to form and for what reasons. Since
even an act required by duty may be chosen for self-interested reasons, the
guidance of intentions by maxims seems to include the practical alternative
of heteronomous or autonomous motivation—even if responsibility did
not require such alternatives.
Kant’s position in the second Critique reflects this: he ‘‘tries to show that
our absolute freedom must be clear from (and solely from) our commitment to maxims that involve (either through acceptance or rejection) specifically
moral ends.’’205 Ameriks is right that the projection of either kind of motive
by itself does not imply leeway-liberty, but the phenomenological evidence
that motives of both kinds seem available in the same choice circumstance
does lend support to the thesis that it is part of the standpoint of agency
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in general for human beings to regard themselves as at liberty to act on
motives with different moral worth. This kind of evidence will be crucial
for any further analysis of the freedom-conditions of responsibility.
Conclusion
As explained in the preface, establishing libertarian freedom as a condition
of moral responsibility in general (and of responsibility for character in
particular) is an essential component of an existential theory of personhood.
However, a phenomenology of the values to which the striving will can
respond together with an account of how the will responds to them by
projecting ends and motivating the agent’s pursuits must precede any viable
argument for existential liberty. For until we know what willing is, how can
we understand freedom of the will? Hence on the existential approach, an
understanding of the will rooted in reflections on human motivation in
everyday experience is prior to any argument that liberty is a condition of
moral responsibility. In particular, we have to understand the role of striving will in shaping the agent’s practical identity through cares and loves and
the way that devotions central to one’s personal ethos generate a unified
sense of one’s life as meaningful or worthwhile. These themes are explored
in existential psychoanalysis (chap. 12) and in contemporary moral psychology (chaps. 13 and 14).
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12
Existential Psychology and Intrinsic Motivation:
Deci, Maslow, and Frankl

Overview. This chapter surveys developments in psychological theory
that support the existential account of projective motivation and applies the distinction between targetable and by-product goods to
these debates. It critiques recent theories of intrinsic motivation and
self-actualization on this basis and interprets Viktor Frankl’s ‘‘logotherapy’’ as a projective theory. It also applies the goal versus byproduct distinction to the problem of self-regarding attitudes such as
various types of ‘‘self-esteem.’’ The discussions are not technical and
connect familiar themes in psychoanalysis with the work of wellknown philosophers such as Rawls, Noddings, and Frankfurt.
1. Twentieth-Century Psychological Theories of Motivation
The debate we have traced between egoistic, eudaimonist, and existential
theories of human motivation can also be found in twentieth-century psychology and psychoanalysis, where we now find support for the existential
model of striving will. I will focus in this chapter on only a few among
several areas of important work in contemporary experimental psychology.
For the theories behind these experimental approaches often uncritically
take over the Transmission principle and focus mainly on the etiology of
long-recognized states of prepurposive motivation—for example, whether
altruistic or sympathetic feelings could be evolved responses. As Edward
Deci says, the fundamental disagreements between ‘‘metatheories’’ guiding
different empirical methodologies (for example, concerning whether inner
experiences are merely epiphenomenal or play a causal role in voluntary
action and whether human action is ultimately determined or involves liberty) result from philosophical hypotheses that cannot be directly tested.
418
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‘‘The research does not substantiate the assumptions’’ that constitute the
metatheory but simply coheres with the framework used to interpret the
results.1
Deci provides a useful summary of the main approaches to motivation
in twentieth-century psychology,2 which include:
I. Mechanistic Theories which hold that behavior is a direct response to stimuli, while thoughts, feelings, and choices are epiphenomenal, playing no causal role in behavior.
(A) Early psychoanalysis (Freud, Adler), which held behavior to
be caused primarily by unconscious drives, conscious desires,
and environmental stimuli.
(B) Extreme behaviorism (Watson, Skinner), which ignores conscious processes and intentionality altogether.
(C) Behaviorist drive theory (Hull), which focuses on internal
associations between stimuli and behavioral responses.
II. Organismic Theories which hold that behavior is primarily
caused by conscious internal processes, including cognitive and affective states, and thus generally counts as voluntary action.
(A) Affect arousal theories (McClelland, Young, Atkinson, Clark,
and Lowell), which hold that behavior follows quasi-mechanistically from positive or negative affects or feelings caused
by past experiences and aroused again by similar environmental cues.
(B) Cognitive theories (Vroom, Hunt, etc.), which hold that actions are caused by choices that are determined in turn by
beliefs and desires (or in general, pro-attitudes).
(C) Humanistic psychology (Buhler and Allen, Maslow, Laing),
which adds free will to a cognitive picture of motivation,
with a special emphasis on personal experience.
To clarify their similarities and differences, it may also be helpful to picture
the relation between these theories on a two-dimensional table:
Motivation Theories

Noncognitive Causes/Motives

Nonconscious
Causes of Behavior

Extreme behaviorism (Skinner);
James-Lange theory of emotion

Cognitive Causes/Motives

Unconscious Causes Early Freudian psychoanalysis
Conscious Causes

Drive theory (Hull); Affect
Arousal theory

................. 16406$

CH12

05-23-07 10:57:08

Cognitive theories;
Humanistic theories

PS

PAGE 419

420

Will as Commitment and Resolve

In this chapter, I will be interested primarily in ideas from theories in
the bottom-right cell of the table, since the others proceed from assumptions now largely rejected in philosophical action theory (chap. 3). When
they allow conscious states to play a causal role in generating behavior,
these theories also tend to be absolutely egoistic. For example, affectarousal accounts imply that all motivation flows ultimately from the drive
to maximize positive feeling and minimize negative feeling,3 as per the reward-event theory (see chap. 5, sect. 2.2). Similarly, Hull’s system conceives
the telos of all desire as physiological ‘‘equilibrium,’’ with drives as disturbances in this equilibrium that have to be reduced by behavior. In this
version of behaviorism, ‘‘Drives activate stimulus-response associations, and
drive reduction strengthens stimulus-response associations,’’ as the organism learns what kind of behavioral responses will reduce the unpleasant
feeling of the drive by returning it to homeostasis.4 On this theory, actions
motivated by emotions such as pity would have to be regarded as energized
by the agent’s desire to quell his own distress. Pure or non-egoistic motives
are ruled out a priori.
The dominant influence of such egoistic models is obvious in Douglas
Mook’s leading textbook on motivation in contemporary experimental psychology, which lists as main topics all the following:
• under ‘‘Biological Motives,’’ hunger, thirst, sex, aggression, homeostatic feedback mechanisms involved in these motives, cultural and
cognitive processes related to these, and the neurological and chemical
realization of these states in our nervous system;
• under ‘‘Energy, Arousal, and Action,’’ theories of habit and drive, and
Freud on arousal and drives;
• under ‘‘Acquired Drives and Rewards,’’ theories of avoidance conditioning, Pavlovian conditioning, imprinting in early infancy, and opponent-process theory;
• under ‘‘Reinforcement Theory,’’ the behaviorist account of operant
conditioning; rational decision theory, its relations to criminology, and
problems with maximizing, and so on.5
It is only in the last quarter of Mook’s textbook that we come to issues
closer to the central problems of philosophical psychology, including the
cognitive processes involved in human motivation (e.g., reducing cognitive
dissonance); theories of emotions as motivating states; love and altruism as
forms of ‘‘social motivation’’ and ‘‘attachment’’; and finally a brief look at
‘‘long-term goals.’’6 As this indicates, the origin of the most important motives in human psychology—those most central to the ethos of a person—
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has until recently been addressed only in post-Freudian psychoanalysis and
humanistic psychology, while more ‘‘scientific’’ approaches focused on motive processes that human beings share with other animals. As Joel Kupperman points out, there is so little good experimental work on ‘‘character’’
and other key concepts in moral psychology (such as ultimate ends) because
it is extremely difficult to conduct experiments in these areas without violating the rights of test subjects or conducting expensive and logistically challenging longitudinal studies of individuals over many years.7 Even when
experiments can be done, they either use animal models or limit test subjects to college students, and the experiments often proceed by way of collecting stories, diaries, and so on (which must then be parsed according to
subjective criteria). Thus the more speculative contributions of psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology have been able to contribute more to literary and philosophical debates about the content and sources of ultimate
human motives.
To illustrate this point, consider one recent example in the post-Freudian
psychoanalytic tradition. A scholarly workbook for therapists using ‘‘egostrengthening’’ techniques, including scripts for suggestion under hypnosis,
relies on a conception of the ‘‘ego’’ as ‘‘the agent or organizer’’ of the self
that is capable of what the authors call ‘‘inner strength.’’8 They never mention the word ‘‘will’’—an example of the lingering effects of Freud’s effort
to dispense with the will. But they start from a notion of ‘‘inner strength’’
which they take to be ‘‘part of the vernacular of the common man,’’ referring to a ‘‘psychic structure created through ordinary maturation and development.’’9 They attribute extraordinary powers to this ‘‘structure,’’ which
their primary script describes to the patient as feeling ‘‘like the very center
of your being.’’10 In particular, the script suggests that
when you are in touch with this part of yourself, you will be able to
feel more confident with the knowledge that you have within yourself
all the resources you really need to take steps in the direction that
you wish to go . . . to be able to set goals and to be able to achieve
them.11
This part of the psyche described here as ‘‘inner strength’’ obviously
plays the roles that I have attributed to the will as the capacity for projective
motivation. To the extent that focusing patients’ attention on this source
of willpower and resolve helps them gain confidence in themselves and
overcome obstacles, it is a testament to the existential theory. Yet these
authors start from a theoretical framework that obscures any deeper understanding of what this faculty of ‘‘inner strength’’ really is.12
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2. From Drive Theories to Intrinsic Motivation
This example illustrates how far some psychoanalytic conceptions of motivation have come from Freud’s basically Hobbesian model (with Helmholtzian mechanisms). Psychoanalysis has been influenced by developments in
empirical psychology, starting around the middle of the twentieth century,
spurred by recognition that many animals have an innate interest in exploration of novel spaces and objects.13 Such motives do not seem to be ‘‘drives’’
according to the classic erosiac conception, that is, energies seeking reduction of some physiological ‘‘deficit’’ in a ‘‘consummatory’’ experience.14 For,
among other things, curiosity is often open-ended (aiming at no particular
object) and can even motivate activities that seem to increase or stimulate it
(such as seeking novel stimuli).15 As we have seen, an agent cannot be motivated by erosiac desire to induce a motivating lack or deficit in herself. Yet
evidence shows that human beings may seek new experiences even at the
cost of increasing anxiety and dissonance with current cognitions.16 Hence,
as the Wallachs note:
A great deal of what we want and strive for has always seemed to
some psychologists just too remote from sex or aggression to be accounted for in terms of Freudian drives. In the early days of psychoanalysis, Jung felt this way about strivings for religious values, for
meaning, and for self-realization; Adler felt this way about strivings
for power and superiority.17
They also note Gordon Allport’s point that activities originally motivated by basic drives may ‘‘become ends in themselves’’ for us, and Asch’s
thesis that ‘‘certain forms of experience and activity—for example, music,
dancing, and painting—are simply interesting or desirable in their own
right from the start.’’18 Much the same might be said for activities involved
in other practices, from chess to ecological science, even when their pursuit
becomes difficult.
The inadequacy of Freud’s gray-tone palette to produce the colorful
array of actual motives we find operating in human experience first became
apparent to many psychoanalysts in Hartmann’s argument that young children do many things that function to develop their motor, speech, and
cognitive capacities without trying to satisfy basic needs for food and comfort. Hartmann saw the ‘‘energy’’ used by the ‘‘ego’’ to motivate such activities as coming from itself, not from the Id.19 This clearly moves us toward
the Aristotelian idea that beings tend to enjoy the development and exercise
of their natural capacities in activities with no (other) utility. As Piaget
noted of the infant’s experimentation with objects, ‘‘The activities tend to
be engaged in and enjoyed precisely when they are just in the process of
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being mastered or of producing new and interesting effects—circumstances
in which they afford more challenge and provocation.’’20
Of course, I am not suggesting that very young children exercise their
will to self-motivate; infants have not developed the rational capacities to
recognize values as reasons for projecting new ends. Since all psychologically healthy children who are given the opportunity do engage in such play,
the motivation for it is both innate and instinctual (nor is this instinct
limited to human beings). Kierkegaard’s aesthetic young man describes it as
the drive to avoid ‘‘boredom’’ and says that ‘‘As long as children are having
a good time, they are always good.’’21 Although seeking relief from boredom by ‘‘the interesting’’ is a movement away from a kind of stasis, this is
not enough to make it projective. Still, although our instinctive aversion to
tedium is not a willed motive, its goal becomes harder to target directly the
older and more reflectively aware one becomes: for to succeed, we have to
forget that we are trying to avoid boredom or (better) stop trying to avoid
it and start exercising our volitional power to set new goals worthy of our
developed capacities.
Hence the baby’s play instinct points indirectly to the latent projective
power of the will, for both enable the human being to act on motives that
do not seek their own reduction. Activity motivated as willed striving differs from the infant’s non-erosiac play motive in actively seeking to sustain
or enhance the motivation involved. But their kinship helps explain why, as
I suggested in discussing the practices (chap. 8, sec. 5), human persons tend
to find value simply in novelty and in an activity’s being challenging (in the
sense of requiring skill and sustained effort), whatever its other effects.
Mild novelty and challenges of the most rudimentary sort are instinctively
enjoyed by the toddler, but the adult can recognize in complex forms of
novelty and challenge a set of values that at least contribute to making the
relevant ends worth willing for their own sake. Even if these values are
rarely sufficient by themselves to ground projective motivation, they are
ones to which projective striving can respond. At this stage, they are not
sought simply for amusement, nor just as arbitrary distractions to save us
from boredom, but rather because setting ourselves to work on challenging
problems and novel tasks (even when we have no prior need for their goals)
is our natural volitional function, and we find its exercise inherently meaningful—at least when applied to goals or objects that are important apart
from their mere difficulty (e.g., because they produce recognizable goods in
some way).22
This point also applies to the development of personal identity in social
relationships. As Alan Gilbert notes in his study of individual selfhood in
democratic theory, an Aristotelian-Hegelian influence is found ‘‘in the modern psychoanalytic conception of the self offered by Heinz Kohut, Harry
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Guntrip, and Alice Miller.’’ For ‘‘[i]n contrast to the misguided instinctual
determinist strain in Freud’s view, Kohut focuses on the social formation
of the self in the contexts of its early relationships.’’23 He finds that even
persons who have suffered deprivation in childhood can form healthy ‘‘integrated’’ selves via the practices: for instance, ‘‘through participation in intrinsic goods—painting, music, friendship, nurturing and the like.’’24 As the
Wallachs also recognize, social motives aimed at direct contact with others,
participation with them in activities, and belonging to groups can be more
powerful than primary biological drives—even in nonhuman mammals.25
After reviewing experimental evidence, they suggest the possibility of motives that point beyond the agent’s own good:
Perhaps concern for other individuals also exists without having to
be based on the biological needs or competence development of the
animal or person showing the concern. Typically, when we are
attached to people, we not only want to be near them and to interact
with them, but we also seem to care about their welfare. Perhaps such
caring is also real and direct, rather than necessarily derivative from
one’s own needs and welfare.26
On this view, care for others is not simply driven by a need to reduce one’s
own empathetic distress, since this reduction is only a concomitant effect
of caring. This idea is hardly surprising to philosophers, but it was a difficult step for a human science so dominated by Hobbesian assumptions
about motivation.
This crucial break from Hobbes, Freud, and behaviorist drive theories
led psychologists back to the old idea of ‘‘intrinsic motivation,’’ which
Mook summarizes as ‘‘performance motivated by pleasure in the task itself,
rather than by external rewards offered for performing it. Think of the
difference between a man who works on a car as a hobby, for the joy of it
(intrinsic), rather than as a job (extrinsic).’’27 Unsurprisingly, the leading
twentieth-century proponent of this idea, Edward Deci, drew explicitly on
Aristotle’s thesis that human beings are intrinsically motivated to pursue
knowledge or understanding:
Intrinsically motivated activities are ones for which there is no apparent reward except the activity itself. People seem to engage in the
activities for their own sake and not because they lead to an extrinsic
reward. The activities are ends themselves rather than means to an
end. This . . . serves quite adequately as an operational definition of
intrinsic motivation.28
However, one problem with this definition is that it does not distinguish
agent-transcending from egoistic ends. If I take a walk in the park simply
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to enjoy being outdoors and take in some scenery, that activity is pleasurable in itself and so would count as intrinsically motivated, on this definition. So would any activity that directly produces some kind of first-order
pleasure or entertainment.
Yet Deci clearly has in mind the kind of higher aspirations that Maslow
included within ‘‘self-actualization.’’29 He and colleague Richard Ryan now
present ‘‘self-determination theory’’ (SDT) as an account of roughly the
same phenomena that I have described as resulting from striving volitional
engagement:
The fullest representations of humanity show people to be curious,
vital, and self-motivated. At their best, they are agentic and inspired,
striving to learn; extend themselves; master new skills; and apply their
talents responsibly. That people show considerable effort, agency,
and commitment in their lives appears, in fact, to be more normative
than exceptional.30
Thus Deci and Ryan describe intrinsic motivation as sustained by
agentic effort and as including ‘‘great volitional persistence.’’31 Although
they do not identify ‘‘the will’’ as a cause of such motivation, they associate
intrinsic motivation with a higher level of voluntariness, ‘‘a feeling of volition that can accompany any act’’ felt to emanate from the self rather than
from external pressures.32 Thus they relate intrinsic motivation directly to
personal autonomy (although they use the term ‘‘authenticity’’ instead):
‘‘Comparisons between people whose motivation is authentic (literally, selfauthored or endorsed) and those who are merely externally controlled’’
show the former to ‘‘have more interest, excitement, and confidence, which
in turn is manifest both as enhanced performance, persistence, and creativity.’’33 The existential account would explain this as a result of the inherent
autonomy and resilience of projected motives.
It is also apparent that Deci and Ryan limit the use of ‘‘intrinsic’’ to
certain kinds of final ends whose value is recognized independently of any
material contribution to the agent’s good (whereas if ‘‘intrinsic’’ just meant
‘‘final,’’ then any voluntary or goal-directed action would have to involve
some intrinsic motivation, as Aristotle argued). ‘‘Intrinsic aspirations’’ include ‘‘goals such as affiliation, personal growth, and community’’ or relationships, while ‘‘extrinsic aspirations’’ aim at things such as ‘‘wealth, fame,
and image’’34 that constitute ‘‘tangible rewards.’’35 For example, Ryan and
Deci contrast acting ‘‘from a sense of personal commitment to excel’’ with
‘‘fear of being surveilled’’ or being bribed.36 Thus ‘‘intrinsic’’ and ‘‘extrinsic’’
ends in SDT largely map onto MacIntyre’s better-defined concepts of ‘‘internal’’ and ‘‘external’’ goods, rather than onto the universal distinction between final and nonfinal goals, as Ryan and Deci sometimes suggest.37 We
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see this in more substantive definitions of intrinsic motivation as a ‘‘natural
inclination towards assimilation, mastery, spontaneous interest, and exploration.’’ An intrinsically motivated agent seeks out challenging and novel
goals even in the absence of specific material rewards.38 Given that the
intrinsic-extrinsic contrast in this literature really marks an (intuitive) distinction among different kinds of final ends, what is meant by ‘‘intrinsic
motivation’’ would be better captured in the existential concept of projective motivation.
However, this conceptual problem in ‘‘self-determination theory’’ is
rooted in what I see as a deeper explanatory error that leads Deci and Ryan
to construe ‘‘intrinsic’’ or internal goods in an agent-relative way. Although
I regard their new, humanistic approach within the family of cognitive theories as more insightful than any other model found in empirical psychology
today, SDT still does not recognize the projective function of the human
will, because its explanation of the ‘‘psychological basis of intrinsic motivation’’ retains too much of the structure of the drive theories that SDT was
meant to replace. Deci recognized that his initial operative definition of
intrinsic motivation did not contain a causal explanation39 so he sought to
develop one that would subsume earlier drive-theoretic explanations ranging from ‘‘secondary reinforcement,’’ ‘‘optimal stimulation,’’ ‘‘optimal
incongruity’’ or dissonance, ‘‘optimal arousal’’ and ‘‘the reduction of uncertainty,’’40 to drives for ‘‘achievement’’ or excellence, self-actualization, and
‘‘meaning’’ (conceived by Maddi as a need to symbolize, imagine, learn,
judge critically, distinguish oneself as an individual and become selfreliant).41
Deci’s own proposal is most indebted to White’s concept of ‘‘effectance
motivation,’’ conceived as the drive to ‘‘competence and efficacy,’’42 which
includes Kagan’s ‘‘motive for mastery’’ in relation to high standards and the
‘‘motive to reduce uncertainty’’ or be in control of one’s fate.43 To this
complex idea of competence, Deci adds both a basic social drive for affiliation with significant others and an intrinsic concern for ‘‘self-determination’’ or autonomy, in the broad sense of acting from an internal locus of
control.44
Thus Deci and Ryan now describe SDT as ‘‘an organismic metatheory
that highlights the importance of humans’ evolved inner resources for personality development,’’ based on empirical research identifying these three
‘‘innate psychological needs’’ as universal and their satisfaction as essential
to normal growth and development of human personality.45 Much as Aristotle sought to embrace all motivation in the desire for happiness, Ryan
and Deci now explain all intrinsic motivation as differentiating out of formally self-regarding needs, or what I would call quasi-drives: ‘‘We have thus

................. 16406$

CH12

05-23-07 10:57:11

PS

PAGE 426

Existential Psychology and Intrinsic Motivation

427

proposed that the basic needs for competence, autonomy [or self-determination], and relatedness must be satisfied across the span of life for an
individual to experience an ongoing sense of integrity and well-being or
‘eudaimonia.’ ’’46
This explanation results from a dialectical subsumption of earlier drive
theories (such as Hull’s) that nevertheless leaves intact their most basic (and
commonly invisible) premises; namely (1) that there must be some reward
or perceived benefit to the agent involved in causing all motivation; and (2)
that the prospect of this benefit explains the energy involved in intrinsically
motivated activities, since no activity can literally be its own reward.47 It
follows from these assumptions that intrinsic motivation exists because of
the goods that it tends to produce for its agent, which SDT identifies as
psychic development, autonomy, competence and competence-based security, fulfillment, excitement, and so on. In other words, SDT starts from the
erosiac concept of our formal telos (see chap. 6, sec. 3), and interprets
the substance of that telos as including a triad of innate and irreducibly
psychological needs, the drives toward which cause intrinsic motivation to
arise (and eventually to be channeled into particular pursuits, projects, and
relationships).
The eudaimonist form of SDT is evident in another article, in which
Deci and Ryan say that it is part of the natural function or ‘‘adaptive design
of the human organism to engage in interesting activities, to exercise capacities, to pursue connectedness in social groups, and to integrate intrapsychic
and interpersonal experiences into a relative unity.’’48 They equate performing this natural function, or attaining our natural telos, with psychological
health or holistic well-being: the Hullian definition of the three psychological needs as ‘‘organismic necessities’’ assumes ‘‘a fundamental human trajectory toward vitality, integration, and health.’’49 This seems to imply that a
fundamental desire for eudaimonia motivates the activities that fulfill these
needs. This is explicit in Deci’s first book, which replaces his initial operative definition with the following formula: ‘‘Intrinsically motivated behaviors are behaviors which a person engages in to feel competent and selfdeterminated.’’50 Yet Deci and Ryan now acknowledge that an intrinsically
motivated pursuit
does not have to be aimed at need satisfaction per se, it may simply be
focused on interesting activity or an important goal if they are in a
context that allows need satisfaction. However, if need satisfaction is
not forthcoming while they are acting, nonoptimal or dysfunctional
consequences typically follow.51
This phrasing is ambiguous: it suggests that satisfaction of one (or more)
of the three basic psychological needs is sometimes only a by-product of
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some intrinsically motivated activity A; but it adds the caveat that if this
contribution to the agent’s well-being does not soon follow, then the intrinsic motivation for A will be counterreinforced and will wane. Thus ‘‘A
direct corollary of the SDT perspective is that people will tend to pursue
goals, domains, and relationships that allow or support their need satisfaction.’’52 This turns SDT into a formally egoistic model like Aristotle’s:
activities not motivated by acquisitive or consumptive appetites are still
driven by the agent’s own need for fulfillment. Yet this seems to be refuted
by the inherent resilience of intrinsic motives, their tendency to be sustained
even through ‘‘dry spells’’ where the usual fulfillment fails to follow.
3. An Existential Reinterpretation of Intrinsic Motivation
I argue here that intrinsic motivation is better understood in terms of projective striving that is not formally egoistic in structure. Carefully specifying
the role of by-product fulfillment will lead us to a fuller articulation of our
existential telos, as an alternative to the three quasi-drives identified in the
Deci-Ryan model. To clarify this alternative, let us return to the example
of character-friendship as a type of intrinsic motivation.
One leading account of friendship (which SDT includes in the intrinsic
good of relatedness) helps illustrate the Deci-Ryan view that agent-related
benefits of intrinsic motivation are crucial to their continuance. Neera Badhwar argues that even when benefits to the agent are an ‘‘unintended result’’
of an activity as Bishop Butler said, ‘‘it may well be that the tacit expectation
of self-benefit—based on past experience, or even just on the natural teleology of our biological constitution—is necessary for sustaining the activity.’’53 Applying this idea, she argues against Nygren that for the object I
contemplate in love to ‘‘further evoke the love’’ rather than quench it, the
happiness I derive from the contemplation ‘‘must serve to perpetuate the
love of the other who is its source.’’54 Alternatively, we might explain this
idea in terms of what Korsgaard, following C. I. Lewis, calls ‘‘inherent
value,’’ which is ‘‘the value that characterizes the object of an intrinsically
good experience.’’55 In these terms, Badhwar’s claim is that we can perceive
the inherent value of a person who is loveable for herself only in enjoying
or delighting in that perception.56
While it is plausible that delight and similar agent-related benefits act as
reinforcers for end-friendship and other types of intrinsic motivation, it is
not as plausible that my friend’s delighting me is an essential component of
the intrinsic value I see in her—or is an integral part of what I love or am
devoted to. In general, the staying power or commitment that is characteristic of intrinsic motivation is difficult to square with final ends that have
agent-related benefits built into them, because joy is not always present in
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the activities explained by intrinsic motivation. In fact, the greatest sense of
fulfillment or meaning often requires persistence through dry spells (both
initially and later on), during which we still recognize the value of our goals
and continue to strive for them. Sometimes the usual joy in loving our
friend is missing; sometimes the intrinsically worthy task involves so many
negatives that the real sense of satisfaction in its pursuit comes only after a
long time of sustained devotion without reinforcing delight.
That many people are not stoical enough to pursue such ‘‘thankless’’ but
valuable activities for long enough to fully appreciate them is no argument
for the Aristotelian account. The situation is similar when the agent-transcending goal of intrinsic motivation is an objective standard of excellence
rather than the qualities of some figure or the good of some person. As
Albert Bandura and Dale Schunk suggest:
By making self-satisfaction conditional on a certain level of performance, individuals create self-inducements to persist in their efforts
until their performances match internal standards. Both anticipated
satisfactions for matching attainments and the dissatisfactions with
insufficient ones provide incentives for self-directed actions.57
But notice that these ‘‘inducements’’ are generated by appropriating some conception of excellence as one’s personal standard; on pain of circularity, the
volitional activity of setting and maintaining the standard cannot itself be
motivated by the anticipated satisfaction of a job well done. Once again,
this hoped-for delight can act as a reinforcer only after the goal of meeting
one’s standard is projected. This reinforcer can be necessary for continued
pursuit of the goal beyond some point, because the agent can tolerate only
so much frustration in the pursuit of the relevant kind of excellence. This
is why ‘‘A sense of personal efficacy in mastering challenges is apt to generate greater interest in the activity.’’ Thus motivation training has to (a) get
the agent to see the intrinsic value in a goal; and (b) tolerate enough lack
of success in pursuing it to get to the point where some effectiveness can
be experienced.58
Hence the existential account of intrinsic motivation does not require
that the agent-related by-product goods remain motivationally irrelevant or
play no supporting role. On the contrary, such benefits may often help the
will sustain its efforts by providing some of the necessary psychic preconditions for volitional striving or outward-looking cares (since a miserable
agent may have trouble keeping volitional focus). By-product satisfactions
may also provide personal reasons for valuing the caring process that support and complement the agent’s independent reasons for valuing her outward goals. For the striving will, though, these agent-related and processbased reasons for pursuing goals with agent-transcending value are not
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themselves attractors or erosiac motives; the vital functions of by-product
benefits remain dependent on the primary operation of the striving will in
projecting ends without regard to self.
Hence the existential account can agree with Deci and Ryan that major
parts of human happiness depend on the by-product goods of intrinsic
motivation, or as they put it: ‘‘a critical issue in the effects of goal pursuit
and attainment concerns the degree to which people are able to satisfy their
basic psychological needs as they pursue and attain their valued outcomes.’’59
We should therefore design our schools, trades and professions, civil society, and family life to support and encourage the inherent human tendency
to develop intrinsic motivation in various domains of life. But we should
remember that these effects emerge from pursuing certain kinds of ‘‘valued
outcomes’’ for their own sake and not merely as occasions for developing competence, relatedness, and autonomy. Thus it is not these ‘‘spiritual’’ needs
that initially ‘‘give goals their psychological potence.’’60 Rather, the pursuit
of potential goals can meet these needs only if these goals have recognizable
agent-transcending values independent of these needs, for the sake of which
the agent can posit or set them as her own.
This central tension in the Deci-Ryan theory of intrinsic motivation
results from trying to account for non-drive-like motives in an explanatory
framework that still assumes the Transmission principle: all motives on which
people act, whether learned or innate, are originally prepurposive, can compete with one another prior to intention-forming choices, and thus may or
may not be acted on. SDT pictures intrinsic motivation as already there in
the psychic needs, nascently waiting to be expressed and differentiated,
rather than as generated by the existential will—the will conceived as an
innate capacity to generate various types of intrinsic motivation. The SDT
model of prepurposive intrinsic motivation thus implies that the basic triad
of innate psychological drives interacts with environmental variables to determine the development of particular intrinsic motives in the individual. But
if that were true, intrinsic motivation could not play the autonomy-making
role that the authors attribute to it, for it would arise without the individual’s agency.
From the beginning, Deci did distinguish the motive structure of the
quasi-drives for competence or effectiveness and autonomy from that of
Hullian physiological drives. He notes White’s point that ‘‘Effectance motivation is persistent in that it is always available’’61 and not slaked or reduced by success in the pursuits that it motivates. Hence in ‘‘intrinsically
motivated behavior, however, the goal will be attained and the behavior will
be rewarded, but the need will not be reduced. Rather, the need is everpresent, so it will remain, and other goals will be set.’’62 Yet surely this
would be an infinitely frustrating process, like Sisyphus rolling his stone or
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Plato’s leaky sieve, rather than a fulfilling one if competence and autonomy
were really motivating ‘‘needs.’’ To explain why intrinsic motives do not
aim at goals that reduce the intrinsic motivation, how they can be selfsustaining, and why activities they motivate can be fulfilling even when not
successful in attaining their final ends, we have to postulate instead that
these motives do not seek their ends as agent-relative rewards at all. Even if
the agent usually derives by-product benefits from pursuing and/or achieving these goals, the relation between intrinsic motivation and these byproducts is contingent and the motivation is internally structured to continue in their absence (within the limits of the agent’s tolerances, beyond
which agent-fulfillment is a necessary condition for persistence); if it were
not so structured, then these by-product benefits would have no chance of
following from the activity.
This requires a non-erosiac conception of our formal telos and hence a
radical break with all drive models. Deci and Ryan recognize that the needs
they postulate to explain intrinsic motivation do not seek a homeostatic completion, but they do not see all that this implies:
From the [drive theory] perspective, needs are understood as physiological deficits that disturb the organism’s quiescence and push the
organism to behave in ways that were learned because they satisfied
the needs and returned the organism to quiescence. Thus in drive
theories, the set point of the human organism is quiescence or passivity; need satisfaction is a process of replenishing deficiencies. . . . By
contrast, in SDT, the set point is growth-oriented activity . . . [people
are] naturally inclined to act on their inner and outer environments,
engage in activities that interest them, and move towards personal
and interpersonal coherence.63
Though this formulation is insightful, the problem with it is that psychological ‘‘growth’’ does not identify any ‘‘set point’’ at all; it specifies an
open-ended by-product of volitional devotion to other goals. This alleged
telos in SDT differs in three striking ways from the equilibria of drive
theories. First, there is a direction toward increased effectiveness, autonomy,
differentiation of interest, and so on but no rest point at which we could say
that a ‘‘satisfaction’’ internal to the aim of the activity has been reached.
This means that the real aim is not rest, completion, or satisfaction at all.
Second, it follows that the motivational telos (or teloi) of intrinsic motivation would have to be the agent-transcending goals that human agents can
take as sustainable final ends (or some relation among such ends), whereas
the natural/functional telos of a human person would be her functioning
so as to pursue such agent-transcending ends. So an agent’s motivational
telos can no longer be identified with her natural/functional telos. Third,
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since well-being or eudaimonia is a by-product of such pursuits, there is
also a gap between performing one’s design function well or realizing one’s
natural telos, and attaining happiness, fulfillment, integration of self, and
so on. The agent’s holistic good, in this sense, thus stands at two removes
from pursuing her true motivational teloi. They may be related such that, if
the by-product benefits that the agent normally derives from pursuing her
motivational teloi are blocked and fall below some threshold, then some of
the necessary preconditions for intrinsic motivation are missing. But, as I
said in reply to Badhwar, such a threshold is not the end-point of the
motivational telos, which exceeds it and remains infinitely open to new
goal-setting.
These three features together present a working existential concept of our
formal telos. The existential approach breaks up the erosiac formal telos (see
chap. 6, sec. 3) into three distinct concepts with different extensions: (1)
our highest ends, (2) our natural function, and (3) our flourishing. This is
a more detailed description of the non-erosiac formal telos that we found
in both Scotus and Kant, although they do not fully agree about its substantive content or requirements (chap. 11). Within this tradition, different
material conceptions of our existential telos are distinguished by the content they specify for our highest ends or, equivalently, the order of agenttranscending goods that it is our natural function to will for their own sake.
For example, I will present a material conception of our existential telos
that is more inclusive than either Scotus’s or Kant’s conceptions (chap. 14).
Any such account of our existential telos remains normative, because it
excludes as bad some significant ends that it is possible for human persons
to project. But it does not make this discrimination simply by asking which
among projectible ends it is most fulfilling, integrating, or self-actualizing
to will.
4. Maslow’s Eudaimonism
To clarify the importance of these distinctions, it will also be useful to
consider Abraham Maslow’s theory of self-actualization. Maslow’s theory
is less sophisticated than Deci’s and Ryan’s, which builds in Maslow’s idea
of an innate motivation to growth and development of creative talents that
awakens ‘‘higher needs.’’64 But given his place in the tradition of humanistic
psychology, Maslow’s account is much better known among philosophical
audiences and more clearly exhibits the problems with eudaimonist metatheory.65 Maslow proposes that human needs come in a lexical hierarchy,
ranging from our most basic biological requirements, through our social
dispositions to affiliation, to the most distinctively human goals, in the
following order:
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1. physiological needs (nutriment, shelter, care in infancy);
2. safety (protection from physical danger and stability in one’s
lifeworld);
3. love and belongingness (relationships with friends, groups,
spouse; attachment in childhood);
4. Esteem (recognition from others for our personality and for
our productive/useful work);
5. self-actualization (‘‘realizing their capabilities fully, being all
they could be’’).66
This theory certainly recognizes a range of possible ends like those suggested in Aristotelian philosophical theories. Maslow still thought of these
motives as drives that are innate in human nature, although the higher ones
emerge only when the lower ones are largely satisfied.67 And since even the
highest goal of ‘‘self-actualization’’ is understood formally in terms of the
agent’s flourishing or full development of psychic health, all our motives
remain formally egoistic in this model.
Maslow’s account of the self on a stagewise quest for its eudaimonia
remains too mechanical, conflating how we ought to be moved with how
we will in fact be moved. As Mook argues, it predicts that ‘‘the more a
person is deficient in a given need, the more important it should be. And
the more the needs at each level are satisfied, the more important the needs
higher in the hierarchy ought to be.’’ Yet in survey studies, ‘‘[t]here was
little support for either prediction in the data.’’68 This is unsurprising, since
Maslow forgot that many people never outgrow what Frankfurt called wantonness, or what Kierkegaard called the ‘‘aesthetic’’ stage of existence:69 they
are contented with the satisfaction of their existing D1–D2 desires without
making any strong evaluations about values that could motivate D3 desires,
let alone projecting agent-transcending goals necessary to engage in practices or cultivate noble friendships. After winning the lottery, they would
happily just sit in their mansion and watch movies on TV all day long.70
That said, even if there is an innate disposition to higher intrinsic motives such as exploration, creative work, and achievement, we could reconstruct Maslow’s lexical ordering as a thesis about how some level of
physiological satisfaction, physical security, and basic acceptance may function as preconditions to willing higher ends. It is certainly compatible with
the existential approach to hold that projective willing has necessary preconditions that are not part of the goals it adopts. Physical deprivation,
chaos in civil society, terror, or mental abuse may undermine our capacity
to set and strive for worthwhile ends. Ryan and Deci cite extensive research
showing that ‘‘a secure relational base’’ needs to be in place for children to
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develop their capacities for intrinsic motivation.71 Indeed, we might regard
all the evidence they present that nondominating, autonomy-encouraging
family and school environments help facilitate the development of intrinsic
motivation as supporting this reconstructed hierarchy thesis.
However, given its eudaimonistic character, Maslow’s theory is also subject to the crucial objection that it confuses intentional goals and by-products. As Mook notes, the best support for Maslow’s ideal of selfactualization in empirical studies is found in the growing literature on intrinsic motivation. I have argued that such motives are best understood
as concerns about first-order goals whose value is intelligible to the agent
independently of any feedback relation it may have for the agent’s own
psyche (at least within her limits of tolerance). Maslow should agree, since
he emphasizes that ‘‘self-actualized’’ persons are focused outwards on problems to be solved, not on themselves.72 They tend to be ‘‘caught up in the
tasks and challenges per se, and not in the extrinsic rewards of performing
them’’ (as MacIntyre also suggested). Yet, as Mook notes, such ‘‘intrinsic
motivation is fragile . . . extrinsic rewards for an activity can turn play into
work. . . . Anxiety about someone else’s evaluation can do the same.’’73
These observations suggest that what Maslow calls ‘‘self-actualization’’
is essentially a by-product of pursuing other worthwhile first-order goals
for their own sake—a side effect that is especially pronounced when the
activity aims at highly valuable agent-transcending ends, like those of the
practices, noble friendship, just political causes, and so on. If Maslow’s
representative individuals, such as Einstein, Thomas Jefferson, and Eleanor
Roosevelt, had been focused on becoming self-actualized or building selfesteem rather than on working out general relativity, creating a new democratic republic, or solving the problems of poverty generated by the Great
Depression, they would never have become self-actualized.
In fairness, this confusion may be more attributable to our idioms for
expressing intrinsic motivation rather than to particular theorists. For example, like Maslow, Robert Cavalier describes ‘‘self-actuation’’ as a form of
motivation in which ‘‘individuals seek ways to fully express their interests,
talents, and potentials as free human beings. . . . They find joy in doing, in
creating, in performing, in experiencing themselves as people through their
work and accomplishments.’’74 Readers easily distinguish this kind of motive from, say, painting as a means to wealth and fame; but the phrasing is
still misleading, for it implies that the agent’s intended goal is a kind of joy
in experiencing the power of their talents. This would reduce the goals of
their craft to mere occasions for self-discovery or opportunities to test their
abilities, when they are rather the opposite: self-discovery and joy in developed talent happen in activity aimed at something else. The agent may
recognize these goods that emerge in the process as reasons for continuing
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their devotion, but that is distinct from being moved by a desire or drive
for these goods.
The same distinction also needs to be made—but usually is not—in
studies on ‘‘personal achievement’’ as a long-term goal. For example, Mook
describes David McClelland’s theory of achievement motivation as follows:
People high in need for achievement (nAch) are likely to choose occupations that entail independent decision-making and rapid, concrete
knowledge of results. McClelland’s group has gathered evidence that
across societies over time, industrialization and economic growth are
associated with the prevalence of achievement motivations.75
However, we must distinguish someone who considers ‘‘achievement’’ (in
the sense of success in school, success in a high-status job, or success in
starting a business, along with the recognition these normally entail) to be
an intrinsic part of his well-being and thus acquires a D3 desire for it, from
someone who cares primarily about the agent-transcending purposes of her
studies, profession, or even a for-profit business and projects excellent realization of these purposes as her final end. In the latter case, it is misleading to
say that the individual has a ‘‘need for achievement’’ and so is formally
seeking her own well-being in striving to excel. Rather, she actively pursues
something for which she has no prepurposive need at all. In doing so, she
may display ‘‘drive,’’ but this is the resoluteness of her will, not her ‘‘ambition’’ in the sense of seeking something to add to her resume. (Resumes
tend to be more impressive when their contents are mostly a side effect of
goals other than building an impressive resume).
Of course, in everyday life, we can find it hard to distinguish this D3
desire for merits and the projective striving for ends that may (as a side
effect) count as meritorious or as ‘‘achievements.’’ Often a person may act
on both kinds of motives, to a greater or lesser degree in each case, and I
do not believe that the ambitious D3 desire must always defeat the pure
projective motive; in a single psyche, the two can often be mutually supporting, despite their different purposes. But they will tend to come apart
in cases where a determined effort to bring about some agent-transcending
result may bring no immediate worldly success or may even hamper one’s
chances of gaining social recognition as a high achiever. This is where we
see the difference between a person of strong will and McClelland’s highly
achievement-motivated agent, who needs continual feedback confirming
success and recognition of the merits or status he is accruing.76
By contrast, imagine a mathematician who is so certain of the importance of the problem on which he is working that he pursues it even when
colleagues whose support he needs dissuade him and see no value in it.
Indeed, the value of such work may sometimes become apparent to others
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only after the agent’s death. For example, in 1919, the ‘‘little-known Polish
mathematician named Theodor Kaluza from the University of Köningsberg’’ sent Einstein a paper suggesting that in addition to the three recognized spatial dimensions, our universe could have another, smaller, curledup, fourth spatial dimension.77 After some initial enthusiasm, Einstein became skeptical; although Kaluza’s paper was eventually published, it was
largely ignored for decades.78 But now it has become the foundation of
string theory, the leading contender today for the ultimate unification of
physics! Sadly, Kaluza never got a Nobel Prize or appointment to the Institute of Advanced Studies in Princeton, but he could still have been selfactualized.79 In sum, the ‘‘drive for achievement’’ can be interpreted either
so that Kaluza satisfied it or so that he did not, and this implies two quite
different kinds of motive.
5. Frankl’s Existential Will to Meaning
5.1. Meaning as a By-Product of Self-Transcending Devotion
These criticisms of Maslow’s theory, which parallel my critique of Aristotle, were famously made by the existential psychoanalyst Viktor Frankl.
In his book From Death Camp to Existentialism,80 reprinted under the bestselling title, Man’s Search for Meaning,81 and in later works, Frankl argues that
the ‘‘will to meaning’’ is a ‘‘primary concern’’ of persons.82 While imprisoned in Auschwitz and other concentration camps, Frankl found that when
people were stripped of dignity and treated as mere objects to be used and
finally exterminated, their practical egos (or sense of being a continuing self
defined by its values) tended to collapse.83 Under these terrible circumstances, ‘‘only a few kept their full inner liberty and obtained those values
which their suffering afforded’’ by achieving spiritual growth.84
This was in large part, Frankl judged, because their dehumanization cut
prisoners off from the goals that had formerly given meaning to their lives
and the hopes that gave significance to their future: ‘‘A man who could not
see the end of his ‘provisional existence’ was not able to aim at an ultimate
goal in life. He ceased living for the future, in contrast to a man in normal
life.’’85 In other words, these conditions made it almost impossible to exercise the striving will in projective motivation. ‘‘A man who let himself decline because he could not see any future goal found himself occupied with
retrospective thoughts,’’ tended to turn inward, and eventually to find everything ‘‘pointless.’’86 Then the crisis would come in which the prisoner simply gave up and refused to get up or do anything, until he became sick and
died.87 In human beings, the phenomenon that Martin Seligman has called
‘‘learned helplessness’’88 often involves existential despair or loss of will.
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The only way to ‘‘restore a man’s inner strength’’ when he reaches such
despair is ‘‘to succeed in showing him some future goal,’’89 to change his
attitude by focusing him on life’s challenge ‘‘to fulfill the tasks which it
constantly sets for each individual.’’90
Frankl generalized these findings into a theory of motivation that led to
‘‘logotherapy,’’ a method for helping those with ‘‘noögenic neuroses’’ that
do not come from trauma or repression of appetites but rather from lack
of sufficiently meaningful purposes to which to devote themselves. This
theory recognizes the distinction between the projective motives of the existential will and what I call D1-D2 desires:
Logotherapy deviates from [Freudian] psychoanalysis insofar as it
considers man as a being whose main concern consists in fulfilling a
meaning and in actualizing values, rather than in mere gratification
and satisfaction of drives and instincts, the mere reconciliation of
conflicting claims of id, ego, and superego, or mere adaptation and
adjustment to the society and environment.91
Frankl also distinguishes the proper functioning of what I call the striving will from all erosiac motivation, including D3 desires. For he recognizes
that in finding intrinsic values in different possible goals and devoting ourselves to them on these grounds, we ‘‘may arouse inner tension rather than
inner equilibrium.’’92 To explain this remark, it helps to recall that from
Plato’s point of view in the Symposium, it would seem that by projecting
goals for which we had no prior appetite or attraction, we would be creating
need or lack in ourselves, or making ourselves less satisfied. Frankl describes
this as moving from a state of motivational equilibrium or psychic stasis to
a new state of tension caused by caring passionately about something. ‘‘However,’’ Frankl continues, ‘‘precisely this tension is an indispensable prerequisite of mental health.’’93 We can even recognize this and realize that we enjoy
the tension caused by our enthusiasm for the tasks at hand. To paraphrase
Senator John McCain, another war camp survivor, we find meaning by
devoting ourselves to ‘‘causes greater than our self-interest.’’94
Hence Frankl explicitly rejects ‘‘those motivational theories which are
based on the homeostasis principle’’—the psychoanalytic version of Plato’s
lack model of desire, according to which ‘‘man is basically concerned with
maintaining or restoring an inner equilibrium.’’95 This was Freud’s principle, but Frankl thinks that it is refuted by Allport, Maslow, and Bühler,
who found that ‘‘propriate striving’’ resists equilibrium and maintains motivational tension.96 So Hobbes and Callicles turn out to be right in a sense
if we restate their objection to Plato in existential form. There may be no
value or sense in stimulating additional D1-D2 desires (which, according
to Socrates’ famous analogy, would be like making holes in our psychic
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sieve), but there is certainly a point to creating a wholly different kind of
‘‘dissatisfaction’’ in our mental economy by setting demanding goals for
ourselves. As Frankl puts it, our mental health always requires
the tension between what one has already achieved and what one still
ought to accomplish, or the gap between what one is and what one
should become. . . . What man actually needs is not a tensionless
state but rather the striving and struggling for some goal worthy of
him. What he needs is not the discharge of tension at any cost, but
the call of potential meaning waiting to be fulfilled by him.97
If so, then it seems that the strong erosiac thesis is wrong; not all our
motivation arises from attraction toward completeness, however broadly
interpreted. It is our nature to be ready to suffer as long as that suffering
has a worthwhile point or meaning.98 By contrast, a person who believes
that happiness is our ultimate goal must see unhappiness as ‘‘a symptom of
maladjustment’’ and therefore experience second-order unhappiness or
shame about his or her suffering or unhappiness.99
Frankl also considers serious existential commitment to real values beyond ourselves to be the mark of psychological maturity in human persons:
‘‘the Freudian pleasure principle is the guiding principle of a small child;
the Adlerian power principle is that of the adolescent; and the will to meaning is the guiding principle of the mature adult.’’100 In other words, mature
agency is typified by projective response to an array of important moral and
nonmoral values. Frankl also rejects Nietzsche’s and Freud’s hermeneutics
of suspicion, which contend that behind all apparently noble, virtuous, or
other-regarding commitments of the self there must lurk repressed, ulterior,
self-serving motives. After noting Allport’s remark that Freud specialized
in interpreting motives that ‘‘cannot be taken at their face value,’’ Frankl
adds, ‘‘The fact that such motives exist certainly does not alter the fact that
by and large motives can be taken at their face value.’’101 Psychological
egoism can be defended against such counterexamples only if it is taken as
an a priori dogma—as when C. S. Lewis’s wonderful Nietzschean devil,
Screwtape, rejects the ‘‘cock-and-bull story about disinterested love’’ and
insists that all this ‘‘talk about Love must be a disguise for something
else.’’102
Because he recognizes that projective motivation is necessary for mental
health and that the neuroses of the ‘‘existential vacuum’’ result without it,
Frankl still speaks of ‘‘man’s desire for a life that is as meaningful as possible,’’103 and he calls such meaning a ‘‘higher need.’’104 But ‘‘desire’’ and
‘‘need’’ stand here for motivation in general, not any kind of erosiac attraction. Objectively, we can be said to ‘‘need’’ the meaning provided by existential willing, since this is our natural function (which is one part of our
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existential telos), but that does not mean that projects are undertaken by
persons on the motive of satisfying a desire for meaning or of gaining happiness. As a result, the phrase ‘‘will to meaning’’ is misleading if it is taken as
implying that meaning itself is our intentional target; rather, Frankl employs
it to contrast with the will to power and the will to happiness.
For, as Frankl himself insists, finding meaning requires an outward focus
on values ‘‘found in the world rather than within man or his own psyche.’’
Hence he rejects the formal egoism of Maslow’s theory: ‘‘Self-actualization
is not a possible aim at all, for the simple reason that the more a man would
strive for it, the more he would miss it.’’105 This point is obviously similar
to my critique of A-eudaimonism: ‘‘like happiness, self-actualization is an
effect, the effect of meaning-fulfillment . . . if he sets out to actualize himself rather than fulfill a meaning, self-actualization immediately loses its
justification.’’106 This paradox of Maslow’s eudaimonism results from the
psychological fact that the agent’s sense of his own self-worth depends on
what Jaspers calls ‘‘that cause which he has made his own’’; as Maslow
himself admits, we realize our ‘‘selves’’ primarily ‘‘via a commitment to an
important job.’’107 More generally, a person can become his ‘‘true self ’’ only
through concerns that are directed to persons, standards, and issues outside
himself or unrelated to his own material interests:
He becomes so, not by focusing on his self-actualization, but by forgetting himself and giving himself, by overlooking himself and focusing outward. . . . What is called self-actualization is, and must remain,
the unintended effect of self-transcendence; it is ruinous to make it the target
of intention. . . . It is the very pursuit of happiness that obviates
happiness.108
This parallels my Elsterian critique of eudaimonism as self-defeating, because eudaimonia is essentially a by-product of virtues, practices, and pure
relationships.
The concept of self-transcendence, which is at the heart of Frankl’s theory, also corresponds to my description of agent-transcending first-order
motives (introduced in chap. 5, sec. 2.2). Frankl emphasizes self-transcendence precisely because he recognizes the point (which we also found in
Feinberg and Williams) that a fulfilling and meaningful life depends on
forming commitments and undertaking endeavors as valuable for their own
sake. Hence in logotherapy ‘‘the typical self-centeredness of the neurotic is
broken up instead of being continually fostered and reinforced,’’ as in the
introspective methods of Freudian psychoanalysis.109 This agrees with
Frankfurt’s paradox that there is something liberating in the experience of
being ‘‘seized’’ or ‘‘captivated’’ by an object of our love, through commitment to which we move out of ourselves (and toward focus on others or
the world).110
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The relation between projective motivation and existential meaningfulness is therefore not usefully explained or analyzed in terms of a desire for
meaning. If we could be motivated to take up a demanding task just by the
simple longing to have something to do or to avoid boredom or to find
‘‘some meaning or other’’ for our life, then we would be able to satisfy such
a desire just by picking any end arbitrarily. But such randomly chosen ends
could not be projected or pursued with serious devotion and volitional
resolve. For they would not be responding to any perceived importance; either
there would be no substantial grounds for valuing these ends or, if there
were, we would not be choosing them for these reasons. As a result, we
could only play at pursuing them. If our ends lack the requisite gravitas or
intrinsic importance for us, we find it possible on a whim to reverse our
interest in them—which is just to say that we are not able to form a real
commitment to them or to fully invest ourselves in them.
5.2. The Alterity of Values to Which the Will Responds
Frankl’s existentialism, like my own, thus presupposes the possibility of real
values outside us in the world to which we can respond. As Frankl argues,
if ‘‘the meaning that is waiting to be fulfilled by man’’ were just an invention
of his mind, like Narcissus’s image in the pool, ‘‘it would immediately lose
its demanding and challenging character; it could no longer call man forth
or summon him.’’111 On this basis, Frankl rightly rejects Sartre’s notion
that we invent values by choosing our projects; Sartre gets the relationship
backwards.112 This is what he means by saying that one cannot just ‘‘will
to will’’ without the perception of meaning or significance that could provide an objective reason for forming a serious project.113
Without nonarbitrary grounds, then, existential projection would be
self-undermining and fail to generate personal meaning. This is why ‘‘subjectivism and relativism’’ about values undermine our capacity for existential
resolve, or ‘‘erode idealism and enthusiasm’’ of the spirit.114 Moreover, to
furnish grounds for projective motivation rather than only D3 desires, these
values must have a certain alterity, otherness, or separation from the agent’s
good. This independence of the agent is implied in the concept of selftranscendence, which Frankl explicitly takes from Buber: ‘‘The essentially
self-transcendent quality of human existence renders man a being reaching out
beyond himself.’’115
In this respect, Frankl’s theory agrees with Nel Noddings’s conception
of caring, which is crucially influenced by Kierkegaard, Buber, and Marcel.
She conceives caring for ‘‘living things’’ as including an effort to attend to
‘‘their natures, ways of life, needs, and desires.’’116 Without this focus on
the other’s reality, we could not understand their good well enough to help
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them. Thus the caring agent focuses on the other rather than on herself ‘‘as
caretaker’’ or on how burdened and caring a person she is.117 In particular,
Noddings emphasizes that caring involves ‘‘engrossment’’ in the other, or
‘‘a displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality of the other.’’
Moreover, she adds that a ‘‘genuine caring for self . . . for the ethical self, can
emerge only from a caring for others.’’118 Thus, although there is a secondary place for concern about the coherence and value of one’s cares, at the
ground level, ‘‘caring is always characterized by a move away from self,’’119
or a nonreflexive focus. There is a convergence here with Frankfurt’s claim
that caring is liberating because of its ‘‘selflessness.’’120 Caring as a motive
state requires this intrinsic interest in something or someone transcending
the self: ‘‘At bottom, all caring involves engrossment. The engrossment need
not be intense nor need it be pervasive in the life of the one-caring, but it
must occur.’’ Without it, Noddings says, there is no love in Buber’s sense
of direct contact with the other-as-thou.121
Existential willing therefore requires an Anstoss, or experience of a reality
that is not merely an ideal construct in the manifold of one’s own consciousness. Echoing Buber, Frankl writes: ‘‘The world must not be regarded
as a mere expression of one’s self. Nor must the world be considered as a
mere instrument, or as a means to the end of one’s self-actualization.’’122 In
projective motivation, I will my movement toward persons, objects, and
states whose value I do not seek to possess, experience, or appropriate into
myself (even in a reasonably extended sense). It is this alterity or alienness of
its ends that makes existential willing essentially non-narcissistic in its general
form, in strict opposition to formal egoism.123 As Frankl puts it, the human
person ‘‘reaches out for something other than itself.’’124
We cannot create ex nihilo any basic or underivative values with this kind
of alterity or difference from our own being, as Sartre’s approach would
require, because we are not God. Our inventions and artifacts are doomed
to remain extensions of our minds; we rightly see them as expressions of
ourselves, and our love of them (even when justified) remains formally narcissistic, for they cannot become free beings whom we can meet or to whom
we could devote ourselves in fully self-transcending will (this is the dream
of which Pinocchio becoming ‘‘a real boy’’ is a classic expression).125 As the
existential theory of divine creativity in chapter 9 suggests, the ability to
create alterity itself—to bring forth separate beings that are not mere property or equipment of the maker but free of his or her control—would be a
distinguishing mark of the divine.126 Indeed, Levinas (a Jewish author) reminds Christian theologians that
The great force of the idea of creation such as it was contributed by
monotheism is that this creation is ex nihilo—not because this represents a work more miraculous than the demiurgic informing of matter, but because the separated and created being is thereby not simply
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issued forth from the father, but is absolutely other than him. Filiality
itself cannot appear as essential to the destiny of the I unless man
retains this memory of the creation ex nihilo, without which the son is
not a true other.127
Thus God, on Levinas’s ‘‘open’’ conception of the divine, is the only one
who can give distinct being itself to the value aimed at in projective willing,
and this is the right way to understand creation ex nihilo.
Of course this general point about the need for non-arbitrary values to
ground projective motivation does not depend on theism, nor does it tell us
which values can play this role. But it does clarify why worthwhile purposes,
according to Frankl, are not all formally egoistic or agent-relative in their
content. Frankl tends to interpret this altruistically, like Noddings, who
writes that ‘‘Our motivation in caring is directed toward the welfare, protection, or enhancement of the cared-for.’’128 Yet Frankl’s structure of selftranscending motivation could also be instantiated by evil volition; as Jeffrey Blustein says, ‘‘we can devote ourselves directly to the destruction or
diminishment of something,’’ and such caring is ‘‘negative in tenor.’’129
Perhaps the significance to be found in such negative projects is in some
interesting ways less enduring or shareable or fulfilling when pursued. But
that it is possible at all puts in clear relief the crucial distinction between
existential meaning (i.e., subjective/personal significance and practical coherence) and eudaimonia, which the radically evil agent may lack. As an agentrelated good deriving from volitional projection or as an effect of a life with
self-transcending motivation, existential meaning is more fundamental than
eudaimonia. For a eudaimon life is necessarily a life with existential meaning,
but the converse does not hold: a life full of existential meaning is not
necessarily eudaimon, both because it may be subject to serious ill-fortune
and injustice and because it could be devoted to negative ends that are
either contingently harmful to the agent or even intrinsically self-destructive
(on this point, see sec. 9 below).130
Thus even if the reflective patient does take an interest in finding existential meaning through projective willing, she would not be acting on a eudaimonistic D3 desire. If meaning itself is an indirectly targetable end for us, as
Frankl sometimes seems to suggest, then our motivation to pursue it would
still not embrace all other motives in the way that the drive to eudaimonia
is supposed to, according to the Eudaimonia thesis. Rather, it would constitute what Blustein calls one type of ‘‘care about caring,’’ namely a basic
commitment to being engaged meaningfully in the world:
The person who cares about caring in . . . [this sense] is emotionally
invested in being a caring person, that is, a person who takes an
interest in and devotes him or herself to things, activities and people
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in his or her world. A person who cares about caring . . . may deliberately take measures (perhaps with the assistance of others) to find
something to care about or to keep alive a sense of purpose and
attachment to life.131
As Blustein says, such a search for meaningful roles or worthwhile values
to care about normally sees caring as an end-in-itself. If it is conceived only
as a means to a self-interested end like showing off superior abilities or
perhaps maintaining an image of oneself as caring, then it can become hollow and self-defeating.
Noddings also affirms that ‘‘As human beings, we want to care and to
be cared for. Caring is important in itself.’’132 But she tends to construe our
response to the intrinsic value of caring in more erosiac terms, for example,
as the ‘‘longing for relatedness,’’133 and to suggest that genuine ‘‘presence’’
to the other requires an affective response from the one caring, so that the
cared-for ‘‘feels her warmth in both verbal and body language.’’134 It is
debatable whether volitional devotion to individuals must always involve
this kind of affective component. In many cases, the projective efforts of
the will may entrain emotional dispositions, but the same dedication to a
shared purpose may find quite distinct emotional expressions in different
personalities. Yet the deeper problem lies in Noddings’s suggestion that our
‘‘longing for goodness’’135 or ‘‘our longing for caring—to be in that special
relation’’ is the wellspring of ethical motivation.136 She may well be right
that ‘‘the joy that accompanies fulfillment of our caring’’ can bolster our
allegiance to the ethical ideal of caring response. But caring cannot begin
from such a motive: Buber is clear that I-Thou relations are not directly
targetable. Noddings’s error here is like Badhwar’s: she conflates a reinforcing condition that can become a necessary condition of continuation with
an initial incentive for caring.
6. How Caring Benefits the Agent: Frankfurt on Means and Ends
We have seen that existential meaning is not usefully conceived as the target
of D3 desire, since it is founded on devotion to ends in view of intrinsic
values that are at least partly independent of the by-product goods that the
agent derives from pursuing these ends, such as the feeling that her life is
important in virtue of its engaging in significant pursuits or maintaining
caring relations. This position can be contrasted with a closely related analysis offered by Harry Frankfurt in his essay ‘‘On the Usefulness of Final
Ends’’137 and further developed in his recent book, The Reasons of Love.138
Frankfurt’s concern, like Frankl’s, is with what makes an agent’s life meaningful, not in the third-personal sense of indicating or representing something to others, nor in the consequentialist sense of having a major impact
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on the world, but rather in the essentially first-personal sense of being experienced as significant by the agent living it.139
More clearly than Frankl, Frankfurt recognizes that while it is good for
life to have this kind of existential significance, this is not the only important good, since a life that is meaningful to its agent could still be unhappy
or evil.140 Still, the meaningfulness a person finds in her life is a very important good that depends, in Frankfurt’s view, on (1) how important the
goals of her activities seem to her; and (2) whether she finds the means to
her ends or the activities involved in pursuing them intrinsically interesting
and well suited to her personality. This shows that the meaning-value of
working toward a final end is more than the terminal value of the state of
affairs sought as the final end, and this surplus may be realized even when
the end is not achieved:
when is activity important to a person? It is important to him only
when he is devoted to something that he cares about. Thus a person’s
life is meaningful only if he spends it, to some considerable extent, in
activity that is devoted to things that he cares about. It is not essential
that the activity he devotes to the things he cares about be successful.
The extent to which life is meaningful depends less upon how much
it accomplishes than upon how it is lived.141
Thus Frankfurt rejects the traditional view that ‘‘the only value that a
final end necessarily possesses for us, simply in virtue of the fact that it is a
final end, must be identical with the value for us of the state of affairs
which we bring about when we attain that end.’’ For having and pursuing
final ends gives personal meaning to our activities, which is an existential
value distinct from that attained in the end.142 In some cases, the quest itself
is so rewarding that we are almost sad when the end has been attained and
the journey toward it is over.
The distinction to which Frankfurt is drawing attention here is the one
that I have characterized as the difference between the product-value of end
E and the derivative values realized in pursuing and possibly achieving E
(existential meaning, challenge, solidarity with others involved, self-esteem,
etc.). Simply for heuristic purposes, I summarize these relations in the following schema:
(Agent A → E) ⇒ M
⊥
V
where → indicates intention, ⇒ indicates efficient causation, and ⊥ indicates a grounding relation of rational support.
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In this schema, agent A intends E as a final end, and this is grounded by
E’s terminal value V, and pursuing E for this reason causes personal meaning (M) and other goods in A’s life. I have argued that A’s motive for
intending E must be projective where V is an agent-transcending value; for
M is an effect on A that derives from pursuing E on the basis of V (or
having E among his active final ends) rather than part of E. I have also
suggested that such existential meaningfulness is not itself a directly targetable goal; it can be pursued effectively only by looking for objective
grounds for caring or seeking out realizable values worth caring about that
supply reasons for projecting final ends.
Frankfurt instead takes this distinction as a reason to question the traditional relation between ‘‘instrumental value’’ and ‘‘terminal value,’’ and the
‘‘fundamental asymmetry’’ between means and ends in Aristotle’s moral
psychology. He summarizes Aristotle’s position as follows:
[First,] A means derives its instrumental value from the relationship
in which it stands to its end, but an end derives no value from the
relationship between itself and the means to it. . . . [Second,] A means
derives no terminal value from being useful. . . . Of course, what has
instrumental value may have terminal value as well. But it cannot have
the latter by virtue of the fact that it has the former.143
Frankfurt believes that this Aristotelian approach is too ‘‘impersonal,’’ since
it ‘‘diverts attention from the fact that every end is the end of an agent’’
and plays a complex role in her life.144 Human agents posit ends, Frankfurt
says, not just for their terminal value but also so that their activities (and
thus their life) can be meaningful for them.145 This suggests, in terms of
my schema above, that end E can be chosen in part for the sake of M:
Final ends are possible states of affairs, which someone values for
their own sakes. It must not be supposed that the measure of how a
life is lived is given by the value of his final ends. Rather, how a life
is lived is a function of what it is like for the person to pursue them.
The problem of selecting final ends is not the same, then, as the
problem of measuring the inherent or terminal value of possible states
of affairs. . . . The goals that it would be most desirable to achieve
are not necessarily those that it would be best to seek.
This is not only because there are differences in the probabilities
and in the cost of attaining various goals. It is also because there are
differences in the kinds of activities, and in the patterns of activity,
by which various final ends may be pursued.146
In other words, the required means to a final end have a lot to do with
the existential value of pursuing that end. For example, Frankfurt suggests
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it is possible that pursuit of some highly noble end might (for a particular
individual in his circumstances) require very little challenging activity,
whereas pursuit of a different end with more modest product-value ‘‘might
require invigoratingly complicated and wholehearted attention’’ that
‘‘would fill the person’s life with meaning and purpose.’’147 I agree that the
fulfillment an agent gains from pursuing worthwhile ends is partly a function of her means to that end (including relationships involved and necessary preparations), and that considerations about the means can function as
reasons for taking up a final end E that do not focus on the product-value
of E. This is one species of what I will call process-focused grounds for projecting ends. E’s existential value, or the meaningfulness of pursuing it, is in
part a function of these important considerations about the processes by
which E can be sought.148
Yet, as the title of his article indicates, Frankfurt instead concludes that
final ends have a kind of ‘‘instrumental value’’ for making life meaningful:
‘‘our final ends derive a certain instrumental value from the very fact that
they are terminally valuable.’’149 This is a category mistake like the one that
leads to the paradox of eudaimonism: meaning is construed as an embracing
end that we desire (or existential boredom becomes the object of an embracing aversion), and we choose final ends because of their ‘‘instrumental
value’’ as a means to this end of leading a meaningful life. Frankfurt repeats
this view in his lectures on love: ‘‘Despite the air of paradox, we may fairly
say that final ends are instrumentally valuable just because they are terminally valuable’’; for example, the lover cares about his beloved ‘‘for its own
sake,’’ but in addition ‘‘what he loves necessarily possesses an instrumental
value for him, in virtue of the fact that it is a necessary condition of his
enjoying the inherently important activity of loving it.’’150
Frankfurt clearly senses the tension in this proposed solution, for he
asks us to consider
a man who tells a woman that his love for her is what gives meaning
and value to his life. Loving her, he says, is for him the only thing
that makes living worthwhile. . . . From his declaration that loving
her fulfills a deep need of his life, she will surely not conclude that
he is making use of her.151
Assuming that this man is sincere, Frankfurt is surely correct—but only
because the woman will understand that the existential value that loving her
contributes to the man’s life is primarily a concomitant effect of devotion
to her rather than the motive for his attention to her and his concern for her
well-being. For if she thought the latter, she would feel used, like a mere
ornament in the man’s narcissistic (and self-deceiving) project of constructing and maintaining an image of himself as a loving being. Frankfurt seems
both to recognize this point yet to obscure it:
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The appearance of conflict between pursuing one’s own interests and
being selflessly devoted to the interests of another is dispelled once
we appreciate that what serves the self-interest of the lover is nothing
other than his selflessness. It is only if his love is genuine, needless to
say, that it can have the importance for him that loving entails. . . .
Accordingly, the benefit of loving accrues to a person only to the
extent that he cares about his beloved disinterestedly, and not for the
sake of any benefit that he may derive either from the beloved or from
loving it.152
While correct, this last sentence surely implies that the loving agent is
not pursuing his own interest (even if his volitional state does in fact promote it); therefore the conflict is not resolved. Frankfurt’s phrasing suggests
that his analysis gives comfort to eudaimonism, when really it does not.153
There is also something misleading in Frankfurt’s interesting and closely
related argument that because ‘‘living a meaningful life is important to us
for its own sake, useful activity possesses for us not merely instrumental
value but terminal value as well.’’154 As Frankfurt explains, his point is not
just Aristotle’s idea that ‘‘activities may be desired as final ends and not
merely as means to ends other than themselves.’’ Of course activities themselves can be desired as ends because of their ‘‘intrinsic character.’’ But
‘‘Aristotle does not recognize that [activities] may possess terminal value
precisely because they are instrumentally valuable,’’155 that is, because they
are experienced as meaningful work that helps produce an end whose realization is valuable for its own sake.
Frankfurt’s point could be expressed by saying that there is a unique
form of terminal value that attaches to the very pursuit of many ends; thus
‘‘it is inherently important for us to engage in activity that is devoted to
advancing our goals,’’ even aside from the product-value of the goals themselves.156 This is the intrinsic existential value that useful activities have
independently of the value of the ends that define these activities. Existential value in this sense is unlike the terminal value that activities can have
for Aristotle when they constitute an intrinsic good. For even those activities that are only means to such goods rather than constituting part of the
human good still have Frankfurt’s existential value above and beyond the
product-value of the ends when achieved. This is an insightful response to
Aristotle but it neglects to mention that when an activity acquires such
terminal existential value because it is at least partially constituted by disinterested commitment to the final end, the agent cannot choose this activity
as a means to such existential value, or initially be moved by erosiac desire
for such existential value.
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In general, Frankfurt misses the fact that not all terminal value is targetable and what generates nontargetable terminal value should not be described as useful for causing such nonintended by-product value. His
analysis conflates the existential value of final ends (their power to provide
an object for meaningful endeavor) with a kind of instrumental value and
thus reinscribes caring within precisely the eudaimonist framework that he
has criticized as leading to an inadequate picture of selfhood. The traditional distinction between ends and means may be inadequate, but the
problem is not solved by blending them. Considering process-focused
grounds for taking up a final end E—such as how interesting the means
involved in the task may be or how pursuit of E is likely to affect one’s
character—cannot amount to regarding the whole process of pursuing E as
final as what we ordinarily call a means to a separate end. As I argue in
chapter 7, even when our final end is itself an activity involving the pursuit
of other things, the terminal value of this activity for the sake of which it
could be intrinsically desirable is quite distinct from the derivative benefits
of taking the activity as final. Potentials for meaning, interesting work, full
employment of one’s talents, or fulfilling engagement with a diverse range
of goods operate here neither as ends nor as means but, rather, as grounds for
willing both the final end and its requisite means. The introduction of this
third term allows us to solve the problems that Frankfurt identifies in the
traditional Aristotelian doctrine.
So while I agree with Frankfurt that the process of pursuing final ends
can add to the agent’s life a kind of value distinct from anything the agent
believes to be inherent in the end-state pursued, I deny that desire for this
agent-related value can be what moves the agent to set and strive for such
ends. Her own will must motivate the agent if her effort is to generate the
highest kinds of existential value for her own life. Another way of saying
this is that if they are not to be self-defeating, agent-relative process-focused
considerations can enter into the selection of final ends only as grounds for
projecting them, not as attractors that cause an appetite for the pursuit of these
ends. When they function as grounds, such process-focused considerations
are not already operative as motives; hence they cannot compete with any
other motive for pursuing the relevant end for its own sake. Moreover, they
can serve as agent-relative grounds for projection only in conjunction with
more agent-neutral grounds focused on the product-value of the final end.
For recognizing that a final end has some terminal value that could justify
anyone projecting it is quite consistent with judging that the pursuit of this
end is also supported by considerations concerning what this project would
be like in a particular individual’s life, given his circumstances, history,
other projects, and so on.
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Hence I argue that the sort of consideration to which Frankfurt draws
attention in this part of his work in fact helps explain why, contra Frankfurt’s own position, caring is grounded on objective reasons. Our projected
life goals can give meaning to our lives only because they are grounded by
our awareness of values that are important to care about independently of their
power to satisfy preferences, contribute to our eudaimonia, or make life
interesting. I defend this ‘‘objectivist thesis’’ in chapter 14.
7. Self-Esteem as By-Product
At this point, we might imagine some contemporary psychologists countering that a meaningful life in Frankl’s sense is motivated by the ultimate or
embracing desire for strong ‘‘self-esteem.’’ For it seems that a sense that our
life is worth living must involve some positive evaluation of our own character and social roles. But we must be wary of conflating existential meaning
with other reflexive psychic states, especially when their concepts have several senses. If self-esteem is simply a matter of achieving one’s goals whatever they are, then anyone with very low self-expectations could achieve it
through meeting his very modest targets. Conversely, someone who demands much of herself for worthy ends may enjoy a rich sense of meaning
in her endeavors even while remaining frustrated by lack of adequate accomplishment. After all, some endeavors may be worthwhile even though
there is very little real chance of attaining the goal; for example, counseling
death-row inmates to come to terms with their lives and themselves; doing
everything possible to save or comfort a terminally ill child; trying to broker
peace in the Middle East; or running for president in the United States on
a platform of social justice, financial sacrifice for the common good, separation of church and state, and a new federation of democracies with our
allies. There is a superlative kind of self-esteem that would come from
succeeding at any of these tasks, but it is not based on reasonable expectations of oneself. Not all kinds of ‘‘self-esteem’’ should be important to us,
nor are all forms of it that are inherently valuable also directly targetable.
‘‘Self-esteem’’ is often recommended as a crucial goal by therapists to
their patients, by teachers to students, and by parents to children. In moral
theory, a number of thinkers follow Rawls in treating ‘‘a sense of our own
self-worth’’ as both a human good (something it is rational for all persons
with a rational life plan to want) and as a ‘‘primary good’’ (or precondition
for carrying out rational life plans) for the purposes of determining basic
justice.157 For example, as Joel Anderson explains, Alex Honneth develops
from Hegel a conception of ethical life in which individual autonomy ‘‘depends crucially on the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and selfesteem,’’ all of which require ‘‘recognition by others whom one also recognizes.’’158 I am sympathetic with Honneth’s analysis, but it also points to
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important distinctions. For example, while he treats ‘‘self-respect’’ as a matter of possessing universal dignity shared with all persons, he understands
‘‘self-esteem’’ as involving ‘‘a sense of what makes one special, unique, and
(in Hegel’s terms) ‘particular’ ’’ in a valuable way.159 As this suggests, we
need to distinguish between at least four different kinds of positive selfregarding attitudes:
1. The first derives from social recognition of our constitutive status
as a competent moral agent capable of responsible action, or as a
person capable of forming and pursuing a conception of her good, or
as a citizen capable of exercising rights, and so on.160
2. The second derives from other people (our caregivers first and
foremost) believing in our innate and acquired abilities to do things
that should earn us respect and recognition over and above what we
deserve merely as competent agents and rights-bearers.161
3. The third, when reality-based, derives from actually doing these
things; it thus depends on the desert or merits we may or may not
acquire by our choices, efforts, and projects. Since these merits arise
from accomplishments measured on some absolute scale of excellence
(whether discounted relative to individual abilities and circumstance
or not), in principle everyone could acquire high merits and the reflexive attitude that properly depends on them.
4. The fourth kind of positive self-evaluation properly depends
instead on merits defined comparatively according to the differences
between individual accomplishments as measured absolutely in 3.
Merits of this last kind cannot even in principle be achieved equally
by all.162
Since usage is fluid in this area, it does not matter much what labels we
give to the different kinds of positive self-regard that arise in these four
ways. I will call the first ‘‘basic self-respect,’’ or a sense of our ‘‘intrinsic
dignity,’’ and the second ‘‘faith in ourselves,’’ or confidence in our own
potential. The third, which I call ‘‘self-honor,’’ or pride in our accomplishments measured absolutely, comes closest to Aristotelian ‘‘magnanimity’’
(see chap. 7, sec. 5). The fourth, which I have already called the ‘‘desire for
superiority status’’ and ‘‘pride in distinction’’ (chap. 10, sect. 2.4), has an
important place in human life but is also dangerous; the desire for this kind
of pride is what Hobbes calls ‘‘glory’’ and what Nietzsche celebrates as the
will to ascendance over others.
Now, it is clear that if a child’s ‘‘self-esteem’’ or ‘‘positive self-image’’
refers to either justified self-honor or pride in distinction as defined here, it
is irrational to try to produce it directly. For unless they are to rest entirely
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on illusions about oneself, these kinds of self-esteem must be mainly byproducts of activities undertaken for reasons other than building self-esteem.
Hence it is not surprising that one study of 642 college freshman by Jennifer Crocker of the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research
found that students trying to improve their looks or get good grades for the
sake of self-esteem were more likely to become frustrated and experience
anxiety—thus lowering their confidence in themselves. ‘‘An obsession with
external markers of self-worth, Dr. Crocker believes, leads to self-absorption,’’ and this ‘‘focus on the self ’’ is also off-putting to others.163 Frankl’s
existential approach seems like a plausible solution to this common neurosis: what is needed is more will directed outward at worthwhile causes, relationships,
works, and ideals. It is hoped that pride in genuine accomplishment will
follow.
Rawls’s conception of ‘‘self-respect (or self-esteem),’’ which combines
what I have labeled ‘‘self-honor’’ and ‘‘confidence in oneself,’’ has the same
implication. For he describes its two aspects as follows:
it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction
that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying
out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so
far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions. . . . It is clear
why self-respect is a primary good. Without it, nothing may seem
worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive
for them.164
Rawls is not concerned to explain how this striving will functions, but
he thinks it is undermined both by a lack of worthwhile goals and by
pervasive social impediments that make it impossible to pursue worthwhile
projects. In this first respect, self-esteem is clearly dependent on the goods
that are available for the agent to care about. Like Honneth, Rawls also
thinks that this requires some level of interpersonal recognition of the value
of our life goals and activities; in addition to internal coherence, it requires
‘‘finding our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others who
are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed.’’165 Like Frankl’s analysis, this suggests that the goods we care about must have a kind of objectivity, although Rawls rejects the strong objectivity of perfectionist doctrines
of excellence.166
Rawls’s student Thomas Hill, Jr., develops this idea beyond moral selfrespect. He argues that in addition to basic respect of oneself as a moral
agent, some people develop respectable nonmoral standards, values, or goals
for their lives, whereas others lack ‘‘a sense of minimum non-moral standards.’’167 It is possible for a person in the latter category to satisfy basic
deontic moral requirements yet think and act wantonly within these limits.
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By contrast, a person in the former category cares deeply about values beyond respecting basic moral rights and feels self-contempt in violating these
values. Hill summarizes: ‘‘This form of self-respect would require that one
develop and live by a set of personal standards by which one is prepared to
judge oneself even if they are not extended to others.’’168 Let us label this
fifth kind of positive self-regarding attitude ethical seriousness. A person who
is ethically serious has a more demanding scale on which to judge herself
than a person who is not.
On Frankl’s account, once again, this kind of self-respect is also derivative from identifying worthwhile objects of attention and concern and devoting oneself passionately to them. For example, someone fully engaged in
a practice in MacIntyre’s sense would obviously derive some appreciation
of her own ethical seriousness as an agent from this. Moreover, like Rawls,
Hill recognizes that needed for values and standards broadly ethical selfrespect cannot be selected arbitrarily but must have significance for others
too. For one can lack respect for oneself as an ethically serious agent in at
least three different ways: (1) by remaining wanton; (2) by setting respectable standards and goals but failing to live by them; and (3) by setting
standards that one recognizes as arbitrary or caring about values that one
sees as insufficiently important. In this last case, ‘‘It is as if one’s interests,
projects, and plans seem worthless even to oneself.’’169 If this negative selfjudgment is justified, then this constitutes one kind of noögenic neurosis in
Frankl’s sense. The best therapy is to care more devotedly about more
valuable goals and ideals—a topic that I explore further in chapters 13 and
14.
8. Willed Carelessness: Emily Fox Gordon’s Case
Frankl’s central point that certain kinds of self-absorption can block passionate devotion to self-transcending ends or block volitional investment
of the self in intrinsically rewarding activities goes a long way toward explaining one especially revealing kind of noögenic neurosis, in which the
agent quite intentionally avoids the volitional effort required for any ambitious undertaking. For illustration of this neurosis, we might turn to Dostoyevsky’s Underground Man or Shakespeare’s Hamlet. But since they
receive variant interpretations—and so many different diagnoses of Hamlet’s ‘‘problem’’ are possible—a less ambiguous autobiographical case will
serve better.
In a shockingly self-critical piece on her personality as a writer, Emily
Fox Gordon begins, ‘‘I am a gormless woman. My life has been characterized by an extreme and pervasive failure of agency.’’170 Coming from the
best-selling author of The Mockingbird Years, this is a little hard to believe at
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first. But she proves her point by describing how, into her thirties, she
cultivated disengagement from her own life and a snobbish disdain for
others happily engaged in theirs—such as Marcy, the chipper wife of a
fellow graduate student. On Marcy’s hokey calendar, plans were listed in
detail (and with obvious zest for life) for each day of the current month,
accompanied by absurdly enthusiastic cartoons drawn by Marcy and her
husband.171 Perhaps this calendar so filled with tasks and interests got to
Gordon because it represented the kind of planning described by Michael
Bratman as extending ‘‘beyond simple purposive agency’’ to deeper
commitments.172
Gordon admits that she defaced this calendar during a party at Marcy’s
house while making fun of the calendar with friends. She diagnoses the
‘‘vehemence’’ of her reaction as due to the existential challenge she sensed
in Marcy’s down-to-earth Midwestern spontaneity: ‘‘Marcy’s proactive grip
on her life called into question my own attitude of fatalistic detachment.
. . . I was forced to ask myself a painful question: If she cared so much
about her life, how was it that I could care so little about mine?’’173 Her
approach to life had been the opposite of Marcy’s: she had tried to ‘‘avoid
acknowledging any ambition or aspiration’’ in order to ‘‘stay potential’’ and
avoid any commitments that would fix significant aspects of her future.
This attitude, which Kierkegaard called aestheticism, Gordon figures as follows: ‘‘Nor would I allow myself to inhabit my life fully. Instead, I’d stand
waiting in the doorway, half in, half out.’’174 Gordon finally discovered the
personal essay as the genre best suited to her temperament, because it allowed lengthy introspection, irony, and taking the stance of passive observer
toward one’s own experiences. ‘‘Unproblematically self-assured types’’ like
Marcy would not make good essayists, but self-tortured aesthetes like Kafka
would. This essay form ‘‘granted me the paradoxical authority of selfdeprecation.’’175
As Frankl’s theory predicts, Gordon found that when circumstances finally gave her the chance to write her memoir, and she had to focus on this
task rather than on her own psyche, it was fulfilling: ‘‘Having a job to do,
and a limited time to do it in reminded me of my pregnancy twelve years
earlier—I felt the same sense of being pulled towards the future.’’176 She
ought to have tried this earlier since, as her memoir tells, she already recognized that undergoing too much traditional psychotherapy in her adolescence had been destructive because it encouraged morose self-involvement,
and she was saved, interestingly, by the ‘‘anti-psychiatric psychoanalyst Leslie Farber’’177 (whose ideas on unwillable states of character and self-defeating ways of pursuing them were among Jon Elster’s chief inspirations—see
chap. 5, sec. 2.4). But by Gordon’s own account, the work of writing her
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autobiography was not enough to overcome her essential barrier to meaningful engagement in life. Since this book itself focuses on her adolescent
years in self-stultifying therapy, it marginalized her more modest adult activities: ‘‘my studies; my motherhood; my marriage; the pleasures, pains, and
struggles of my daily life’’ were all consigned to obscurity in the memoir.178
In her American Scholar essay, Gordon diagnoses this as part of her continuing failure to value her role as participant in ordinary daily activities; instead, she tended to value speculative reflection on herself—even on her
own disillusionment with therapy and its inward focus.179 Thus acknowledging the regret she felt in Marcy’s kitchen more clearly recognizes the
need for existential engagement than the memoir did: there ‘‘it occurred to
me that there was something to be said for planning to make a life instead
of planning to make a story of my life.’’180 Her conclusion is both poignant
and philosophically significant:
What was I regretting as I stood in her kitchen? Almost everything: I
regretted the way I had exiled myself as an observer rather than a
participant, regretted the exceptionalism I had used to console myself
since childhood. . . . How many times have I comforted myself with
the old saw about how the unexamined life is not worth living? In
Marcy’s kitchen it occurred to me that the reverse might well be
truer—that the unlived life is not worth examining.181
This response to Socrates could serve as the motto for my new version
of existentialism, as long as we remember (as I noted in discussing Elster)
that authenticity still requires something more than totally unreflective
spontaneity, which only leads to wantonness. Instead it requires a kind
of practical self-critique and volitional self-control that seeks existential
coherence while avoiding the self-defeating aspects of speculative and introspective evasions. And this will always require commitments regarding our
own character that cannot be followed through merely by writing an essay,
however sincere. Notice that having written a memoir that was itself largely
a reflection on the dangers of too much therapeutic reflection-on-self, Gordon went on to critique her memoir as inauthentic, but she did this by
writing another self-reflective essay about the process of writing a memoir
and its seductions.182 In other words, she achieved fourth-order reflection on
the possibilities of self-deception in reflecting on the dangers of therapeutic
reflection! Even Proust never managed this feat.
Gordon does not tell us to what concrete purposes she will now commit
herself, although her studies, her relationship with her spouse, and her relationship with her children are possible candidates. An abstract resolve to
form some commitment or other will not work, as Frankl’s analysis implies—we need to let ourselves encounter values that transcend us in their
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alterity, because particular commitments are a response to values that strike
us independently of our will. We cannot have such an I-Thou encounter
with meaningful values simply in writing an essay about our existential
regrets; that is still too reflexive an activity.183 As an emotion, regret at most
opens us up to encountering values that we might positively embrace in
willed resolve. (That important values may sometimes only be discoverable
this way at least implies that a life without any regrets may be condemned
to a certain ignorance and should not be regarded as an ideal). Regret over
ignoring or rejecting worthwhile goods is thus a possible ground for projecting more concrete goals involving these values, as long as one does not
wallow in regret. As the saying goes, if you feel sorry, do something to make
amends.
9. Willed Inferiority: Sartre
Whereas Gordon willed her state of noncommitment or aesthetic wantonness, there are (probably) even more dramatic cases in which dissatisfaction
itself is the agent’s primary goal. In such cases, lack, deficiency, and incompleteness would become final ends (not so that the agent could consume
more, as Plato’s Callicles imagined, but just so that she would be punished
for her self-perceived inadequacies). In such an intended purpose, where
the opposite of fulfillment is the goal, virtually by definition the motive
must be non-erosiac: such a goal could only be projected. For example,
consider Sartre’s argument, against Nietzsche’s reduction of all motivation
to ‘‘will to power,’’ that ‘‘We can choose ourselves as fleeing, inapprehensible, as indecisive.’’184 Indeed, Sartre argues that an ‘‘inferiority complex’’
consists at bottom in the will to take one’s being-for-others as a basis for
self-abhorrence:
the inferiority that is felt and lived is the chosen instrument to make
us comparable to a thing. . . . But it is evident that it must be lived in
accordance with the nature which we confer on it by this choice—i.e.,
in shame, anger, and bitterness. Thus to choose inferiority does not
mean to be sweetly contented with an aurea mediocritas; it is to produce
and assume the rebellion and despair which constitute the revelation
of this inferiority. For example, I can persist in manifesting myself in
a certain kind of employment because I am inferior in it. . . . It is this
fruitless effort which I have chosen, simply because it is fruitless—
either because I prefer to be the last rather than to be lost in the mass
or because I have chosen discouragement and shame as the best means
of attaining being.185
Such a project is paradoxical because it requires the agent to project a
recognizable task or role such as being a great artist (and strive to achieve
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it) yet to select such a goal because it guarantees failure. The project becomes
a mere means for the agent to prove her worthlessness or lack of merit.
Such a state is no mere expression of ‘‘infantile dependency.’’ Rather, it
is one manifestation of what Izenberg calls ‘‘a will to unfreedom or selfabnegation.’’186
If it really is possible for an agent to be so motivated, then she clearly
cannot desire her inferiority in any orektic sense. Nor could her problem be
a separate second-order desire to experience unsatisfied desires for approval
and success, because as we have seen, second-order desire must be independent of the satisfaction or frustration of the first-order desires to which it
refers. Sartre’s agent does not even want any second-order satisfaction in
being regarded as inferior; ironically, her aim would be stymied if she were
happy as a by-product of attaining it.
Sartre imagines an existential ground for such a project that is perhaps
intelligible: the agent is desperate enough to see inferiority as a viable way
to be assured of some definite meaning in her life, some individual distinctness,
no matter what the cost in happiness. In addition, we might suggest as
grounds for such a project that after years of neglect and abuse by others
or the failure to develop ambitions she can earnestly pursue in good faith,
the agent decides in self-hatred that the only thing to which she can devote
her whole self with all her volitional capacity is the denial of her value as a
person and the denigration of her agency—and better this than nothing! In this
way, she will spite those who destroyed her hopes or discouraged her, or
she will punish herself for past failures.
If Kant is right, then the volitional capacity that this agent engages to
will her own worthlessness also inevitably expresses its own inherent value
in the very process of motivating her to strive for her perverse goal. This
implies a kind of pragmatic contradiction in the existential project of inferiority. For the ground or basis for her projection is the importance of some
meaning rather than none, or the value of individual expression via existential projection rather than pure passivity, and this seems to commit the
agent to the inherent value of her own will. But the specific content of
her goal is to deny this value.187 The will to inferiority is therefore selfcontradictory in the sense that violates the categorical imperative and it can
also be regarded as a form of radical evil, or willed cruelty to persons. It is
directed inwardly at the self rather than outwardly at others, as in the forms
of radical evil I discussed in chapter 10.
Perhaps this kind of self-hatred is often connected with a malign will
toward others; perhaps some agents who define themselves in terms of despising others cannot believe themselves capable of more positive contributions or relationships. Since they do not believe themselves capable of
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willing genuine goods, in despair they throw themselves into evil purposes
instead.
Conclusion
At this point, we have identified the objective status and alterity of values
or practical reasons that can serve as grounds for projecting related ends.
We have also identified some particular examples of such values or reasons
serving as a basis for projective willing: for example, in the good will to
justice or duty and (oppositely) in the various forms of radical evil, willed
carelessness, and the will to inferiority. These are all states of the existential
striving will with strong moral properties, ranging from moral virtue to
extreme moral corruption. In between, however, there is a large range of
projective endeavors that are morally neutral (in the narrow deontic sense),
being morally permissible within limits required by justice, but which have
broader ethical significance arising from nonmoral values to which they
respond.
In chapter 8, I suggested that we find grounds for engaging in practices
in aesthetic values, theoretical values of knowledge, and other social goods,
while we find grounds for engaging in friendship in the values of individual
personalities and character on the basis of which we commit ourselves to
friendships. In the next two chapters, I return to this question of broadly
ethical or non-deontic grounds for projective willing. We will see that the
existential theory of striving will requires not only a conception of the right
but also a conception of the good.
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Caring, Aretaic Commitment,
and Existential Resolve

Overview. This chapter argues that caring and commitment—
concepts central to both analytic moral psychology and ethical theory—are best explained as projective phenomena of the striving will.
Although the chapter surveys a wide set of recent developments in
moral psychology, it focuses on work by Harry Frankfurt, Bernard
Williams, and Jeffrey Blustein. The discussion is rarely technical and
can also serve as an introduction to this genre for the general reader.
Review
The previous chapters in Part III have advanced three main theoretical
goals.
1. They have provided substantial evidence that the primary function of the striving will is the active projection of new motives. For
they argued that virtuous motivation as Aristotle conceives it, Kant’s
motive of duty, Levinasian agapē, and vices involving radical evil cannot adequately be understood except in terms of projective motivation and the corresponding existential conception of volitional
strength.
2. These examples, along with others from existential psychotherapy, suggest that projective end-setting and striving are always responses to strong evaluative judgments concerning intrinsic values.
Like D3 desire, projective willing involves practical validity claims
concerning pursuable goods; but unlike D3 desire, projective willing
responds to such goods as at least partially agent-transcendent, or
initially unrelated to the agent’s own well-being or perfection, however broadly conceived.
458

................. 16406$

CH13

05-23-07 10:57:11

PS

PAGE 458

Caring, Aretaic Commitment, and Existential Resolve

459

3. Analysis of these case studies suggests a working taxonomy of
the different kinds of intrinsic values to which projective volitions
can respond, which extend beyond the formal considerations of fairness and justice that ground deontic projection.
This chapter completes the case for 1 by arguing that the closely interrelated concepts of care, commitment, and personal projects—which play
such vital roles in contemporary theories of the self, its obligations, and the
conditions of a meaningful life—cannot adequately be understood without
the projective model of striving will. Goals 2 and 3 are completed in the
next chapter.
1. Frankfurtian Care as Projective Motivation
In the last thirty years, the fields of ethics and moral psychology have absorbed several closely related critiques of egoistic, utilitarian, and Kantian
moral theories. From Humean, Aristotelian, feminist, or even Nietzschean
perspectives, critics have converged on the idea that classical modern theories of moral norms do not fit with the most important motives operative
in human life. Arguments offered by Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker,
John Kekes, Harry Frankfurt, Nel Noddings, Annette Baier, Virginia Held,
and several others imply that human beings are capable of projecting a
wide variety of goals for themselves, including but going well beyond moral
considerations of justice or fairness.
Yet as impressive as this convergence is, the main motivational concepts
on which these arguments rely remain largely unexplained. In my view, the
crucial role played by cares, commitments, and ground projects in forming
a person’s practical or volitional ‘‘self ’’ and their difference from ordinary
prepurposive forms of desire can be adequately understood only in terms
of projective motivation. Without the existential conception of the striving
will, we cannot make sense of how an agent is active in forming her ground
projects or shaping her self-defining commitments. The alternative, which
holds that the cares and devotions around which our life is structured ultimately arise from contingencies that are beyond the agent’s control, undermines the autonomy of these states, without which they cannot have as much
importance in moral theory as is commonly thought.
At the end of chapter 3, I suggested that only the existential conception
of the will as both second-order executive agency and the capacity for projective motivation can explain the crucial role of striving will in determining
the ethos of a person—that is, his personality, but especially his character, what
he stands for, the narrative unity or fragmentation of his life’s ‘‘subplots’’
and its development over time, and in general the whole way in which he
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experiences (or fails to experience) his life as meaningful or imbued with
significance. Any human life that develops from infancy acquires such a
personal ethos, for better or worse, and it is crucial for the existential conception of personhood that what we might call the practical depth of this
ethos—the profundity of meaning and the extent to which it is self-determined—is distinct from its happiness.1 The existentialist claims, then, that
one acquires a personal ethos with practical depth primarily through projective willing—that is, through resolving on projects and purposes that have
significance both in their producible ends and in the pursuit of those ends.
Frankfurt’s analysis of caring, developed over several years in a number of
works, seems to be closely related to this existential view in several respects,
though several important differences will emerge as well.
1.1. Care and Self-Unification over Time
First and most importantly, Frankfurt clearly understands ‘‘caring’’ not as a
prepurposive motive but rather as a settled or plan-like purposive state that
actively guides the formation of more particular intentions over time. Unlike many short-lived inclinations (including many of what I have called
D1 and D2 desires), what a person cares about ‘‘coincides in part with the
notion of something with reference to which the person guides himself in
what he does with his life,’’2 and thus ‘‘The outlook of a person who cares
about something is inherently prospective: that is, he necessarily considers
himself as having a future.’’3
This point connects caring with Bernard Williams’s well-known concept
of ‘‘ground projects’’ as motives that give an agent reasons to go on living
since they are ‘‘categorical’’ in the sense that they do not ‘‘operate conditionally on his being alive, since [they] settle the question of whether he is
going to be alive.’’4 Like Frankfurt, Williams says that we can understand
the practical unification of the self over time through its interest in its own
future agency, given ‘‘the idea of a man’s ground projects providing a motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for
living.’’5 However, Williams seems to think that to provide such temporal
unification, ground projects must involve goals we would be willing to die
for if circumstances required it. Cares as Frankfurt describes them do not
necessarily have to motivate this level of self-sacrifice; different cares can
have higher or lower priority for the individual agent, and only the highestpriority cares might fit Williams’s definition.
Yet Frankfurt seems to be right that it is essential to cares—not only
cares for which we would die—to endure through time in a way that desiderative states need not. When an agent genuinely cares about something (as
opposed to just paying it lip service or wishing it well), then she is already
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committed to acting for it in some way as circumstances may allow; and
this activated motive tends to preserve itself over time. Its stability arises by
the agent’s design or activity, whereas when a desire influences someone’s
conduct over a long period of time, its persistence may be due to chance
alone (e.g., imagine someone who has enjoyed evening television for years
but who can drop it without much regret when his Army Reserve unit is
called up). Thus the persistence of desires does not by itself entail that the
consciousness experiencing them understands its past, present, and future
as related or unified by that consciousness’s own activity in positing goals
and planning actions aimed at them. Frankfurt puts this point in a way
that suggests connections to Heidegger’s analysis of the distinctively human
experience of temporality:
Desires and beliefs can occur in a life which consists merely of a
succession of separate moments, none of which the subject recognizes—either when it occurs or in anticipation or memory—as an
element integrated with others in his own continuing history. When
this recognition is entirely absent, there is no continuing subject. The
moments in the life of a person who cares about something, however,
are not merely linked by formal relations of sequentiality. The person
necessarily binds them together, and . . . construes them as being
bound together, in richer ways . . . a person can care about something
only over some more or less extended period of time. It is possible
to desire something, or think it valuable, only for a moment. Desires
and beliefs have no inherent persistence.6
To guide oneself through caring, then, is not simply to exhibit a pattern of
actions over time that can be intelligible to third-party interpreters in terms
of ongoing motives; it is to will an ongoing understanding of one’s activity
in terms of certain lasting goals, projects, or ideals.
Here again Frankfurt’s account converges significantly with Nel Noddings’s (remarkably enough, since neither Frankfurt nor Noddings cite the
other’s work). For Noddings argues that the most essential elements of
caring, as experienced from the inside, are ‘‘The commitment to act on
behalf of the cared-for, a continued interest in his reality throughout the
appropriate time span, and the continual renewal of commitment over this
span of time.’’7 Like Frankfurt, Noddings understands caring as outwardly
focused yet involving an active effort to sustain the motivation: the caring
agent repeatedly ‘‘renews his resolve.’’8 However, Noddings does not clearly
recognize that the active effort through which first-order motives persist in
cares is distinctively volitional; instead, she treats it as basically affective
or emotional and as an extension of ‘‘natural inclination.’’9 To this view,
Frankfurt’s account is a useful corrective.
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1.2. Caring Involves Reflexive Volitional Attitudes
Thus Frankfurt’s first thesis about the function of cares in the temporal
structure of the self depends on his second main thesis, namely that to care
about some X, the agent must identify with this care (and with other desires
and emotions that caring about X may involve). In his most developed
treatment of caring, Frankfurt reaches this conclusion through a series of
steps. He begins by arguing that in equating happiness with the satisfaction
of desires, Hobbes fails to recognize that ‘‘people may be misguided in
what they want.’’10 Whether or not desires may be objectively wrong,
Frankfurt claims that getting what we want may not make us happier because ‘‘some of the things that people want, or prefer, are things they do
not really care about.’’11 He points out that even if it is important to us to
avoid frustration of strong desires, this can be done either by satisfying
such desires or by eliminating them, which is not true of cares.12 Of course,
we often say things like ‘‘I wish I didn’t care what she thinks of me,’’ but
our desire for another’s praise here does not refer to a volitional devotion.
On the other hand, if we are engaged in trying to alter some first-order
devotion, then this must be motivated by some other care(s). A care in
Frankfurt’s sense cannot motivate its own elimination. This is also true of
D3 desires because they involve strong evaluations of agent-relative goods
to be realized in action; this was Gary Watson’s chief insight (see chap. 5,
sec. 1.2). Hence it is natural to assume that caring differs from ordinary
first-order desire in part because it also involves strong evaluative attitudes.
Frankfurt does not accept this explanation, but I will postpone discussion
of this issue until chapter 14.
Instead, Frankfurt suggests that caring about some goal or person means
(1) being disappointed or feeling loss if X is not realized or things do not
go well for X; (2) that the agent continues to care about X even when giving
some other purpose higher priority in a decision; and (3) that this motivation ‘‘must endure through an exercise of his own volitional activity rather
than by its own inherent momentum’’ or ‘‘affective inertia.’’13 In other
words, caring involves higher-order volitions that aim at preserving the desires, emotions, and other attitudes involved in serving the object of our
care and attenuating or eradicating first-order motive-states that conflict
with our care. For example, Frankfurt says that an agent’s caring about
attending a concert
implies that he is disposed to support and sustain his desire to go to
it even after he has decided that he prefers to satisfy another desire
instead. Foregoing the concert would frustrate his first-order desire
to attend the concert . . . [but] it would fail to touch the higher-order
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desire . . . that this first-order desire not be extinguished or abandoned. His caring about the concert would essentially consist in his
having and identifying with a higher-order desire of this kind.14
This passage clarifies the relationship between identification and caring that
was less clearly indicated in Frankfurt’s first essay on caring, where he
avoids directly defining caring in terms of his controversial notion of volitional identification:
A person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it. He
identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes
himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits, depending on
whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced. Insofar as
the person’s life is in whole or in part devoted to anything, rather than
being merely a sequence of events whose themes and structures he
makes no effort to fashion, it is devoted to this. . . . Thus caring
about something is not to be confused with liking it or with wanting
it; nor is it the same as thinking that what is cared about has value of
some kind, or that it is desirable.15
Perhaps Frankfurt hesitated to define caring in terms of volitional identification because of Gary Watson’s well-known objection that identification
could not consist simply in a higher-order ‘‘desire.’’ In introducing the concept of caring, Frankfurt was looking for a motive-state that would be
clearly distinct from mere desire because it is inherently autonomous or
expressive of the agent’s will. But the concept of caring could not solve this
problem if it were defined in terms of higher-order desires. The idea was
to explain in some other way why cares are autonomous or inalienable.
Identification would then become intelligible as part of the process of caring. Hence Frankfurt suggests that in the profoundest type of caring, which
he calls ‘‘volitionally necessary’’ caring (or ‘‘love’’), the agent ‘‘does not experience the force of volitional necessity as alien or external to himself ’’
because it is partly constituted by ‘‘desires which are not merely his own
but with which he actively identifies himself.’’ This active support of the
first-order motives involved in his care helps him ‘‘avoid being guided in
what he does by any forces other than those by which he most deeply wants
to be guided.’’16 Such cares are experienced as inherently autonomous.
Along the way, Frankfurt has also explored other ways of analyzing
volitional identification to solve Watson’s objection, such as the model of
decisive identification,17 and the model of identification as satisfaction with
one’s desires.18 The latter model of ‘‘identification as acceptance’’ allows
Frankfurt to say that identification with some desire is insufficient for caring about it: ‘‘Since I may identify with desires that I consider to be quite
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trivial, such as a desire to have some ice cream, identifying does not entail
caring.’’19 This is problematic,20 but even if it is true, it does not entail that
there is no ‘‘essential linkage between identification and caring,’’ as Frankfurt suggested here.21 For even if identification does not entail caring, the
converse might hold. And indeed, Frankfurt affirms this in The Reasons of
Love when he explains why caring cannot be constituted simply by a certain
intensity of desire:
When a person cares about something . . . he is willingly committed
to his desire. The desire does not move him either against his will or
without his endorsement. He is not a victim; nor is he passively indifferent to it. On the contrary, he himself desires that it move him. . . .
Besides wanting to fulfill his desire, then, the person who cares about
what he desires wants something else as well: he wants that desire to
be sustained. Moreover, this desire for his desire to be sustained is
not a merely ephemeral inclination. It is not transient or adventitious.
It is a desire with which the person identifies himself and which he accepts as expressing what he really wants.22
Hence caring about X entails identification with desires for X’s good (if X
is a person) or upholding X (if X is a principle), just as alienation from (or
counteridentification with) a desire entails not caring about the desired object.
Yet Frankfurt’s phrasing here clearly recognizes the so-called ab initio
problem that Watson first raised against the simple hierarchical account
of identification: an ephemeral higher-order desire or brute second-order
preference will not do. Frankfurt might now suggest that to identify himself
with the higher-order desires involved in his care, the agent must be satisfied
with them. But this formulation leaves out the idea that the agent who cares
about some X is committed to it (in the relevant sense) and hence committed
to the first-order motives and evaluative attitudes that devotion to X requires. I propose that it is because the higher-order volition(s) involved in
caring about something or someone themselves consist in a firm commitment of the striving will that they are distinct from types of motive-states
(such as desires) which in themselves are wanton and merely sequential over
time unless the agent endorses them or otherwise makes them autonomous.
The concept of projective willing supplies what Frankfurt needs to complete his account.
1.3. Caring Is Based on Volitional Commitment
Several passages in Frankfurt’s work move toward this idea that a kind of
volitional commitment is the central element in caring that distinguishes it
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from lower-order desires and assures its autonomy in the agent’s motivational life. In his 1999 essay on caring, following the argument that caring
involves higher-order volition, Frankfurt suggests that although ‘‘beliefs,
feelings, and expectations’’ may often reliably indicate what someone cares
about,
What is at the heart of the matter is not a condition of feeling or of
belief or of expectation but of will. The question of whether a person
cares about something pertains essentially to whether he is committed
to his desire for it in the way that I have suggested. . . .
Being committed to a desire is not at all equivalent to simply approving of the desire or to merely endorsing it. Commitment goes
beyond acceptance of the desire and hence willingness to be moved
by it. It entails a further disposition to be active in seeing to it that
the desire is not abandoned or neglected.23
In other words, caring about something involves more than identification understood as mere satisfaction; it involves the agent’s proactive effort to
keep this care alive and informing her choices. Here my notion of striving
will as not only projecting new ends but also strengthening the agent’s
motivation to pursue existing projects and priorities suggests itself as an
explanation of this ongoing intrasubjective effort. The agent’s reflexive contribution to caring seems to consist primarily in a resolve that focuses her
willpower on building up the ‘‘right’’ sort of affective and motivational
dispositions and breaking down the ‘‘wrong’’ sort, where right and wrong
are determined by the needs and/or content of what she cares about.
Frankfurt’s insistence that care and love are ‘‘volitional’’ phenomena requires such a projective explanation. In his first essay on caring, Frankfurt
says that ‘‘The fact that someone cares about a certain thing is constituted
by a complex set of cognitive, affective, and volitional dispositions and
states,’’24 but he emphasizes the volitional: ‘‘the fact that a person cares
about something is a fact about his will.’’25 But the relevant sense of ‘‘will’’
here cannot be what Frankfurt has routinely called the ‘‘first-order will,’’
signifying the desire on which the person acts;26 for the unwilling addict’s
first-order will is to get heroin. Certainly the addict ‘‘cares’’ about his heroin
in one sense but not in the sense of deeper commitment or resolve that
Frankfurt has in mind. Nor is Frankfurtian caring ‘‘volitional’’ in the sense
of being a ‘‘decision,’’ which Frankfurt analyzes as an ‘‘iteratively self-implementing’’ act that forms a specific intention.27 For he emphasizes that cares
function like entrenched dispositions in a person’s character that are not
easily altered and hence not subject to ‘‘decision’’ in this familiar sense: ‘‘the
fact that a person decides to care about something cannot be tantamount
to his caring about it,’’ as we see in Sartre’s famous example of the young
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man.28 Contra Sartre, Frankfurt says that the young man might decide to
choose the option that he truly cares about less and then find himself unwilling ‘‘to carry out his intention.’’29
I agree with this argument up to a point, because the commitment on
which caring is based must involve a kind of investment of the self that
significantly binds the agent’s first-order motives going into the future; no
attitude toward X could count as commitment to X if it is just as easy to
abandon X or reverse oneself after adopting this attitude as it was before. I
am more skeptical about Frankfurt’s claim that this binding can amount to
‘‘volitional necessity,’’ or that it is ever totally outside the reach of the
agent’s control, unalterable by her initiative.30 However, the present question is rather: What kind of ‘‘will’’ or ‘‘unwillingness’’ is determined by
whichever option the young man truly cares about most in his ‘‘volitional
heart’’ (even if he does not introspect it accurately)? Frankfurt says:
If a person’s will is that by which he moves himself, then what he cares about
is far more germane to the character of his will than the decisions or
choices that he makes. The latter may pertain to what he intends to be
his will, but not necessarily to what his will truly is.31
Consciously or not, Frankfurt is appealing here to the existential conception of striving will, which functions at a level deeper than its surface decisions—a level at which it is an active source of new motivation as well as a
shaper and sustainer of existing motivation. In the very process of forming
particular intentions on the basis of existing motives, it also reaffirms and
expresses its own unique type of motivation, which Frankfurt calls ‘‘caring.’’
This existential interpretation explains why Frankfurt wants to say that
caring is a mode of willing even though it is not an act of ‘‘decision,’’ or
what Kant would call the legislation of a subjective maxim.
This existential interpretation also explains why Frankfurt can insist that
agents express themselves in their cares, as well as why agents experience
‘‘love,’’ in his volitional sense (as an especially strong species of care), ‘‘as
actually enhancing both their autonomy and their strength of will.’’32 For caring is an ongoing effort of will, and the volitional commitment upon which
it is based is the paradigm achievement of a will strong enough to posit
demanding goals and to keep in place the focus of mind and energy to
pursue them. The projective explanation also makes sense of Frankfurt’s
frequently repeated claim that caring strongly about morality is one particular kind of care that does not arise from pure reason alone; for recognizing
rational justifications for justice or fairness is not the same thing as a personal commitment to these ideals as overriding all other goals.33 The latter,
as I argue with respect to Kant (see chap. 11), is one kind of projected
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motive that the agent forms on rational grounds that do not move him
without his will’s participation.
Finally, the projective account of caring sheds light on how cares can
autonomously ‘‘guide’’ us while not themselves simply consisting in a decision or set of decisions. First of all, to be ‘‘guided’’ by one’s care is for it to
function as a standing project in one’s practical life:
To care about something is not merely to be attracted by it, or to
experience certain feelings. No one can properly be said to care about
something unless, at least to some degree, he guides his conduct in
accordance with the implications of his interest in it. This means
paying attention to it and to what concerns it; it means making decisions, taking steps. Thus, with respect to those things whose importance to him derives from the fact that he cares about them, the
person is necessarily active.34
Hence cares are ‘‘active’’ in something analogous to the way that decisions are
active: by forming intentions, decisions guide first-order action (mental or
bodily acts other than decision); by caring, the will guides the motives that
inform decisions. In decision, as I argue in chapter 3, ‘‘the will’’ is no more
than the executive agency (or perhaps ‘‘power’’) that takes up some preexisting motives and forms a particular purpose motivated by them. But caring
does not simply select in this way among already present motives in order
to define the agent’s purposes; it also guides his particular purposes by
dedicating the agent to a cause, person, or ideal and thus forming a distinctive
kind of motive. Thus to care about some X is not just voluntarily to form, on
the basis of prior desires, an intention to achieve X, to promote X’s wellbeing, or do what X requires. It is to have what I call an ‘‘essentially volitional motive’’ (chap. 3, sec. 3.4), i.e., one generated by the will’s resolve in the
process of forming the specific intentions.
Although this is clearly my explanation, not Frankfurt’s, it coheres well
with his insistence that caring is not governed by ‘‘decision’’ in the ordinary
sense; for the striving will as the capacity for projective motivation musters
resolve, sustains commitment, and shapes the agent’s most central motives
rather than simply forming particular intentions. Something like the intensity of such efforts at dedication or sustained devotion may perhaps be felt
in making a decision in the ordinary sense, especially when this requires
resolving a contest between competing preexisting motives.35 But the power
of the striving will, whose exercise we sense in making any significant intention-forming decision, is much more strongly felt in projecting motives or
(we may now say) in forming cares—even though this is a process not
achieved in an instant nor always played out in fully articulated reflective
awareness of what we are doing.
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So, although it does not feel much like a ‘‘decision’’ in today’s sense of
that term, the formation of cares is a voluntary movement of agency. It is
often a slow and quiet buildup, sometimes culminating in a great moment
of personal commitment but often simply growing into an established engagement and concern with a project or relationship. For example, in the
film Tombstone, Wyatt Earp never seems to pass through a moment of deeply
fraught and conflicted decision.36 How this works is an interesting question
that deserves more attention in philosophical psychology.
1.4. Volitional Love as Nonappetitive Motivation
So far, I have argued that caring in Frankfurt’s sense is best understood
projectively because it is a persisting motive-state that involves higher-order
management of one’s first-order desires, and a state that is distinct both
from ordinary desire and from decision. Of course, since it is a kind of
motivational disposition, caring could be called a ‘‘desire’’ in the thinnest
or maximally formal use of this term (as in Davidson, Mele, Lewis, and
many others). But Frankfurt rightly complains that ‘‘desire’’ as a catchall
synonym for ‘‘motive’’ is not very useful as a philosophical concept because
it tends to obscure or downplay important distinctions among different
kinds of motives.37 As I argue in chapter 4, to clarify how the states produced by striving will differ from other kinds of motive, we have to contrast
them with ‘‘desire’’ in the Greek erosiac sense. In this section, I argue that
this distinction is implicit in Frankfurt’s treatment of ‘‘love’’ as the existentially deepest kind of care.
Among the many ‘‘different ways of caring,’’ Frankfurt holds that ‘‘The
most notable of these are perhaps the several varieties of love.’’38 In his
important paper on ‘‘Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,’’ Frankfurt clarifies
that the kind of ‘‘love’’ that he has in mind is a distinctively volitional state:
As I deploy the concept, it has a very wide scope: love is a species of
caring about things, and its possible objects include whatever we may
care about in certain ways. . . . To love differs from having feelings
of a certain type, such as those of powerful attraction or of intense
desire or compelling delight. It is also not equivalent to or entailed
by any judgment or appreciation of the inherent value of its object.
To love something is quite different from considering it to be especially appealing or precious. . . . Of course, love does ordinarily involve various strong feelings and beliefs that express, reveal, and
support it. The heart of love, however, is neither affective nor cognitive. It is volitional.39
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This distinguishes volitional love from D2 appetites (such as ‘‘loving’’
chocolate), from D3 desires (such as ‘‘loving’’ the feeling of security provided by a good retirement plan), and from complex emotional states composed of D2 and D3 states (perhaps romantic love is an example, if it
includes both sexual attraction and an appreciation of the partner as complementing our own personality). And as we have already seen (in sec. 1
above) Frankfurt takes loving some X in the volitional sense to involve
regarding X (or X’s good) as an end-in-itself. This helps explain his intriguing thesis that the ‘‘commands’’ of love can be ‘‘categorical,’’ just as Kant
claimed the commands of morality must be.40
Yet, as Frankfurt argues, Kant denies that motives that are affected by
‘‘contingent personal features’’ and varying circumstances ‘‘that make people
distinctive and that characterise their specific identities’’ are autonomous,
because ‘‘personal interests’’ that are affected by such contingencies ‘‘are not
integral to the essential nature of a person’s will.’’41
I agree with Frankfurt that Kant is mistaken on this point; he seems to
have conflated those constitutive properties of rational free willing that are
universally shared by all morally responsible beings because they are essential to moral personhood (a general ‘‘essence’’) with those commitments
and character traits that are essential to the practical identity of an individual
person. Kant’s goal is to show that based on its universal nature, the free
rational will is always-already implicitly committed to the fundamental
norm of morality, namely the overriding value of the existence and effectiveness of free rational willing itself. But even if Kant is right about this
(as I think he his), these universal implicit commitments of free rational will
as such cannot define the whole of what Korsgaard calls a person’s ‘‘practical
identity.’’ Hence other more specific motives may be autonomous for the
individual.42
Frankfurt understands the core of a ‘‘practical identity’’ to consist in the
agent’s volitional loves; hence action motivated by such loves must count
as autonomous:
A person acts autonomously only when his volitions [or intentions]
derive from the essential character of his will. According to Kant, a
person’s volitions are related to his will in this way only insofar as he
is following the austerely impersonal dictates of the moral law. In
fact, however, the same relation between volition and will holds when
a person is acting out of love.43
To defend this claim, Frankfurt then argues that the motives of love are
structurally analogous to the Kantian motive of duty in important respects.
Since I have already shown that the motive of duty as Kant conceives it has
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a projective structure, it should come as no surprise that this is what Frankfurt’s analogy implies about motives of love as well.
Frankfurt draws this analogy by arguing that volitional love is ‘‘active’’
in much the same way that Kant believed the will to be active in resisting
temptation for the sake of duty or treating persons as ends. By contrast,
Frankfurt characterizes as ‘‘passive’’ all other types of ‘‘love’’ in which the
motive is erosiac (and hence formally egoistic) in structure:
In many of its instances, love is fundamentally passive. It is passive
when the lover is motivated by an expectation that obtaining or continuing to possess the object of his love will be beneficial to him . . .
his love is conditional upon his attribution to his beloved of a capacity to improve the condition of his life.44
This description clearly encompasses what I have called D2 and D3 types
of desire, including the global desire for eudaimonia and all the forms of
eros that this involves. Volitional love, on the other hand, is not even formally egoistic in structure:
But love need not be based upon self-interest. It may be fundamentally active, differing from passive love in the nature of the lover’s
motivation. . . . Loving of any variety implies conduct that is designed
to be beneficial to the beloved object. In active love, the lover values
this activity for its own sake instead of for the advantages that he
himself may ultimately derive from it. . . .
This must not be understood to mean that what motivates him is
the inherent appeal of the activities in which loving leads him to
engage [e.g., their enjoyability], considered entirely apart from their
effects on his beloved.45
This formulation seems to me clearer than those I critique in chapter 12
(sec. 6) as unwittingly reintroducing formal egoism into the account of
volitional love; for here instead Frankfurt emphasizes the agent-transcending
nature of the agent’s purpose. The example he introduces to illustrate this
point—which reappears in all Frankfurt’s discussions of love—is a parent’s
‘‘wholly active and unconditional’’ love for her child. He suggests that caring for the child may involve many activities that are inherently enjoyable
in themselves (though I add, based on personal experience, that it certainly
includes some that are not so pleasant too). But either way, the activities
involved in caring for the child are chosen for the child’s good as the final
end: the loving parent’s ‘‘interest in the child is entirely disinterested. It can
be satisfied completely and only by the satisfaction of interests that are
altogether distinct from and independent of his own.’’46
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‘‘Disinterestedness’’ in this sense is the same quality that I call ‘‘purity’’
of motive: the agent has sufficient motivation in first-order goods that are
not materially connected to his own good. In his long essay on caring,
Frankfurt worries that the term ‘‘disinterested’’ may not be adequate, however: although it expresses the idea that ‘‘the lover’s concern for his beloved
. . . must have no ulterior aim whatsoever,’’ it may sound ‘‘colorless and
lacking in personal warmth,’’ whereas in fact volitional love usually involves
‘‘a kind of passion and urgency that disinterestedness appears to preclude.’’47 I
note that the existential account of the striving will explains this intuition
because it tells us that love in Frankfurt’s special sense consists primarily in
an ongoing volitional effort and secondarily in the first-order emotions and desires that this striving cultivates. In projecting and maintaining personal
ends, volitional striving is experienced as a kind of pathos that is unlike
passive emotions, which is precisely why the Greeks called it spirited or full
of heart.48
This reading fits well with everything Frankfurt says except his claim
that disinterested self-love can be achieved by desiring one’s own well-being
as a final end.49 The projective model of volitional love certainly allows for
the possibility of projecting one’s own happiness as a personal end, but it
requires us to distinguish this clearly from natural desire for one’s own eudaimonia. For even one who, through despair or some other emotional dysfunction, has lost the natural love of his own life could still will to become
happier and to recover this natural concern for his well-being.50 This would
constitute a kind of care of self that is quite distinct from any egoistic state
of mind.
Love is ‘‘active’’ for Frankfurt, then, when its motive is ‘‘disinterested,’’
or pure, in my sense, which is to say when it is not caused by external
attractors that trigger appetites but, rather, is actively energized by the
agent’s own will. And this is why such actively willed loves are experienced
as essentially autonomous, unlike passive first-order appetites: in contrast
to those ‘‘passions’’ that ‘‘have no inherent motivational authority’’ for us
because we can either identify with them or alienate them, ‘‘Love is not an
elementary psychic datum’’ that we can accept or reject. ‘‘Since love is itself
a configuration of the will, it cannot be true of a person who does genuinely
love something that his love is entirely involuntary.’’51 The existential account explains such configurations of the will as established dispositions of
projective or self-motivational activity itself.
Frankfurt instead offers what I think is a less plausible explanation for
such states of will: for him, they are parts of the ‘‘essential identity of an
individual,’’ one’s personal essence.52 On this view, love-motivated action is
autonomous in the strongest metaphysically conceivable sense: ‘‘Thus, despite the fact that unconditional love is a personal matter, what a person
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loves may be among his essential volitional characteristics,’’ giving them not
just personal authority but even volitional necessity for the agent.53 Although this formulation allows Frankfurt to maintain a parallel with Kant’s
notion of rational necessity as a basis for categorical authority in motives,
it seems unnecessary to me. The individual agent’s loves, or strongest cares,
can have an unconditional personal authority based on his unconditional
commitment to them, which in turn finds justification in the grounds for
his projective resolve without this personal authority constituting a form of
necessity analogous to logical truth.
Hence I do not see that personal authority or the autonomy of the
agent’s motive could be rooted only in an absolute identificational destiny or
volitional essence that is uniquely her own. To make a case for this claim,
Frankfurt has to argue not only that the activeness/autonomy of volitional
love is distinguished by its selflessness or the absence of prior attraction to
the beloved, but also that the personal authority of volitional character is
not compatible with leeway-libertarian freedom.54
I am concerned here with only the first of these two theses, which
amounts to the claim that volitional love is an especially important form of
projective motivation. Indeed, Frankfurt’s insights become clearer in light
of the existential analysis of the striving will. Volitional caring can play the
crucial role that Frankfurt gives it in establishing the ethos of a person—
what the person stands for and ‘‘who he is’’ in the practical sense—because
caring is the primary function of the willpower that distinguishes human
persons from all other animals. So it turns out that Frankfurt was correct
when he wrote that ‘‘one essential difference between persons and other
creatures is to be found in the structure of a person’s will’’55 —but not only
because of our capacity for higher-order volition. Rather, it is our capacity
for projecting self-defining commitments, combined with the ability to reflect on ourselves, that makes us persons.
2. Aretaic Commitment and Backward-Looking Considerations
2.1. The Concept of Commitment
In the foregoing sections, I used the term ‘‘commitment’’ loosely as an
analog to caring and ground projects. But we can isolate a more precise
sense of ‘‘commitment’’ that is directly related to the projective phenomena
of volitional resolve. The term ‘‘commitment’’ has been used in many different ways in recent analytic philosophy. Most often, it simply refers to a
normative epistemic connection between something an agent already believes and what follows from this. It can also be used in this sense to say
that an agent is implicitly ‘‘committed’’ to some norm or principle by things
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that she does or says (e.g., this is the sense in which Kantians say that the
employment of the will commits agents to the principle that the free will
has inviolable intrinsic value).
Another usage comes a bit closer to the sense of ‘‘commitment’’ I am
interested in: it takes committing as an act with the same intentional content
as promising or contracting: the agent binds himself to do, say, or deliver
something. Crucial to this sense of ‘‘commitment’’ is the idea that it creates
a backward-looking consideration for decisions and action in the future. Thus
W. D. Ross argues correctly against utilitarianism that ‘‘the fact that we
have made a promise is in itself sufficient to create a [prima facie] duty of
keeping it, the sense of duty resting on remembrance of the past promise
and not on thoughts of future consequences of its fulfillment.’’56 But considered this way, ‘‘commitment’’ is a kind of speech-act, or its equivalent,
that gives other persons some sort of claim on us.
The existential tradition suggests that commitment in this speech-act
sense is possible for us only in virtue of our capacity for a more fundamental kind of commitment that rests in the will itself.57 Commitments of this
most primordial kind are volitional in nature; although they are commitments to something or someone outside the self, they also involve a reflexive
or intrasubjective relation-to-self. The agent binds herself not to others (as
in promises) but, rather, to herself, forming the sort of higher-order volitional disposition that proves central to caring, on Frankfurt’s account. As
we saw, to care about something (or someone) involves acquiring the beliefs, judgments, emotions, and dispositions that should come from willing
its (or their) flourishing. S cares about X entails that S identifies with
1. whatever first-order desires, emotions, and other evaluative attitudes are required for (or fit with) promoting X’s well-being (if X
has interests) or living up to X’s demands (if X is a principle or an
ideal);
2. dispositions to express care for X, to endorse the value of X,
and, when appropriate, to encourage others to care about X as well.
This helps explain the sense in which caring about something or someone
involves commitment to develop or maintain one’s own psychic economy
in a certain state over time. Without such commitment, as Frankfurt says,
‘‘We would have no settled interest in designing or in sustaining any particular continuity in the configurations of our will’’ or the motives on which
we act.58
Hence the sort of commitment we are isolating is the kind that stands
at the core of every volitional care. Since they partly define the character or
overall ethos of the agent, I will call these ‘‘aretaic’’ commitments. In addition to their reflexive element, such commitments are distinguished from
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appetites and inclinations by their consequence-transcending content; prepurposive
motives in general arise as attractions to various outcomes or states of affairs (usually involving the agent’s possession or consumption of some object), but an aretaic commitment is a motive-state that expresses or affirms
values that are irreducible to first-order states of affairs (not only of the
agent’s own well-being, but in general).59 To commit himself to this kind
of value, the agent’s resolve must be in an important sense unreserved: his
commitment cannot be conditional on success in bringing about the outcomes or consequences at which he aims as part of the expression of these
values.
This is already suggested by the familiar (prephilosophical) sense of
‘‘commitment’’ as crossing a threshold, often described as a ‘‘point of no
return.’’ For instance, a textbook on aeronautics may say that once the
airplane reaches the V-1 velocity for the runway, the pilot is ‘‘committed’’
and must lift off (since not enough runway remains to abort the takeoff ).
Similarly, once you jump from the tower with the bungee cord, you have
‘‘taken the plunge,’’ and there is no way back.
Through these colloquial expressions, ‘‘commitment’’ is associated with
irreversibility, with full investment of oneself in an activity, or even with staking everything on a single bet. But the sense in which aretaic commitment
is unconditional or absolute does not entail that it must be literally unrevisable
or that the agent who commits herself in this special sense can never reconsider her commitment (perhaps in light of criticism or new experiences); it
entails only that the committed agent cannot disengage simply to save herself trouble, or to maximize her own happiness, or even to promote the good
states of affairs whose realization she is committed to pursue. This last
qualification, which puts the essential structure of aretaic commitment in
clearest relief, emerges from ideas found in MacIntyre, Kierkegaard, Williams, Anderson, and Blustein.
2.2. MacIntyre and Aretaic Commitment
For example, MacIntyre has pointed out that to engage in a practice is not
simply to pursue the first-order good it produces (e.g., health as the good
produced by medicine) as a final end; it is also to be committed to standards of excellence internal to that practice, which limit the means by which
its first-order good may be produced. So the doctor must care about her
patient’s health, but not as a good consequence to be maximized by any
means whatsoever; the values expressed in caring about the patient’s health
transcend these consequences, and aretaic commitment to them is unconditional in the sense that it cannot be violated even to cure illness. Even the
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nonmoral conceptions of excellence involved in every practice are distinguished by this consequence-transcending quality; for instance, performance-enhancing drugs may increase a runner’s speed, but excellence in
sprinting consists in more than achieving the fastest possible speed (even
when one is not competing against other athletes in formal competition,
and issues of fairness do not arise). This becomes even clearer when the
standards of excellence in practices are extended to include the virtues on
which practices depend:
It is of the character of a virtue that in order that it be effective in
producing the internal goods which are the rewards of the virtues it
should be exercised without regard to consequences . . . although the
virtues are just those qualities which tend to lead to achievements of
a certain class of goods [components of social well-being] nonetheless
unless we practice them irrespective of whether in any particular set
of circumstances they will produce those goods or not, we cannot
possess them at all.60
For example, courage may tend to overcome obstacles to human flourishing both for individuals and communities, but the courageous person
remains brave even when no first-order human good seems likely to result;
it is in that sense uncompromising. Likewise, justice tends to produce trust
and coordination among persons who need to cooperate, but the commitment to give people what they deserve according to fair criteria cannot be
turned off or on whenever such changes in our psyche might produce more
just outcomes; loyalty to the principle of justice has an intrinsic value that
transcends its instrumental value as a cause of just outcomes.
2.3. Williams against Consequentialism
Similarly, Bernard Williams uses ‘‘commitment’’ in the practical sense for
one broad species of project, namely ‘‘those with which one is more deeply
and extensively involved and identified.’’61 Commitments are lasting pursuits that give intelligible shape to a sustained course of activity requiring
some perseverance, thereby providing much of the personal meaning our
lives have for us. This is why, in agreement with Feinberg’s argument
against egoism, Williams adds that ‘‘It may even be that . . . many of
those with commitments, who have really identified themselves with objects
outside themselves, who are thoroughly involved with other persons, institutions, or activities or causes, are actually happier than those whose projects and wants are not like that.’’62 Like Frankl and Frankfurt, Williams
clearly recognizes that a devotion to worthwhile projects generates much of
the value and fulfillment in human lives. What he adds is the insight that
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these effects arise precisely because existential devotion to a project, principle,
or person is not simply a specification of desires for good consequences;
this is why a consequentialist ethic would inevitably break down or divorce
us from such commitments.
As we saw, Williams thinks of ‘‘ground projects’’ as one species of care,
namely, the kind that forms the core of one’s personal ethos because it involves commitment to our highest ends embodying our ultimate reasons
for living. Thus ground projects are manifested in what Kierkegaard calls
‘‘infinite’’ passion, and this puts some limits on the type of goals that one
can reasonably pursue as ground projects; for ‘‘It is a contradiction to be
willing to sacrifice one’s life for a finite goal.’’63 Ground projects will also
help determine what other, less central or fundamental commitments are
volitionally possible for a person. Whether they are pursued in pure immediacy or involve reflective evaluation, the infinite commitment of the will
that characterizes ground projects is incompatible with a utilitarian attitude
toward one’s subjective ends.
As Williams argues, a man’s ‘‘decisions as a utilitarian agent are a function of all the satisfactions which he can affect from where he is: and this
means that the projects of others, to an indeterminately great extent, determine his decision.’’64 Of course, sometimes it is reasonable for our projects
to give way when they conflict with the more important projects of others
or with communal needs, and we have to be sensitive to this. But loyalty to
our deepest commitments cannot vary with every change in the social context that may (given how others will react) alter the net effects that are
likely to follow from our pursuing these principal life goals. As Williams
asks:
how can a man, as a utilitarian agent, come to regard as one satisfaction among others, and a dispensable one, a project or attitude around
which he has built his life, just because someone’s else’s projects have
so structured the causal scene that this is how the utilitarian sum
comes out?65
To expect someone to abandon his ground projects whenever doing so
would maximize collective utility is, as Williams says, ‘‘to alienate him in a
real sense from his action and the source of his actions in his own convictions.’’66 The point here is not that a morally responsible agent can never
recognize reasons to change his or her ground projects or be open to changing them or willing to suspend them when necessary;67 nor do ground projects require the agent to ignore all possible consequences of actions.68
Rather, Williams’s point is that a human life cannot have a narrative structure and robust personal meaning without being held together by some
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commitments that are regarded as worthwhile for their own sake and not
just as ways of maximizing good results.
Thus some commitments with an aretaic structure are necessary for a
well-unified life-narrative. Ground projects usually direct us toward realizing some state of affairs, but this is hardly all they do; if we could permanently secure that state of affairs simply by pushing a button on a
superpowerful machine, then the ground project could not play its existential role in giving our life-narrative shape. But since what consequentialist
principles directly enjoin is the maximizing of some state of affairs (S), as
opposed to directly enjoining certain forms of action, attitude, or purpose,
a consequentialist concern to maximize S cannot replace a ground project
that involves caring about S. As Williams was the first to explain in detail,
the consequentialist version can even require the agent to do something
counter to S if this will cause other agents to take steps that will maximize
S-states,69 whereas caring about S usually cannot have this implication.
I suggest that this is because volitional caring involves an aretaic form
of commitment that rules out resorting to strategies that betray that very
commitment as a means to pursuing its ends. For example, a parent who is
committed to her children will not consider doing them some serious harm
on the assurance that others will then give them some benefit that greatly
outweighs the harm. For this would communicate to them and others that
she sees her love for them only as a means to their good, not as important
in its own right. But what their good most requires is a loving devotion
that plays a stable and central role in the ethos and life-narrative of the
parent. This is true of all cares involving interpersonal relationships, of the
practices, and of devotion to principles.
What about commitment to direct utilitarianism or some other ‘‘extremely impersonal moral perspective?’’70 Owen Flanagan suggests that
Buddhists, for example, may believe that the collective good of all persons
trumps any attachment to personal projects.71 Yet Flanagan recognizes that
‘‘if Buddhism said that persons ought to realize a moral personality that
involved no attachments whatsoever, it would be an impossible and selfdefeating theory, since it would then . . . prohibit attachment to its own
tenets.’’72 This is correct if we understand ‘‘attachment’’ as willed devotion,
for setting oneself to pursue a goal is an inherently self-sustaining projective
activity. Thus if ‘‘commitment’’ to a consequentialist ideal entails being
willing to erase the beliefs and motives involved in this commitment whenever one reasonably believes that doing so will maximize the likelihood of
the outcomes preferred by this ideal, then this cannot be ‘‘commitment’’
in the volitional/projective sense. Pure consequentialism cannot, then, be
earnestly willed in a self-sustaining manner that stabilizes the significance
of future options for the agent.
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For instance, a person who has, by volitional effort, set himself wholeheartedly to the task of (say) maximizing average income in his nation
would have to see something inherently noble in this cause. If he respects
this value and wants this respect to be reflected in his life, then he could
hardly will to take a mind pill that makes him into a political libertarian if
this would somehow get the right redistributive tax laws passed to maximize average income. Subjecting himself to a false political ideology as a
means to his goal would betray his own sense of what gave meaning to his
life. The motive-power of commitment is undermined if the agent sees
volitional striving as having only instrumental value. Perhaps this basic fact
of human psychology holds because human willing is, as Kant thought, an
essentially self-respecting process.
This point is worth further elucidation. Respect for X is a relation that
by definition cannot be a mere means to X’s benefit or to anything else.
Aretaic commitment involves respecting the intrinsic value of principles,
persons, excellences, and worthy causes as having a kind of significance
that ought to be recognized and expressed in human identities, not simply
promoted by those identities. To respect them is to regard our volitional
response to them as more than a mere means to actualizing them or to
realizing the product-value of our goal. Thus aretaic commitment always
implicitly affirms its own existential nobility as a respectful response. For the
object of such commitment is taken to have a kind of value that cannot be
served by betraying the intrinsic value of one’s volitional agency in treating
the will as a mere means.73 Hence, beyond a certain point, which only
prudence in the classical sense can ascertain, to care in the sense of volitional
devotion is to refuse to calculate certain consequences any further, to bracket some
possible outcomes as irrelevant, and to rule out certain ways of producing
cared-for outcomes. To illustrate this kind of identity-shaping devotion,
Kierkegaard contrasts two politicians. The first has only what Kierkegaard
calls a finite passion for his goal, though (comically) he wants to be heroic,
considers himself inspired, and deceives himself into believing that he is
willing to sacrifice his life for his cause. ‘‘But he is sagacious enough to
perceive—something that is hidden from the more simple—how important
his life is for the state, that if he lives a long time no one is going to be in
want, but inspiration this is not.’’74 The other dies for his cause without
trying to calculate the consequences of his absence on the public good.75
His commitment is what Kierkegaard calls ‘‘infinite.’’
2.4. Anderson, Frankfurt, and the Priority of the Object
The conflict between caring devotion to personal projects and consequentialist theories of practical rationality has been widely acknowledged, even
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if its origins in the projective nature of care or commitment to tasks and
persons has not been clearly recognized. This is in part because commitment is frequently based on what Elizabeth Anderson calls ‘‘backwardlooking’’ reasons: ‘‘agents often choose an alternative not because it maximizes expected future payoffs but because the alternative bears an appropriate relation of narrative unity to prior action.’’76 Anderson uses this
feature to show that her own principle of respect for persons recommends
ends for reasons different from those generated by alleged consequentialist
equivalents. For instance, a forward-looking consequentialist principle that
‘‘fulfilling [past] commitments to oneself is intrinsically good’’ recommends
maximizing the state of affairs that commitments are kept, and so would
encourage people to ‘‘make commitments willy-nilly, just so that more commitment-fulfillments can exist in the world.’’77
Moreover, on any consequentialist principle recommending that we
bring about some state of affairs E, the motive for pursuing E is always
such that ‘‘there can be no rationale for avoiding E-violations when they
would bring about more instances of E.’’78 Thus no principle R defining
what is reasonable or good in terms of ‘‘agent-centered restrictions’’ can be
captured by a putative consequentialist equivalent calling on us to maximize
the state of affairs that R is realized.79 Thus nonconsequentialist motives
involving agent-centered restrictions, such as Kant’s motive of duty, do not
aim simply at promoting ends but, rather, at pursuing ends in certain appropriate
or legitimate ways.
Anderson takes the ‘‘attitude’’ of love to be a backward-looking commitment in her argument against the adequacy of a consequentialist principle
P, which says ‘‘Act so as to promote the state of affairs: that my actions
adequately express my rational attitudes towards persons.’’80 Anderson argues that this principle, in asking us to maximize a certain state of affairs,
implies the wrong motives for actions regarding our beloved:
In acting on P, I take my own desire to be a loving person as my
reason for action. In taking this to be my reason for action, I do not
act out of love for my husband. . . . What makes sense of my taking
my husband’s needs as my reasons for action is that I love him, not
that in so taking them I make myself a loving person.81
This point is also related to the reflection problem that we noticed in
Elster’s analysis (chap. 5, sec. 2.4): genuine love or care is a purposive
motive focused on an agent-transcending object; it is distinct from the desire to validate a certain self-image of oneself as loving, which might be measured by how much apparently loving activity one exhibits. As Blustein
argues, my caring about a person or principle ‘‘is not reducible in any simple
way to caring about my own satisfaction or advantage, or more particularly,

................. 16406$

CH13

05-23-07 10:57:23

PS

PAGE 479

480

Will as Commitment and Resolve

to caring about an image of myself as caring about these’’ persons or principles.82 The latter motive would be concerned only about the consequence
that I act lovingly, as recommended by a principle like P. But action on this
motive is not genuinely loving; it is a neurotic and potentially narcissistic
perversion of true devotion. By contrast, if the agent takes the satisfaction
of her husband’s needs as intrinsically valuable and on this basis projects the
end of satisfying these needs (in reasonable ways), then her motive is loving
in Anderson’s sense.
Such a projective commitment could even make her willing, in certain
circumstances, to undercut her self-image as ‘‘the person lovingly devoted
to this man,’’ if she saw that this was necessary to promote his good. This
might happen if, for example, she found that for his own good, she had to
disengage from pursuing his good through direct interaction with him.83 The
projective structure of volitional love explains how it is possible for a true
lover sometimes to sacrifice such loving activity itself out of love. By contrast,
a desire (in the substantive orektic sense) can never motivate one to abandon
pursuit of the desired outcomes except as a temporary postponement in
service of future gratification. I cannot permanently sacrifice my enjoyment
of some object or end on the basis of my desire to possess this object or be
completed by reaching this end. But projective devotion to some end or
person can sometimes motivate me to abandon direct pursuit of this end or
to give up direct relation to the person for their sake (thus promoting a
good that I cannot experience as its direct cause but can, at most, appreciate
from a distance). To be strong-willed in the existential sense does not mean
always asserting oneself as an agent who has to be active in every significant
development or who has to be centrally involved in the life of things and
persons she cares about. Sometimes it takes volitional strength to withdraw,
leave things or persons alone when that is best, or let others achieve a noble
end that we could secure (see ‘‘Conclusion: The Danger of Willfulness
Revisited).
This seems to be part of what Frankfurt means when he writes that ‘‘the
value of loving to the lover derives from his dedication to his beloved,’’ for,
in spite of the by-product benefit that the object of love may have for the
agent (by making it possible for him to enjoy ‘‘the inherently important
activity of loving it’’), his active pursuit of the beloved’s good is motivated
purely by the intrinsic importance of the beloved’s good. Thus ‘‘the activity
of the lover is subordinated to the interests of his beloved.’’84 This entails
that he is willing to disengage from direct involvement with her and thereby
lose the by-product benefits of his interaction with her if this is what her
good requires. But it does not entail that the agent’s caring devotion could
motivate him to give up his commitment to his beloved—to cease caring about
her entirely or even to cultivate hatred of her—as a means to promoting
her good. We have seen why this kind of manipulation of self and other is
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inconsistent with loyalty to the values that makes her worth caring about.
What he wills is not only her good but also his respect for her value (and
thus for the value of her flourishing). Thus his volitional loyalty to her
cannot merely be instrumental to her good. By contrast, a consequentialist
principle like P could motivate Anderson to despise and harm her husband
if this would make her more loving toward him or make him better off in
the long run.
Thus Williams’s insight really points out a distinctive mark of aretaic
commitment in opposition to consequentialist motivation toward endstates, product-goods, or results in general. Although it can certainly motivate disengagement from direct pursuit of the valued end or suspension of
active relations with the beloved person, aretaic commitment to some end
E cannot motivate its own elimination as a means to promoting E; nor can
it motivate its own violation or repression as a means to its longer-term
cultivation. Aretaic commitment is uncompromising in two senses: it gives
priority to its object rather than to itself, but it also cannot be self-effacing.
Both these features reflect the overriding importance of remaining true to
the values that make the object worthy of devotion. Thus, once formed,
aretaic commitment always serves as a backward-looking reason for its own
preservation and active expression (even though this must sometimes take
the form of disengagement or hiding one’s love) and so it rules out the
kinds of self-manipulation that indirect consequentialism is notorious for
justifying.
It is because ground projects and volitional cares in general involve aretaic commitment that they cannot be explained simply in terms of a motivation to optimize certain results or to bring about the best states of affairs
(even the state of affairs that one is loyal to one’s commitments). Rather,
to care is generally to be subject to agent-centered constraints in the ways
that intended results may be pursued, where these constraints express both
(1) respect for the intrinsic value of one’s object, and (2) proper respect
for the authenticity of one’s own will. These constraints govern the actions,
attitudes, and attention that we render to the object of our care, giving our
devotion to it an essentially nonconsequentialist structure.
It follows from this analysis that aretaic commitment to some X is reflexive in the sense that it is always also a commitment to its own purity;
its goal is not simply the first-order value of X’s flourishing or being upheld,
but also the second-order value of its own respect for X’s value. This second-order value is the nobility that a volitional state derives from taking
the sincere expression of first-order values in the world as its regulating
principle. Commitment in this strong sense can only be projective for the
same reason that Kant’s motive of duty must be projective: its full aim
transcends the consequence-only focus of orektic prepurposive motives.
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2.5. Blustein on Commitment
The relation of commitment to caring is clarified in Jeffrey Blustein’s thorough treatment of these concepts. Blustein considers commitment central
only to a subset of cares, because he recognizes several kinds of ‘‘caring,’’
following common usage:
1. ‘‘caring for’’ some X as ‘‘liking, having affection for, being
drawn or attracted to’’ X;
2. ‘‘having care of ’’ somebody or something, that is, being in
charge of them or it;
3. caring about something or someone X: the agent’s well-being
is tied up with X;85
4. ‘‘caring that’’ something X is the case or happens: the agent is
invested in X.86
Senses 3 and 4 are closely related, because caring about something or someone usually involves caring that some propositions are true or false and/or
that some states of affairs obtain or do not. For example, caring about my
son might involve hoping that he has not died today in Iraq. However,
Blustein argues convincingly that caring about X can be quite independent
of caring for X. Positive caring about X requires only that ‘‘S wants to do
something that will benefit X, or be welcomed by X, or that will enhance
it in some way, or keep it from being harmed.’’87 It does not require that
the agent enjoys X or the pursuit of X.
So Blustein follows Frankfurt in emphasizing that caring about something or someone involves risking distress and loss; for example, ‘‘close
friends are strongly, durably, and deeply invested in each other’s wellbeing.’’ But, unlike Frankfurt, Blustein recognizes that this kind of attachment to another person or investment in her well-being can also be selfinterested: ‘‘I may positively care about you because I am dependent upon
you for advancement of my own interests,’’ as when an employer cares
about an employee only qua worker.88 In these cases, the dependence of the
agent’s well-being on the well-being of her target precedes and motivates the
care relation rather than following from it. Thus Blustein distinguishes selfinterested and other-regarding ‘‘caring about,’’ calling the latter ‘‘disinterested care.’’89 In such disinterested care I actively ‘‘take an interest in things
and people I care about when I make their condition my active concern
because I identify myself with them.’’90 This clearly corresponds to Frankfurtian caring, in which the agent’s well-being depends on the beloved’s
flourishing as a result of his projecting her good as his end.
However, Blustein also argues that even some disinterested cares do not
embody deep commitments or give ‘‘deliberative priority to projects’’ involved in the care.91 Caring without commitment occurs in cases of akratic
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caring against one’s will (or against one’s central values);92 it also occurs in
the case of personal projects such as ‘‘hobbies’’ that the agent ‘‘could forego
with relative ease, even if not without any personal disappointment or
pain.’’93 Here the absence of commitment seems to be marked in two ways,
according to Blustein. First, hobbies are not ground projects; the agent
would not die for them, and they are not even vital to her identity. Second,
the agent can see the hobby’s value as purely ‘‘personal,’’ or derivative from
his caring about it. These two aspects of such existentially peripheral cares
are related:
Perhaps when one cares seriously about something that one values,
one must suppose it to have a kind of value that does not simply
derive from one’s own individual caring about it. . . . It is only in
connection with what we might call deep-seated caring that the one
who cares must see the value of what he or she cares about as lying
both within and without him or her. In cases of peripheral caring,
this is not necessary. . . . The projects that have personal value for us
must at least be seen to be innocent in themselves, apart from their
relation to us, and in the case of deep-seated caring, personal value
must also be sustained by the conviction of impersonal value.94
This seems largely correct, for there is an evident distinction between
projects that are more central and those that are more peripheral to one’s
identity, and hobbies may by definition fall into the latter class.95 I would
amend Blustein’s analysis only by allowing that caring about something
because of its objective or impersonal value need not make our care deepseated or give it a high degree of deliberative priority in our lives. For this
reason, it seems possible that projects such as hobbies may also be taken by
their agents to be responses to forms of value that are not only morally
innocent but also interpersonally recognizable as goods, although they are
only optional and not obligatory. For example, I might see some objective
value in maintaining a Web site on local history; I do it ‘‘for fun,’’ as we
say, but it is fun because the history has some genuine interest rather than
being absolutely trivial.
This minor quibble aside, Blustein’s great insight is that the commitment
involved in cares that play a deep role in the agent’s personal ethos must be
experienced as a serious response to values that stand over against the agent,
whose high importance should be intersubjectively recognizable. This thesis
fits well with my further claim that these values must be experienced as
consequence-transcending (or not exhausted by the product-value of the
relevant end-states). For it is only to values of this kind that we can be
aretaically committed, and only this kind of commitment defines the agent’s
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volitional identity in the deepest way, making strong narrative unity possible and giving value to integrity as a kind of second-order loyalty to one’s
commitments. By contrast, in projects motivated only by the value of the
likely consequences, our volitional devotion to the goal, as well as to our
own resolve and the sense of enduring meaning that it produces in our lives,
functions only as contingent means to the goal itself. Our volitional identity, as defined by this kind of project, is in principle dispensable. This is a
deficient form of projective willing, whereas aretaic commitment is the
will’s highest function.
Blustein recognizes that integrity in our projects or cares is at issue only
if they involve commitment to impersonal values,96 but he does not rule out
consequentialist values as grounds for the identity-defining commitments of
a stable and integrated self.97 He writes, ‘‘If we think of integrity in a formal
way as what is manifested in a person maintaining his or her principles or
deep commitments in the face of temptations or trials, then it is not clear
why the utilitarian must lack integrity.’’98 I agree with Blustein that a utilitarian can regard his project as having primacy in his own deliberations
and that real human agents could enthusiastically pursue a project such as
increasing the collective happiness of some group—appropriating it as their
own and making this goal personally important to them.99 But this project
cannot constitute an aretaic commitment; for if the agent judged that the
world would be improved by giving up his commitment and teaching others
not to hold it, he would have to do this.100 This amounts to denying that
the value of collective happiness deserves ongoing respect and hence denying the intrinsic value of willing the utilitarian project; only its outcome
would have such value. But, as Blustein has helped to show, the striving
will’s natural relation to its ultimate grounds is respect, which implies continuing affirmation. Thus the existential analysis of volitional commitment puts
the integrity critique of utilitarianism on a new footing.
This is only a sketch of an existential argument against utilitarianism; its
full development requires an analysis of integrity as a proto-virtue of the
human will (as well as further distinctions in value theory).101 However, we
have seen both that the existential role of aretaic commitment has significant ethical implications and that only the existential account of striving
will can explain how aretaic commitment is possible. Our analysis of this
phenomenon has identified the following main elements:
The Existential Conception of Aretaic Commitment
(from Blustein, with my additions)
1. Active Direction toward an End: Commitments are states of
our agency (not something that simply happens to us), and they are
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motivational states aiming at (usually self-transcending) objects of
concern. Commitments may be to principles (propositional maxims)
or directly to persons or to other kinds of valuable ends.102
2. Investment of Self and Staying Power: Commitments involve
personal engagement in a relationship, or personal appropriation of an
ideal or set of values. Apathy or detachment defeats commitment, as
does the absence of sincere conviction in its objective value or importance. Because they embody respect for objective value, commitments
are motivational dispositions through which we are engaged in a way
that is difficult to reverse: we cannot disengage ‘‘at will’’ just to please
others or ourselves or whenever it might be convenient.103
3. Backward-Looking Significance: Thus aretaic commitments
shape the volitional feasibility of future options for us. Such a commitment is always a backward-looking reason for future action in
circumstances where it is relevant. Thus aretaic commitment to something is inconsistent with a pure consequentialist attitude toward the
future:104 it is never sufficient to justify changing or suspending my
commitment that doing so will allow me to cause more of the outcomes that I am committed to pursuing.
4. Self-Sustaining Significance: Commitments are self-sustaining
in the sense that they always give us a personal reason to preserve
them and to remain loyal to them, given the alterity and endurance
of the values that they respect. This is a reason that can be defeated
only by conflicting commitments or by evidence telling against the
evaluative attitudes on which they are based. Thus it is essential to
aretaic commitment that it can never directly motivate us to abandon
it, betray it, or alter it.
5. Reflexive Resolve and Resilience: Commitments involve devotion of oneself to the end because of its intrinsic values but also
involve an effort to mold related desires and emotions in accord with
our commitments. As a result, commitments are resilient against noncognitive resistance from other experienced motives; in strong-willed
agents, they are swayed only by evidence bearing on rationality of the
goal (i.e., the reasons for valuing the end intrinsically) or the rationality of one’s route toward it (i.e., the reasons for believing that one’s
pursuit of the goal is feasible and fits coherently with other commitments). Thus commitments do not change easily, on a whim, or
merely as a means to producing other desirable consequences.
6. A Basis in Strong Evaluation: This suggests, in turn, that the
judgments (or other cognitive attitudes) on which commitments are
based tend to be strongly evaluative in nature and hence sensitive
only to evidential reasons for altering the evaluation rather than to
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nonevidential reasons (such as D2 desires) for adapting one’s commitments to convenience or expediency. Yet the committed agent
should entertain rational critique of her commitments since her respect for their grounds implies that she does not want them to be
based on falsehoods.
7. Strength of Will: Commitment to some X implies the ability
to act for X’s sake and some significant level of success in doing so
(whether or not X is attained), which is incompatible with a high
degree of akrasia.105 Thus commitment is a phenomenon of volitional
effort, liking ‘‘trying,’’ but concerned with setting and sustaining ends
rather than merely attempting to enact intentions once formed. This
effort of will is not just in response to adversity, for exceptionally
resolute persons have little difficulty in acting on their commitments;106 that is because they have already made the effort to bring
other motivations into line, and active effort to maintain their end or
goal is now a lasting disposition of their will.
One advantage of this conception is the way it makes sense of our intuition that ‘‘strength of will’’ is enhanced by firm commitment. Following
Ronald Milo, Blustein suggests that an irresolute person ‘‘does not make a
sufficient effort to preserve strength of resolve even though this could have
successfully been done had the person exercised powers of self-control.’’107
It should be apparent now that the ‘‘resolve’’ lacking in such cases is a
projective effort of self-motivation.
In conclusion, this chapter shows that several concepts playing central
roles in late-twentieth-century ethical theory and moral psychology cannot
adequately be explained without the existential conception of striving will.
In particular, the key concepts of care, volitional love, identity-conferring
commitments, and integrity are clarified by the existential approach to personhood. It remains to be shown that this approach is compatible with an
objective conception of the values worth caring about, as suggested by
Blustein’s rich analysis and the concept of respect to which I have appealed.
That is the task of the next chapter.
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An Existential Objectivist Account of
What Is Worth Caring About

Overview. This chapter develops the idea introduced in chapters 12
and 13 that an existential conception of the will as an end-setting
and motivation-sustaining capacity is compatible with moderate objectivism about the values that give us reasons to set ends, initiate
new projects, and form deep commitments. The chapter begins with
a review of the importance of this question about the nature of good
lives for contemporary political philosophy, and then develops an
existential response to Harry Frankfurt’s subjectivist interpretation of
the worth of what we care about. The analysis does not try to establish the metaphysical status of values but it does have normative implications (in particular in the concluding taxonomy of grounds for
caring).
Introduction
This chapter concludes the argument for the book’s first main thesis by
showing that the existential conception of the will is compatible with an
objective account of practical reasons for willing and so escapes charges of
arbitrariness or irrationalism. Against Harry Frankfurt’s subjectivist account
of practical normativity, I argue that when caring is understood in terms of
projective commitment, it always depends on objective (and even, in a weak
sense, ‘‘universalizable’’) grounding value-judgments. Nor are these reasons
for caring entirely derivative from already-existing cares or loves. There
must always be grounds for the projection of any goals, yet these grounds
do not necessitate action and need not themselves constitute prepurposive
motivation.1
487
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Consistent with the account of aretaic commitment in the last chapter,
I also maintain that the grounds for caring about something X are not
generally exhausted by the product-values involved in realizing X or bringing about X’s good; for there are often other goods related to the process
of pursuing X that can (without self-defeat) provide at least part of the
basis for devotion to X. Moreover, some grounds for caring about X may
be accessible or salient only to particular agents, depending on contingent
features of their personal history, including past choices and standing projects or relationships. This chapter concludes with a preliminary taxonomy
of grounds for projective willing, which plays the same role in an existential
virtue ethics that a list of basic goods plays in ‘‘new’’ natural-law theories
of practical reason.2
1. Existential Objectivism
In chapter 13, we saw that the existential account of caring and volitional
love explains and supports Frankfurt’s theory on all but these two points:
the existential conception of the striving will does not require that the
core of the self be constituted by ‘‘volitional necessities’’ that, in turn, are
determined by contingencies beyond the agent’s control; nor does it imply
that the agent’s ultimate grounds for caring are inscrutably personal or subjective. My goal in this chapter is to show that an existential theory of the will
does not imply that the volitional constitution of our life goals or ground
projects is ultimately arbitrary or without interpersonal justification. By
contrast, in explaining the structure of projective motivation (chap. 9, secs.
4 and 5), I introduced the Grounding thesis, which says that goals and ends
are projected upon objective grounds. This implies what I call existential
objectivism (EO):
EO: The goal-setting and goal-pursuing activity of the striving will
(projecting new final ends, modifying existing motives, and consolidating or focusing the motivation behind intended purposes already decided
on by the agent) is always performed in light of values or goods that
(appear to the agent to) ground or at least partially justify the motives
formed by volitional commitment and resolve, independently of any relation between these goods and the agent’s existing D1-D3 desires. In
general, these values have the broadly ethical character of tending to provide
intersubjectively accessible reasons for ways of life, modes of caring, or different types of personal ethos.
This kind of existential view clearly rejects Sartre’s signature thesis that
my practical orientation toward goals, relationships, and concerns that inform my actions is an ‘‘original projection of myself . . . which causes the
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existence of values, appeals, expectations, and in general a world’’ of practical significance to exist for me.3 Whether or not we exercise libertarian
control over projective motivation in my sense, it does not experience itself
as utterly unjustified or anguished due to lacking any foundation for its
purposes. Rather, existential objectivism is analogous to the old eudaimonist formula that the will always aims at some good; but it is liberated from
the idea that the first-order good(s) at which the will aims must be part of
the agent’s own eudaimonia or even the collective eudaimonia of the agent’s
community.
Despite its sharp departure from Sartre’s early theory of values,4 EO has
a well-established place in the tradition behind my existential conception
of the will. We have seen that Scotus and Kant are objectivists about specifically moral values as overriding grounds for projective motivation (chap.
11) and that Frankl is an objectivist about a much broader range of potential ‘‘meanings’’ to be found in potential causes, purposes, or undertakings
(chap. 12). This is unsurprising, because at the normative level, quite apart
from metaethical questions about value-realism, there are several reasons to
think that the proper functioning of the human will presupposes objective
values (of multiple kinds) and requires volitional agents to be at least moderately able to recognize and track such goods, taking them to be realities
independent of their own subjective states, including especially their desires.
Today, an interesting array of figures in both analytic and Continental
thought provide support for this view. In recent moral psychology, perhaps
the most impressive is Jeffrey Blustein, who argues that ‘‘not all care is, all
things considered, good care or equally good care.’’5 He presses this point in
order to show that one cannot build an ethic solely on the formal structure
of the caring attitude, as Nel Noddings once suggested.6 Some personal
projects are immoral, and others are ‘‘excessive,’’ focusing obsessively on
one cause or principle while ignoring others to which the agent ought to
attend.7 Cares can be criticized not only according to deontic standards but
also according to other broadly ethical standards about what anyone ought
to care about: ‘‘Plausible candidates are things that can be identified as
fundamental and important human goods: knowledge, life, play, aesthetic
experience, practical reasonableness (including morality), and sociability
(love and friendship).’’8
Blustein’s list focuses on human goods, whereas EO recognizes grounds
for projective motivation beyond the human realm, for example, in natural
values like the flourishing of nonhuman species and ecosystems, good essences (among ersatz entities), and possibly divine being. But Blustein
agrees that such objective values provide a key part of the evaluative framework in which we can undertake ‘‘critical scrutiny of our fundamental carings and core commitments,’’ which in turn is crucial for ‘‘autonomy’’ in
our deepest identity.9
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As we will see, such an objectivist approach has to be qualified in several
ways to stand up to Frankfurt’s arguments for the opposite position, which
we might call existential subjectivism (ES). Since Frankfurt draws together several antiobjectivist and antirationalist arguments from other thinkers, focusing on Frankfurt will help to show how EO can be made sufficiently flexible
to capture the features of human psychology on which subjectivists focus,
without abandoning key aspects of objectivism that reflect ordinary prephilosophical intuitions about the relationship of cares and values. In the next
section, I put this project in historical context by arguing that recent political philosophy reveals the need to find some acceptably objectivist understanding of norms concerning good lives.
2. Caring and the Good in Recent Political Philosophy
As I suggested in chapter 2 (sec. 4), the question of whether there are
objective ways of understanding goods that can inform individual and
group decisions about how to live was raised in the twentieth century by
communitarian and Aristotelian responses to neo-Kantian political theories.
The revival of virtue ethics reopened questions about good character and
good lives that were underemphasized in moral theories aiming primarily
to provide criteria for justice in liberal societies. As we see most clearly in
John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, these theories aimed to define justice in a
way that would be neutral between many (although certainly not all) rival
comprehensive conceptions of happiness for individuals and communities.
The hope of both pragmatist and more rationalist versions of the neoKantian project is to show that there are grounds (either in the nature of
practical reason and agency itself or at least in personhood as conceived in
some political traditions) for principles of duty, justice, and individual
rights that are largely independent of other values we may pursue in life. Hence
without threatening the objectivity of morality and the foundation of political justice, citizens can disagree not only about what other values should
regulate our long-term goals or highest ends but also about whether these
values are entirely subjective (defined only in reference to agents’ brute preferences) or objectively based in human psychology, sociology, religion, or
in some other dimension of reality. It is, of course, this sought independence from any comprehensive doctrine of ‘‘the good’’ that makes ‘‘morality’’ in the neo-Kantian sense narrower than ‘‘ethics’’ in the broad, classical
sense of a practical inquiry into what goals are worth pursuing for their
own sake and what ways of life are superior.10
Yet several twentieth-century authors, such as Elizabeth Anscombe,
Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, and Michael Sandel, have made different criticisms of this neo-Kantian project, both as a goal for moral theory
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per se and as a way of grounding political philosophy. In every case, their
criticisms are driven by a desire to refocus attention on the question of how
we can argue for the superiority of some forms of shared life and some
kinds of personal goals over others. The principles required for such a
broad, ethical evaluation of political institutions and social life (the state,
civil society, and the personal endeavors they support) unavoidably involve
‘‘thicker’’ conceptions of the good than a neo-Kantian conception of justice
can provide. Thus an adequate political ethics cannot abstract entirely from
the values that guide the selection of individual and group life goals.
But belief that this question needs a systematic answer, part of which
may include an account of the virtues or perfections of character that make
possible the pursuit and perhaps attainment of the best form(s) of life, is,
interestingly, not exclusive to those who reject the possibility of moral principles that are neutral between at least a large range of comprehensive accounts of the good. In recent years, a significant number of other authors
who are not as pessimistic about the neo-Kantian project of finding an
ethos-independent basis for political philosophy have suggested that we
also need substantive conceptions of ‘‘the good’’ and have looked for values
that can ground ways of life or justify personal devotions. In addition to
Blustein, authors as diverse as Owen Flanagan, Joel Kupperman, Thomas
Hurka, Stephen Darwall, and others have asked whether we have any objective criteria for what is worth caring about. Their work in moral psychology
intersects with a growing feminist literature that attempts to base normative
ethics on an account of caring. Some of the authors in this tradition see
their project as complementary with neo-Kantian accounts of justice, and
others do not. Moreover, similar themes have for decades concerned Continental philosophers writing on ethics, such as Buber, Sartre, Jaspers, Arendt,
Levinas, and Ricoeur.
The main problem with all these recent attempts to revive ethics in its
broader sense is that they lack a conception of the will adequate to the task.
As far back as 1960, Elizabeth Anscombe told us that before significant
progress could be made in ethics, we would need to address several more
basic problems in moral psychology.11 Since then, following her lead, philosophers have devoted much attention to explaining the notions of intention, action, decision, and practical reason as well as to clarifying the
differences between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist moral theories. Yet, as we saw in chapter 3, these developments led to a conception of
‘‘will’’ that covers only decision or the formation of intentions—which at
most is conceived as a special kind of agent-causal process that occurs in
selecting among multiple options.
Thus twentieth-century moral psychology failed to reach the heart of
the problem that Anscombe recognized. Without a sufficient understanding
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of the will’s unique motivational function, proponents of the broad ethical
approach could not adequately explain how human persons form and sustain long-term commitments, identity-defining cares, or governing personal
goals, the pursuit of which gives life not only its narrative shape but also a
large part of its personal meaning or practical significance for the agent
living that life. That is the lacuna I have tried to fill.
My existential conception of the will supports the recent idea that a
value-objectivist response to this question of ‘‘practical normativity’’12 can
be compatible with holding that a neo-Kantian analysis of the Right is a
better basis than comprehensive conceptions of the Good for understanding
the basic requirements of social justice and legitimate constitutional structures. It is possible to favor a deontological conception of basic duties
and political rights without holding that the plurality of ‘‘comprehensive
conceptions’’ of the good in contemporary societies shows that objective
ethics at this level is impossible. One could simply hold that the concept
of the Right is the primary criterion for evaluating the basic structure of
society, with rival theories of the Good playing at most a secondary role in
justifying a given society’s public conception of political justice (it is the
common point of reference in constitutional debate).
If this is correct, then fundamental principles for political justice are
determined by ideals that are definable and defendable largely in abstraction
from the values that inform concrete life goals or existential projects, although these might play a secondary role by justifying some differences
between just constitutional schemes across different societies. One can hold
this, as Kant clearly did, without thinking that the question of the best life
or what goods we should value is merely subjective, or without taking a
relativist view of the Good. As a result, one can accept that at least the
formal structure of the Right is analyzable largely in independence from
the Good, without accepting the implausible further claim that the particular content of political rights and democratic lawmaking can be understood
wholly without reference to our substantive views about what human beings
need and what ends and goals are worth pursuing for mature moral agents.
For it is difficult to interpret the scope of rights and to justify even the
weakest types of legal paternalism (such as state support for the arts or
prohibitions on polygamy) without reference to thick goods.
Such a combination of political deontologism and ethical objectivism
contrasts sharply with two theses recently defended by Jürgen Habermas
(but also present in Rawls and other neo-Kantians): (1) that substantive
accounts of the goods to be valued in human life always depend on some
form of ‘‘metaphysics’’ that illegitimately presupposes appeals to religious
faith or to discredited essentialism in a theory of human nature; and (2)
that ‘‘philosophy no longer has the right to intervene’’ in debates about
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substantive goods, since the ‘‘legitimate pluralism of worldviews . . . prohibits any form of paternalism in the area of genuinely ethical advice.’’13 In my
view, these theses are both profoundly mistaken. The first is refuted by the
plain fact, proven again and again in creative philosophical and literary
work, that philosophers (along with novelists, playwrights, and screenplay
writers) are capable of a descriptive phenomenology of different goods
worth being valued and pursued, along with a critique of such values and
their social conditions, without recourse to anything more ‘‘metaphysical’’
than reflection on human experience, critical psychology, sociology, and
history—though they sometimes appeal to faith.14 Disagreements about
thick goods within literature and film are really analogous in philosophical
status to disagreements about what is politically just: they are articulated
with relevant examples in search of reflective rational consensus.
Habermas’s second thesis commits a fallacy of misplaced neutrality, for
the idea that persons must to some extent be free to form and pursue goods
as they conceive them is itself a substantive deliverance of a theory of the
Right—as is any position concerning what issues the state should leave up
to individual choice (and thus also to market forces). Moreover, philosophical analysis can at times even give direct advice about the goods that inform
life plans and ways of life without violating political freedoms. The liberal
approach to political justice cannot reject this, because neo-Kantian theories
of justice obviously depend on a conception of the person as a willing agent
who values goods and pursues life projects in their light. This metaphysical
conception implies that the problem of what to will, or what values we
should commit ourselves to pursuing, is in principle at least partially answerable in terms other than sheer personal preference (or D2 desire), arbitrary selection on a whim, or blind acceptance of some traditional authority.
As Joel Kupperman has convincingly argued, the liberal idea that persons
should be free to pursue their own subjectively preferred values and goals,
as long as this violates no moral requirements, does not entail that we cannot
or should not judge, condemn, reproach, or praise their choices and activities or argue with them about their priorities in terms external to their own
‘‘system of desires.’’ In fact:
Such extreme reluctance to judge, from the outside, the lives of others
(apart from those small areas that are subject to moral judgment)
lends itself to a sense of one’s own life as having no relation to standards of excellence. From this it is a short step to a sense of one’s
own life as essentially meaningless.15
This is correct and it can also be defended from the opposite direction.
Imagine a person who explains to a friend or relative the long-term goals
upon which she has resolved or the highest values to which she has devoted
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years of her life and unquantifiable amounts of blood, sweat, and tears.
Now consider the effect when her interlocutor responds with no more than
‘‘well, whatever turns you on,’’ or ‘‘that’s nice, I suppose,’’ or ‘‘if that’s what
you wanted, I’m glad you were free to pursue it.’’ Such empty responses
constitute only the most hollow form of ‘‘recognition’’; they implicitly dismiss the agent’s strivings as no more than an expression of her brute private
preferences, which cannot have any further significance beyond her own
subjective enjoyment of her projects—though that is certainly not why she
thought them worth so much effort. In short, the concerns and priorities
around which our agent has built her life are implied by her interlocutor
here to be no concern of his at all, as if the fact that they mattered so much to
her couldn’t be any evidence that he should consider their importance as
well.
But if his view is justified, then what was their point for her? What her
interlocutor implies is far worse than if he had criticized her goals or questioned the wisdom or adequacy of her projects. At least then they would
be recognized as having some universal human significance, however inadequate it might be, in his judgment. This would be a far more reassuring
recognition of her agency. By comparison, pure toleration based on the
implication that the question is a matter of mere personal taste is necessarily
offensive when the question concerns the core of one’s practical identity.
The meaning our identities have for us requires them to matter in the
broadly ethical sense and to be subject to broadly ethical judgment or be
based on objective grounds.
3. Three Initial Reasons for Objectivism
When Frankfurt first tried to explain the importance of caring in human
life, he seemed to recognize some of the reasons sketched above for an
objectivist analysis, yet he also insisted that in many cases, the only ‘‘importance’’ that our cared-for object or goal has is that which we give it by
caring about it. Although the latter theme has come to dominate his recent
treatments of caring, in his 1982 essay Frankfurt aids the objectivist by
noting that, given the centrality of cares to our character and our concern
about the value of our character, ‘‘a person may care about what he cares
about’’—a question naturally related to ‘‘evaluation and justification.’’16 At
the very least, he thought that it makes sense to ask ‘‘what ends to set for
ourselves and what sort of character to strive for,’’ and thus to look for a
‘‘genuinely objective sort of reasoning by which a person can establish or
validate his ends.’’17
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3.1. Caring about the Worth of Our Cares
Indeed, the force of this point is far stronger than Frankfurt lets on: although some measures of character may be primarily reflexive (like integrity
or loyalty to one’s own projects), most measures refer to standards that are
thought to be widely held or in principle even universally shareable, such
as moral, aesthetic, or broadly ethical norms and ideals. If it makes sense to
worry about how worthy our character is in these senses, this could only be
because we believe that, in principle, we have access to some objective standards for the worthiness of our character. To the extent that this question
of merit is a function of how worthwhile our cares and loves are, it suggests
that there must be objective grounds for or against caring about certain
objects or caring in certain ways. So higher-order caring about one’s volitional character, or reflexive concern to understand and approve of what
one cares about, is most naturally construed in objectivist fashion as caring
that one’s first-order cares are well grounded or sufficiently guided by the
real values there are in the world, which are not created by one’s own will.18
In other words, it is caring2 about the axiological adequacy of one’s cares1.
In Saving Private Ryan, this is what the elderly Ryan means when he asks,
at the Normandy graveside of Captain John Miller, ‘‘Have I lived a good
life?’’19 This question is intensely personal, and admittedly the standards
for judging it are difficult, complex, and, as his case makes unusually clear,
historically conditioned in unrepeatable or individually unique ways.20 Nevertheless, Ryan’s question is interpersonally intelligible, and his wife understands that it means more than ‘‘Have I cared deeply about something or
someone, no matter what or who?’’ For it includes, among other things, the
question: Were my cares adequate responses to the sacrifices to which I am
indebted?—which in turn involves: Were the objects of my care the sort of
things that it is good to care about, given the individual sacrifices made so
that I had a chance to live and had material conditions necessary for caring
about things beyond myself? No advanced philosophical education is required to understand what Ryan means when he asks his own less abstract,
more existential, version of Socrates’ eternal question, ‘‘How should one
live?’’ The audience understands immediately and intuitively that Ryan
could have done better or worse, and the movie reinforces the natural presumption that this objective difference matters—not just for Ryan but for
anyone (especially in reference to the past sacrifices of others).
This example illustrates why some kind of axiological objectivism is
required to capture in philosophical theory the intuitive prephilosophical
outlook of most persons on the relationship of caring to values. If people
naturally look for values that can ground, explain, or justify their cares, and
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this is what they ordinarily take themselves to be attending to in caring2
about whether their cares1 are good, adequate, or responsible, then the burden is clearly on the subjectivist to explain how caring1 can make sense or
be meaningful to its agent without such objective grounds. Frankfurt seems
to recognize this when he admits:
The fact that what a person cares about is a personal matter does not
entail that anything goes. It may still be possible to distinguish between
things that are worth caring about to one degree or another, and
things that are not. Accordingly, it may be useful to inquire into what
makes something worth caring about—that is, what conditions must
be satisfied if something is to be suitable or worthy as an ideal or as
an object of love—and into how a person is to decide, from among
the various things worth caring about, which to care about. Although
people may justifiably care about different things, or care differently
about the same things, this surely does not mean that their loves and
their ideals are entirely unsusceptible to significant criticism of any
sort or that no general analytical principles of discrimination can be
found.21
In this crucial passage, Frankfurt originally acknowledged that even if
there is wide latitude in the scope of cares that could be reasonable for a
person, given her circumstances, that is compatible with some objective
limits. For example, he recognizes here that it is not worth caring about
‘‘avoiding stepping on cracks in the pavement,’’22 and that ‘‘there is a wellestablished and valuable usage’’ according to which the preference of
Hume’s man who prefers the destruction of the world to some minor damage to his finger is not only unreasonable but even ‘‘crazy.’’23 Frankfurt
suggests that this man’s ‘‘defect is volitional,’’24 but he does not clarify that
the volitional error in this case consists in caring too little about something
of enormous importance and too much about something of infinitesimal
importance by comparison. Such a person’s cares seem to be so unguided by
real value that we might question whether he meets the cognitive conditions
required for moral responsibility. Or if he does recognize these value-differences but simply ignores them, then we might well ask whether he meets
the motivational conditions for moral sanity.
In sum, then, the first reason for existential objectivism about the broad
range of values relevant to personal projects, relationships, and goals concerns the widely held conviction that one sense in which a final end or object
of care can be ‘‘important’’ is what we might call the normative worth sense
(NW): some things are worth caring about in such a way as to justify normative judgments of cares as worthy. NW importance, in other words, functions as the truth-maker for a certain kind of evaluative judgment that, even
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in the age of abstraction from comprehensive conceptions of the good, still
plays a vital role in interpersonal, broadly ethical assessments of characters
and lives.
3.2. The Intersubjective Intelligibility and Criticizability of Cares
In the crucial passage quoted above, Frankfurt accepts another point in
favor of objectivism: we generally presume that people’s cares, loves, and
ideals are intersubjectively evaluable, and even if we reject particular evaluations of our life goals and projects, we cannot intelligibly reject the very
possibility of such critique. As Charles Taylor has persuasively argued, following Hegel, ‘‘No one acquires the languages needed for self-definition on
their own.’’25 Precisely because our volitional ‘‘identity’’ (consisting centrally of our cares and long-term devotions) is so important, ‘‘We define
this always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities
our significant others want to recognize in us.’’26 Even in dialogue with
ourselves, we have to understand our practical identity as ‘‘the background
against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make
sense.’’27 And to make sense to us, they must, at least in principle, be capable
of making sense to others as well; hence to ‘‘define ourselves’’ through personal commitments or cares, ‘‘we have to take as background some sense of
what is significant,’’28 or what values have sufficient intrinsic importance to
merit attention from any relevantly situated human agent.
Thus in Taylor’s view, as Joel Anderson explains, ‘‘There are grounds
for disputing one’s sense of what is personally important that go beyond
the experience of internal conflict,’’ or subjectivist norms of ‘‘internal coherence.’’29 We must articulate any robust self-conception in a ‘‘vocabulary of
values’’ that cannot be a private language game.30 Without such a vocabulary, as Taylor says, we could not even ask ‘‘what constitutes a rich, meaningful life—as against one concerned with secondary matters or trivia.’’31
Moreover, the importance of many pursuits cannot be described without
invoking the kind of aretaic values and contrasts (between noble and base)
that Taylor terms ‘‘strong evaluation.’’32
Thus our practical identities can be significant to us only within a horizon of intersubjectively intelligible values. If this were not the case, then
the normative worth of our endeavors, relationships, and life goals could
not form the basis of what Taylor calls our personal ‘‘dignity’’ or ‘‘our sense
of ourselves as commanding (attitudinal) respect.’’33 Although Taylor is
surely right that popular views about what activities are worthwhile or command respect have changed radically since the warrior culture of Homeric
Greece and now emphasize possibilities available in ‘‘ordinary life’’ much
more than in earlier times, our pride in our activities and purposes still
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depends on interpersonal evaluations in public space. ‘‘The notion is never
that whatever we do is acceptable. This would be unintelligible as the basis
for a notion of dignity.’’34 (See the related discussion of self-esteem in chap.
12, sec. 7.)
3.3. Goods Internal to Practices Are Worth Caring About
A third important argument for existential objectivism comes from the
analysis of the practices already given in chapter 8. The goods at which a
practitioner must aim for their own sake to count as engaging in the practices are objective social goods that are important for the flourishing of
human individuals, communities, and other living beings.35 Although different individuals will differentiate their attention to and enjoyment of these
social goods, this hardly requires them to deny that (for example) public
health, different types of scientific knowledge, and the various types of
beauty created by fine arts and crafts are objectively good (even if their
goodness is incommensurable or impossible to compare on a single scale).
Moreover, the various nonmoral types of excellence and standards for great
products of the practices can also count noncontroversially as objective
goods.
These excellences that arise in the process of pursuing the objective
goods definitive of the practices are usually related to various kinds of difficulty resulting from the concrete conditions of human life. The existential
account of projective motivation as the primary function of willing explains
these material conditions as objective (process-based) grounds for striving
for ends that are hard to attain, because they constitute challenges that can
help make life interesting and meaningful. If full and rich human lives involve some level of devotion to goods internal to practices that are not easy
to master (as well as other kinds of interpersonal relationships that demand
sustained effort from us), then a meaningful life depends on projecting
goals in part because they are challenging. Sport practices are distinctive in
that they are specifically designed around this thin reason for taking up a
goal that can test and hone human talents (even if the goal is contrived or
has no terminal value outside the game-context).
The value of challenge is also evident in the familiar notion of a ‘‘dream’’
or a personal aspiration that can require our greatest talents and efforts.
Thus in her famous song in The Sound of Music, the Abbess of Salzburg tells
Maria to choose a way in life that will draw on her great capacity to love:
‘‘A dream that will need all the love you can give, every day of your life, for
as long as you live!’’36 This advice is based on objective considerations that
ought to be important to the projective will. Although the development of
talent or full use of distinctive personal qualities is a relatively thin ground
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for projecting a purpose, it remains interpersonally intelligible and does not
depend on the romantic faith that if we search our hearts, we will discover
what we already care most deeply about. Maria cares about the abbey, the
mountains, music, Captain von Trapp, and his children; she cannot make
her decision by simply introspecting her emotional response to each. But,
as the Abbess gets her to see, a life with the von Trapp family is clearly the
better ‘‘fit’’ for her; the family needs more of what she can give best.37 To
care in the volitional sense about something is always to challenge ourselves
in some important way, and thus the possibility of caring depends on the
same background conditions of human finitude as do practices with their
own internal goods. As Margaret Tate has insightfully argued, developing
Frankfurt’s analysis, ‘‘It is a necessary condition of things that we value
highly and about which we care deeply that those things are scarce, fragile,
and ephemeral. This is true of both animate and inanimate objects of caring, as well as activities about which we care.’’38 I would add that some
objects of our care, such as individual persons, are not merely rare and
precious but irreplaceable.
In the case of activities, Tate adds that activities to which we devote
ourselves would be of no interest ‘‘if everyone could do everything perfectly
that he/she desired with no effort or no danger or no fear of failure.’’39
The point is not that we can care about or invest ourselves only in achievements that will distinguish us comparatively from others—although the
possibility of distinguishing oneself is another thin process-focused ground
for projecting certain ends. Rather, the point is that the difficulty of realizing an end or the scarcity or uniqueness of some valuable object provides
opportunities to give ourselves challenges where none necessarily existed from
prior desires. It is not always wise to do so, but we can make virtually any
limitation the occasion for motivation by positing an end that is only realizable with struggle against this limitation.
For example, Christopher Reeve’s heroic efforts to maintain his muscle
tone and recover some bodily control despite his quadriplegia surely went
far beyond anything attributable to natural desire for these goods. In an AP
interview not long before he died, Reeve said ‘‘I refuse to allow a disability
to determine how I live my life. I don’t mean to be reckless, but setting a goal
that seems a bit daunting actually is very helpful toward recovery.’’40 Likewise, we surely do not need to reach the top of some high mountain; even if
we have an appetite for a good view, or pleasant air at the top, or the
exercise that climbing will involve, it may be the difficulty of the ascent
that we have in view in willing ourselves to make it to the summit. The
goals definitive of sport practices, like many hobbies, typically have their
difficulty for an average or unapprenticed person among the processfocused reasons for projecting them.
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Of course, the scarcity of other things that we do need for survival, such
as food and water, or the scarcity of social objects that form generic means
for other ends, such as money and professional degrees, may also heighten
our (direct D1 or derived D2) prepurposive desires for these things. But
their objective importance to us, both individually and communally, can
also be a reason for making them the goals of various practices. Thus a
practice like gourmet cooking starts with the objective need for food as its
most basic ground but increases the difficulty of the goal by adding other
kinds of gustatory values to nourishment as a basic good.
4. Frankfurtian Arguments for Subjectivism and Objectivist Rebuttals
4.1. Two Kinds of Importance
In considering Frankfurt’s arguments for subjectivism, it is helpful to begin
with the distinction he draws between (a) something’s being important in
what I called the sense of having ‘‘normative worth,’’ or deserving consideration whether or not the agent already has any motivated interest in it; and
(b) something’s being important to a particular agent because he cares
about it, in which case, as Frankfurt says, ‘‘caring about something makes
that thing important to the person who cares about it.’’41 The (b) sense is
agent-relative, whereas the (a) sense is agent-neutral in its basic content (though
it may have agent-relative specifications, as we’ll see). The existential objectivist should certainly accept Frankfurt’s point that there is a kind of ‘‘importance’’ that derives from caring rather than operating as a prior ground for
caring. We might call this personal importance (PI) to signal that it arises from
the attention that the agent directs toward her object or goal or from her
personal appropriation of some possible task or relationship as her own.
Blustein describes this ‘‘personal value’’ as the ‘‘value that we give to the
objects of our care by caring about them.’’42 In this sense, following my
earlier example, Maria made it personally important to her that Captain
von Trapp’s children gain the liberation they need to flourish. It is also
personally valuable or important to Maria to be a loving wife to the captain
once she has wholeheartedly embraced that goal (having overcome her earlier volitional ambiguity about erotic love).
According to existential objectivism, the agent-neutral (normative) sense
of importance and the agent-relative (personal) sense of importance are
always related as follows: the agent projectively devotes herself to some
goal, ideal, or relationship because she believes that this possible final end
deserves her care or is worth caring about and thus she makes it personally
important to her. In other words, ‘‘personal’’ value derives from the volitional uptake of impersonal value.43 This view can accommodate Frankfurt’s claim that for the person who cares about not stepping on cracks in
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the sidewalk, this goal is really important to him: ‘‘his error consists in
caring about, and thereby imbuing with genuine importance, something
which is not worth caring about.’’44
This way of putting the matter is fine, as long as we clearly distinguish
the two senses of importance involved: avoiding the cracks may be personally
important to this neurotic agent, but it is not (in the agent-neutral or normative sense) worthy of attention. Hence when Frankfurt insists that an
object’s importance to an agent can be ‘‘fully genuine’’ although it depends
on his already caring about it,45 this observation proves no more than that
personal importance is a real phenomenon distinct from objective value. It
tells us nothing about the possible bases of personal importance and thus
it does not count in favor of subjectivism; for objectivism is refuted only if
agents can, by their own will, make something personally important to
them without any thought whatsoever about its worthiness to be an object
of care or any judgment concerning the normative worth of caring about it.
One cannot easily get such an example out of everyday cases in which
agents devote excessive attention to unimportant trivialities, because the
objectivist will respond that either the agent mistakenly sees normative
worth in his goal (when there is none), or he just perversely desires this
goal rather than caring about it in the distinctively volitional sense (which
is compatible with EO).46 On the other hand, the subjectivist faces the
objection that her agent seems to care quite arbitrarily or on a mere whim,
which in turn would seem to undermine the seriousness of the agent’s care
or the authenticity of his devotion. If he is brought to see his project as
the result of a compulsive disorder or a mere delusion, his resolve will be
undermined. As Blustein says, if someone or something ‘‘is deeply important to me, I must believe that it matters, that my devotion is to something
that is worthy of it.’’47
For example, irrespective of any concern for future sales, it must matter
to a budding novel writer what an intelligent reader in her target audience
thinks of her story draft. It must matter to a scientist that his project has
some basis in existing science and potential for new discovery. A young
couple deciding to have children cannot think that they are doing nothing
but adding to the world’s population problems. This tether to objective
value is also necessary to the experience of volitional dilemma. Blustein cites
Loren Lomasky’s example that a woman’s struggle to balance raising her
children with pursuing her career would be trivialized ‘‘unless she supposed
that some value inheres in her childrearing and her career ambitions that is
independent of the fact that she cares about her children and a career.’’48
Finally, Blustein notes that when people do come to believe that pursuits
to which they have devoted much time and energy were pointless or unworthy, their sense of misjudgment about the grounds for caring may render
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them ‘‘unable to summon up enough conviction or interest to care deeply
about anything at all.’’49
These points all support the essential role of objective values as grounds
for the projective motivation in caring. Many of the common tensions involved in caring about concrete particulars would not exist if the only experience of value essential to caring was the kind that is bootstrapped into
being by caring. Yet Frankfurt sometimes implies that the very existence of
personal importance and its difference from agent-neutral importance or
normative worth are sufficient to show that caring is a process of creating
new value that transcends any possible guidance by rational deliberation
about values independent of the will. For example, although he accepts that
moral obligations are objectively important in the NW sense (they are worth
caring about), Frankfurt suggests that in cases of personal dedication to an
ideal with moral content, the agent is ‘‘probably not being moved most
immediately by objective moral considerations’’; rather, he is moved by his
own ‘‘commitment’’ to this ideal, or his giving it special emphasis in the
structure of his life.50
My projective analysis of caring clarifies the error here: Frankfurt is confusing personal appropriation of some moral value (which is the willed response
to it) with the ground or basis for this movement of the striving will. Frankfurt
means to deny that pure reason simply causes a desire to act morally and
means to hold instead that caring about morality transcends such prepurposive desire. But a moral obligation need not function as a prepurposive
motive in order for it to serve as the justifying reason in light of which the
agent commits himself to live by an ideal embodying or expressing this
moral value. In doing so, he may go beyond what it requires universally of
all agents, but the moral value still grounds such a supererogatory response
to it. As I have argued in explaining Kierkegaard’s notion of the existential
choice, the objective ethical force of some value or norm must be distinguished from the personal act of embracing that value or norm, making it the
basis for one’s goal-setting and intention-defining volitional activity.51 Even
if caring is a distinctively resolute mode of such personal response to perceived values or norms, this could hardly entail that the agent does not have
these values or norms in mind (reflectively or tacitly) as justifying reasons
in so strongly taking them to heart.
That Frankfurt does not understand agent-neutral normative importance
and agent-relative personal importance as interdependent in this way is clear
when he writes that either kind of importance can function as the agent’s
ground for caring about something:
He might claim that the thing is independently important to him and
that it is worth caring about for this reason. Or he might maintain,
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without supposing that the thing is antecedently important to him at
all, that he is justified in caring about it because caring about it is
itself something which is important to him.52
This last clause is ambiguous, but Frankfurt explains it by saying that
when the object or goal’s importance derives only from caring, ‘‘the only
way to justify doing this is in terms of the importance of the activity of
caring as such,’’ which ‘‘serves to connect us actively to our lives in ways
which are creative of ourselves.’’53 In other words, Frankfurt holds that, in
some cases at least,54 caring for some particular X needs no justification
beyond the value that the process of caring about anything in general has for
the agent because it lets him engage in meaningful willing that gives narrative shape or ‘‘thematic continuity’’ to his life. This is what Frankfurt means
when he writes that
the significance to us of caring is thus more basic than the importance
to us of what we care about. Needless to say, it is better for us to
care about what is truly worth caring about. . . . However, the value
to us of the fact that we care about various things does not derive
simply from the value or suitability of the objects about which we
care. Caring is important to us for its own sake, insofar as it is the
indispensably foundational activity through which we provide continuity and coherence to our volitional lives.55
This is correct, because the process of caring involves a personal appropriation of values by the will which takes them as grounds for its projective
endeavors; in doing this, the will is performing its natural function, or
realizing its existential telos, in a deeper way than it does in making superficial
decisions: it is helping to shape the agent’s volitional character and thus his
practical identity. This ‘‘good’’ of engaging willpower transcends the product-value of the ends projected, to be sure, but it also relates itself to these
and other objective values as grounds for its activity rather than simply
bootstrapping value into its activity or serving as its own ground. Thus the
idea that a rich, autonomous personal ethos as the by-product existential
value of caring in general could serve as the primary ground for whatever
cares the agent discovers in himself (see chap. 12, sec. 6) was really developed to provide a generic agent-relative ground for caring when objective
grounds are either absent or insufficient. Frankfurt thinks there are such
cases, as we will see.
4.2. The Nygrenian Fallacy
Frankfurt’s idea that loving or caring can be its own ground seems remarkably similar to Anders Nygren’s conception of divine agapē as a love that
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is unmotivated by any possible value in the persons or things it loves. As I
suggest in chapter 9, Nygren errs by arguing that:
(i) if any objective value in the object X explains or grounds love
of X, then
(ii) this value in X must cause that love by attracting the lover,
in which case
(iii) his love is erosiac rather than agapic (or, more generally, projective) in structure. Hence
(iv) if a love is agapic (or non-erosiac), then it has no objective
grounds [i, iii, contraposition].
As we saw, (ii) is an erroneous premise: values can inform the will in ways
other than appetitive attraction or prepurposive motivation of any kind.
Yet Frankfurt seems to make an error identical to Nygren’s: he treats erosiac
motivation or appetite-love and self-justifying love/care as dichotomous
alternatives:
The loving activity of the passive [erosiac] lover is motivated essentially by a self-regarding interest in sustaining or enhancing the likelihood that the object of his love will be useful to him. In active
[projective] love, the lover is not motivated by any interest of this
sort in the utility to him of his beloved. Rather he is motivated by an
interest in loving itself.56
This dichotomy suggests that the ‘‘active’’ nature of loves—their independence from prior desires, including self-interested appetites—entails
their independence from all objective grounds, or their self-justifying status.
This is just Nygren’s fallacy. Thus it is especially noteworthy that Frankfurt
footnotes Nygren’s Eros and Agape at the conclusion of his first essay on
caring:
According to one theological doctrine, divine love is in fact bestowed
without regard to the character or antecedent value of its objects. It is
God’s nature to love, on this view, and He therefore loves everything
regardless of any considerations extrinsic to Himself. His love is entirely arbitrary and unmotivated—absolutely sovereign. . . . When a
person makes something important to himself, accordingly, the situation resembles an instance of divine agape at least in a certain respect.
The person does not care about the object because its worthiness
commands that he do so. [Rather] the worthiness of the activity of
caring commands that he choose an object which he will be able to
care about.57
This crucial but rarely noticed passage reveals how Nygren’s failure to
understand the real structure of projective motivation in analyzing divine
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agapē provided a key inspiration for Frankfurt’s subjectivism. He takes
from Nygren the idea that absolute autonomy is determination solely by
what is intrinsic to the agent, which entails lack of prior motivation, which
entails unresponsiveness to values that exist prior to the agent’s willing. In
his most recent book, Frankfurt pushes this conception of divine agapē to
its most Spinozistic extreme: ‘‘God loves everything, regardless of its character or its consequences.’’ Thus divine love is totally unconcerned about
merit or any other kind of objective criterion.58 Echoes of this description
of divine agapē are clearly heard in his emphatic summary of the existential
subjectivist view:
It is true that the beloved invariably is, indeed, valuable to the lover.
However, perceiving that value is not at all an indispensable formative
or grounding condition of the love. . . . The truly essential relationship
between love and the value of the beloved goes in the opposite direction. It is not necessarily as a result of recognizing their value and of
being captivated by it that we love things. Rather, what we love necessarily acquires value for us because we love it.59
I conclude that Frankfurt is led into this position by a misunderstanding
of what makes love volitionally active or autonomous—a misunderstanding
that derives from a highly influential misconstrual of agapē in the countereudaimonist tradition. The result is an ES theory of willing according to
which our fundamental cares are ‘brute’’ motives, just like brute D2 preferences, with no strong evaluative content: ‘‘[T]he fact that a person cares
about something . . . need not derive from or depend on any evaluations or
judgments that the person makes or accepts. . . . It may simply be a brute
fact, which is not derived from any assessment or appreciation whatsoever.’’60 But, thus far, Frankfurt’s arguments for this view are preempted by
the existential analysis of willing as projective motivation.
4.3. The Rejection of Strict Proportionalism: Wolf’s Analysis
Existential objectivism is compatible with different metaethical views about
the status of objective values. For example, EO does not require an extreme
realist view that something has objective value only ‘‘if it would be a good
thing for it to exist even in a world without conscious, desiring beings, even
if it were never experienced by anyone.’’ EO can conceive objective value
instead as ‘‘interpersonal or intersubjective value.’’61 Nor does EO require
that my carings are arranged in a hierarchy that exactly mirrors ‘‘their ranking in some impersonal scale of values I accept.’’62 The values to which the
striving will responds need not be conceived as rigidly ordered; they can be
open to legitimately different ways of taking them up and embracing them
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as personal values. For EO includes a moderate version of the idea that
what Blustein and Nagel call ‘‘the personal point of view’’ is vital to human
agency and must be respected by any viable moral theory or conception of
good lives.
This insight is central to Susan Wolf ’s critique of Frankfurt. She correctly notes that his reliance on the existential import of caring in general
recommends that ‘‘we care about whatever it will be most fulfilling, rewarding, and satisfying to us to care about.’’63 Yet this implication reintroduces
a formal egoism seemingly at odds with Frankfurt’s insistence on the disinterestedness of volitional caring; it also allows anything we may enjoy caring
about, however immoral. However, Wolf also presents another putative
argument for subjectivism that we can find suggested in Frankfurt’s writings. This argument works by rejecting a strict proportionalist view that
‘‘one’s love of a person or object or activity should be proportional to its
value or worthiness to be loved. One should love most that which is most
deserving.’’64 That it involves such a strict desert criterion is a familiar objection against Aristotle’s account of noble friendship, and Wolf rightly
rejects such a criterion as ‘‘pompous, stiff, self-righteous, or naive, foolish.’’65 Even if there are objective differences in the (moral and nonmoral)
merits of different individuals, loving devotion to them should not be keyed
precisely to such measures: ‘‘Just imagine the parent who loves one child
more than another because one is better (smarter, perhaps . . . ).’’66
Parental love serves as a paradigm case in subjectivist arguments: Frankfurt points out that we love our children before we have ‘‘any relevant
information about their personal characteristics or their particular merits
and virtues,’’67 and he argues that this is ‘‘the species of caring that comes
closest to offering recognizably pure instances of love.’’68 I take up this
example again below, but my initial response is that important evaluative
judgments do play a crucial role in ‘‘unconditional’’ love; one is the negative
judgment that with close friends, and even more in the case of our children,
certain kinds of objective criteria of merit ought not to guide our caring. The
right attitude involves what MacIntyre calls ‘‘a systematic refusal to treat the
child in a way that is proportional to its qualities and aptitudes,’’ and a
determination instead to provide them with unconditional love.69 As MacIntyre argues, this attitude can be systematic because there are objective
social grounds for this egalitarian attitude; without it, the practice of parenting is hindered in realizing those social goods of nurturance and cultivation of ego security in the child that only the childrearing art can provide.
Thus the rejection of strict proportionalism is a principled rejection of one
possible kind of ground for love in a certain context, not a determination
that practical reason should play no role in guiding the will in forming cares.
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If it were the latter, then it would validate a parent who loved only one of
his two children and entirely ignored the other, not because the first scored
higher on objective talent or performance scales of any sort but just as a
totally brute fact. Imagine a father who said, ‘‘I just find in myself a deep love
of Tim, but no love at all for Jeff. I don’t know why, but after all, I have
to follow my heart!’’ Anyone who would try to use the valid objections to
proportionalism as a basis for defending this parent would quickly see how
limited those objections are; he would be immediately suspect to anyone
with even a moderate degree of parental virtue. For obviously, this putative
defense entirely misunderstands the reasons why proportionate regard is
out of place in this context and substitutes totally arbitrary whim for the
values that govern parental love. Of course, it can also happen that a parent
who wills equal love for all his children finds himself unable to come near
to the mark, and not for lack of volitional effort on his part, either. But
when this is not due to akrasia or other vices, we consider it a tragedy, not
a psychological fact that determines who he ought to love.
This is sufficient to show that the inappropriateness of merits as a
ground for strictly proportional care responses in many contexts does not
entail existential subjectivism (quite the contrary, since this inappropriateness itself has objective grounds). Wolf ’s response to Frankfurt is more
modest: she suggests that ‘‘the role worth plays in determining what to care
about is to set a minimal condition’’ or threshold of value beneath which
an object or end cannot fall if it makes sense to care about it.70 Yet she
does not simply say that above this threshold all options are equal. The
grounds for caring may not call for maximizing product-value or for finetuning the level of our attention to degrees of merit, but they include different kinds of excellence. Thus Wolf notes the relevance of the familiar advice,
‘‘You can do better.’’ This does not mean, for example, that only the very
best partner, job, hobby etc. is worthy of devotion,71 but rather that ‘‘as long
as one has or is in a position to cultivate having more options, there is
something to be said for aiming higher for a more interesting or virtuous
or appealing partner, or a more challenging or responsible or socially useful
job.’’72
Wolf also rightly notes that a rich diversity of interests is a criterion for
caring, especially for those optional pursuits and hobbies that ought not to
be the primary focus of someone’s attention: ‘‘Being a fan of a sports team,
a bridge player, a lover of musical comedies, adds interest and variety to
life. . . . Interests like these are good and healthy—but they can take more
time, and demand more sacrifice than they are worth.’’73 We would presumably not say this about causes of great moral importance (such as devoting
part of one’s life to working for Doctors Without Borders) or relationships
of love in families and a few other cases in which we think single-minded
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devotion to the exclusion of almost everything else can be justified (at least
for a time).
In addition to such agent-neutral criteria for care objects and ways of
caring, Wolf identifies a very important type of agent-relative consideration
that begins to explain how agents may choose between different care options that all fall within the acceptable range on agent-neutral criteria. This
is what she calls the agent’s ‘‘affinity’’ for a particular care object. I suggest
that we understand affinity as including the fit between a potential project,
goal, or object of care and a person’s talents, emotional dispositions, and
less central aspects of his personality. The importance of affinity, as Wolf
says, explains why ‘‘the fact that one activity, object, or person is not objectively as good or better than any number of others may pale in importance
before enthusiasm for that particular one.’’74 For example, we saw that in
The Sound of Music, Maria has more affinity for the von Trapp family than
for the abbey, though she loves both. One may simply find oneself drawn
to one kind of practice more than to competing options, even if the latter
involve social roles that one’s family, friends, or significant others expect
one to play.
The tension between personal affinity and social expectation is a familiar
theme in literature and film. A useful illustration is provided by the movie
Bend It Like Beckham, in which Jess Bhamra, a British girl of Indian ethnicity
and Sikh faith, finds herself powerfully drawn to soccer; her aptitude and
affinity for this sport, along with the opportunity to play it professionally,
provide ample grounds for projecting her serious engagement in soccer as a
practice—even though it conflicts with the traditional ideal of a marriageable young woman in her culture.75 However, it is crucial to recognize that
although affinity itself is always agent-relative, the importance of affinity as a
valid ground for volitional devotion is universally applicable and so objective in authority. The importance of this criterion for authentic willing
relative to other cultural considerations is precisely what Jess’s father has to
learn in Bend It Like Beckham, and its function as a valid ground for the will
has significant ethical and political implications. Affinity may include D2
desires and related emotional tendencies, but for the will, it functions not
as brute attraction but, rather, as an interpersonally recognizable and
(within limits) defensible reason for projecting purposive motives that go
well beyond any preexisting appetites and emotions that are part of the
individual agent’s prior personality.
This is not to say that culture-based expectations of significant others
regarding the roles we should play are of no relevance or have no objective
weight for the will. For example, any child of an Old Order Amish family
starts life with a weighty reason for cultivating an appreciation of those
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values that the life of the Amish realizes in distinctive ways. But the judgment that considerations of this kind are generally less important or
weighty than (often competing) considerations of personal affinity is a distinguishing mark of modern as opposed to strongly traditional culture. To
assert the objective superiority of this aspect of modern culture is therefore
to judge that it better reflects the true relation between the values of personal
fit versus fit with rigid or highly specified cultural prescription regarding
what roles and relationships are appropriate to whom.
I regard it as a theoretical advantage of EO that it makes such intercultural comparisons possible and perhaps even requires broadly ethical assessment of cultures. For it does not seem that our access to values that ground
caring is entirely determined by a cultural frame that we can never critique
or assess. We can assess cultural attitudes both with respect to how well
they promote and sustain the central elements in human flourishing and
whether they make possible fully meaningful lives for individuals. Both
these approaches must pay special attention to how a given cultural outlook
or worldview either clarifies or obscures the grounds for caring or volitional
devotion that there are in the world and their relative weight or significance.
We should want a conception of practical normativity that makes it possible, for example, to support Bill Cosby’s often-repeated argument that a
culture that privileges machismo, violent self-assertion on the model of the
gangster, disdain for learning and courtesy, and conspicuous consumption
is a corrupt culture that destroys many of its members and radically levels
off their ability to appreciate much of what is most worth caring about in
human life. It is difficult to see how an axiological subjectivist like Frankfurt could support such a critique of the life idolized by gangsta rap or of
the wider American culture of crass materialism and status-seeking out of
which this highly influential subculture grows.
4.4. Does Optionality Entail Subjectivity?
The importance of personal affinity brings us to another major argument
that Frankfurt offers for ES: namely, that it follows from the rational optionality of many cares or loves. By this I do not mean that Frankfurt thinks we
can form cares or loves ‘‘at will’’; he clearly rejects this as implausible. But
he does argue that ‘‘Caring about something differs not only from wanting
it’’ but also ‘‘from taking it to be intrinsically valuable. Even if a person
believes that something has considerable intrinsic value, he may not regard
it as important to himself.’’76 I agree with this distinction, for we can think
of many cases in which someone recognizes intrinsic value in some possible
goal, relationship, or activity yet does not make it her own end. In The Sound
of Music, the Abbess tells Maria that married life is also sanctified, but she
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hardly takes this judgment to require that she give up her own cloistered
life and go find a husband. I may recognize that golf is an interesting game
requiring difficult skills and that it tends to give its players physical exercise,
social interaction, and relaxation in the midst of peaceful (if rather sculpted) greenery—all good reasons to play golf. Yet I may focus on tennis, or
skiing, or biking instead. Hence, as Frankfurt says, recognizing significant
intrinsic value in something does not rationally require that someone cares
about it. At most, ‘‘it commits him to recognizing that it qualifies to be desired
for its own sake, and to be pursued as a final end.’’77
In other words, some end E can have significant intrinsic value while
remaining rationally optional. Any X is rationally optional in the sense I mean
if it is true both that it is rational for agents (meeting certain background
conditions C) to pursue X for its own sake, giving it a certain priority (P)
in their lives, and that it can also be rational for agents meeting conditions
C not to devote any attention to X, or at least to give it a priority lower
than P. Clearly many of the pursuits, causes, activities, and relationships
that people typically care about fall into this category. Frankfurt considers
the success of a basketball team to be an optional object of caring attention
in this sense: neither fans nor those with no interest in the team are guilty
of any error in practical reasoning or choice here.78 Rational optionality
will be evident whenever we care deeply about something or someone but
do not believe that this entails that everyone else (meeting the same background conditions) ought to care about it as well (or care as much as we
do). The fact that I love my best friend very dearly ought not (and usually
does not) involve any evaluative judgment to the effect that anyone in circumstances roughly like mine ought to love this person as I do. Thus
Frankfurt concludes that, unlike universal principles of reason, love is personal in the sense that the agent ‘‘does not thereby commit himself to
supposing that anyone who fails to love what he does has somehow gone
wrong.’’79
From this, we can start to see how someone might try to construct an
argument from rational optionality to ES. The general idea is that since it
would not be unreasonable for a given individual not to care about X, if he
does come to care about it, this cannot be explained by or grounded in any
objective value that X may have. This argument could be formalized as
follows:
1. If A’s caring for X were justified by universalizable values V associated with X itself and/or with the process of caring about X, then
V would require any agent (situated similarly to A) to care about X.
2. But caring about X is optional: for some agents (situated like
A) it is reasonable not to care about X. In other words, V does not
require all agents (situated like A) to care about X.
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3. Therefore, since the consequent of 1 is false, the antecedent is
false [by modus tollens]: A’s caring about X is not justified by universalizable values.
The argument is valid; so, given that premise 2 is true in many cases of
caring, if 1 were a conceptual truth, 3 would follow, at least for those cases.
However, premise 1 falsely assumes that a value cannot justify caring about
X unless it universally requires of all similarly situated agents that they care
about X. This narrows the concept of justification or grounding to its
strongest form. Values and practical considerations can rationally support
caring about something or someone without universally requiring that all
relevantly similar agents do likewise, on pain of irrationality if they do not.
Hence 1 is false, and the argument is unsound. Frankfurt is correct that
recognizing inherent value in some goal does not entail ‘‘that anyone has an
obligation to pursue it as a final end.’’80 But this does not support ES; it is
compatible with EO.
Another way to see the subjectivist’s error here is to recognize that caring
about X can involve or commit the agent to a validity claim that is significantly weaker than the demand that everyone similarly situated care about X
as much (or in the same way) as he does. Suppose, as the existential objectivist maintains, that caring about X necessarily involves an evaluative judgment J concerning the significant intrinsic value of X, or the significant
intrinsic value of the process of caring about X, or both. Then, as Frankfurt
himself suggested, the claim that these values exist (objectively, for all) may
commit the agent to no more than the judgment that anyone (similarly
situated) rationally could care about X. This is still an important evaluative
judgment: it says that a person will have good grounds for caring about X, if
she chooses to do so. Minimally, this means that X does not fall below the
acceptable threshold; one would not be wasting one’s time on X.
Beyond this, personal affinity may make all the difference. More robustly, the judgment could extend to the claim that persons relevantly situated ought to consider X carefully, or pay serious attention to X as a viable
candidate for their concern, even if they pass it up for other options. For
example, at a time when the nation lacks sufficient numbers of highly qualified teachers, a talented college student with an affinity for children has the
imperative to consider teaching in our public schools as a valuable calling
to which he ought to give serious consideration. This leaves the personal
devotion required for such a career quite optional, but it says more than
simply that a person who devotes his or her life to teaching in public
schools has not wasted their potential. As Wolf sees, the objectivist can
content herself with this kind of an objective validity claim in cases of
rational optionality. The values that an agent caring about X cites as her
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grounds are indeed universally relevant, even if not taken up by all persons.
Sometimes (as in the case of a career, political activity, or friendship), the
judgment may be that X is one instance of a type of which it is rational to
have at least one in our life. Frankfurt recognizes an analogous phenomenon
when he explains the possibility of disjunctive needs, no one of which is
indispensable to us, although we must have at least one of the disjuncts.81
In other cases (as with a sport or a hobby), the judgment may be weaker
than that: one should strongly consider playing some sport or having at least
one hobby, although it may not be irrational entirely to exclude such pursuits if other callings demand all one’s attention.
Frankfurt seems to resist this view when he argues that ‘‘We can think
of many things that might well be worth having or worth doing for their
own sakes, but with regard to which we consider it entirely acceptable that
no one is especially drawn to them and that they are never actually pursued.’’82 He suggests a life devoted to meditation or to ‘‘courageous feats
of knight errantry’’ as examples. Yet normally, it seems that in recognizing
something X as having volitionally optional intrinsic value, we judge that
although it is not unreasonable for any single individual to pass it up for
the sake of other cares, still (a) caring about X would be more reasonable
than caring about nothing at all or being wanton; and (b) it would be a
shame if no one in the world devoted significant time to X, even in the
past. Surely the human race would be collectively poorer (in a nonmoral
but broadly ethical sense) if King Arthur’s knights had never ridden across
old Britain on their noble quests—at least in story? History would also be
less interesting without persons of great meditative devotion (as the fascination with such characters in popular film and literature shows). In any case,
there may be some level of intrinsic value that we can recognize as significantly supporting some endeavor or undertaking, without judging that our
community is poorer if it does not include even one person who cares about
it. This would still constitute an objective value judgment in favor of such
a care, should anyone decide to take it up.
Thus EO only requires a loose fit between cares and the objective value
of what is cared about. It does not demand caring strictly proportional
to merit, and it is compatible with multiple rational options. As Blustein
writes:
Actual caring should align to some extent with what ought to be
cared about by anyone. . . . Conversely, there is much that people care
about of which it cannot plausibly be said that anyone ought to care
about it. . . . But if this caring generates personal value that is sufficient to support a sense of meaning and that implicates one’s integrity, the one who cares cannot see the value of what he or she cares
about as emanating simply from within.83
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My account explains these observations by saying that the values that are
personally appropriated by the striving will as its reasons for projecting
goals have normative significance for the agent, but in many cases, she may
be committed only to the claims that they are important candidates for
agents like her to consider and that others should recognize that her devotions have a basis beyond her own brute preferences. Others may disagree
with her, but they are then disagreeing about substantive axiological judgments relevant for willing.
Moreover, EO includes a complexity caveat: some objective grounds for
caring about something may be relevant only if the agent does or does not
already have certain other cares. For example, having children may be rationally optional, but for a person who has embraced the value of raising
children and has taken up this task, the individual value of each child is not
rationally optional: he ought to care about each of his children (and in a
way not proportional to merit alone, as we saw). Similarly, Wolf ’s criteria
of greater interest, appeal, or challenge may not be (as) relevant to someone
once they are committed to a particular partner, career, and so on. But the
fact that some criteria for caring take on new importance while others become less relevant as we change our cares (or alter what is personally important to us) does not mean that these criteria are merely subjective or derive
all their authority from the agent’s existing motivational set. On the contrary, they come with certain volitional territories or narrative environments
(and not others), whether the agent likes it or not. Such practical worlds
are generally self-sustaining but not totally self-enclosed; they may include
values that give the agent good grounds for forming new cares, some of
which would take her into different axiological territories or narrative spaces.
This reflexive relation between the rational grounds for caring and the
current state of our will is part of any sufficiently complex existential
objectivism.
4.5. Does Essential Particularity Entail Subjectivity? Raz’s Analysis
It might be suggested that individual friends, close family members, or
loved ones are an exception to the objectivist account I have sketched for
rationally optional cares. Sometimes a romantic will go to the extreme of
pretending that the lover need not care in the least whether anyone else in
the world sees the slightest bit of value in his beloved. As Tracey Ullmann
sings in her (one) hit song, ‘‘I tell the others ‘don’t bother me,’ ’cause when
they look at you, they don’t see what I see!’’84 While it is sometimes quite
admirable to ignore the opinions of certain other people, taken to an extreme this view becomes a fiction, for it generally does tend to undermine
what Frankfurt calls our ‘‘confidence’’ in our love to recognize that everyone
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whose judgment we respect thinks we are crazy. Thus, we generally do want
others (especially significant others whose character we value) to recognize
at least some of the values in our friend or lover that would make loving
them intelligible; that is, we want these people to see at least some of what
we see, even if we know that they could not see it all without actually loving
this person just as we do.85 Otherwise put, we do not mind mysteries of
value that are revealed only to us, once we have already volitionally embraced more basic values; but we still believe that some part of these values
should be intelligible to wise, value-sensitive persons who are not initiated
into our personal mysteries. When even those whose advice we respect
completely deny that our love has any rational basis, we have to be quite
sure that they are wrong—that we do have solid objective grounds for our
care—to strengthen our will against the resulting doubts.86
Nevertheless, the argument for subjectivism with the widest appeal today
is based on our familiar experience of what has come to be called ‘‘essentially particularistic love.’’ Michael Stocker introduced this idea into contemporary moral psychology by arguing that utilitarian and deontological
accounts do not call us to love a particular person in his uniqueness but
only to consider his instrumentally or intrinsically valuable properties (such
as happiness or rational freedom):
What is lacking in these theories is . . . the person. For love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling, and community all require that the
other person be an essential part of what is valued. The person—not
merely the person’s general values nor even the person-qua-produceror-possessor-of-general-values—must be valued.87
Stocker’s insight has been taken up by Bernard Williams, who argues
that moral theory never provides reasons for loving particular individuals
as unique, but only gets in the way. Nel Noddings draws similar antitheoretical conclusions from her even stronger claim that the basic form of care
is essentially particularistic. Given ‘‘the uniqueness of human encounters,’’
she rejects any universalizable principles, since these ‘‘function to separate
us from one another.’’88 She conceives caring for unique persons as ‘‘essentially nonrational,’’89 which makes it impossible to conceive of universal
caring, except as a readiness to care for ‘‘whoever crosses our path.’’90
Here again, Noddings converges with Frankfurt, who argues that volitional love of an individual person is not ‘‘a response to the perceived worth
of the beloved.’’91 In the case of children and friends, he argues, our love is
unlike ‘‘impersonal’’ benevolence directed at categories or types of needy
persons.92 Rather, the agent (volitionally) loves the particular individual as
irreplaceable: ‘‘There can be no equivalent substitute for his beloved.’’ That is
because the person as a unique individual is loved, and she cannot be unique
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in virtue of possessing multiply instantiable properties. Thus ‘‘[t]he significance to the lover of what he loves is not that his beloved is an instance or
an exemplar’’ of various valuable properties: ‘‘Its importance to him is not
generic; it is ineluctably particular.’’93
I accept that such essentially particularistic love occurs—and although
Frankfurt considers it basically nonmoral in significance, I would suggest
that some conceptions of agapē make it a moral requirement to cultivate
precisely this kind of focus on the person as properly named or as absolutely individual.94 The problem is whether we should think of all essentially particularistic love, agapic or otherwise, as arbitrary generosity. As
Barbara Herman notes with respect to Frankfurt’s view, ‘‘in loving, the
support for reasons is not any value inherent in the loved person or the
loving relationship. The welfare of the loved other is reason-giving for me
because, and only because, I care about him.’’95 According to ES, the unconditional authority to me of considerations related to my beloved’s wellbeing derives completely from a subjective condition of my psyche. As in
other internalist theories, ‘‘the value of what we care about does no work
in the generations of reasons’’ that move us;96 it is not the object’s own
value, but rather our valuing this object that gives the normative status of
reasons to the considerations that move us.97
This implies a radical asymmetry in caring relationships: all essentially
personalistic love becomes a blind gift that is entirely unmerited by the
beloved. But this is just as offensive as reducing a person to iterable properties. Suppose one answered Stocker’s question by explaining to one’s friend
in the hospital: ‘‘Honestly, nothing about your personality or character gave
me any reason to care about you; it is just my nature to care about you,
though I have no independent reason to do so.’’ Would the friend be any
happier about this explanation than a Kantian or utilitarian one?
To avoid both extremes, we need some way of grounding essentially
particularistic love in the beloved’s real value, but without reducing this value
to a mere instantiation of some pattern or participation in some ersatz form.
If objective value could consist only of repeatable properties that would
require us to love equally anything exemplifying the same properties, then
this subjectivist argument would succeed; the particularistic caring that exists in our life would have to be entirely ungrounded. But this is not the
case, as several philosophers in the study of normative particularism have
recently argued. Among them, I will focus briefly on Joseph Raz’s insightful
analysis, which makes possible an objectivist account of essentially particularistic love.98
Raz begins by endorsing rational optionality in the sense that I have
already explained: a legitimate diversity of ends arises from ‘‘the partiality
of people to some people or goals which are all valuable, but to which some
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people are attracted and committed, whereas others are indifferent.’’99 Raz
has also developed at length the point that rational optionality makes sense
as long as we do not conceive practical reason as an exclusively maximizing
enterprise that could never ground more than one option in any choice
circumstance. My account differs only in that I do not take ‘‘attraction’’ to
be what motivates personal commitment or caring itself. What I call the
broadly ethical importance of having rational grounds for one’s cares, Raz
calls practical respect for value: ‘‘partiality is permissible so long as it does
not conflict with respect for what is valuable.’’100
Raz also defends the distinction between personal ‘‘attachment’’ to objects of love or devotion and the objective criteria of ‘‘suitability’’ that make
such attachments worthwhile. ‘‘Attachment’’ here refers to what I (following Kierkegaard) call personal appropriation; as Frankfurt argues, this implies a
kind of value that is essentially agent-relative or particular because it derives
from the agent’s attachment, caring, or volitional appropriation itself. Raz
calls this special kind of value ‘‘personal meaning:’’ ‘‘Meaning is invested in
the world by our attachments.’’101 In my view, the will has the power of
creating this special kind of value, which ‘‘depends on the person’s attitude
to the object or objective of the attachment.’’102 But the values that give us
reason to attach ourselves to goals in this way are not similarly derivative.
People can form attachments based solely on personal affinity, but ‘‘these
are highly unusual cases’’; normally we believe that ‘‘the people we love are
suitable objects of our love. Otherwise the love is demeaning to us,’’ and its
autonomy is undermined.103 The normal relation is that ‘‘our attachments
appropriate (impersonal) value, and make it meaningful for us.’’104
This is also what the projective model of the will implies: an agent
responds to a range of worthwhile values by devotion to some of them or
some instances of them, thus taking them up in to the personal fabric of
her life. My existential theory differs from Raz’s in emphasizing that the
impersonal values can be appropriated by volitional resolve without these
values having to link up with any natural appetites for the agent’s own wellbeing. Yet the idea of projective motivation is implicit in Raz’s language:
‘‘By assuming duties, we create attachments,’’ thus generating a ‘‘meaningful
life.’’105 Thus, as Frankl also argues (see chap. 12, sec. 5), Raz maintains
that ‘‘The personal meaning of objects, causes, and pursuits depends on
their impersonal [agent-transcending] value, and is conditional on it. But
things of value have to be appropriated by us to endow our lives with
meaning.’’106 This formula captures the two conditions for existential meaning according to EO: the first sentence expresses the objective condition,
and the second sentence expresses the existential condition (requiring volitional incorporation through projective motivation).107
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Within this framework, particularistic love can be grounded on the basis
of an agent-relative criterion that differs importantly from personal affinity,
which was defined relative to non-volitional features of the agent’s personality. The new criterion is backward-looking: it consists in a complex set of
historical relationships, including the agent’s past involvement with the potential
object of care and relations with other persons who have cared about this
or related ends or who have cared about goals or activities contrary to this
object’s interests, and so on. Sometimes these relationships in themselves
have powerful ethical implications: I suggested that Private James Ryan has
a historically unique relationship with Captain John Miller that could not
be repeated without the two agents being the same temporally developing
persons. We are all caught up in a web of debts to the past that we did not
voluntarily choose, which often create backward-looking reasons for focusing on an irreplaceable object of care or devotion specified in a way that is
unique to our shared history.108
Raz focuses on the beautiful case of Saint-Exupéry’s Little Prince, who
is mortified to discover that the single rose whose looks so charmed him is
not unique in appearance at all. But the Little Prince refuses to conceive
maturation in Diotimian fashion as only a movement from the particular to
the universal form that it instantiates:
He believes in the importance of uniqueness. He believes that uniqueness is of the nature of love, which is for him the paradigm of all
special attachments to people and to objects. He believes that both
meaning and understanding, misery and happiness, arise out of one’s
special, particular, non-universal attachments.109
Clearly this is what Stocker and Frankfurt believe too (maybe they read
Le Petit Prince). But when the Little Prince devotes himself in a new way to
his rose, he bases his love on ‘‘their common history,’’ which itself originated from aesthetic attraction.110 The Little Prince sees his rose as unique
because of the efforts he has already made at cultivating her.111 Thus agentrelative historical considerations help explain why (as noted in chap. 13),
appetitive motivation can sometimes transmute into projective motivation;
in some cases, actions in the past that were motivated by ordinary desires
establish a historical sense of involvement or investment that the agent can
then take as grounds for projective devotion.112 As MacIntyre says, this also
happens with the practices: ‘‘Someone may become a physicist or a physician or a baseball player’’ merely for money or out of altruistic desires; but
once involved, he starts to see the importance of the profession’s unique
type of excellence and to care about meeting these standards. Similarly,
according to the complexity caveat (above), standing commitments to impersonal ends may happen to bring us closer to particular individuals, giving
singular importance to their unique personality and interests.
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Raz actually argues that individuals who are the object of essentially
particularistic love can become ‘‘irreplaceable’’ in two ways: the first is ‘‘de
facto’’ uniqueness due to certain aspects or features that happen not to occur
in this combination in others (often because of their complexity); the second is ‘‘logical uniqueness . . . and a common history is the only way to
ensure it.’’113 This factor can explain parents’ particularistic love for a child
who is temporally unique, even if its clone were born at a later time.114
Likewise, presumably Stocker’s friend in the hospital would not be offended
if, on asking Stocker why he cared enough to visit, Stocker reminded him
that they had grown up as next-door neighbors, had shared good and bad
times, and developed a friendship like none other in their lives. Historical
contingencies that generate such agent-relative reasons are not problematic;
rather, they are a familiar indicator of what Heidegger called the essentially
temporal nature of human caring.
Similarly, though less exclusively, many grounds for attachment to a
particular heritage or traditional way of life are temporally contingent and
apply only to certain individuals.115 It may be the intersection of such
shared traditions with other factors, such as career interests, hobbies, political or religious ideals, and other causes of emotional affinity that singles
out a given individual as uniquely important for us to care about (prior to
our particularistic devotion to her). Alternatively, we could think of the
uniqueness as located in the agent X’s access to the value of another individual Y: although Y’s worth is in principle accessible to others, in fact only
X knows Y well enough to see it. This idea is familiar in popular culture;
for example, Cindy Lauper sings: ‘‘I see your true colors; that’s why I love
you.’’116
Whether the grounds for such attachments are historically unique in
themselves or unique in their accessibility, they may not at first glance seem
to be universal in normative force since they will be salient to only a few
or maybe just one agent in certain circumstances. Indeed, the gestalt complex of reasons that individual X has for loving individual Y, as opposed
to anyone else, may be relevant only to X because he shares a certain metaphysically unique trajectory through the web of historical relationships with
Y (which include individuated grounds for caring about Y).
But Raz points out that if we move up one level of abstraction from
these particulars, we recognize them as token instances of types of considerations or grounds that are universally important to all agents and that serve
as legitimate reasons for anyone to form particularistic cares (within moral
limits). Thus ‘‘recognition of the value of unique attachments meets the
condition of universalizability’’ as a requirement on values, and indeed
‘‘public recognition of personal attachments can be impartial.’’117 For we
can each recognize the relevance to others of many particularistic grounds
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for projective motivation that apply to them as a result of the historical
facts of their lives, including their own previous actions, the actions of
others to whom the agent is related, and their consequences.118 Thus we
can judge, for instance, that Chief of Staff Marshall is not being unfair to
other soldiers in risking so much to save Private Ryan, because of his unusual situation. Likewise, we judge that the child we mothered, fathered, or
adopted is bound to us in an intimate reciprocity that grows from the date
of his or her arrival, distinguishing the child as uniquely precious in our
life.
Thus the love of persons as unique individuals—as that which we signify
by their proper names rather than definite descriptions of their features—
fits within a sufficiently nuanced version of existential objectivism that recognizes backward-looking, historically conditioned grounds for caring. An
essential feature of personhood is the capacity to will another person’s good
on such a basis. Without this, the kind of singular encounter with another
person as Du or ‘‘Thou,’’ which Martin Buber calls the ‘‘I-Thou’’ relationship, would be impossible.119 More generally, Raz’s analysis seems to answer Joel Anderson’s question for Charles Taylor, namely, how is a
‘‘pluralistic notion of something having special value for me (and not for
you) to be squared with the general prescriptive and motivating character
that Taylor attributes to the good?’’120 The general perspective is individualized by volitional uptake and the historical development of selective involvement with some projects and persons (rather than others) occasioned by
such personal appropriation of general values.121
4.6. Do Objectivist Values Lack Noncircular Grounds?
At this point, we can return to cases that are easier for the objectivist to
handle. Although ‘‘the realm of values is both complex and pocketed with
indeterminacies,’’122 Wolf suggests that the objective importance of values
such as truth should be obvious: ‘‘we do not want to be deluded about the
things that we love and care about,’’ even when the truth is painful.123
Although some people do prefer delusion, the normative value of truth has
also been supported by Nozick’s Experience-Machine argument and the
related theme in the Matrix movies.124 Frankfurt’s own critique of ‘‘bullshit’’
as an attitude that harms communicative practices through wantonness
toward truth values also supports this point.125 Similar remarks, it seems,
would apply to beauty, basic components of human welfare (much discussed in new natural-law theories), and also environmental goods: persons
who are entirely numb to such values seem even more deficient than those
who recognize these values but neglect them for material gain or pleasure.
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These likely candidates may explain why, at various points in his career,
Frankfurt was more optimistic about identifying universalizable grounds
for caring. In addition to moral values, Frankfurt suggested that ‘‘imperatives of tradition, of style, of intellect’’ (which would surely include knowledge) ‘‘or of some other mode of ambition’’ (perhaps types of excellence)
would make sense as ‘‘ideals.’’126 This search for grounds is important, even
though we do not exercise immediate executive control over our cares, because ‘‘From the fact that what binds us to our ideals is love, it does not
follow that our relationship to them is wholly noncognitive. There is considerable room for reason and argument in the clarification of ideals and in
the evaluation of their worthiness.’’127 And even though I can love someone
as an unrepeatable particular without thinking ‘‘that anyone who does not
do the same is making a mistake,’’ it does not follow that our loves are
mere givens, ‘‘brute facts with respect to which deliberation and rational
critique have no place.’’128 This is surely right if our will is not entirely
blind to reason or entirely lost in fanaticism. We can change our cares, and
do so in light of reasons intelligible to others. Why, then, does Frankfurt
finally reach the conclusion that our identity-defining loves are inscrutable
givens, and the practical question of how one should live ‘‘is inescapably
self-referential and leads us into an endless circle’’?129 I suggest that this
error has three main causes.
The first is that when he considers possible criteria for judging ends
worth caring about, Frankfurt tends to focus on putative goods that are
agent-relative, or conceivably part of the agent’s eudaimonia. In order for
someone to judge between ways of life,
it must be clear to him how to evaluate the fact that a certain way of
living leads more than others (or less than others) to personal satisfaction, to pleasure, to power, to glory, to creativity, to spiritual
depth, to harmonious relationship with the precepts of religion, to
conformity with the requirements of morality, and so on.130
Without reliance on a metaphysical account of the human telos, any justification of such agent-relative values might seem to assume existing concern
or desire for them. Of course, Frankfurt recognizes that the value we find
in our cares transcends the agent-relative value of their goals. As he wrote
in 1982:
The varieties of being concerned or dedicated, and of loving, are
important to us quite apart from any antecedent capacities for affecting us
which what we care about may have. This is not particularly because
caring makes us susceptible to certain additional gratifications and
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disappointments. It is primarily because it serves to connect us actively to our lives in ways which are creative of ourselves and which
expose us to distinctive possibilities for necessity and freedom.131
The problem with this is the implicit dichotomy: agent-relative benefits
(such as emotional fulfillment) and existential by-product goods (such as
developing one’s practical identity) exhaust the alternatives. The possibility
of agent-transcending goods in the end-product to be sought seems to be
excluded from the start. Yet it is in such values that many of Frankfurt’s
contemporaries have looked for meaning. For example, Robert Nozick says:
The particular things or causes people find make their life feel meaningful all take them beyond their own narrow limits and connect
them up with something else. Children, relationships with other persons, helping others, advancing justice, continuing and transmitting a
tradition, pursuing truth, beauty, world betterment—these and the
rest link you to something wider than yourself. The more intensely
you are involved, the more you transcend your limits.132
Thus Frankfurt looked in the wrong place for objective criteria of normative worth.
The second problem is the demand for procedural and contrastive justification. In 1993, Frankfurt wrote that more philosophical attention is needed
to what features our ideals must have and to explaining ‘‘the basis on which
a person can reasonably make a choice from among various worthy ideals.’’133 This way of posing the question asks for too decontextualized a
reason for caring: It supposes that having any rational ground for positing
some worthwhile activity or social cause as an end or for motivating oneself
to pursue some ideal or the welfare of some particular person requires having a contrastive justification for spending time on this one goal to the
exclusion of all other possible candidates. On this view, there cannot be
objective values that ground caring unless they provide an agent volitionally
engaged in a given ethos ‘‘reasons good enough to justify him in living that
way’’ as opposed to any other possible ways.134
This is an old fallacy frequently featured in critiques of libertarian accounts of moral freedom; it insists that choice is irrational or arbitrary if it
is not made by some algorithmic method or decision procedure that determines a single best outcome, or at least on the basis of reasons that single
out one option as the exclusive best.135 This demand for a sufficient contrastive explanation leads to the conclusion that nothing is an objective
ground for caring if it cannot explain, in terms free of all singular references,
why the agent cared about one ground project rather than another or why
she devoted loving attention to one unique individual as opposed to others
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who rank the same or even higher on ahistorical criteria. On this view, even
Platonic ideals such as social justice, beauty, or truth, whose importance is
apt to seem most evidently objective or universally applicable, lose their
objective status, for ‘‘it is not generally considerations of value that account
for the fact that a person comes to be selflessly devoted to one ideal or
value rather than to some other.’’136 This is misleading, for personal affinity
and historical relationships cannot do all the work of grounding our cares
and life projects on their own.
Third, Frankfurt’s subjectivism reveals Bernard Williams’s influence, for
it amounts to the thesis that every proposed reason for caring about anything is implicitly hypothetical or has to appeal to some care that is already
in our ‘‘internal set.’’ One cannot in advance identify ‘‘criteria on the basis
of which’’ the question of what to care about can be answered without
affirming definite answers to the question.137 Yet this circularity should be
troubling only if we start from the radically antitheoretical assumption that
rational justification of values (including those that give normative worth to
our cares) has to have a procedural structure, like Rawls’s theory of justice, in
which we first isolate a method for deciding the question that is in reflective
equilibrium with our considered convictions then apply this criterion to
uncontroversial instances, refine it, apply it to harder cases, and so on. The
question of grounding values may be too fundamental to be answered in
that way, but this would not make it ‘‘systematically inchoate’’ or inscrutable; this is the kind of circle, untroubling to phenomenologists, that we
always encounter when we can do little more than describe our experience
of basic values and try to make clear the natural properties on which they
seem to rest.
For instance, in his famous diary of wilderness experiences, the American
naturalist (and father of ecocentric ethics) Aldo Leopold writes the following about his communion with a crane marsh:
Our ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the
pretty. It expands through successive stages of the beautiful to values
yet uncaptured in language. The quality of the cranes lies, I think, in
this higher gamut, as yet beyond the reach of words. This much,
though, can be said: our appreciation of the crane grows with the
slow unraveling of earthly history. . . . When we hear his call we hear
no mere bird. We hear the trumpet in the orchestra of evolution. He
is the symbol of our untameable past.138
This may seem closer to poetry than philosophy, and indeed, the study
of philosophical theory is hardly the primary route to an appreciation of
basic values.139 One may need to experience the crane marsh firsthand (in
combination with many related experiences). One may also need a certain
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amount of biological understanding to ‘‘see’’ in the cranes the value-gestalts
that Leopold perceives. It may also be true, as the Symposium teaches, that
higher value-gestalts in different domains worth caring about become more
apparent to us only after we have started to care about the lower ones. For
example, a child who had already acquired at least a moderate love of charismatic mammal species (especially domesticated ones like dogs or cats)
might find it easier to follow Leopold on the journey toward an appreciation of intrinsic values in wild animals, entire species, wilderness ecosystems
as organic wholes, and so on.
5. The Reciprocal Relation between Value Insight and Volitional
Resolve
To escape from Frankfurt’s circle, we have to remember the medieval insight that there is a reciprocal relation between the development of volitional and of cognitive aspects of one’s personality. In this chapter, I
frequently portray this relation in its simplest form as an unconditioned
value insight grounding a volitional response. The actual relation is usually
more complex, because beyond early childhood, the agent has almost always
projectively willed some ends and acquired rudimentary cares. In the narrative process of human lives, such prior volitional activity (whether recognized or not) always, to some extent, affects and colors how various
possible grounds for further projective willing appear to us; sometimes it
even limits the range of grounds that we can consider.
But this stagewise dynamic in what we might call ‘‘broadly ethical education of human sentiments’’ hardly implies that all reasons for caring about
anything new to us must be agent-relative or derive all their (potential)
motivational force and direction from what we already care about. Frankfurt has offered no compelling reasons to accept his conclusion that it is
impossible ‘‘for a person who does not already care at least about something
to discover reasons to care about anything. Nobody can pull himself up by
his own bootstraps.’’140 Surely people sometimes do change from leading
relatively ‘‘wanton’’ lives with no serious volitional cares or aretaic commitments to anything (even to their own pleasure).141 If young children count
as ‘‘wanton,’’ then this transition from wantonness to passionate devotion
through the formation of ground projects is probably even part of the
normal course of human development; as Kierkegaard’s famous transition
from naı̈ve ‘‘aestheticism’’ to ‘‘ethical’’ seriousness also suggests, people can
pass from uncaring disengagement or superficial busyness to deep engagement through volitional caring.
Are we to conclude that the agent’s sensitivity to objective values—or
his practical reason in its most extended sense—cannot guide this process
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at all, that it is entirely blind or only a matter of discovering proto-cares
already given within the proto-self? These alternatives are far less plausible
than the straightforward explanation that in response to an awareness of
values that she did not create (however reflectively this awareness is articulated), the agent projects new final ends for herself? ‘‘Bootstrapping’’ cares
into being is not problematic; it is the will’s natural function. By contrast,
the idea that all values are bootstrapped into being by self-defining cares is
highly counterintuitive since it is a radical revision to the ordinary practical
standpoint of nonphilosophical agents. So the intelligibility of ‘‘bootstrapping’’ depends entirely on what boots are being pulled up by what straps.
To put the matter another way, existential objectivists will agree that
most people already care about something (even if only halfheartedly) that
can be appealed to in getting them to care about something else. For example, if they care about their shiny new Yamaha sports bike, then they will
care about reducing motorcycle theft in their neighborhood, and no new
projective motivation is needed to explain the latter; it is simply instrumental to preserving the initial object of their concern. But it is quite different
when an existing care for X encourages, facilitates, or leads to a new care
for Y that is motivationally independent of the first care. It can do this if
caring for X opens the agent to see logically independent grounds for caring
about Y or makes these grounds more salient, better understood, or appreciated. This is a common experience, which I have already mentioned in
connection with friendship (see chap. 8, sec. 4): love of some person P is
likely to get us to pay more attention to what P cares about and to think
about what the grounds for those cares might be. But taking up my friend’s
interests or practices need not be (only) instrumentally motivated for the
sake of the friendship; these interests or practices can become important to
me in their own right. Likewise, two people who both care about the same
goals or ideals may start to care about each other directly rather than merely
as cooperators in a joint quest. This newly formed love may be able to
survive the lapsing of some or perhaps even all of the cares that led to it.
Relations between one kind of care and grounds for others in its ‘‘practical vicinity’’ are complex. Suppose that I already enjoy nature photography
and have taken it up as a hobby—I visit exhibits focusing on wilderness
photographs, read articles about new ultra-high-density mountain shots,
and print my own pictures of rivers and streams. Let us further suppose
that I got into this hobby from the classroom rather than the field: my
grounds for taking it up came from studying aesthetic theories in a photography class, which helped me appreciate the aesthetic values of fine composition and use of natural light in nature photography. I was never really a
nature lover; I was more a lover of formal aesthetic theory and the art of
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photo composition. Still it would be entirely unsurprising, almost predictable in fact, that once I had pursued this hobby for a couple years, the
experience of being in settings of awesome natural beauty would awaken me
to natural values that are related but not identical to aesthetic values in
human expressive artifacts or artworks. The objective values of pristine deserts, jagged mountains, and prairie landscapes might have been accessible
to me before taking up nature photography, but they become more salient
or evident to me as a by-product of my creative pursuit of photography
based on an appreciation of aesthetic values realized in photos.
Suppose I respond to these natural values so strongly that I eventually
drop nature photography altogether and spend my spare time as a naturalist
in the field or as a lobbyist for environmental preservation. This development in my will would be anything but arbitrary; it would make narrative
sense in my life story. Yet it could not be explained according to Williams’s
conception of internal reasons nor according to Frankfurt’s similar model
of reasons that depend on my existing cares, because it involves the generation of a new final end that transcends my present motivational set.
This kind of ‘‘leap’’ from one care, aretaic commitment, or ground project to another is a very familiar feature in human biographies. Sometimes
the emotional dispositions involved in the first care alter the agent’s sensitivity to values that are relevant to the normative worth of other cares. For
example, suppose that a nurse’s devotion to very sick children in a pediatric
cancer ward has generated a strong emotional reaction to children’s suffering. This in turn leads her to read about issues concerning child welfare
and eventually to switch to a career as a social worker with the Division of
Children and Youth or as an advocate with a foundation that works to
reduce child abuse. Here the connection is obvious enough. But the links
between earlier and later cares can involve all kinds of twists and indirect
connections that no general theory could reduce to a short list of motifs.
Suppose our nurse instead becomes a facilitator for parents struggling to
care for children with disabilities; somehow her sympathy for children with
cancer has made her more aware of obstacles faced by parents whose children have a different kind of problem. Maybe the explanation would involve a particular family that she got to know in her first line of work.
Given such narrative complexity, we can only say that in each case, activities
involved in devotion to present goals and relationships have by-product
effects on the agent’s broadly ethical sensibilities. That is because cares are
like peaks in a figurative landscape of practical interest and motivation. In
this topological analogy, imagine the horizontal x-y directions as value variables and the vertical z direction as the volitional variable. Our natural
desires and learned tastes can move us horizontally along the valleys, and
even from there we can see a few mountains worth climbing. But we have
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to work ourselves up the slopes (against volitional inertia and natural lassitude) to get a better view. Hence the paradox that agents who care sincerely
about something worthwhile are better able to discern many other things
that would be worth caring about, while agents who care about little can
discern few reasons to care about anything. From our present peak, we can
get a good view of surrounding peaks and the grounds on which they stand.
Thus to educate the will, one starts by getting children to care about something whose value they can already appreciate, however humble, and then
one helps them to recognize the new value vistas that their initial effort
opens up for them.
But this metaphor fails in one respect: in volitional life, one does not
necessarily have to move through a valley to get to another peak. One can
sometimes leap from the top of one mountain to the slopes of another.
The topological metaphor also fails to capture the fact that intensive cares
or loves can sometimes occlude the importance of other potential objects
of care, even when contingencies of history and affinity would suggest them.
Some volitional peaks are shrouded in clouds of different colors that filter
our ethical vision. Caring passionately about something can obscure from
our view personally relevant universalizable considerations in favor of caring about something else. For example, years of work prosecuting sex offenders might diminish a person’s ability to appreciate the value of the
erotic, even to such an extent that it creates relationship problems. Or years
of work as a prison guard looking after violent criminals might make it
harder for a person to appreciate the importance of mentoring, better opportunities, and second chances for adolescents headed in the wrong direction. Note that it would be oversimplistic to assume that such a person just
lacked an ‘‘affinity’’ for caring about impoverished youth; he might have
been emotionally and temperamentally well suited for this role, but, given
the devotion he put into his corrections work, the reasons for projecting a
mentoring role might have become almost invisible to him.142 This is one
of several reasons why our nonmoral endeavors and relationships need to
remain nested within a more fundamental devotion to ethical wisdom and
virtue ideals that keeps our phronetic capacities attuned to values from which
our personal projects might otherwise cut us off.
As complex as the effects of the striving will can be on ethical sensitivity
to worthwhile values, perhaps in a few areas, an existential version of Diotima’s ascent is possible: caring about a more highly specified activity or
end awakens us to values of a more general or embracing kind. In such
ascents, new values open to us at each stage that transcend the reach of
those we already care about. Whether we pursue them or incorporate them
personally into our lives depends on our will. Yet these values are not mere
fantasies of our will, phantom shadows of our existing motives displayed
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on the screen of the world. They could not make personal meaning possible
for us if they lacked the alterity that Frankl emphasized. This is how Susan
Wolf puts the same point:
In addition to wanting to live in the real world, we want to be connected to it—that is, we want our lives to have some positive relation
to things or people or ideas that are valuable independently of us.
This, I believe, is at the core of the desire to live a meaningful life.143
Thus Wolf, Nozick, Raz, and Blustein all give us similar reasons to favor
existential objectivism. If they are right, EO does imply one remarkable
conclusion: the willing that is most distinctive of personhood and through
which life becomes personally meaningful is possible only because the
world we inhabit is already ‘‘meaningful,’’ full of domains of value worth
caring about.144 In that sense, human autonomy is also dependent on a
world of values it does not create. As Larmore argues in response to Nietzsche, self-determination requires authoritative reasons and hence some values that ‘‘exist independent of our will . . . our lives cannot be ones of
limitless self-creation. . . . Our lives must instead rest on respect for the
claims that the world makes on us.’’145
6. Toward a Taxonomy of Significant Grounds for Caring
In this chapter, I have argued that a sufficiently nuanced objectivist conception of values as grounding cares fits well with the projective explanation
of caring supplied by the existential conception of striving will. Of course,
this is far from providing a direct defense of objective values themselves.
This task would require analyzing a wide-ranging and insightful body of
recent literature in the ‘‘rebirth’’ of analytic axiology, such as Chisholm’s
Brentano and Intrinsic Value and Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations. In different
ways, the authors in this broad movement146 lend support to some version
of the objectivist idea that
in order to explain commitment and in order for an individual’s commitment to remain stable over time and to fulfill its roles in the governance of action, enhancement of self-understanding, and constitution
of identity, one must assume the truth of moral realism and so make
room for the possibility of moral facts.147
Although I do not take on the burden of defending a complete objective
list theory of values or any metaethical account of value realism, it will be
helpful to assemble in systematic form all the different types of values
that I have mentioned at various points as possible grounds for projective
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motivation, especially in the form of ground projects, self-defining commitments, or cares. Organizing the table according to types of grounds rather
than types of ends yields a taxonomy with a much clearer structure and
order than the sort of goal hierarchies presented in the best available work
on this topic in empirical psychology.148 This taxonomy serves as a sketch
of an existential theory of ‘‘basic goods.’’149
Worthwhile Objects of Care and Other Grounds for Commitment
I. Agent-Transcending Product-Focused Reasons. Such reasons are
independent of:
• the agent’s prior cares, commitments, or desires and emotions in
the agent’s internal set;
• objective conditions for the agent’s individual well-being, flourishing, or happiness (the material elements of the agent’s
welfare);
• higher-order goods of existential coherence and subjective meaningfulness (process-goods for the agent).
1. The moral worth of an end E (or the moral status of some way
W of pursuing E) irrespective of the positive or negative impact of
realizing this end on agent’s own flourishing:
1a. E or W is required under a formal or deontic standard of
universalizability or fairness or justice, given the intrinsic
value of each individual (e.g., keeping a promise or protecting innocent persons from lethal threats when possible).
1b. E or W is inherently good according to nonformal ethical
standards; for example, W is a virtuous action aimed at E
as a species of ‘‘the noble’’ as defined by an authoritative
list of virtues of character.
1c. Under such standards, taking an interest in E or caring
about E is morally required of any person in the situation
in which the agent finds himself or herself.
1d. Devotion to E is itself an inherently worthy state according
to nonformal criteria of moral worth, such as the duties
of agapē as a universally caring response to neighbors and
strangers; for example, E is the goal of showing mercy to a
wrongdoer, or forgiving one who has wronged us, or reconciling persons who have been enemies.
2. The broadly aesthetic value of an end E, irrespective of its value
for the agent’s well-being:
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2a. E is an end whose realization would create some kind of
made beauty in human works or communicate something
important through art—which, in most cases, makes it the
object of an artistic practice.
2b. E is some form of natural (not made) beauty or harmony
in chemical, mineral, or geological phenomena, land forms,
or ocean environments that can be destroyed or preserved
according to human choices.
2c. E is an end whose realization would develop the conception of beauty or aesthetic value in a tradition or practice
in which the agent participates.
2d. E is an end whose realization is difficult or challenging
for human beings, which thus presents an opportunity for
developing and testing certain talents or capacities. These
tend to be ends definitive of sports practices.
2e. E is a standard of excellence concerning the way in which
difficult or challenging goals are properly pursued, which
is internal to some practice.
3. The broadly ethical value of an end E, which is not simply a
function of the positive or negative impact of the intended outcome
on the agent’s well-being:
3a. Social goods. Although not an object of justice deontically
conceived, E is an important component of the common
good of individuals as parts of larger groups or communities—which, in many instances of this type, makes E the
end definitive of some practice; for example:
• knowledge or theoretical unification as the goals defining
scientific practice;
• the dissemination of such knowledge and understanding
and the apprenticeship of persons into practices in general, as the goals defining practices of education;
• public health and the bodily and psychological health of
patients, as the goals defining medicine and counseling;
• wise political decisions regarding the use and administration of public resources.
3b. Cultural goods. The devotion of groups of persons to E is
part of a living tradition of human activity that fosters a
sense of communal identity or creates some other cultural
good; for example, preserving one’s heritage and the monuments and works that embody it, or connecting persons to
shared ethnic roots, or fostering civic fraternity.
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3c. Filial and romantic love. E is part of the flourishing of a person
whose entire personality we apprehend as uniquely valuable
or who has some other historically unique relationship to
us and who is thus an apt target for essentially particularistic love.
3d. Parents/guardians. E is (some part of ) the welfare of family
members or others who provided the nurturing, upbringing, and parental love that enabled our growth and emotional maturation and to whom we therefore have duties
of fidelity.
3e. Environmental goods. E is part of the flourishing of some nonhuman form of life, such as particular animals or plants,
animal or plant species, biodiversity itself, or environments
and ecosystems that sustain species and biodiversity.
4. The religious value of an end E, irrespective of the impact of
commitment to it on the agent’s well-being:
4a. E is taken to be the authoritative will of a divine being, or
part of the good of a divine being.
4b. Pursuit of E is demanded by a sense of religious ‘‘calling’’
or revelation from the divine that goes beyond ordinary
requirements of morality or ethical living.
4c. Commitment to E is apprehended as part of one’s destiny,
fate, or place in a divine order.
4d. E is bound up with a sense of mystery that transcends
ordinary life and bears on questions of ultimate meaning
(such as the origin and purpose of the universe, the significance of death, or eschatological goods beyond death).
II. Agent-Relative Product-Focused Reasons. Two qualifiers
about this category:
• It does not mention considerations that bear directly on the
agent’s own well-being (since we assume that each agent desires
his own happiness and in this case the desire is global enough
to provide reason to care about any significant material conditions of his welfare).
• Specific reasons in the subcategories below may not hold as
practically reasonable grounds for caring for all persons; the
most we could say is that every person will find some reason(s)
in each of these categories that pertain to them and would provide a reasonable basis for their commitments.
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1. Retrospective reasons for caring about E:
1a. Commitment to E responds to something deeply personal
in our past, such as a trauma or loss suffered by ourselves
or significant others. By commitment to E, we can transcend this experience as simply a harm or meaningless absurdity, bringing to it a new and positive meaning that it
did not have initially (thus bringing a complex good out
of it).
1b. E is required or suggested as a possible creative response,
beyond any strict duty of fidelity, to particular individuals
or groups:
(i) to whom we are significantly indebted for technically
unrepayable gifts;
(ii) whose wrong actions it is valuable to repudiate by
corrective action or other communicative response;
(iii) to whom we, as offenders, may make some kind of
significant restitution, apology, or offering of reconciliation (this consideration is related to I.1d above).
2. Prospective reasons for caring about E:
2a. E is effectively pursuable only as a joint end with others,
who will not commit themselves to it unless we do so as
well, on the same terms. (Many social goods that at least
partially transcend the good of individual agents, e.g., possibly requiring uncompensated sacrifices from them, are
pursuable only as goods to which multiple such agents are
jointly committed, each person’s commitment being contingent on the others’ reciprocation. See chap. 8, sec. 7.)
2b. E is the end of a possible hobby, which is like a practice but
usually less complex and demanding and produces a good
less widely shareable, or with less social or intrinsic
significance.
III. Agent-Relative Process-Focused Reasons. Such reasons are
not based on the agent’s desire for her own eudaimonia or flourishing,
but of all the grounds for projective motivation, they come closest
to this. These considerations are based instead on the psychological
requirements that living a coherently meaningful life, or living autonomously, puts on the process of caring. Concern for these existential
‘‘goods,’’ however, cannot accurately be construed simply as concern
for one’s own happiness. Although well-being in the broadest sense
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may involve these goods, in the cases that concern us, the action is
not motivated by the prospect of these goods desired as part of eudaimonia; rather, the agent does not pursue them directly at all but only
sees the pursuit of other possible ends in light of these considerations
as existential grounds for positing, sustaining, and/or ordering these
other ends as final for her. As this analysis suggests, these grounds are
not ones that can function entirely on their own; rather, they become
relevant only in combination with other considerations relating to the
value of the product to be willed as one’s final end. That is, they
properly arise as qualifying, amending, or reinforcing considerations,
not as primary considerations in favor of projecting end E (see chap.
12, sec. 3).
1. Prospective reasons concerning the process of caring about E:
1a. The stars align: we find ourselves with a fortunate opportunity to pursue E with likely success.150
1b. Structural opportunity: commitment to E is psychologically possible for us, culturally possible, valued and endorsed by significant others in our life, is likely to win
cooperation, and so on.
1c. Replacement: commitment to E provides a sense of purpose and can fit into or enhance a coherent pattern of caring that generates existential meaningfulness in the agent’s
life.
1d. Liberal breadth: E is significantly different in kind from
our other identity-defining commitments and personal
projects, and/or pursuit of E requires activities and draws
on talents or capacities that are not as well employed in
the pursuit of our other governing life goals—thus promoting the process-good of intrapersonal practical diversity in
our life.
1e. Innovation and individualization: the particular instantiations of E that we seek and the activities involved in pursuing them are novel and/or different in interesting ways
from those pursuits and goals that shape the distinctive
character of significant others in our life—thus promoting
the process-good of individual distinctiveness and originality in
our life.
2. Retrospective reasons concerning the process of caring
about E:
2a. Stare decisis: our pursuit of E first developed for other reasons, such as its power to satisfy various desires, and now
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this pursuit appears outwardly to be an established part of
our character on which others trust and rely. We feel too
involved with E to turn back now without feeling disloyal
and possibly also directionless.
2b. Existential coherence: commitment to E is required by, reinforces, or at least fits well with other prior commitments
we have made and the shape of our life to date; for
example:
• E is the welfare of the child (by former marriage) of the
person we are marrying;
• E is valued and pursued by friends to whom we have
committed ourselves;
• caring about E is, given the circumstances of human life,
practically implied by caring about some other end F to
which we are already devoted (for instance, caring about
our children’s education requires caring that they not be
bullied in school).
2c. Personal affinity: we find that our commitment to E can be
wholehearted or unreserved, unifying what were previously
conflicting aspects of our will or preserving us against such
disunity—thus promoting the process-good of practical
unity in our volitional life.
2d. Innate orientation: in our quest for self-discovery, we find
that our devotion to E is volitionally necessary for us as a
volitional disposition that we cannot will to reject and that
we were destined to express, given our personal essence or
the unique volitional character that individuates us. This
devotion is our individual ergon, our ‘‘personal function.’’151
The basic goods in this list fall into three out of four quadrants of a
simple two-by-two matrix:
Agent-Relative Product-Focused
Reasons

Agent-Relative Process-Focused
Reasons

Agent-Transcending Product-Focused
Reasons

[empty]

I have not listed any agent-transcending process-focused grounds in the
fourth quadrant, because second-order goods realized in the process of pursuing first-order goods typically pertain to (or are directly realized in) the
agent who is in this volitional process. For example, the coherence of his
pursuits and the meaningfulness of his life are agent-relative goods and
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hence are related to his history and circumstances in ways that agent-transcending goods are not. So rather than invent practical considerations for
the fourth quadrant or force some into it for the sake of artificial architectonic completeness, I have left it empty. By contrast, existential subjectivist
accounts can accommodate only some of the considerations included in the
top-right quadrant.
Although many grounds for different types of cares are accessible to
reflection in human beings with the necessary experience or knowledge by
acquaintance, this existential objectivist account certainly does not claim
that all the grounds on which our actual cares or ground projects are based
are known to each of us or even that with sufficient introspection, they can
all be known. Sometimes the status and content of our cares and ground
projects themselves are misunderstood by us, and sometimes we are (to an
extent) self-deceived about them. The grounds or considerations to which
we respond in projecting some end may also not be ones that really justify
pursuit of this end (as is always the case with radically evil projects but also
with some morally neutral or good projects too). The objective grounds
for caring included in my list are reasons that agents do consider in projecting final ends and can take as sufficient bases for their cares or commitments;
but agents are sometimes wrong in this regard. My claim is only that each
item on my list can sometimes serve as part of an adequate ground for
setting a particular end.
A theory of authenticity is, in part, a systematic normative treatment of
these issues. Even when we do understand what our purposes are, and they
were formed on the basis of adequate reasons, these reasons may not be
entirely known to us. This does not entail that the volitional commitment
involved in these purposes is inauthentic. Indeed, the opposite view is advanced in the Emersonian and Marcelian traditions. As Henry Bugbee
writes in his mid-century classic:
It is the essence of authentic commitment that it be grounded behind
the intellectual eye and not merely in a demonstrable basis which we
can get before us. The ultimate meaning of service lies just here: we
cannot gain command of what grounds our action; there can only be
an unconditional basis of action in so far as we are at ‘‘its’’ disposal
and not our own.152
It is for this kind of reason that category I.4 is included in my list; it is
surely true that some ‘‘callings’’ are categorized as religious because their
grounds are mysterious and not fully knowable to their agent. But Bugbee
and Marcel do not restrict their thesis to religious callings, and Levinas
would extend it to moral motivation, which he thinks is a response to a
value that transcends human cognition (the infinity of the other). Even if
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we do not agree that all authentic commitment must be formed on the basis
of a ‘‘calling’’ whose ultimate source is hidden from us, it is an interesting
question whether some of the more passionate and intense types of human
caring or ground projects are generally grounded in this veiled way. Here I
will say only that the main elements of existential objectivism as sketched
in this chapter do not decide this issue one way or another. Answers to
these questions are further refinements or additions to the basic EO framework, which is flexible enough to include a range of views that recognize
the alterity of values grounding the self-motivational activity that is human
‘‘willing’’ in its most primordial sense.
Nor is my subdivision of grounds for volitional projection into aesthetic, ethical, moral, and personal reasons meant to be exhaustive; aside
from tradition and culture, mere social convention and popular opinion are
also sometimes taken as grounds for projective motivation. But this is usually a mistaken judgment or perception of normative worth. Aside from the
personal grounds mentioned in the list, factors such as religious background, revelations, disturbing events, and many other distinctive experiences not catalogued here, can become the bases for the resolve in which a
person steels herself projectively to new ends. My list is also limited to
positive grounds that can in the right circumstances validly support the agent’s
volitional response to them through care or personal devotion. It does not
include those negative grounds that I survey in chapter 10 as reasons-inview for projecting radically evil ends or any other reasons that it is always
erroneous to take as grounds for caring. (Many of the considerations in my
list could be taken as reasons to form projects that would be morally wrong
in certain circumstances, but they are distinct from corrupt grounds that
the will can only take as reasons for forming evil or destructive projects.)
This existential taxonomy of values worth caring about embraces but
transcends the insights of the eudaimonist tradition and Frankfurt’s alternative. It gives proper place to agent-relative process-focused considerations
such as existential coherence and mutually reinforcing relationships among
an agent’s projects, for example, between friendship and other activities.153
Concern for process-focused reasons referring to the goods of effectiveness
and practical coherence in one’s own life is not egoistic, because these goods
are required for volitional stability or sustainable devotion to any worthwhile first-order goals. Too much cognitive dissonance or conflict among
goals undermines commitment to any of our goals.154 Likewise, as the psychological study of intrinsic motivation has shown, confidence in a minimum level of control over one’s environment and conditions of life is a
precondition for strong volitional devotion to anything. Feeling that one is
utterly at the mercy of forces beyond one’s control is a strong predictor of
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depression and general demotivation.155 A heroic agent may be able to pursue good ends even with little prospect of success, but only if she retains
confidence in a minimum effectiveness of her agency in the world. My existential
account denies that adjusting one’s ends in light of such considerations is
rooted only in desire for eudaimonia. For such process-focused considerations do not by themselves generally provide sufficient reason for willing a
first-order end; their relevance piggybacks on the presence of product-focused reasons for forming or continuing various first-order projects. For
example, a significant opportunity for success in a career as an engineer
becomes relevant to me only if the goods produced by excellent engineering
are already worth willing in themselves.
My tentative summary of the main positive reasons for projective willing
is also ‘‘pluralist’’ in the sense defended by both Jeffrey Blustein and John
Kekes. As chapter 7 made clear, unlike A-eudaimonism, my existential objectivism does not claim that every worthwhile good can be balanced in a
unified narrative structure within in a single life. Hence I agree with Blustein
that ‘‘no particular configuration or ranking of . . . basic human goods
follows from the claim that living a life that combines these goods in a
coherent, harmonious structure is intrinsically good.’’ There are many different ways of balancing goods worth caring about.156 Similarly, Kekes
writes that ‘‘Living a good life requires the achievement of a coherent ordering of plural and [often] conflicting values, but coherent orderings are
themselves plural and conflicting.’’157
The incommensurability of many nonmoral values and the fact that only
limited combinations of them in different priority ordering are practically
compatible fits with several features of EO: (1) It helps explain the existence of rational optionality in judgments concerning what is worth caring
about. It also explains the reality of what we might call soft dilemmas, in
which we are forced to choose between things we have cared about equally
or without relative priority up until now. (2) It fits with the fact that moral
reasoning about fairness/justice is not the only source of insight into values
worth caring about. (3) It also supports the idea that although reasonable
life plans are not instantiations of a single recipe, there are objective limits:
‘‘not all possibilities are reasonable.’’158 In particular, there are ‘‘primary
values’’ that determine what count as harms and benefits for all normal
human persons, which are culturally invariant.159 In my opinion, we should
also limit the ‘‘conditionality’’ of nonmoral values160 by giving overriding
significance to strictly moral values (deontic requirements). But a defense
of this claim goes beyond the scope of my present analysis.161
Conclusion
This chapter shows that the existential conception of striving will fits well
with moderate objectivist approaches to the problem of practical normativity within contemporary analytic philosophy. It provides a theoretical basis
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for broadening our view of basic goods beyond those recognized by neoAristotelian natural-law theory and thus shows how to fill the lacuna in
Kantian moral psychology without reverting to eudaimonism. Thus it is
possible to develop an explanatorily powerful non-eudaimonist conception
of willing without the dangers of irrationalism, subjectivism, and empty
formalism. The resulting existential conception of personhood provides a
better basis for a substantive ethic of the good life that can live within a
broader deontological framework for moral norms.
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The Danger of Willfulness Revisited

[M]any persons strive for high ideals;
and everywhere life is full of heroism.
—Max Ehrmann, Desiderata
Life is what happens when you’re making other plans.
—Opus, November 2004

My defense of striving will as key part of the new existential account of
personhood started with the contrast between ‘‘Eastern’’ and ‘‘Western’’
attitudes toward willing in its heroic sense. In fixing the concept of willing
to be explained by the existential theory of projective motivation, I argued
in chapter 2 that it is possible to formulate a moderate version of the
positive ‘‘Western’’ attitude toward heroic willing, which the subsequent
existential analysis clarifies and supports. We can now ask whether that
analysis has shown that heroic willing can play a positive role in the formation of robust practical identity and a meaningful life.
In taking stock of what the previous chapters imply for our original
question, it is clear that some ‘‘Eastern’’ worries that the striving will is too
Promethean or violent have been recognized as valid in the limited context
of radically evil willing. I also acknowledged that decision may frequently
be egoistic, taking its goals from self-interested desires. Yet we have also
found several reasons to think that human striving will is not essentially
violent, metaphysically rebellious, or inherently bent on misappropriation,
illegitimate power, or dominance. While it is not a mere privation or result
of ignorance or mere weakness in the face of desires for lower goods, radically evil will is still a deficient mode of the striving will, not its natural state.
539
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Although the projective capacity of our striving will indeed makes radical
evil possible, without it, agapic love and moral virtue in general would also
be impossible, great undertakings could not begin, the practices could never
have developed, and human beings could not muster the staying power
required for long-term devotion to the kinds of goods necessary for a
flourishing society. Hence the ‘‘Western’’ attitude has been vindicated to
this extent: human beings cannot realize their existential telos without developing the strength of will necessary for authentic caring and the kind of
aretaic commitment that makes for strong practical unity among one’s motives over time (and ideally throughout one’s life).1
Moreover, our new existential account makes clear that volitional ‘‘resolve’’ is not mere ‘‘choice seemingly devoid of criteria,’’ as Frank Schalow
expresses this common worry about Heidegger’s concept.2 Rather, ‘‘resolve’’
is a response to possibilities of value-realization, ‘‘the freedom which corresponds to our entry into a domain of praxis.’’ As Schalow argues, this
includes entry into social relationships, or possibilities of Mitsein.3 Perhaps
such resolve requires some recognition of our mortality—our having only
a finite time to devote ourselves to what matters most in our circumstances.4
Then authentic willing is the very opposite of a blind ‘‘will to will’’ or pure
self-assertion; rather, it requires a sense of ‘‘guardianship’’ or responsibility
to respond to beings beyond our agency or even to Being itself.5
These ideas must be developed in a full existential conception of authenticity that does not confuse being true to oneself with the ground of all
moral requirements. However, there is one crucial worry about projective
willing and its role in the ethos of individual selves that has not been yet
been addressed or allayed. The worry is that even an agent willing worthwhile goals as parts of a coherent ethical life, within limits set by her higherorder will to justice or universal respect, can take the pursuit of her agenda
to exhaust the meaning to be found in human existence. What if strength
of will, as a magnificent obsession with one’s long-term ‘‘to do’’ list, actually
blinds us to more objectively important things (such as needs) that come
along unexpectedly? Even worse, what if the deepest kind of relationship
with other persons is blocked by reducing everything in ‘‘my world’’ to the
significance it has in my hierarchy of cares, personal projects, or long-term
commitments?
Such an attitude could involve a subtle kind of existential narcissism,
even if my cares are altruistic or my projects consist entirely of devotion to
worthwhile agent-transcending goods. Even though I do not violate the
categorical imperative by reducing other persons (or ideals such as scientific
truth, the value of nature, or human-made beauty) to ‘‘mere means’’ to my
ends, I might still see everything through the lens of my ‘‘ownmost’’ project
or interpret the significance of each thing or person in terms of its practical
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relation to my highest ends (as Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein in Being and
Time arguably implies). What if opening myself to other persons in their
alterity, or experiencing them as they really are, requires an encounter with
them as transcending the web of concerns constituted by my existing volitional devotions? Indeed, Martin Buber’s I and Thou seems to suggest that
agapic love of another person requires putting aside my agenda or suspending
my will in order to open myself unconditionally to the other. This is why
Nel Noddings writes that caring for persons ‘‘involves stepping out of one’s
personal frame of reference into the other’s.’’6 Thus contemporary alterity
ethics may show, after all, that ‘‘Eastern’’ suspicions of the striving will
contain an insight not yet sufficiently addressed in my analysis.
The objection that concerns me is succinctly and straightforwardly developed in a recent book by Robert Ehman (though in response to Heidegger). Ehman rejects the idea that our distinctive identity is revealed when
we are ‘‘absorbed in our tasks and roles.’’ He thinks of the authentic self as
something that transcends the everyday contexts in which ‘‘The self is defined in terms of its status, roles, achievement, virtues, purposes, not in
terms of its unique personality.’’7
Ehman does not sufficiently distinguish between someone who loses
himself in roles and hides behind a ‘‘superficial public’’ face and one who
is deeply devoted to the values served by his social roles.8 As Gabrielle
Taylor argues, there is a crucial difference between an agent who is wholeheartedly committed and an aesthete who uses ‘‘being busy’’ as a way of
avoiding full engagement and ignoring the question of what is really worth
caring about.9 Yet this distinction is suggested by Ehman’s admission that
an authentic person need not ‘‘oppose the everyday world or retreat from
it.’’ He recognizes that Heidegger’s idea of ‘‘authentic resoluteness which
projects upon a single end right up to our death’’ contrasts with ‘‘the unauthentic ‘curiosity’ and frivolousness of everyday being in which we flit from
one affair to another.’’10 This agrees with Frankfurt’s distinction between
wanton and volitionally engaged agents. But Ehman rejects the existential
idea that a person is defined by ‘‘a unity of purpose, a fundamental project’’11 as too technological or instrumental, reducing the person to a goalpursuing engine.
Some of the emptiest people, Ehman says, are ‘‘resolute in their fulfillment of a single goal in terms of which they give meaning to their lives.’’12
He considers living a ‘‘dedicated’’ or ‘‘strenuous’’ life, in which ‘‘one performs one’s tasks seriously and responsibly,’’ to be a Calvinist or utilitarian
ideal that defines an individual in a way that makes her, in principle, replaceable.13 For it is possible (he assumes) that another individual could
have the same purposes or even pursue the same goals in the same way. Yet
the personality gestalt that is uniquely individual is
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too all-encompassing to be the object of a project. The value of a
personality is not a possible object of will and action. While the
person himself as well as others might attain an inkling of his personality, it is beyond his control. He can only respond emotionally to it,
not change it.14
Now, this critique assumes that the existentialist typically makes her
own personality into an intentional target or goal. This is not necessary to
an existential conception of the will, as my account makes clear. Although
I have suggested that autonomy, authenticity, and virtues of character must
be at least indirectly targetable reflexive goals (chap. 5, sec. 2.4), I regard
volitional character as primarily a by-product of first-order strivings. Moreover, in my existential conception, our cares and long-term commitments
define only the core of a personal ethos, not the entire gestalt. Each individual will pursue his or her ground projects in uniquely distinguishing ways,
and, given the historically conditioned grounds we have for fine-grained
cares, a volitionally engaged agent is also usually de facto irreplaceable in
those pursuits. Thus my model is compatible with Ehman’s conception of
unique personalities as well as with his thesis that authenticity is not identical with moral goodness,15 and with his conception of persons as essentially
interpersonal and expressive beings.16
But Ehman’s complaint against the existential approach goes deeper than
this. He follows the Levinasian view that ‘‘In the face of the otherness of a
genuine other, we cannot feel at home.’’ Thus a ‘‘personal encounter with
another in the depths of his personality’’ displaces our focus on our own
heroic quests and strivings: ‘‘we must open ourselves to the strangeness of
the other and be willing to explore his otherness. In so doing we must
suspend our own everyday projects and purposes, must see the other apart
from his functional and instrumental roles, must see him as an end in
himself.’’17
This suggests that my earlier treatment of friendship and love relationships as quasi-practices that can be willed fails to go deep enough: a fundamental relationship with an irreplaceable other cannot be a willed project.
Rather, it is something that happens to us, suspending our agenda and transcending ‘‘the competitive teleology of our everyday life.’’18 Nor does
Ehman restrict this to the context of essentially particularistic love, for he
thinks it holds true for the most primordial kinds of ‘‘encounter’’ with
other values, too. Contra Sartre’s theory of value, Ehman says:
all of us have moments when we suspend our projects in an appreciation of beauty, truth, personal worth. The very choice of our projects
depends in fact upon our experience of the values of things independently of projects, since we engage in projects to bring about something that we already find of value. . . . the intrinsic value of things
determines our projects.19
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We see here that Ehman’s objection to defining a person in terms of her
willed goals turns mainly on his dissatisfaction with subjectivism: the willing agent is responding to values that she did not posit, recognition of
which may even interrupt her volitional activity. Thus his insight is already
incorporated into existential objectivism: the value of persons and other
goods worthy of devotion is not itself willed but rather encountered. In that
sense, Ehman is entirely correct that existential authenticity built on volitional devotion is dependent on ‘‘a world of values and meanings’’ that have
significance prior to or ‘‘apart from all purpose.’’20 In particular, as I emphasize in discussing Levinas, our moral responsibility to care about persons as
ends cannot be autonomous in the sense of being voluntarily willed; rather, it
precedes all willing.21
But Ehman, like Levinasians in general, tends to underrate the existential
importance of the agent’s volitional response to such values. After all, he admits
that an encounter with the unique alterity of the other leaves open the
possibility of loving, hating, and other responses. Encountered values must
be personally appropriated through the projective activity of the striving
will; even if this is not experienced as a separate moment of decision, an
active embracing attitude is synthesized with passive discovery. The requirement to respond to values certainly puts ethical limits on our egoistic pursuit of power or self-interest but admits the need for volitional response in
general. Moreover, a full appreciation of other individuals often requires
laying aside our agenda precisely because their personal ethos is defined at
its center by their own goals, projects, and strivings. This stands in sharp
contrast to pure moral respect for the other as a moral agent or end. Hence
I have to reject Ehman’s claim that ‘‘objective, public, universal criteria’’
cannot enter into our grounds for loving persons as unique individuals.22 If
in part we love them for their devotion to objectively valuable goods, then
our evaluation of their character must have some objective criteria as well.
This is compatible with Ehman’s claim that the self transcends its ‘‘interests’’ and includes its whole way of being in the world,23 and with his claim
that individuals have the right to live lives that we would not judge as
good.24
My deeper response to this alterity critique of existential willing is twofold. First, while it recognizes the positive and vital role played by the
striving will in defining the core of one’s personal ethos, my new existential
theory of personhood, authenticity, and practical coherence is not committed to the extreme claim that strength of will or depth of commitment is
all that matters or even to the weaker thesis that projective motivation is
the most important requirement of an authentic and/or good life. My
sketch of a moderate existential objectivist position in chapter 14 suggests
that deeply willed cares can both open us to new values (beyond those
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which grounded these cares) and sometimes obscure or close off other values from our attention. Because our dedication to our projects can blind us
to other important values, in order to attend properly to persons that we
ought to care about or other potential goods or harms that we should
consider, we may sometimes have to suspend our pursuits, set aside our
agendas temporarily, and be willing to modify them in light of new insights.
Existential strength of will does not require fanaticism; nor does practical
unity require monomania.
Therefore, there is room within an existential objectivist account for the
idea that we should sometimes let things be without drawing them into the
orbit of our projects, or attend to them without viewing them only in terms
of their relation to our strivings. Since existential coherence requires caring
about the worth of our cares (chap. 14), we have good reason to let ourselves be guided toward values by realities that are independent of our missions. This idea has been central to the Romantic tradition since
Wordsworth. Heidegger tells us that our highest dignity is to be witnessing
poets, ‘‘keeping watch over the unconcealment’’ of beings.25 Mary Oliver,
the great contemporary American nature poet, says: ‘‘To pay attention, this
is our endless and proper work.’’26 But this is one-sided, for it is not our
telos merely to be passive observers of being. Making and building, working
the world of nature into culture, and subcreating, in Tolkien’s sense, are
also essential parts of our natural function. After Gelassenheit comes volitional response, ever interrupted by further attending and leading to further
alteration of the will (sometimes taking up new purposes, sometimes laying
old ones aside).
Of course, sometimes the very earnestness of our dedication to projects
and roles can distort our views or hinder requisite axiological attentiveness,
but that is the risk we must take. It cannot be avoided by Eastern-style
disengagement; while separation from the superficial values of mass consumerism may clear our minds, detachment from the profound values of
life cannot lead to a more meaningful life. The danger of blindness to
values outside our projects can be addressed only by blending passionate
devotion with a willingness to hear objections and remain open to perspectives alterior to our own.
Hence I believe that the right existential conception of authenticity must
articulate the required balance between volitional engagement in projects—
including the practices, social roles, and relationships that make up culture—and the ability to withhold from pursuits or suspend our will in a
way that (at least partially) makes it possible to transcend our present practical horizons.
The second point is that this very withholding, by which we put aside
our agendas and let alterity interrupt our volitional trajectories through our
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shared lifeworld, is itself a higher-order work of the striving will, grounded in our
recognition of alterity and our own epistemic finitude. This is what Edward
Mooney calls ‘‘receptive willingness.’’27 He argues that sometimes the agent
can grow only if his will is humbled by phenomena that transcend him
without presenting a particular ‘‘task,’’ realities that ‘‘bend,’’ check, or even
transform his will.28 But this is not sheer coercion; rather, to be humbled,
we must make an inward effort to put our projected ends in abeyance or
even be willing to alter them for the sake of the other person (following
Buber and Levinas) or perhaps for the sake of nature (following Oliver) or
for religious hope (following Kierkegaard).
This ‘‘willingness’’ is the right alternative to the dangerous ‘‘will to will’’
or sheer delight in one’s projective powers and ability to make a mark on
the world;29 it is the will, when necessary, not to will (for a time) those ends
to which one is committed or those roles and relationships in which one is
engaged. Through willing2 such volitional disengagement from first-order
projects, we are sometimes able to see more clearly the values to which we
ought to be responding, or to remember why we set out on the course we
were taking, or understand more profoundly the values for the sake of
which we began questing in the first place. In this way, we acknowledge
that the process of volition in which our practical identity is defined is not
entirely our own; the grounds on which we will our personal ends are informed not only by friends and tradition but also by regestaltings of our
world through strangers, novelty, alterity—perhaps even the divine. Our
true self is as much ‘‘received’’ as invented.30
In my conception, then, the striving will is not essentially always on a
mission or permanently locked into heroic-quest mode. It can stop itself,
sometimes to smell the roses, sometimes to remember the past, sometimes
to enjoy all that has been won or given, and sometimes to respond to
alterities that may turn it aside from its intended path. The will is the heart
of planning agency, which can initiate breaks from the status quo, keep
focus against distractions, and press on against resistance; but it can also
suspend its plans for the sake of the other. To alter one of Bernard Williams’s examples, consider an artist who devotes years of her life to an
enormous work, like carving Mount Rushmore. But now imagine that she
discovers that her partially finished work sits on the last remaining part of
lands once holy to a Native American tribe. If she is sufficiently sensitive
to these values, then despite her wholehearted devotion to her project, she
could change her goal, stop carving, or perhaps rework what she had done
into something more acceptable to the original stewards of this land. Because it is a response to objective values, aretaic commitment can be altered
without loss of self or volitional integrity when one’s perception of the
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relevant values change. The greatest freedom of all is the power to change
one’s mind for good reasons.
That is why in great epics, the quest never proceeds directly; for the
authentic end can never be reached except by way of what seem at first to
be digressions. Much of the final meaning of a life-narrative may lie in these
twists and turns (while the perfectly straight road would miss most of what
makes life worth living). The higher-order will to digress from one’s intended path when necessary is a mark of maturity in human agents. Failure
to respond to unexpected needs and problems, even at great cost to one’s
prior agenda, can mean passing up what were really opportunities for the
most meaningful and fulfilling engagements or efforts in our lifetime. The
single-minded will to stay ‘‘on-task’’ no matter what the potential ‘‘distractions’’ sounds like a great formula in superficial self-help books but it rejects the conception of agapē at the heart of an existential ethic worthy of
the name.
In conclusion, human agapic love is this balance between an attentiveness
that transcends prior agendas and, in response, passionate engagement in
pursuit of good ends. The agapic will, at our human level, is the higherorder will to balance the need for Gelassenheit with sustained effort to make
the world more just, more beautiful, and richer in knowledge and wonder
for all. So understood, the agapic ideal combines what is best in both the
‘‘Eastern’’ and ‘‘Western’’ traditions: the serenity of LeGuin’s sage Ogion
must be joined with the dedication we see in progressives such as Francis
Bacon, Immanuel Kant, and Gene Roddenberry. A will committed to finding out the good work that needs to be done and resolved to do it is the
true ideal of existentialism.
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‘‘will’’ that go along with them, but they all adhere to his basic Hobbesian
paradigm.
51. Oberdiek, ‘‘The Will,’’ 477.
52. James, 528.
53. Ibid., 529.
54. Oberdiek, ‘‘The Will,’’ 478.
55. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, part 3 sec. 1, 399.
56. Ryle, Concept of Mind, 67.
57. Wittgenstein, Brown Book, in Blue and Brown Books, II, no. 11, 151.
58. Ibid., no. 11, 150.
59. Ibid., 151–52.
60. On these points, see the helpful summary in Scott, ‘‘Wittgenstein’s Theory
of Action.’’
61. See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, II, xi, 213.
62. Scott, 363.
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63. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 613, 159.
64. On this point, see also Winch, ‘‘Wittgenstein’s Treatment of the Will.’’
65. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 627–28, 162e. Of course, we
can try to move our arm and discover that it is strapped down. But if I read him
right, Wittgenstein means that there is no separate act of initiating the arm movement that will either succeed if physically unimpeded or fail if the arm is held; for
if there were, then this separate act would also be something that we could try to
do and succeed or fail in trying. But we do not experience this in voluntary acts
such as intentional bodily movements. This may or may not be compatible with a
theory like O’Shaughnessy’s, which simply unpacks the experience of intentional
first-order action to show that it always involves at least a weak sense of trying to
perform the intended act. But Wittgenstein’s aim is to deny that we try to form
first-order intentions themselves, as Kane and Pink maintain.
66. See Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, no. 1040, 181e.
67. Ibid., no. 766, 137e. Actually, Wittgenstein often uses ‘‘trying’’ in the more
specific sense of making a focused effort against resistance, since he says that in
ordinary cases, ‘‘when I walk, that doesn’t mean that I try to walk and it succeeds’’
(ibid., I, no. 51, 13). This explains why he says that although an experience of
effort is the paradigm, it is not essential to volition, since it is lacking in voluntary
acts such as handwriting or moving the eye to look at an object (Brown Book, II,
no. 13, 152–3). Moreover, it is crucial to Wittgenstein’s view that the kinesthetic
sensation we feel in, say, moving our hand while drawing is not something we
anticipate and decide to bring about; at the most basic level in voluntary action,
there must be motions or changes that are part of the ‘‘matter’’ of the action but
are not themselves specifically selected in advance by deliberate choice (ibid., no.
13, 154).
68. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I, no. 618, 160–61.
69. Ryle, Concept of Mind, 67.
70. Kane, Significance of Free Will, 4 (emphasis omitted).
71. Ibid., 27.
72. Ibid., 21.
73. Ibid., 27.
74. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 6–8. Of course the details of Aquinas’s
account are actually much more complex, but this rough summary is not too misleading. I have discussed the location and nature of libertarian freedom in Aquinas’s
model in more detail in Davenport, ‘‘Aquinas’s Teleological Libertarianism.’’
75. Kane, Significance of Free Will, 22.
76. Ibid., 26–27.
77. Ibid., 125.
78. Ibid., 126.
79. Ibid., 127.
80. Ibid., 128–33.
81. Ibid., 4.
82. Ibid., 152.
83. Ibid., 25.
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84. There is admittedly a strand in so-called ‘‘existentialist’’ literature that does
provoke this common attribution of a reductive conception of will to existentialists. This strand, which sometimes appears dominant in Sartre (though even in
Being and Nothingness it does not totally exclude more substantial kinds of volition)
may ultimately derive from Fichte’s claim that since ‘‘nothing pertains to the I
which it does not posit,’’ its feelings of limitation must also be posited or selfgiven (a position Fichte shares with Reinhold). See sec. 6 of Fichte’s summary,
‘‘The Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1789–1799,’’ in Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy, 69.
85. Van Inwagen, Essay on Free Will, 8.
86. If we add in the requirement that the alternative courses of action at least
involve intentions, then van Inwagen’s definition is consonant with the second
concept of the will described below.
87. At this point, Dennett quotes Anscombe’s complaint that there is no univocal sense in which I can ‘‘will’’ my arm to move but not will a matchbox to
move—see Anscombe, Intention, 48–49. This sort of view is the main target of
O’Shaughnessy’s work, but interestingly, its secondary thesis that action is intentional only under certain descriptions is reaffirmed in the context of later executive
action theories of the will (see sec. 3.3 below).
88. Dennett, Content and Consciousness, 171.
89. Ibid., 172.
90. Ibid., 173. Dennett equates conscious ‘‘awareness’’ here with verbal expression of the information that the brain is processing. This elimination of sentience
continues to be a problem in all his later work in the philosophy of mind.
91. Ibid., 173.
92. As it happens, there is now much empirical evidence against Dennett’s
eliminativist treatment of willing. See Miller, Inner Natures, part 2, chap. 3, ‘‘The
Impetus of Self: Action and Volition.’’ Miller argues that it is portions of the
frontal lobe that control ‘‘the overall regulation and evaluation of thought and
behavior’’ (44). Damage to this part of the brain leaves more particular abilities
intact but destroys regulation of their sequences:
In such cases, the individual’s very capacity for autonomous volition seems
to have been sucked right out of him . . . the impression is not unlike that
of a robot with a faulty guidance system: The patient does little on his own,
but once prompted, seems incapable of stopping what he’s already doing or
shifting to something else without explicit outside guidance. (45)
In my view, such cases suggest that there are brain centers responsible for (among
other things) the function of decision or intention-formation, without which the
human being is reduced to an automaton.
93. Moya, Philosophy of Action, 106.
94. Ibid., 145–46.
95. Nevertheless, as Moya argues, for Davidson this causal relation requires
that an adequate version of physicalism be true: beliefs, desires, and actions must
be identical with physical events of some kind, e.g., neurological events. See ibid.,
111–12.
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96. Kane, Significance of Free Will, 27.
97. O’Shaughnessy, The Will, vols. I & II.
98. Audi, Action, Intention, and Reason, chap. 3, 74.
99. Ibid., 75.
100. Ibid., 76.
101. Ibid., 76.
102. Ibid., 77, quoting Ginet, ‘‘Voluntary Exertion of the Body: A Volitional
Account,’’ 234.
103. Ibid., 78. Yet Audi draws the wrong conclusion when he infers from the
thinness of this agreement that ‘‘There may be no ordinary conception of volition,
or willing, or even trying, which is being analyzed and used to understand action’’
(79). Rather, all these accounts are explanations of willing in the thin sense as
whatever makes our acts voluntary. This moral concept is what remains after the
historical degeneration of the notion of will in the empiricist tradition from
Hobbes through William James.
104. Ibid., 79.
105. Kane reconstructs this traditional formula in terms of four conditions:
act A is done voluntarily iff the agent (1) has reasons or motives for doing A, (2)
wants to act on these motives more than on any others at the time, (3) does A for
these reasons, and (4) the agent’s doing A and willing to do A for these reasons
are not coerced or compelled. The first three conditions thus capture doing A
intentionally, in Kane’s view. See Kane, Significance of Free Will, 30.
106. Oberdiek, ‘‘The Will,’’ 464.
107. Ibid., 466.
108. Ibid., 466.
109. Ibid., 469.
110. Ibid., 470.
111. Ibid., 485. He also notes that ‘‘Descriptions under which an act is voluntary are not always descriptions under which they are intentional’’ (484), since an
act is voluntary under a description of consequences that are foreseen, but foreseen
consequences may not always be intended. For example, I voluntarily caused my
mouth to hurt when I went to see the dentist, but this was a side effect of my
intended goal of fixing my tooth. This suggests that intention, unlike voluntariness,
makes implicit reference to the motives for which an act is done; these motives pick
out a subset of the descriptions under which an act is intentional.
112. Ibid., 483.
113. Pink, Psychology of Freedom, 17.
114. Gert and Duggan, ‘‘Free Will as the Ability to Will,’’ 206, n. 2.
115. Ibid., 210.
116. Ibid., 211.
117. Ibid., 213.
118. Ibid., 211.
119. Ibid., 209, n. 5.
120. Moya, Philosophy of Action, 18.
121. Ibid., 20.
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122. Ibid., 21.
123. Ibid., 23. Moya here cites O’Shaughnessy’s early essay, ‘‘Trying (as the
Mental ‘Pineal Gland’),’’ 365–86.
124. Moya, Philosophy of Action, 24–25. I am not convinced here by Moya’s
argument that ‘‘trying’’ to do some nonbasic action can itself only consist in other
actions in the ordinary sense, e.g., ‘‘trying to start a car is doing such things as
taking the key, putting it in the lock, turning it, etc.’’ (24). On the contrary, it
seems to me that all these bodily actions are experienced as the outcome of a
mental trying in O’Shaughnessy’s sense. My efforts to do each specific component
of the large act, for example, trying to pick up the key, trying to get it in the lock,
and trying to turn it, are experienced as parts of my larger effort to execute the
intention to start the car, or to drive to town, or whatever I am trying to do.
125. Ibid., 25–26.
126. Ibid., 37.
127. Ibid., 46.
128. Ibid., 50. Note that the account of voluntary action that Scott reconstructs from Wittgenstein’s manuscripts is similarly holistic, focusing on the ‘‘environment’’ or context of the action, which in many cases is needed to make it
intelligible (Scott, ‘‘Wittgenstein’s Theory of Action,’’ 362–63). But Wittgenstein
does not sufficiently develop the notions of intentional action and meaning-communicating action that are needed to make this holistic point clear.
129. See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, chapter I.3. In particular, Habermas rejects Danto’s theory of certain bodily movements as ‘‘basic actions’’; referring to Wittgenstein’s theory of rule-governed games, he argues that
communicative acts in particular depend on an intersubjective, background, normative context regulating the pragmatics of language use in making validity claims
(97–101).
130. Moya, Philosophy of Action, 64.
131. See MacIntyre, After Virtue, chap. 15.
132. Pink, Psychology of Freedom, 3.
133. Ibid., 29.
134. Ibid.
135. Kahn, ‘‘Discovering the Will,’’ 238.
136. Ibid., 240.
137. Ibid., referring to Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.83.4.
138. As Pink suggests, many types of higher animals are probably capable of
intentional actions, while the capacity for decision or second-order agency is more
closely tied to personhood.
139. Pink, Psychology of Freedom, 3.
140. Ibid., 12. Pink thus hopes that his account will be neutral on the question
of whether moral responsibility is compatible or incompatible with natural
determinism.
141. Ibid., 16.
142. Ibid., 8.
143. Ibid., 10. He assures this agreement with a restriction that he calls ‘‘Reason-Apply.’’
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144. Ibid., 15.
145. I treat Pink’s account of decision as his conception of willing, although
he rejects the term ‘‘volition’’ since it has been used since Locke to name ‘‘an
undifferentiated category’’ mistakenly combining ‘‘trying’’ to perform an act and
‘‘deciding’’ to perform it (ibid., 261), or amalgamating ‘‘conation and will,’’ as he
says earlier (55).
146. Ibid., 20. Pink allows that intentions can also flow directly from habit
but argues that this does not crucially affect his account, because ‘‘all intentions
are governed by rationality in the same way’’ (21), and so intentions formed by
habit are as ‘‘ ‘active’ ’’ as those formed by decision.
147. O’Shaughnessy, The Will, vol. I, 29.
148. Ibid., 32–34.
149. Pink, Psychology of Freedom, 9.
150. Ibid., 17 (emphasis added).
151. Ibid., 17.
152. Harry Frankfurt has defended a very similar position in his paper on
Descartes’s notion of the will’s ‘‘infinite’’ capacity: ‘‘Concerning the Freedom and
the Limits of the Will.’’ He says that the distinction between ‘‘choosing to do
something and doing it’’ is absent when ‘‘the object of the choice or decision is
itself a specific choice or decision’’ (126), and hence ‘‘the will is absolutely and perfectly
active. . . . All the movements of my will—for instance, my choices and decisions—
are movements that I make. None is a mere impersonal occurrence, in which my will
moves without my moving it’’ (127). Contra some of Pink’s doubts, this clearly confirms
that Frankfurt shares Pink’s notion of decision as second-order agency.
153. Stampe and Gibson, ‘‘Of One’s Own Free Will,’’ 530.
154. Ibid., 530, n. 3.
155. Ibid., 529–30.
156. Ibid., 532–33.
157. Granted, the extreme agoraphobic may not deliberate about this, since
she is seized with an overwhelming fear at the bare thought of opening the door
and cannot contemplate it. But Stampe and Gibson allow that ‘‘a decision need
not be an act of deliberation, and it need not be conscious’’ (530, note 3).
158. Ibid., 532. In general, Stampe and Gibson say, freedom of will requires
the ability ‘‘to make the rational decision even if the circumstances were relevantly
different from the way they actually are—e.g., just different enough that the rational decision would be something other than the one that is rational in the actual
case’’ (532). But they overlook the problem that one of the most important ways
in which the circumstances can vary is for the agent’s desires to change, or for the
motives controlling one’s intention-formation to alter. If the will can be involved
in bringing about such changes, as I argue, then its freedom can hardly be defined
according to whether the decisions it would form in a range of possible circumstances would be rational relative to the strengths of desires given in these different
scenarios.
159. Ibid., 533.
160. Science-fiction fans may consider the example of Angus, a cyborg in Stephen Donaldson’s novels A Dark and Hungry God Arises and Chaos and Order. Angus’s
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mind has been ‘‘welded’’ to a minicomputer in his back that controls a whole net
of minielectrodes in his brain, and these in turn control his every bodily action in
accordance with prewritten instructions. Angus does not act like an unconscious
machine; he forms intentions and even whole plans of action that are always subjectively rational relative to his enforced desire to achieve his programmed goals. But
he very clearly does not form these intentions freely: his will helplessly rebels against
the continual coercion, leaving Angus in a state of never-ending mental torture.
The second-order agency that is Angus is powerless before the non-agent machine
that forms intentions in him, or forms conscious practical thoughts that are executed as actions of his body.
161. See Frankfurt, ‘‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’’ and
later essays.
162. Kane, Significance of Free Will, 23.
163. Ibid., 24.
164. Ibid., 25. I have summarized only part of Mele’s list of six important
functions that intentions play in our practical life. He also holds that intentions
explain and sustain intentional action, help coordinate action over time and with
other agents, and help guide and motivate further deliberation.
165. Moya, Philosophy of Action, 53.
166. Ibid., 55–56.
167. Ibid., 58.
168. Ibid. It should be pointed out that there are two distinct senses of ‘‘plan.’’
In the first sense, which Moya uses here, a ‘‘plan’’ is a standard for the achievement
of something. In the second sense, a ‘‘plan’’ is a genuine commitment of the agent
to following a series of steps toward the outcome. The first sense is purely normative, whereas the second is volitional.
169. Ibid., 60.
170. Ibid., 59.
171. Ibid., 141.
172. Ibid., 131. However, this clam might have to be qualified with respect to
dolphins and certain species of ape, if current literature on their mental capacities
is accurate.
173. Ibid., 148.
174. See Davidson, ‘‘Intending,’’ 98. He allows that forming an intention
might be a kind of action (89) but holds that intention-judgments can arise without any act of decision (99).
175. Moya, Philosophy of Action, 150.
176. Ibid., 153–54.
177. Ibid., 156–57.
178. Ibid., 169.
179. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, sec. 3.2.1, 93.
180. Ibid., Lecture 9, 229.
181. Ibid., 120–21.
182. This appears to be the main thesis of Alexander Pfänder’s classic 1900
work, Phänomenologie des Wollens (Leipzig: Barth, 1900). See Pfänder, Phenomenology of
Willing and Motivation, 3.
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183. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 96. Of course, for Kant it is not only
‘‘desires’’ that provide such suggestions but also purely rational considerations such
as the universalizability of a given maxim for beings like us.
184. Ibid., 97.
185. See Moya’s point that from his criterion of agency it follows that ‘‘there
are some descriptions of actions which are in some sense privileged ones, namely
those under which the action was intentional’’ (Moya, Philosophy of Action, 55). And
as we saw, being voluntary or imputable (in the most basic sense) roughly comes
to being done intentionally without being coerced.
186. Kane, Significance of Free Will, 28–30.
187. American Heritage Dictionary, 1382.
188. Rank, Truth and Reality, 17.
189. Rank, Will Therapy, 112 n. 1. However, in my view, there is no need to
accept Rank’s hypothesis about the ‘‘original negative nature of will power’’ as a
reaction to control by parents (see Truth and Reality, 49). This part of Rank’s view
shows the long shadow of Freud and Nietzsche, which is overcome in my conception of positive projective motivation as a response to value-alterity.
190. Murdoch, Metaphysics as Guide to Morals, 300.
191. Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life, 86.
192. Ibid., 89.
193. Ibid., 113.
194. This is what Hauerwas means when he says, ‘‘By acting under one description rather than another the agent not only determines what he will do, but
also the kind of person he will be’’ (ibid.).
195. Ibid., 51.
196. In this respect, as Pink notes, decision is unlike seeking to ensure that we
stick to our diet by telling friends that we are going to lose weight in order to
‘‘bring the fear of losing face in as a further motive to induce ourselves to eat less
in the future’’ (Pink, Psychology of Freedom, 5). Tactics like this are ways of twisting
one’s own arm, whereas decisions constitute a noninstrumental (or nonstrategic)
form of self-control.
197. Ibid., 6.
198. Ibid., 23. This follows from Pink’s view that the will is not simply a
deliberative faculty but rather an executive faculty distinct from the capacity for
practical judgment which it serves.
4. The Erosiac Structure of Desire in Plato and Aristotle
1. I provide some historical evidence for this hypothesis in chap. 4, sec. 2, and
chap. 5, sec. 1.
2. Williams, ‘‘Internal and External Reasons,’’ in Moral Luck.
3. Ibid., 104. Williams actually says that practical deliberation can ‘‘add new
actions for which there are internal reasons, just as it can add new internal reasons
for given actions’’ (104); but he means only that deliberation can do this by correcting false judgments or extending the agent’s imagination about the
consequences.
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4. Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents, 39–40.
5. Sverdlik, ‘‘Motive and Rightness,’’ 338.
6. Ibid., 335.
7. Ibid., 336.
8. On this idea, see the concept of D3 desire developed in chapter 5.
9. Sverdlik, ‘‘Motive and Rightness,’’ 336. The example Sverdlik gives is envy,
which ‘‘gives rise to the desire to remove the envied object from another person.’’
He acknowledges that some emotions, such as grief, may not give rise to desires,
but says that they then fail to constitute motives. However, the idea that emotions
are usually motivational is not uncontroversial. For example, it is rejected by Richard Wollheim in On the Emotions, 128.
10. Ibid., 336.
11. Ibid., 337.
12. Ibid., 339.
13. As explained in the introduction, I focus on the motivational aspects of
Platonic and Aristotelian eudaimonism, since this is the aspect that embodies TP.
The question of whether some form of rational eudaimonism that rejects TP is
plausible is postponed until chapter 8, secs. 3 and 5.5.
14. Davis, ‘‘Two Senses of Desire,’’ 64–65.
15. WET remains a simplifying assumption for this book, because some contemporary theories do recognize non-erosiac desires among prepurposive motives.
For example, Ronald de Sousa distinguishes ‘‘consummatory’’ from ‘‘ludic’’ desires
‘‘that come with a desire for indefinite continuation.’’ As paradigm cases of ludic
motives he mentions desires for play and contemplation (Rationality of Emotion, 216).
Because the scope of ‘‘consummatory’’ desire is narrower than that of ‘‘erosiac’’
motivation as I conceive it, not all de Sousa’s ludic desires are non-erosiac. However, some may be, and we find similar non-erosiac PPMs in other contemporary
theories. But such motives generally lack the complexity and connection to evaluative judgment that would make them (like D3 desires and projective motives)
possible candidates to explain the phenomena on which my account focuses. So I
think they can be included in a more complicated and disjunctive version of WET,
but I leave this extension of the Existential Core Argument for future work.
16. Vedder, ‘‘Heidegger on Desire,’’ 354.
17. See the Latin dictionary at http://www.sunsite.ubc.ca/LatinDictionary/.
18. See the Notre Dame Latin dictionary at http://www.nd.edu/⬃archives/
latgramm.htm. This lexicon also lists the more specific military sense of desidero as
‘‘to lose’’ something.
19. Ibid.
20. See the entry in the LSJ lexicon at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/
resolveform. There is also a useful discussion in Earl Jackson’s ‘‘The Phaedrus Kit,’’
which I hope will become available again on the Internet.
21. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, 82, citing Aristotle’s De motu animalium, chap. 7.
22. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, 273.
23. Ibid., 276.
24. Ibid., 274.
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25. Nussbaum now recognizes this irreducibility to event-causal mechanism as
essential to Aristotle’s project (Fragility, 278), but she is misleading in describing it
as ‘‘more active than passive: it is a going for, a reaching after . . . , as opposed to
a being-overwhelmed’’ (274). This description makes it sound as though orektic
states are all autonomous, which is false, and it obscures the key difference between
projective ‘‘going for’’ and erosiac being-drawn-toward.
26. See, e.g., Plato’s Phaedrus 255c: ‘‘even so the stream of beauty turns back
and reenters the eyes of the fair beloved’’ (Plato, Collected Dialogues, 501).
27. Plato, Cratylus, 419e–420a (emphasis added), trans. Fowler, Loeb ed. 167.
28. Gould, The Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy, 63.
29. Ibid., 64.
30. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, 259–60, citing Lucretius, De Rerum Natura.
31. Murdoch, Sovereignty of the Good, 102–3. This essay is also reprinted in part
in Crisp and Slote, Virtue Ethics, 99–117. In this anthology, see 117 for the quoted
passage.
32. Thus, although Nussbaum’s expertise in this area far exceeds mine, I must
disagree with her view that Plato’s account lacks Aristotle’s insight into ‘‘what is
common to all cases of animal movement’’ (Fragility, 275). Aristotle introduces
orexis to overcome the tripartite soul (as discussed in the last section of this chapter), not to introduce a new schema for motivation unknown to Plato.
33. Soble, Structure of Love, 17. He actually writes ‘‘erosic,’’ but I follow Robert
Solomon in adding the ‘‘a’’ to enhance the distance from ‘‘erotic.’’
34. Ibid., 4. In my judgment, this error results from defining the erosiac thesis
as the negation of the agapic thesis as Nygren misconstrues it (as the claim that x
can love y without any reason concerning y at all; ibid., 4). See the discussion of
Nygren in chapter 9.
35. This problem frequently reappears in postmodern discussions of ‘‘identity’’
and ‘‘difference’’ in friendship: see, e.g., Watson, Tradition(s) II, 72. In responding
to Levinas, Watson is Aristotelian or Hegelian enough to want to reduce the distinctions between ‘‘self and other, egoism and respect’’ (68). But Levinas’s account
points to an alterity beyond complementarity that avoids the paradox in erosiac
conceptions of friendship.
36. Plato, Lysis 215a–b, in Collected Dialogues, 158.
37. Moreover, it is much easier to understand in this light why Aquinas wrote
in his Summa Theologica that with respect to the ‘‘perfect happiness we will have in
heaven, friendship is not a necessary requirement for happiness since man has in
God all the fullness of his perfection’’ (I–II Qu. 4, Art. 8, Respondo), and likewise,
‘‘The perfection of charity is essential to happiness as regards love of God but not
love of neighbor’’ (ibid., Rep. 3).
38. This is how Vlastos portrayed the contrast in his well-known essay, ‘‘The
Individual as an Object of Love in Plato,’’ 3–42; reprinted in Soble, Eros, Agape,
and Philia, 96–135.
39. Plato, Lysis, in Collected Dialogues, 218c, 162.
40. Ibid., 216e; 160. We have to remember here that ‘‘evil’’ translates a word
meaning harmful or dangerous.
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41. Meno 78A–B, in Great Dialogues of Plato.
42. See Plato, Gorgias 492d–4b; 65–7. It is instructive to compare Gorgias’s
statement, which reflects the archaic view of nobility and glory that Plato is trying
to overthrow, with Thomas Hobbes’s thesis that our felicity is found only in the
continued struggle for ever more power and challenges, ending only in death (Leviathan, 130 and 139). Hobbes puts the same idea as follows in De homine: ‘‘For of
goods, the greatest is always progressing towards ever further ends with the least
hinderance’’ (Man and Citizen, 54). As my analysis in the introduction suggests, these
formulations are all distorted versions of the right conception of the heroic will,
with its inherently projective structure.
43. Plato, Lysis, in Collected Dialogues, 221d; 166.
44. Ibid., 222a; 166.
45. Ibid., 222b; 167.
46. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, 53.
47. Ibid., 54.
48. As Irwin notes (44–45), in the Laches, the thesis that virtue must be beneficial is ambiguous about who benefits, but the Apology and Crito are clearer that his
virtue must be the most beneficial or advantageous state for the agent himself.
49. Ibid., 62–63.
50. Ibid., 53.
51. Ibid., 63.
52. Ibid., 116.
53. Ibid., 33.
54. Plato, Republic IV, 437b–c; Collected Dialogues, 679. The Rouse translation
reads:
thirst and hunger and desires in general, and again to wish and to be willing
. . . the soul of the desirer always wants that which he desires, or is attracted
to that which he wishes to have; or again, inasmuch as it wants something
to be provided for him, it nods ‘‘yes’’ to itself as if someone had asked the
question, reaching forward to the production of the thing. (Great Dialogues of
Plato, 236).
55. Republic IV, 437e, Collected Dialogues, 679.
56. Republic IV, 437d–e, 679.
57. Republic IV, 438a–b, 679–80.
58. Republic IV, 439a, 681 (emphasis added).
59. Hampton, Pleasure, Knowledge, and Being, 52.
60. Auden, ‘‘Quest Hero,’’ 40. Quests, on the other hand, require higher cognitive and volitional powers, according to Auden.
61. MacIntyre, After Virtue, chap. 15, 218–19. I consider After Virtue especially
Platonic because of its emphasis on the motives involved in crafts and practices as
both an analog of the virtues and a site of their application. Although this analogy
is also found in Aristotle, it is arguably more central to Plato’s analysis of the
virtues than to Aristotle’s, which instead begins from common definitions of the
virtues and then revises them in light of the doctrine of the rational mean stated
in Nicomachean Ethics II.
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Plato, Meno, 77c–78b.
Watson, ‘‘Free Agency,’’ in Free Will, 97.
Ibid., 98.
Ibid., 99. In support, Watson cites Phaedrus, 237e–238e.
Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, 210.
Ibid., 211.
Republic IV, 439a–b, 681.
Commenting on Plato’s Phaedrus, Earl Jackson, Jr., argues that:

Eros for the lyric poets was a condition that insinuated itself into the cognitive system of the beloved via the rays of desire emanating from the eyes of
the lover gazing upon the beloved. This condition was ecstatic and rapturous
but rarely if ever good news. The vision (in two senses) of the beloved is
affected, and a searing emotion of need or longing for the lover ensues. Thus
it is a ‘‘disease of the eye.’’
This is from his informal essay, ‘‘The Lexica of Desire in Plato’s Phaedrus,’’ which
I hope will become available again on the Internet.
70. Plato, Symposium 193a, 545. Compare this to an earlier proposal that we
desire what is complementary, in Lysis 215e.
71. Ibid., 199d, 551.
72. Ibid., 200d–e, 552.
73. Ibid., 207a, 559.
74. See Annas’s Introduction to Cicero, On Moral Ends, xxv.
75. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 2, Art. 6, Rep. 1; quotations from the
Treatise on Happiness, trans. Oesterle.
76. Ibid., 200e, 553.
77. See Payne’s useful discussion of such objections by Stokes, Reeve, and
Nussbaum in his article, ‘‘Refutation of Agathon,’’ 246–47.
78. And this would explain why there is something perverse in the Narcissus
complex taken literally as sexual interest in oneself: for one cannot really lack nor
therefore desire one’s own bodily beauty; one can only desire the image of it alienated from oneself (and such a desire therefore essentially requires self-deception).
79. Payne, ‘‘Refutation of Agathon,’’ 243.
80. Plato, Symposium 205d, 557.
81. Thus I disagree with Payne’s claim that ‘‘When we consider rational, gooddependent desires at Symposium 204–206 we are still dealing with epithumia’’ (Payne,
243, Greek transliterated). This cannot be right, since in the Republic, epithumia as
D1 or D2 desire is clearly distinguished from D3 evaluative desire. When Plato
talks about D3 states of orexis in terms that are peculiar to epithumia among other
forms of orexis, I take him to be speaking metaphorically. However, I emphatically
agree with Payne’s suggestion that the main point in Agathon’s argument concerns
‘‘the lack which afflicts a lover’’ rather than Nussbaum’s idea that the lover should
focus on ‘‘repeatable instances of a property’’ (Payne, ‘‘Refutation of Agathon,’’
249).
82. Payne, ‘‘Refutation of Agathon,’’ 251.
83. Plato, Symposium, 202b–d, 554–55.
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84. Ibid., 203b, 555.
85. And Diotima’s analogy here nicely squares with the image of Love as a
trickster-figure: ‘‘he brings his father’s resourcefulness to his designs upon the beautiful and the good, for he is gallant, impetuous, and energetic, a mighty hunter,
master of device and artifice—at once desirous and full of wisdom’’ (ibid., 203d).
86. Ibid., 204a, 556 (emphasis added).
87. See Plato, Lysis 217e–218a; 161–62:
when it is not evil as yet, though evil be present with[in] it, this very presence
of evil makes it desirous of good, but the presence which makes it evil
deprives it, at the same time, of its desire and friendship for good. . . . On
the same ground, we may further assert that those who are already wise are
no longer friends to wisdom, be they gods or be they men; nor, again, are
those friends to wisdom who are so possessed of foolishness as to be evil,
for no evil and ignorant man is a friend to wisdom. There remain, then,
those who possess indeed this evil, the evil of foolishness, but who are not,
as yet, in consequence of it, foolish or ignorant, but who still understand
that they do not know the things they do not know.
In reading this, we must recall here that ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘evil’’ do not have a modern
deontic sense but rather refer to what helps or harms us, aiding or detracting from
our well-being.
88. This idea is perhaps clearest in the Phaedrus, when, upon seeing his beloved,
the Charioteer’s memory ‘‘goes back to that form of beauty’’ that he had glimpsed
as a disembodied soul in his former life (245b, 500).
89. Plato, Symposium, 204c, 556.
90. Ibid., 205b, 557.
91. Ibid., 205e, 558.
92. Ibid., 210c, 562.
93. Ibid., 210d, 562.
94. Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 110. In this
passage, Gadamer is clearly also alluding to Kierkegaard’s enigmatic thesis in EitherOr that ethical choice begins in or depends upon the fundamental choice to be a
chooser.
95. Ferrari, ‘‘Platonic Love,’’ 251–52.
96. Ibid., 252.
97. Ibid., 253.
98. Ibid., 255.
99. Plato, Symposium 206e, 558.
100. Ibid., 207d, 559.
101. Ibid., 212a, 563.
102. I take this idea that the Symposium involves a proto-version of Aristotle’s
function argument from Andrew Payne’s insightful essay, ‘‘Practical Reason and
the Comparison of Lives in the Speech of Diotima,’’ 4. The idea that Aristotle
derived his conception of teleology in general from Plato’s Symposium and Phaedo
was taught by Thomas Gould in mentoring my senior thesis in 1989.
103. Gould, The Ancient Quarrel, op cit., 9.
104. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 1, Art. 5, Respondo.
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105. Nygren, Agape and Eros, 175.
106. Vlastos, ‘‘The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato,’’ reprinted in
Soble, Eros, Agape, and Philia, 110.
107. Ibid. John Bretlinger has challenged this point in his reply to Nygren
titled ‘‘The Nature of Love,’’ reprinted in Soble, Eros, Agape, and Philia. But his
argument depends on denying the possibility of love as essentially particularistic
care, and he mistakenly suggests that Nygren’s criticism depends on attributing to
Plato the view that ‘‘if a person loves x because he believes x to have the property
G, he must be using x as a means to G’’ (Soble, 141). While this principle is
indeed false, the formal egoism of Platonic eros is not based on making the loved
object instrumental to the agent’s good. Rather it is found in Plato’s understanding
of what it is for an agent to desire some good for its own sake. On the erosiac
model, desiring something X as a final end just is desiring unity with the value of
X as part of one’s own completeness. My analysis shows how Diotima’s speech
confirms this. Bretlinger misses this point entirely when he writes that ‘‘All men
are alike in trying to satisfy their desires, and thus it shows nothing about the
egocentricity of a concept of love to show that it involves desire’’ (141). For
Nygren’s point is precisely that Plato’s concept of desire itself, including desire for
final ends, is formally egoistic.
108. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 3, Art. 1, Rep. 2; in the Treatise on
Happiness, trans. Oesterle, 28.
109. Ibid., I–II Qu. 5, Art. 4 (Oesterle, 59).
110. Ibid., I–II Qu. 2, Art. 4 (Oesterle, 19–20).
111. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, chap. 19.3, 117. I am indebted
to Daniel Moloney for this reference.
112. An obvious example pertinent to Diotima’s analogies would be the case
where a young couple have sex out of mere instinctual desire and nine months later
find themselves proud parents.
113. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 4, Art. 2, Obj. 2 (Oesterle, 42).
114. Ibid., Qu. 2, Art. 6, Respondo (Oesterle, 23).
115. Although (c) refers to any by-product good, whereas ‘‘delight’’ or psychological satisfaction is only one kind of by-product good.
116. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 4, Art. 2, Respondo (Oesterle, 42).
117. Ferrari, ‘‘Platonic Love,’’ 256.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid., 257.
120. Ibid., 258.
121. Ibid., 259–60.
122. An alternative terminology would be to call them ‘‘pursuable’’ goods, but
this might give the wrong impression that we mean to pick out those goods that
are practically feasible or probably attainable in our circumstances.
123. Rist, The Mind of Aristotle, esp. 182–88.
124. Annas, Morality of Happiness.
125. Watson, ‘‘On the Primacy of Character.’’
126. Frankfurt, ‘‘Identification and Wholeheartedness,’’ 171.
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127. Mele, Autonomous Agents, chap. 1.
128. Thus, for example, we might place Alexander Nehamas’s studies of Plato
largely in the second category, though he also writes in the third category; and
whereas MacIntyre’s reconstructions of Aristotle in After Virtue largely fit in the
third category, his analyses in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? are closer to the second
category.
129. Heroic courage as a model for striving will reappears later (but only in
distorted form) in works related to political theory that remain more or less at
odds with the traditions of philosophical ethics stemming from Socrates—for example, in Machiavelli and Hobbes.
130. I am not here considering the difficult question of whether Plato remained committed to a tripartite moral psychology in later works. On this, see the
helpful discussion in Robinson, Plato’s Psychology, chap. 7. However, I am suspicious
of Robinson’s hypothesis that the soul appears as tripartite in the Republic only to
help facilitate the political theory of the three classes (121). I agree with John
Cooper that it is more likely the reverse, that is, that the division of classes is
modeled on a psychology Plato already believes on independent grounds: see
Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 120. Angela Hobbs also responds to Robinson in Plato
and the Hero, 4–5.
131. It is true, however, that in Laws IX, Plato distinguishes the sort of motivation arising from anger and other passions from the sort arising from desire for
bodily or sensual pleasures of several kinds. But this does not mean that the passions that threaten justice are identified with thumos.
132. Oberdiek, ‘‘The Will,’’ 465. Thus Oberdiek sees Plato as ‘‘offering, for
the first time in Western philosophy, the materials and suggestive metaphors out
of which modern notions of the will evolved’’ (464).
133. Republic IV, 439e (in Shorey’s translation), or ‘‘the desiring temper’’ (in
Rouse).
134. Cooper argues persuasively that Plato sees this desire as fundamentally of
the same kind as our basic biological urges for food, drink, and sex. Although
Leontius’s urge apparently arises from imagination, ‘‘it is nonetheless a brute fact
about the way his being is affected by the physical world,’’ rather than stemming
from any rational insight into the good (Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 129). Unlike
Cooper, I distinguish between D1 desires, which are fixed in their generic end by
instinct, and D2 desires, which are brute preferences in Cooper’s sense but for
more specifically conceived objects. Many D2 desires will be specifications of D1
inclinations (or ‘‘transformations’’ of them, as Cooper puts it, 128); however this
D2 category also includes other brute preferences as well. Some of these will be
desires arising from imaginative specifications of other more variant urges, like the
desire to see violence, or enjoyment of shock or thrill, or even ‘‘necrophilious’’
inclinations (in Fromm’s broad sense of the term). My taxonomy thus largely
agrees with Cooper’s but makes a few more distinctions.
135. See C. Taylor, ‘‘Responsibility for Self.’’
136. Vander Waerdt, ‘‘The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s Tripartite Psychology,’’ 300.
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137. Plato, Republic IV, 440d.
138. For this point, I am indebted to Meyer, ‘‘Thumos, Endurance, and Emotion in Plato’s Republic.’’
139. As Terence Irwin and other commentators have argued. However, this
interpretation is challenged by David Engel, who argues that Plato never does
admit that a person can willingly do wrong because Plato’s standards for knowledge of the good are so high: see his paper, ‘‘Plato’s Denial of Willful
Wrongdoing.’’
140. Carr, ‘‘The Cardinal Virtues and Plato’s Moral Psychology,’’ 189. Carr
assimilates Plato’s middle soul to ‘‘will’’ rather quickly, but clearly what he means
by ‘‘will’’ here is not the process of forming specific intentions to act but rather a
distinct motivational process related to self-control, courage, and endurance. My
point, of course, is that this kind of effort also represents a crucial sense of ‘‘willing’’ that is lost in contemporary action theory.
141. Plato, Republic IV, 440c.
142. Plato, Republic IV, 441a. Since the main point in this section is to show
that the high spirit is something other than reason, Socrates follows this example
with a quote from Homer in which reason chides the heart, standing for the middle
part of the soul. Because it is an independent source of motivation, this middle
part can come under rational criticism, even though, rightly trained, it strengthens
the agent’s desire to follow reason’s purposes.
143. And there is a good deal of insight in this: in my experience, even from
the age of fourteen months or so, children can display what can only be described
as a spirited will to autonomy to prove that they can ‘‘do it themselves,’’ or be
successful by their own efforts (though some display this disposition more than
others). And if Plato is right, then a smart parent will do well in trying to channel
this energy in productive directions rather than just trying to crush this fledgling
spirit entirely (as the ‘‘Eastern’’ attitude discussed in chapter 2 would evidently
have us do). Nor should the wise parent inflame this fledgling spirit by mocking
the child for its weaknesses. Too much control or shaming can damage the child’s
future confidence in her abilities and her developing sense that her efforts acquire
at least some intrinsic value just from being her own.
144. Williams, Shame and Necessity, chap. 2, ‘‘Centres of Agency,’’ 21.
145. Ibid., 26 and 24.
146. Ibid., 32.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid., 33.
149. Ibid., 34.
150. Ibid., 36.
151. Pink, Psychology of Freedom, 28. Thus Pink dismisses Williams’s ‘‘special
scorn’’ for ‘‘the idea that decision-making is a second-order executive agency’’ with
the rejoinder that ‘‘What is more plausibly a peculiarity of ‘bad philosophy’ . . . is
the attempt to conceive the freedom and agency of our decision-making in [purely]
deliberative terms, as a freedom and agency of practical judgment’’ (31–32).
152. Williams, Shame and Necessity, 36.
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153. Ibid., 37–38.
154. Ibid., 39–40.
155. Ibid., 41.
156. Ibid. As we will see, this error itself derives from Kant. Ironically enough,
Williams takes it over uncritically, making a straw man out of his notion of the
modern will.
157. The existence of several rival bipartite theories and the influential misreading of Plato in the Magna moralia 1182a24–26 (which attributes a bipartite
theory to him) is very helpfully explained in Vander Waerdt, ‘‘The Peripatetic
Interpretation of Plato’s Tripartite Psychology.’’
158. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.13, 1102a33–b28. Unless otherwise noted,
all citations are to the Ross translation in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. II.
159. This would explain for Aristotle why Plato suggested a few times that
the middle soul is always reason’s ally: Aristotle could accommodate this within
his framework by assuming that Plato was thinking in these cases of the virtuous
thumos.
160. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.13, 1102b33–34.
161. Since Aristotle also goes on to compare this kind of exhortation and
reproof to that which a child receives from its father, we have another analogy for
the parts of the soul implied here as well: the fetus and infant are purely vegetative;
while the child from a young age (perhaps four to five) through the beginning of
adolescence exhibits rational appetite; and in the young adult abstract speculative
reason finally blossoms.
162. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.13, 1102b29–31.
163. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 62.
164. Ibid., 63–65.
165. Ibid., 66. In the cases where there is resistance, the rational part seems to
operate half by browbeating and charismatic influence and half by appeal to trust
and personal bond (which has to be fostered first). This is without doubt the case
in getting very young children to begin doing what is right with some minimal
voluntariness on their side. And the same thing can be necessary with an adult in
volitionally difficult circumstances: for example, think of Gandalf persuading Bilbo
to give up the One Ring in Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings.
166. As Broadie says, in the virtuous person, ‘‘It is as if the nonrational [desiring] part is, from itself, a practical tabula rasa’’ (ibid., 66). What she means is that
in Aristotle’s virtuous person, the only felt PPMs that get taken up into purposes
or become ‘‘incipient actions’’ are those that cohere negatively and positively with
practical reason’s favored ends. Yet, as she notes, this kind of perfect harmony is
also possible in principle even when practical reason’s vision of the good is thoroughly corrupted (67), which may be a problem for Aristotle.
167. Oberdiek, ‘‘The Will,’’ 466.
168. This idea of a generic faculty of erosiac motivation is perhaps even more
clearly formulated by Thomas Aquinas, and one finds it in every thinker who
closely follows his moral psychology, e.g., C. S. Lewis, Abolition of Man.
169. And it is in this form, of course, that we see the ‘‘middle part of the soul’’
as a true composite of two subdivisions of the two most basic psychic faculties on a
fundamentally bipartite taxonomy.
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170. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.3, 1113a11.
171. Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 239. In order sharply to distinguish Aristotle’s
view from that of the Stoics, Cooper attributes to Aristotle a kind of vector-sum
model in which the strongest desire will initiate action or cause a voluntary movement. But this sort of determinism is problematic, and we should want to rescue
Aristotle from such a view if possible. For one thing, the agent has to have some
way of specifying the means to her end, or the particular action she will do in
order to realize her goal. And prohairesis plays this specificatory function in Aristotle’s scheme. If prohairesis can be motivated by nonrational desires rather than boulēsis
without reflective practical reasoning employing objective value-criteria, then Aristotle’s position would still be recognizably different from that of the Stoics, who
held that all the motivation involved in the purposes behind our voluntary action
can be turned off or on by different practical judgments. Perhaps one can move
Aristotle a bit closer to the Stoics’ more developed model of intention-formation
without committing him to their intellectualism.
172. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 79.
173. Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 240.
174. See the Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 6–Qu. 8.
5. Aristotelian Desires and the Problems of Egoism
1. Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 241. I have expanded Cooper’s abbreviated titles
in this passage. I also find it curious that he treats the Magna moralia as a work by
Aristotle, since the scholarly consensus now seems to be against this.
2. Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life, 53.
3. Ibid., 55.
4. I am not sure that this is Hauerwas’s complaint, because a passage about
right reason as judging ends according to their pure measure (58) seems to be in
tension with this reading of Hauerwas.
5. See Aristotle, De anima, II.3, 415a6–7: ‘‘Again, among living things that
possess sense, some have the power of locomotion, some not’’ (560).
6. In general, it seems that consciousness, as opposed to powers of soul and the
epistemic capacities of sense and mind (nous), simply does not occur to Plato,
Aristotle, and their predecessors as a separate problem. Something like the notion
of subjectivity is included in the Eleatic distinction between appearances and reality,
and it motivates later skepticism, but consciousness as a phenomenon does not
seem to get distinct treatment until Augustine.
7. Aristotle, De anima, III.9, 432b15–20. See also III.10, 433a, and III.11,
434a1–2.
8. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, 81.
9. Consider the famous example of the Sphex wasp, presented in Daniel Dennett, ‘‘Mechanism and Responsibility,’’ from Essays on Freedom of Action (1973), reprinted in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson, repr. 162.
10. Although the wasp’s behavior is triggered by various sensations, it is not
unreasonable to assume that there is no phenomenal experience of these sensations, i.e.,

................. 16406$

NOTE

05-23-07 10:55:08

PS

PAGE 571

572

Notes to Pages 124–126

that they are mere physiological reactions without there being anything that ‘‘it is
like’’ to be the wasp.
11. See, e.g., Miller, Body Question, 39:
Our nervous system is designed to emphasize what’s going on in the outside
world. . . . The inside of the body—blood vessels, heart, intestine, lungs,
and bladder—is literally studded with instruments capable of registering
changes in pressure, temperature, and chemical composition. But none of
these meters has any dials: they are not meant to be read by human consciousness, but are linked up with reflex systems which obey automatically.
12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (trans. Ross), III.1, 1109b35: ‘‘Those things,
then, are thought involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to
ignorance.’’
13. Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand, 141. Note that Lear uses ‘‘desire’’ for
orexis in general, and ‘‘appetite’’ for epithumia. He rightly argues that the Oxford
translation is misleading, since it uses ‘‘appetite’’ both for lower urges (epithumia)
‘‘and for the word that is standardly translated as ‘desire’ (orexis)’’ which is more
general (142, n. 110). The Smith translation of the De anima unfortunately employs
‘‘appetite’’ throughout for the general concept (orexis) and ‘‘desire’’ for lower appetites, which is the inverse of Lear’s translation. In order to avoid confusion I have
simply noted the Greek terms in square brackets.
14. De anima, II.3, 415a7–12. However, the possibility of a conscious computer would cast doubt on this thesis.
15. Thus D1 desires cannot count as emotions. I suggest that emotions typically require D3 desires that include some value-judgment, even if the agent does
not assent to the judgment or identify with the emotion. Nussbaum tries to explain
this distinction, e.g., between startle (which is not an emotion) and fear (which is)
by arguing that the latter involves actually holding a value-belief (Therapy of Desire,
84–85). Since Robert Roberts has critiqued this account, it may be better to look
at the distinction between D3 and other kinds of desire to explain this difference.
16. Desmond, Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness, 18.
17. MacIntyre, ‘‘How Moral Agents Became Ghosts,’’ 303.
18. Ibid., 302–4.
19. In order to compare the relative strengths of D2 appetites, one may qualify
them as ‘‘buffer-free’’ in Mele’s sense (see Autonomous Agents, 38–40).
20. It is an interesting question whether some D2 appetites can also develop
in relative independence from any underlying instinctual drive. Perhaps this is more
likely the more fine-grained the D2 preference is. For example, I may have a very
crude musical inclination for classical over pop, or a very refined preference for
Mozart over Beethoven over Brahms, without any basis in aesthetic evaluation.
More radically, Levinas argues that our ‘‘enjoyment’’ of the ‘‘elements’’ of the material world includes pleasures that have no instinctive basis: ‘‘there is a non-systematic accumulation of occupations and tastes,’’ such as desire for cigarettes, that are
neither moral nor instinctual (see Totality and Infinity, 133–34). However, some of
the things Levinas would include in this category could also be interpreted as D3
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desires involving aesthetic judgments, such as tastes for ‘‘the fine cigarette lighter,
the fine car’’ (140).
21. This is an implication of Mele’s version of the thesis that we act on our
strongest desires—specifically his principle P1n (Autonomous Agents, 40).
22. C. Taylor, ‘‘Responsibility for Self,’’ 116.
23. Ibid., 114.
24. See C. Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 37–39.
25. However, I do not mean to import into the definition of D2 desires anything like the formal apparatus of restrictions on preferences which rational decision theorists have evolved.
26. Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 243.
27. Watson, ‘‘Free Agency,’’ 101.
28. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality, 75–76.
29. Watson, ‘‘Free Agency,’’ 101.
30. MacIntyre, ‘‘How Moral Agents Became Ghosts,’’ 304.
31. This is directly connected to the kind of ‘‘practical ultimacy’’ or ‘‘categorical nature’’ of the evaluative imperatives involved in prohairesis that distinguishes
them from the hypothetical imperatives of skill according to Aristotle; see Broadie,
Ethics with Aristotle, 89.
32. This may be the agent herself or someone else who is an expert in her
evaluative tradition and its underlying theory of rationality.
33. D. Lewis, ‘‘Desire as Belief II,’’ 304.
34. Ibid., 303.
35. Ibid., 304.
36. Ibid., 305. Of course, the sort of externalism about ethical motivation that
Lewis espouses here is not itself accepted by Hume, who (as noted in chap. 3, sec.
1.3) would rather say that no one could have ‘‘our’’ evaluative convictions about
joy, knowledge, and love without having our desires for these things. But Lewis’s
position remains Humean in the broader sense that he sees motivation as external
to the purely cognitive element in our practical syllogisms.
37. Ibid., 306. According to Lewis, this would make the necessity a merely
conceptual or definitional one rather than ‘‘any de re necessity in nature’’ (306).
Thus if you fail to care about objective value or ethical reality, the only danger is
that ‘‘your inner states will fail to deserve folk-psychological names’’ (307). But
that would be true only if ‘‘desire’’ had such a definitional role in folk psychology
by mere convention, rather than because our folk concepts track psychological necessities of human nature or requirements for the flourishing of persons as such.
38. Ibid., 308–9.
39. For this reason, several debates about desire today start with the understanding that something’s being desirable for an agent is distinct from his actually
desiring it, and focus on various possible deliberative or communicative conditions
for desirability. For example, Morton White interprets desirability as ‘‘what we
ought to desire or have a moral duty to desire,’’ and attributes to John Dewey the
position that ‘‘a thing is said to be desirable just in case we know the causal antecedents and consequences of desiring it’’ (M. White, ‘‘Desire and Desirability,’’
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230–31). Against this, White objects that if my desire not to smoke opium originated from considering it in a normal state of mind, and I knew the consequences
of smoking it, this would hardly make the desire morally obligatory. He also holds
that desirability cannot depend on our actually desiring the consequences of having
the desire (231–32), and that the distinction between desire and desirability is not
analogous to the distinction between apparent and real qualities. Thus a pragmatic
reduction of ‘‘This apple is really red’’ cannot be transferred to ‘‘This apple is
desirable’’ (236–37). These are the kinds of semantic questions raised by D3-type
desires. The notion of objective desirability required for D3 desires need not be
restricted to ‘‘moral desirability,’’ although it is limited to well-being. Both D3
desires and projective motivation have often been discussed under the ambiguous
heading of ‘‘desirability.’’
40. Mele, ‘‘Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness,’’ 734.
41. Aristotle, De anima, III.9, 597, 432b27–34.
42. Ibid., III.10, 598, 433a15–17.
43. Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 241–42. Cooper indicates some ambiguity over
whether prohairesis always involves boulēsis as its motive engine or whether it can also
take some form of nonrational desire (see Cooper, 242, n. 4). I think it is clear
that Aristotle usually thinks of prohairesis as involving boulēsis.
44. John McDowell, ‘‘Virtue and Reason,’’ 345. McDowell acknowledges the
distinction (see 335).
45. Aristotle, De anima, II.2, 558, 413b21–23.
46. Ibid., II.3, 559, 414b12.
47. Ibid., III.11, 599, 434a1–3: ‘‘Clearly they have feelings of pleasure and
pain, and if they have these, then they must have desire.’’ So these feelings are
sufficient conditions for desire.
48. Ibid., III.10, 433b7–9.
49. This is not to deny that ‘‘cultural’’ factors in the most general sense will
usually play a role in how exactly an instinctive urge is specified or what objects we
fix on, since D2 inclinations are open to a large amount of adaptation and social
molding, as the influence of television advertising shows (even the desire for chocolate ice cream may be influenced by seeing others we admire preferring it to vanilla).
Moreover, I do not deny that there will be borderline cases between the clear
domains of these two subdivisions.
50. Watson, ‘‘Free Agency,’’ in Free Will, 104.
51. Ibid., 105.
52. Ibid.
53. Sober and Wilson, Unto Others, 211.
54. In other words, epithumetic desires would count as what Jon Elster calls
‘‘visceral’’ states, including ‘‘drives such as hunger, thirst, and sexual desire’’ (Strong
Feelings, 1–2), or what Craig Delancey calls ‘‘affect programs’’ (Passionate Engines,
5–6).
55. Aristotle, De anima, II.3, 559, 414b1–5.
56. Ibid., III.9, 596, 432b5–8.
57. Ibid., III.10, 598, 433a22–27.
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58. Lear, Aristotle, 143. Again, by ‘‘desiring,’’ Lear means what our translation
of the De Anima means by ‘‘appetite.’’
59. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, sec. 13, 1102b.16, 1741.
60. Ibid., 1102b.26–31, 1742.
61. And as Lear explains, in the Nicomachean Ethics ‘‘deliberated choice’’ (prohairesis) or decision follows:
only after a process of deliberation. Aristotle’s theory of deliberation (bouleusis) is a theory of the transmission of desire. The agent begins with a desire
or wish (boulēsis) for an object. The object of wish appears to be good to the
agent. But the appearance helps to constitute the wish itself . . . an agent’s
awareness that he wishes for a certain end is itself a manifestation of that
wish.
(Lear, Aristotle, 143).
62. Aristotle, De Anima, III.10, 598, 433a18–20 (emphasis added).
63. Lear, Aristotle, 142 (emphasis added).
64. Ibid., 149.
65. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 69.
66. Ibid., 68–69.
67. Ibid., 66.
68. Ibid., 67.
69. Ibid., 70. Notice the clear reference to the agent’s own good in this formulation, as opposed to a later formulation on the same page, in terms of the question:
What is it best for me to do? This latter formulation is ambiguous between what
it is best that I do (which, for Kant, might be determined by deontic standards of
justice) and what it is best for me that I do. For MacIntyre, unlike Kant, these
judgments must agree, but that is because he grounds the former normative judgment in the latter eudaimonistic judgment.
70. Ibid., 71.
71. Ibid., 72.
72. Ibid., 74.
73. Ibid., 75.
74. Ibid., 76.
75. Ibid., 85–86 (emphasis added).
76. Ibid., 87.
77. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 32. This also relates to
the question of justifying the virtuous life to egoists ‘‘from the outside,’’ which I
treat in the discussion of Hursthouse in chapter 8, sec. 5.5.
78. Jensen, Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson’s Ethical Theory, 17.
79. Ibid., 15.
80. Ibid., 16. However, Hutcheson offers other arguments against psychological
egoism that may be more successful against formal egoism, such as the argument
that people sometimes act from purely altruistic motives that are not reducible to
sympathetic passions (17–19).
81. Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, 33.
82. Ibid., 25.

................. 16406$

NOTE

05-23-07 10:55:10

PS

PAGE 575

576

Notes to Pages 146–150

83. Ibid., 29. Nor, unfortunately, does it seem that Tillich’s treatment of agapē
in chap. 7 exempts agapic love from this formal structure.
84. In Principia Ethica, chap. III, sec. 59, G. E. Moore nicely distinguishes between getting something that is good and the goodness of my getting or possessing
it (98). But he obscures the agent-relative character of the latter value by insisting
that in both cases we are really talking about an agent-neutral good to whose goodness it is irrelevant that it is coming to me (as an indexical referent to the deliberating agent). From this confusion, he reasons that the egoist who says that his
possessing some beneficial X is good is committed to the thesis that anyone’s
possessing X is good, and therefore egoism (formulated in agent-neutral terms) as
the view ‘‘that each man’s happiness is the sole good’’ is self-contradictory (99). If
only it were this easy to refute egoism!
85. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 91–92.
86. Ibid., 95.
87. Annas, Morality of Happiness, 129.
88. Ibid., 28.
89. Ibid., 35.
90. Ibid., 35.
91. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, 275.
92. Ibid., 35.
93. Ibid., 30.
94. John Oesterle, introduction to Aquinas, Treatise on Happiness, xiii.
95. As Christine Korsgaard has shown, this is the root of serious problems
with moral egoism as a doctrine of practical reason that is supposed to show that
(1) egoistic principles are naturalistic constructions based on what seems naturally
or prima facie good (e.g., the satisfaction of our desires); and (2) egoistic principles
can have normative force. See Korsgaard, The Myth of Egoism.
96. Oesterle, introduction to Treatise on Happiness (trans. Oesterle), xiii.
97. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, 276.
98. Thus moral egoism does not entail psychological egoism. It is often
thought that the inverse obtains, but see note 110 below.
99. See Robert O’Connell, S.J., Plato on the Human Paradox, 10–11.
100. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 86, 568 (emphasis added).
101. Feinberg, ‘‘Psychological Egoism,’’ in Reason and Responsibility.
102. Ibid., 547–48, sec. 4b.
103. Ibid., 549 (some emphasis omitted). The truism Feinberg cites may not
be analytic in the sense of logically tautologous, given the meaning of the terms,
but it may be metaphysically necessary, given the concept of action.
104. Korsgaard, The Myth of Egoism, 17.
105. Ibid., 24. Korsgaard is responding here to Williams’s analysis of egoism
in ‘‘Egoism and Altruism,’’ in Problems of the Self.
106. This kind of self-absorption, e.g., in demanding that we be the one to
find the cure, rather than just willing that a cure be found, is also the heart of the
problem in perverse romantic attitudes, as I have argued in Davenport, ‘‘The Ethical and Religious Significance of Taciturnus’s Letter,’’ 226–27.
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107. Korsgaard, The Myth of Egoism, 23. Korsgaard makes an interesting argument that desires as natural items in our psychology may often aim at results that
are patently not good for us or that only seem by rationalization to add to our
well-being (16). This supports an intriguing argument that rational egoism is a
dogmatic realist doctrine. My construction of psychological egoism does not conflict with this argument, since it requires only the idea that desires as natural items
can aim at first-order objects that are seen in some way as good for the agent. It
does not require that the agent sees every such object as a net benefit or as causing
an overall improvement in her well-being.
108. Moore, Principia Ethica, 97–98.
109. Bernard Gert has argued that Hobbes himself did not really hold this
kind of psychological egoism; see Gert’s Introduction to Hobbes, Man and Citizen,
4–12. But whether or not this is right, Hobbes as traditionally read has come to
represent a paradigm version of egoism in the sense defined here.
110. For a general account of MME as a maximizing principle, see Parfit’s
account of ‘‘the self-interest theory’’ of practical reason (or S) in Reasons and Persons,
chap. 1, 3–4. See also Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Book II, chap. 1, which defines
‘‘egoistic hedonism’’ as the doctrine that ‘‘each individual should aim at his own
greatest happiness,’’ and attributes this position (paradoxically, I think) to Bentham
(119). Also compare Kraut’s insightful distinctions among three MME doctrines
that differ in the kind of consideration they allow us to give to the interests of
others; see Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good, chap. 2.1. All three include a maximizing imperative. For instance, ‘‘All legitimate reasons for actions, according to pure
egoism, must take this form: this act will maximize my own good’’ (78). This
conception of ‘‘pure egoism’’ directly applies the maximization test to each act,
while Parfit’s S does not. There are other imaginable imperatives that give the
interests of others zero weight or less weight than our own interests without requiring us to maximize our own interests. But because they may allow the agent to
harm his own greater interests or even to prefer a very minor pleasure for himself
that requires the death of others to a great good that he could have secured at no
cost to others, such imperatives might better be called perversely egoistic than rationally egoistic.
111. And for this reason, psychological egoism does not entail rational egoism
or moral egoism if these must include a maximization requirement. The psychological egoist says that all our actions are ultimately motivated only by the desire to
secure some self-related first-order good (or perhaps also some self-related secondorder good, in complex psychological egoism), and this rules out an independent
desire for the good (or harm) of others as final ends. But believing that human
beings are naturally concerned only with their own welfare does not entail the
judgment that such beings should be rational maximizers of their welfare or should
not be irrational or thoughtless egoists. If the MPE theorist endorses any theory
of practical reason, it will probably have to be some version of MME; but she
might without any logical inconsistency endorse no theory of practical reason at
all. Or she might endorse a nihilistic morality on the grounds that if MPE is true,
life is so absurd that it does not matter what we do.
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112. Feinberg, ‘‘Psychological Egoism,’’ 550–51.
113. Ibid., 551.
114. Caputo and Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 148 (emphasis in original).
Note that by ‘‘the medievals,’’ Caputo must mean Aquinas, for certainly Scotus
and several others would protest most vehemently against the view he expresses
here.
115. Feinberg, ‘‘Psychological Egoism,’’ 550 (emphasis in original). Feinberg’s
distinction is not exactly the same as mine here, since I include entertainment and
the satisfaction of D1 desires as first-order pleasures. Also, Feinberg does not
clearly link his ‘‘paradox of hedonism’’ to the pragmatic contradiction of directly
pursuing second-order satisfaction (554). But my reconstruction will bring out this
connection.
116. Ibid., 552–53.
117. Morillo, ‘‘The Reward Event and Motivation,’’ 171. Morillo misconstrues these as arguments against PE itself; in fact they are only alleged defeaters
to arguments for PE.
118. Sober and Wilson, Unto Others, 212.
119. Rousseau, Discourse Concerning the Origins of Human Inequality.
120. Ibid., Part II, 77.
121. Ibid., Part II, 64.
122. Morillo, ‘‘The Reward Event and Motivation,’’ 174–75. Morillo here
refers to famous studies on the electrical stimulation of parts of the limbic system
in rats and their remarkable motivational effects, and to similar anecdotal evidence
from the direct stimulation caused by smoking crack cocaine.
123. Ibid., 177.
124. Ibid., 178. In my view, this may be true for many objects of our attention
that are important both for our survival (like food) and for the survival of our
offspring (like tending infants) but it becomes much more tenuous when extended
to goals like the friend’s good, or the creation of beauty, or the acquisition of
speculative knowledge with no evident technical application-value.
125. Ibid., 176. Morillo suggests here that ultimately the aesthetic pleasure of
Mozart is made of the same ‘‘stuff ’’ as the pleasure of eating, drinking, or having
sex.
126. Ibid., 180.
127. As Morillo says, ‘‘this is a kind of deep monism, which could be expressed
by saying that there is only one basic motive and only one basic object of motivation’’ (182).
128. Ibid., 178.
129. As Sober and Wilson note, ‘‘what begins as a purely instrumental desire
may get transformed into a desire that is functionally autonomous’’; see Sober and
Wilson, Unto Others, 221. They cite Slote (1964) and Kavka (1986) in support of
this point.
130. In Utilitarianism, chap. 2, Mill talks about the pleasures of challenging
work and the development of one’s talents as ‘‘excitement’’ and suggests that we
need a diverse range of such excitements to balance out the other fundamental
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component of happiness, which (following Epicurus) he calls ‘‘tranquility.’’ In
these two poles of Millian happiness we can see the Eastern and Western attitudes
pulling in diametrically opposite directions.
131. Feinberg, ‘‘Psychological Egoism,’’ 551.
132. Ibid., 551–52.
133. Ibid., 552.
134. See Mill, Utilitarianism, chap. 2.
135. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 6–7.
136. Ibid., 27–28.
137. Williams, ‘‘Critique of Utilitarianism,’’ 110.
138. Ibid., 113–14.
139. Frankfurt, ‘‘Rationality and the Unthinkable,’’ 178–80.
140. Technically, Parfit’s agent acting on or following theory S is not necessarily a simple material egoist in my sense, since S does not limit her to the pursuit
of materially self-related goods, i.e., to what Parfit calls ‘‘selfishness.’’ Rather, S can
be interpreted on the desire-fulfillment theory of well-being to count as ‘‘selfinterested’’ in the pursuit of agent-transcending ends when the agent happens to
desire these for their own sake, e.g., out of love for others (Parfit, Reasons and Persons,
5). But if this agent chooses E because (1) she just happens to desire E (in the D2
sense), and (2) she believes her happiness consists in the satisfaction of her D2
desires, and (3) she is committed to principle S, then E cannot be a purely agenttranscending end for her. If E is her beloved’s good, for example, then she acts not
on her desire for his well-being but only on this taken together with her policy of
trying to fulfill her desires in order to maximize her own well-being (understood
here as satisfaction of her desires). Her beloved might then reasonably complain
that she really sees him just as an occasion for her desire-fulfillment. Indeed, in
this application of S, it seems that it would be in her interest to arrange it so that
she has D2 desires for all and only those ends that are most easily realized. But
choosing them in this way is not choosing them for their own sake.
141. We could imagine this machine producing wave after wave of orgasmic
pleasure as often as possible to maximize the pleasurable feeling without damaging
the brain and with whatever variation would be necessary to avoid diminishing
pleasurable returns over time, etc. One early instance of this familiar kind of objection to the most brutal form of hedonism is Socrates’ response to Polus that the
life of a ‘‘catamite’’ (a boy prostitute/slave) cannot be the best life (Gorgias, 494e).
This point also stands behind Aristotle’s remark that the life that many people
think constitutive of happiness is ‘‘completely slavish’’ and is really ‘‘a life for
grazing animals’’ (Nicomachean Ethics I.5 1095b20–21). It is partially to avoid this
banality objection that Mill introduces his infamous distinction between ‘‘higher’’
and ‘‘lower’’ pleasures.
142. Korsgaard, The Myth of Egoism, 26.
143. Batson, Altruism Question. For this reference, I am indebted to John Neubauer’s dissertation, The Role of Feelings in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Fordham University,
2004), chap. 1.
144. Elster, Sour Grapes, chap. II, 43.
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145. Ibid., 44–50.
146. It is useful to compare this to Kant’s distinction between the ‘‘contradiction in concept’’ and ‘‘contradiction in willing’’ versions of the universal law formula (Groundwork, II, Ak 423–24). Of course, Kant is concerned about what either
an individual or all relevant moral agents who interact in the same world-system
could rationally will as a law for all possible moral agents without practical selfdefeat—as opposed to what an individual could will for himself alone. But his
distinction exists at the individual level as well, as Elster’s analysis shows.
147. Elster, Sour Grapes, 50.
148. It will therefore be part of the intended sequel to this volume.
149. Elster, Sour Grapes, 51. Elster mentions belief but does not explain why
such doxastic states are essentially by-products.
150. See Elster’s fascinating and extremely insightful discussion of such cases
in Sour Grapes, sec. II.4, 60–66.
151. See Elster’s three responses to this suggestion, 56–60. I return to some
of the problems with indirect strategies in later chapters. However, in previous
work I have in effect argued that volitional wantonness, in Frankfurt’s sense as the
complete absence of higher-order evaluative attitudes toward one’s first-order motives, cannot be intentionally produced even by indirectly self-erasing will (see Sour
Grapes, 58). Thus there is no return to naive aestheticism or the innocence of moral
ignorance for the ‘‘awakened aesthete.’’
6. Psychological Eudaimonism: A Reading of Aristotle
1. See Plato, Gorgias 465a.
2. An obvious problem, though, is that in Book X, Aristotle considers that
speculative science could be higher than political science. For other problems with
this notion of ‘‘a ladder, or pyramid of ends’’ involved in different crafts, see
Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 14–16.
3. Stephen White, Sovereign Virtue, 6. White lays particular emphasis on the
natural hierarchy among crafts as Aristotle’s primary basis for claiming that there
is a single highest end.
4. Hill, ‘‘Two Perspectives on the Ultimate End,’’ 100. My analysis will focus
on what Hill calls the subjective or ‘‘internal perspective’’ on the ultimate end taken
by the Ethics (106) rather than the ‘‘external perspective’’ that she argues is found
in the physical and metaphysical works. However, as I will suggest later, the metaphysical conception of the ultimate end as the animal’s ‘‘actualization of its form’’
(101) supports a holistic understanding of the way in which this end includes all
others.
5. White implies nonholistic inclusion when he says that for Aristotle, the
highest good is such that ‘‘we want it only because of itself, whereas we want all
the other ends because of it’’ (Sovereign Virtue, 9). White rightly cites the passage at
the start of the anti-regress argument in support of this reading. But elsewhere, he
implies that the end of politics holistically includes other ends: ‘‘The notion of
inclusion operating here, then, is hierarchical: the end of politics is to oversee and
coordinate the pursuit of a given range of other ends’’ (7).
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6. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Irwin, Translator’s Commentary, 174.
7. It is also false that the non-mereological whole is always superior in intrinsic
value to its parts, though this is harder to see (G. E. Moore is one of the few to
note this point). My activity of breaking the code on some lock could be intrinsically valuable as a display of rare skill, yet it might be a non-mereological part of
the larger activity of stealing some poor widow’s retirement savings from her safe,
which as a whole has negative intrinsic value.
8. Yet the critique of the life of pleasure seems to rely on a criterion of the
ultimate good—namely its comprehensiveness, which in turn requires that it involve the full use of our most valuable capacities—that is only established later.
So either Aristotle’s lecture is disorganized or, more likely, our text does not exactly
reflect Aristotle’s order of presentation, let alone a mature ‘‘fine copy’’ or completed
edit by Aristotle himself.
9. See Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 2, Art. 3, Obj. 3 and Reply 3.
10. Ibid., Qu. 2, Art. 8, Respondo.
11. Cf. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chaps. 3 and 10. In Fragility of
Goodness, Nussbaum qualifies this claim by noting that all the Greek thinkers she
discusses recognize ‘‘that the good life for a human being must to some extent,
and in some ways, be self-sufficient, immune to incursions of luck’’ (3). But in
chaps. 10 and 11 of Fragility, I think she underestimates the extent to which Aristotle tries to minimize the influence of luck.
12. Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, chap. 1, 13.
13. Specifically, Bostock says that the phrase ‘‘most complete’’ in the Function
Argument probably ‘‘just means ‘all-inclusive,’ as it appeared to do earlier when he
was speaking of an end or goal that is ‘most complete’ (1097a28–b21)’’ (20).
This derives from Bostock’s reconstruction of the ‘‘more complete’’ relation (22),
whose two conditions are comparative rather than maximal versions of the two
conditions in my definition of ‘‘most nonholistically inclusive.’’ However, Bostock
does not distinguish this from what I call holistic inclusion relations.
14. Nicomachean Ethics, Commentary, 184. Irwin calls this the ‘‘exclusive’’ as opposed to the ‘‘comprehensive’’ reading of this passage, which I discuss below. I
think it is clearer to describe this distinction in terms of two types of ‘‘inclusion’’:
the holistic or comprehensive relation of end parts to the whole end and the nonholistic or instrumental relation.
15. Ironically enough, Richard Kraut offers one such model as Aristotle’s considered view; see his highly nuanced and impressive book, Aristotle on the Human
Good, chap. 1. I discuss a few of Kraut’s ideas in sec. I.4.
16. On White’s reading, for example, the claim that ‘‘happiness is the only
thing we want solely for its own sake’’ (Sovereign Virtue, 10) seems to be based primarily on the empirical fact that politics is the only science that has a ‘‘comparably
general end’’ (8).
17. White describes the nonholistic and holistic alternatives this way: ‘‘Although we all have several ends we choose ‘because of themselves’ [i.e., as final],
we might also choose each of them for some one of them that we choose only
because of itself [unconditional completeness]. Or this supreme end might be the
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set of those ends as an organized whole’’ (ibid., 11). White is right that the holistic
alternative cannot ‘‘be all-inclusive’’ in the sense of a simple conjunction or mereological sum of all fully final ends; rather, ‘‘it needs a criterion or standard’’ for
ranking them (7).
18. Of course, this agrees with the earlier thesis that politics is the highest
craft, whose goal is our highest end. But there is a limit to the sociality of our
highest end implicit in the idea that it is the complete good appropriated or possessed by a single individual, bringing him total practical harmony in his own
psyche.
19. ‘‘Things, then, that are called complete in virtue of their own nature are so
called in all these senses . . . because they lack nothing in respect of goodness, and
cannot be excelled and no part proper to them can be found outside [them].’’
(Metaphysics 16 1021a30–33).
20. In this light, I find surprising the exclusivist reading of this passage advocated by Heineman, White, and Kenny, as described by Bostock:
a rival interpretation takes the point to be that eudaimonia does not already
include all goods, but may be considered as one among many goods, and
when so considered, it is the most choiceworthy of each of them taken
singly. But we can count ‘‘count it together’’ with those other goods, and in
that case it must of course be admitted that eudaimonia  x is more choiceworthy than eudaimonia by itself, where x is a good (however small) that is
not already included in eudaimonia. (Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, 23–24)
This is precisely the conclusion that Aristotle regards as absurd (given the sufficiency criterion) and thus as a reductio of any noninclusive conception of eudaimonia! For as Bostock points out, Aristotle clearly endorses the argument,
borrowed from Plato’s Philebus 20d–22c, that ‘‘x cannot be ‘the good’ if x  y is
better than x by itself ’’ (ibid., 24).
21. Nicomachean Ethics, Irwin’s commentary on I.7, sec. 5, 181–82.
22. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, 67.
23. Thus Irwin argues (69) that Plato can answer his own objection in the
Hippias Minor by saying that in practice virtue as the supreme craft will never be
misused, despite the logical possibility of its misuse.
24. Ibid., 73.
25. White finds support in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics and Rhetoric for the idea
that other final ends such as pleasure and justice can be seen as ‘‘parts of happiness’’
(Sovereign Virtue, 13).
26. Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand, 157, 160 (emphasis added).
27. See Davenport, ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics,’’ 293.
28. Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, 21. Bostock adds that such an inclusivist understanding of the highest good is clearly found in the Eudemian Ethics, according to
general consent.
29. Nicomachean Ethics, Irwin’s Commentary on I.7, sec. 3, 181.
30. Davenport, ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics,’’ 291–92. See also the
discussion in n. 91 (318–19), which puts in capsule form what I argue in chaps.
6–8 of this book.

................. 16406$

NOTE

05-23-07 10:55:14

PS

PAGE 582

Notes to Pages 184–188

583

31. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 1, Art. 6, Respondo (Oesterle, 10–11),
10–11. Aquinas also endorses the holistic interpretation of completeness in Qu.
3, Art. 2, Reply 2, where he approvingly cites Boethius’s idea that happiness as ‘‘a
general notion’’ is the complete ‘‘ ‘aggregation of all goods.’ ’’
32. Lewis, ‘‘Weight of Glory,’’ 28–29.
33. Ibid., 30.
34. Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, 26.
35. Hence it is important to emphasize that the weak version of Trans does
not say that if X is a ‘‘fully final’’ or ‘‘unqualifiedly complete’’ end (pursued only for
its own sake), then X must also be nonholistically all-inclusive in the sense that
every other final end is also desired as a means to X. For, as we saw, weak Trans
does not follow just from the idea of a fully/unqualifiedly final end, of which it is
conceptually possible for there to be several. The contrapositive of weak Trans
does, however, say that if X is not all-embracing or comprehensive, then it is not
fully/unqualifiedly final. Should we understand this to mean that any noncomprehensive final end must also be desired as an instrumental means to the embracing
good? Since, on this reading, weak Trans would be most implausible, we should
reinterpret it to say only that a noncomprehensive final end must be seen as part
of the one comprehensive good—not that it must be the subject of mixed motives,
being desired both for its own sake and also as an instrumental means to some
quite distinct end. For weak Trans to make sense, then, there must be two ways to
fail to be fully final: the nonholistic way (by being also desired as an instrumental
means) and the holistic way (by being final only as an integral part of the highest
final good). If we take ‘‘not fully final’’ in the first way, as requiring mixed motives,
then weak Trans will be implausible. But when we take this negative term in the
second way, weak Trans becomes only a little more than a tautology and hence
clearly far weaker than Plato’s version of Trans. Weak Trans, then, can do little
work in Aristotle’s eudaimonism: all the heavy lifting is done by the criteria of
self-sufficiency and comprehensiveness.
36. Aristotle himself notes that (2) follows from (4) when he argues that because ‘‘happiness lacks nothing, but is self-sufficient,’’ it must also be ‘‘choiceworthy in its own right,’’ or such that it is not done as a means to anything else (NE
X.6 1176b5–7).
37. Lear, Aristotle, 155.
38. Bostock apparently agrees, since he says of the self-sufficiency criterion,
‘‘There is no ambiguity here, and it is very difficult to see how a single ‘dominant’
end, such as theoretical activity, could satisfy this description’’ (i.e., being sufficient
all by itself ); Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, 23. Interestingly, Hardie agrees with this,
although he thinks it does not obviously square with the distinction between ‘‘two
main forms’’ of happiness in NE X.8. Hardie eventually attributes a dominant-end
view to Aristotle only because he sees that the inclusive view requires ‘‘a plurality
of ends,’’ but he mistakenly thinks this is incompatible with one end being ‘‘most
final’’ (Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 22–23).
39. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good, 25.
40. Ibid., 7.
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41. Ibid., 5.
42. This is also clear in n. 13 (8), where Kraut denies that happiness ‘‘includes’’
(holistically) the external intrinsic goods, although he affirms that a happy life will
‘‘contain’’ (nonholistically) these goods.
43. But Kraut does not clearly make this formal-material distinction (maybe
because Aristotle is also often unclear about it, despite implicitly requiring it).
44. It is important to beware of a possible confusion here. Kraut is not proposing that Aristotle holds both practical and intellectual virtue (or their related
goods) to be ultimate; that would be a contradiction. If both of them are completely or unqualifiedly final (not subsumed under any other as a means to it) then
there is no ultimate end in the sense of a maximally nonholistically inclusive goal.
45. Ibid., 8.
46. Purinton, ‘‘Aristotle’s Definition of Happiness,’’ 264.
47. Kraut, ‘‘Aristotle on the Human Good: An Overview,’’ 79.
48. One version of this would be the view Kraut describes as follows: ‘‘Here
is another possibility. The goal of the best life is a mixture of philosophical and
political activity, with more emphasis going to the former rather than to the latter.’’
Kraut rejects this notion of an ideal balance in favor of the formula that the most
eudaimon life is ‘‘the one that has the greatest amount of philosophical activity’’
(Aristotle on the Human Good, 51).
49. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good, 10–11.
50. Ibid., 84–85. Note that Kraut’s formula for weak egoism is ambiguous
about whether the benefit that accrues to the agent from his practically virtuous
action is part of his motive. However, it must be according to formal egoism. Thus
Kraut does not clearly ascribe formal egoism to Aristotle.
51. It is also hard to square the self-sacrificing view that Kraut ascribes to
Aristotle with Aristotle’s Diotima-like claim that ‘‘as far as we can, we ought to be
pro-immortal, and go to all lengths to live a life in accord with our supreme
element’’ (NE X.7 1177b34–35).
52. Here, as Kraut notes, we must insert whatever further conditions would
ensure that the phronimos would clearly judge this to be a case where helping the
parent is the noble thing to do in the circumstances.
53. Hardie, ‘‘The Final Good in Aristotle’s Ethics’’; and Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical
Theory, chap. 1: ‘‘The Final Good for Man.’’
54. Ackrill, ‘‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia.’’
55. Purinton, ‘‘Aristotle’s Definition of Happiness,’’ 260.
56. Ibid., 263.
57. Ibid., 260–61.
58. Ibid., 265.
59. Ibid., 265–66.
60. Ibid., 269–70.
61. Ibid., 271–72.
62. Ibid., 285–86. However, Purinton’s and Kraut’s rejection of the mixed
model of eudaimonia in X.7–8 does make it harder to square this part of Aristotle’s text with a holistic inclusivism (whether maximal or restricted to human virtues). My own guess is that Aristotle means to be describing study or
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contemplation as the most important activity in the complex whole of human
eudaimonia, and that he emphasizes its separateness (NE X.8 1178a23) to agree
with his account of the separable intellect as our divine element in the De anima.
63. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, 65, referring to Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics 1214b24–27.
64. On this point, see Mark Murphy’s helpful account of final causation models in his reconstruction of Aristotle’s function argument; Murphy, Natural Law and
Practical Rationality, chap. 1, sec. 2.
65. Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, 380–81.
66. Although, as we’ll see (perhaps surprisingly), it is unclear how within Aeudaimonism this sort of reflective knowledge can actually help our pursuit of F.
67. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 5, Art. 8, Respondo.
68. In this respect, Aquinas is more insightful, since he perceives that the jointure thesis and the eudaimonia thesis both require some defense, quite apart from
the more specific argument that M involves supernatural union with the Divine.
69. In other words, we can distinguish two versions of this thesis. In its unsaturated form, the jointure thesis asserts the existence of a highest motive that is the
holistic union of all our motives, or an ultimately final end that embraces all our
final ends, but it leaves the concept of F open beyond that. So this unsaturated
formulation does not require that the comprehensive or all-embracing motive be
erosiac. In its saturated form, the jointure thesis asserts the existence of a good
answering specifically to the erosiac concept of F: in this formulation, it has the
strong erosiac thesis as a corollary.
70. Nicomachean Ethics I.7 1097a37.
71. Hill, ‘‘Two Perspectives on the Ultimate End,’’ 107. Thus Hill shares my
view that the function argument is the key to Aristotle’s account of M rather than
to his account of F.
72. Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, chap. 7: ‘‘Moral Standards and
the Distinguishing Mark of Man,’’ 64–65.
7. The Paradox of Eudaimonism: An Existential Critique
1. Note that, as Annas herself argues in The Morality of Happiness, almost all
ancient ethical doctrines are eudaimonistic in form.
2. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II Qu. 2, Art. 3, Rep. 1. The point here is that
virtuous works are not done for the sake of honor, for then ‘‘this would no longer
be virtue but ambition.’’ Honor is properly a by-product of virtuous works. But it
is not clear why one’s own happiness is a more virtuous incentive than honor.
3. By this Aristotle is apparently referring to the Platonic idea that a person
with a virtue must know the good aimed at by that virtue, for he goes on to downplay the significance of this cognitive condition relative to the importance of the
disposition of choice produced by practicing virtuous acts. So understood, this
cognitive condition says that understanding the agent-neutral moral value of one’s
act is essential to virtuous motivation, although simply reflecting speculatively on
its good will hardly be sufficient for virtuous motivation. But Aristotle may also
be referring to the point made later in his discussion of voluntariness (NE III.1)
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that to be held accountable, the agent must know the circumstances of his act
sufficiently for him to intend it as this particular act under one description rather
than another description of his behavior; we are obviously not virtuous if the
description under which our behavior would be a virtuous act is not the one we
intend in performing it.
4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.4, 1105a.29–33, Ross/Urmson translation.
5. Ibid., III.6, 1115b.13–14.
6. Aristotle may have this point in mind when he argues that:
every excellence both brings into a good condition the thing of which it is
the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g., the
excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good, for it is by the
excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly, the excellence of the horse
makes a horse both good in itself and good at running . . . the excellence of
man also will be the state which makes a man good and which makes him
do his work well. (Ibid., II.6, 1106a.15–23)
A horse does not perform well just in order to qualify as a good horse; when it needs
constant incentive, it is not yet a good horse. But when it performs well for no
other end than performing well, it is good. Similarly, human persons are properly
functioning and thus ‘‘happy’’ in the fullest sense only when they are purely motivated to act for the sake of the noble.
7. On the latter issue, see Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 38.
8. Ibid., 36.
9. Von Wright, Varieties of Goodness, 142 and 145.
10. Ibid., 143.
11. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 93.
12. Ibid., 94.
13. Ibid., 94.
14. Edmund Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues, 112, citing Dewey, Human Nature
and Conduct, 7.
15. On this topic, see Frank, ‘‘Is Subjectivity a Non-Thing, and Absurdity
[Unding]?’’ See also Henrich’s essay, ‘‘Fichte’s Original Insight,’’ and of course
Sartre’s discussion of prethetic self-consciousness in Being and Nothingness, Part I.
16. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 94–95.
17. I think it is an open question whether all the kinds of ethical evaluation
that go into discerning different kinds of ‘‘nobility’’ in actions are really ‘‘welfarist’’
(in the broad sense of being concerned about human well-being generally). I
strongly doubt that they are, although this is left unclear in Aristotle’s arguments
that the kalon is not the warlike, the bold, the powerful, or the aristocratic but
rather the balanced and harmonious. Normative theory in the natural law tradition
has tried to make up for this large gap in Aristotle’s account by basing norms and
virtues on considerations about human well-being impartially considered; see, e.g.,
Mark Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality. In ‘‘new natural law’’ theory,
however, this approach seems to assume the possibility of impartial concerns about
the good of all persons that may not be embraced by any fundamental desire
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for one’s own eudaimonia. To that extent, such normative theories are no longer
psychologically eudaimonist.
18. Annas, ‘‘Self-Love in Aristotle,’’ 14.
19. Ibid., 2.
20. NE, VIII.13, 1163a24, McKeon edition. Irwin’s translation reads: ‘‘the
controlling element in virtue and character lies in decision.’’ The Ross/Urmson
translation reads: ‘‘for in choice lies the essential element of excellence and
character.’’
21. Annas, ‘‘Self-Love in Aristotle,’’ 5.
22. Ibid., 8–9.
23. Ibid., 9: ‘‘In the way he presents the altruistic choice as a choice of the
heroic over the humdrum, Aristotle seems to be assimilating it to a familiar Greek
tradition of heroism that is distinctly self-centered in its desire to shine and excel
for a brief and glorious moment.’’ Throughout the Nicomachean Ethics, in fact, we
should recognize that Aristotle is drawing on his readers’ timocratic values and
trying to reconstruct them into desire for his own purified version of ‘‘the noble.’’
This is especially clear in the sections of Books III and IV on courage and magnanimity, which are ethically transformed or ‘‘moralized’’ versions of older timocratic
conceptions of these concepts as aristocratic qualities of fearlessness in battle and
grandeur in relations with others. The transformation occurs with rivalry between
gentlemen of the patrician class in this discussion of friendship.
24. Ibid., 11.
25. Ibid., 12.
26. Richard Kraut, ‘‘Comments on Julia Annas’s ‘Self-Love in Aristotle’,’’ 22.
27. There are complex questions in contemporary theories of motivation concerning such counterfactual conditions for the purposes operative as motives in
our intentions that I am ignoring here (because these questions demand a separate
treatment in their own right that would require a long digression).
28. And again, we should not be surprised nor blame Aristotle for this, for he
worked out by far the most sophisticated analysis of human motivation in his time.
Many distinctions that are clear to us today are naturally enough not clearly made
by Aristotle, who worked near the historical beginnings of systematic moral
psychology.
29. Gottlieb, ‘‘Aristotle’s Ethical Egoism,’’ 5.
30. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed., 197: ‘‘As Aristotle says, the enjoyment of
the activity and the enjoyment of the achievement are not the ends at which the
agent aims, but the enjoyment supervenes upon the successful activity in such a
way that the activity achieved and the activity enjoyed are one and the same state.’’
But whether this idea of ‘‘one and the same state’’ can resolve the paradox of
eudaimonism is what I am investigating in this section.
31. Annas, ‘‘Self-Love in Aristotle,’’ 12 (emphasis added).
32. Similarly, in our previous example the woman might take her business
associate out for a celebratory meal only for the sake of pleasing him but find later
that this has also encouraged him to continue his business relationship with her,
even though bringing about this result was no part of her original intention. In
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this case, there would be no mystery about how to reconcile two motives in our
agent because there would in fact only be one motive and one unintended by-product
result.
33. Annas, Morality of Happiness, ‘‘The Good of Others,’’ 223. I should note
here my view that this book is a monumental achievement in scholarship on ancient
ethics in general. Although I take issue with this one aspect of Annas’s multifaceted
work, I am largely persuaded by her main thesis that ancient ethics concerns largely
the same things that moderns mean by ‘‘morality’’ and that despite major structural
differences in approach, the gap is not as large as both sympathizers with ancient
ethics (such as Williams and MacIntyre) and its legion of critics have made it
seem.
34. See Parfit’s memorable discussion of this well-known puzzle in game theory in his book, Reasons and Persons, chap. 1, sec. 8.
35. Annas, Morality of Happiness, 223.
36. Ibid., 224.
37. Ibid., 127. In fact, I want to say that ‘‘an ethics of virtue’’ need not by
definition be eudaimonistic at all. Holding even a radically aretaic theory of ethical
norms for judging character, actions, institutions, and so on, does not by itself
commit one to a eudaimonistic metaethics (i.e., a eudaimonist psychological and
conceptual justification of one’s normative system). As I argue in Kierkegaard After
MacIntyre, we should not assume that a eudaimonistic moral psychology is the only
possible or plausible kind of objective grounding or foundation for a virtue ethics,
for a Kierkegaardian-existentialist moral psychology might also do the job.
38. Annas, Morality of Happiness, 223.
39. Gottlieb, ‘‘Aristotle’s Ethical Egoism,’’ 12.
40. Kraut, ‘‘Comments on Julia Annas’ ‘Self-Love in Aristotle,’ ’’ 22–23.
41. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 35.
42. Ibid., 39.
43. The question is not: Could we part company with Aristotle by rejecting
eudaimonism altogether on this issue and regard the agent’s reflexive fulfillment in
virtue as a pure by-product? For clearly we could do that, but it would mean
granting that the strong erosiac thesis is false and thus opening the door to an
existential account of striving will. So anyone who takes that route is conceding
the conclusion I am working to establish. The question here is rather whether
Annas’s proposal offers a way of avoiding this conclusion.
44. Thus Aristotle’s ideal philia is ‘‘impersonal’’ in a way that contrasts with the
essentially particularistic care that Michael Stocker describes as a love for a single
individual just for his or her unique identity; see Stocker, ‘‘The Schizophrenia of
Modern Ethical Theories,’’ 71–72.
45. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, chap. 2, 121, n. 29.
46. See Politis, ‘‘Primacy of Self-Love in the Nicomachean Ethics.’’
47. Ibid., 153.
48. Ibid., 154.
49. Ibid., 157. This claim concerning the comparative priority of one’s own
virtue seems to suggest that it is better that x virtuous actions be done by me than
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2x quantity of such actions by my friend. Although Politis notes Irwin’s failure to
include this priority claim in his widely used 1985 translation, Irwin still omits it
in his new edition; see Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed. (Hackett, 1999), IX chap. 8, sec.
8, 148.
50. Politis, ‘‘Primacy of Self-Love,’’ 161–62.
51. Ibid., 164–65.
52. Ibid., 166–69.
53. Ibid., 170–72.
54. Sherman, Fabric of Character, 145.
55. Kraut, ‘‘Two Conceptions of Happiness,’’ 174.
56. Ibid., 172–73.
57. We should not be surprised that Callicles’ macho ideal involves a rejection
of the erosiac conception of happiness, since it is simply a distorted version of the
concept of heroic will that so radically opposed the paradigmatically Eastern ideal
of perfection as a completeness in which all motivation reaches stasis.
58. Note that Kraut does not specify that ends we consider ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘worthwhile’’ must refer back to our own well-being; he leaves open the possibility of
motivation pure of self-interest, as Annas also insisted.
59. This is the sense in which we can say that the second-order motive is
metaphysically secondary to, derivative of, or ‘‘supervenient’’ (in a loose sense of
that tricky term) on the first-order motive.
60. This does not mean, however, that some D3 desires are in no sense ‘‘egoistic.’’ For valuing something instrumentally or only as a means to one’s own interests
is not the only way to value something egoistically.
61. Since, as we saw above, being a constitutive part of X, where X is a holistic
relationship of its constitutive parts, is quite different from being an instrumental
means to X.
62. This is similar to Bruce Brower’s claim that certain virtue concepts include
reasonableness; e.g., ‘‘an act is courageous only if the goal one hopes to attain is
worth the risk involved in performing the action,’’ or one believes it is worth the risk
(see ‘‘Virtue Concepts and Ethical Realism,’’ 682). I do not agree, however, with
Brower’s view that being reasonable or worth doing can be cashed out in terms of
maximum utility in the likely results. On rival conceptions, an act could be kalon
even if the agent knows that the good at which the act aims is inaccessible, or even
if he believes that some other act might have maximized utility.
63. Thus if anyone ever did decide to pursue for its own sake the pseudoactivity A of merely desiring some other end B—which would be bizarre but I do not
say impossible—then his motive for A could not be any kind of desire in the
orektic sense. Rather, he would have to be projecting A for some reason (e.g.,
perhaps because he just wondered what it would be like). I discuss such curiosity
as a basis for projection in the analysis of sadistic cruelty in chapter 10.
64. This will include both purely altruistic ends, such as the well-being of a
stranger, and many others, such as the ends pursued by those practicing different
arts or sciences in their pure mode.
65. I discuss the distinction between eudaimonia (which seems desirable in the
D3 sense) and personal meaning (which is not desirable in this sense) in the later
sections of chapter 12.
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66. Annas, Morality of Happiness, 322.
67. Ibid., 322.
68. See Davenport, ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics,’’ sec. IV, 291–94.
69. See Williams, Morality, 60, for his early version of the conflict-amonggoods objection.
70. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 43:
He believed that all the excellences of character had to fit together into a
harmonious self. Moreover, he was committed to thinking that the highest
developments of human nature, which he identified with intellectual inquiry,
would fit together with the more ordinary life of civic virtue, even though
they represented the flowering of rather different powers, theoretical rather
than practical reason. He was not very successful in showing this.
71. Ibid., 47.
72. Ibid., 45–46.
73. See Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good, 317–19.
74. See Mark Murphy’s analysis of natural functions, which is based on Mark
Bedau’s work, in Natural Law and Practical Rationality, chap. 1, sec. 2.
75. See Davenport, ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics,’’ 301–9 and n. 30.
76. Witness the fact that Sartre runs together all these different senses of ‘‘essence’’ (as functional essence of a natural kind, as Molinist haecceity or individual
monadic essence, as character-essence constituted by one’s life projects and longterm goals, etc.) in his famous argument that the ‘‘existence’’ of human persons
precedes their essence; see Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism.
77. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 34–35.
78. See Davenport, ‘‘Liberty of the Higher-Order Will.’’
8. Contemporary Solutions to the Paradox and Their Problems
1. John M. Cooper, Reason and the Human Good in Aristotle. Allan deserves credit
for giving the first clear statement of the paradox of eudaimonism.
2. Ibid., 2–3.
3. Ibid., 76.
4. Ibid., 78.
5. Ibid., 79.
6. Ibid., 80–81.
7. Ibid., 82.
8. Ibid., 83.
9. Ibid., 86–87; see Cooper’s n. 113 referring to Ross’s account in his book,
Aristotle (Meridian Books, 1959).
10. Cooper, Reason and the Human Good in Aristotle, 88.
11. MacIntyre, ‘‘Virtue Ethics,’’ Encyclopedia of Ethics, 1276.
12. Lear, Aristotle, 170.
13. Cooper, Reason and the Human Good in Aristotle, 87.
14. And the value of the general end must likewise be prior to the value of
something we regard as its specification. This is true whether or not we think G. E.
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Moore (to whom Cooper refers, 82, n. 110) is right that some wholes can have
values that transcend the values of their parts (some of which Moore thinks might
be essential to a whole without themselves having any value when isolated).
Moore’s entire analysis of organic holism in value is confused precisely because it
makes no sense to contrast the value of a whole with the mereological sum of the
‘‘separate’’ values of its parts if their individual values are entirely a function of
their being parts of this whole. See Moore, Principia Ethica, chap. I, secs. 18–23.
15. Perhaps it is possible to imagine cases in which the first-order goal is part
of the good that results from its very pursuit. If so, then these pursuits would be
self-reinforcing in an unusual sense. For example, suppose the student government
leader’s goal is to promote more student involvement in campus activities and get
more students to be visibly or publicly involved in outreach efforts. Now, her
engaging in the specific activities she selects as instrumental means to this goal
might at the same time constitute part—at least a small part—of the very thing
she is after, since she would be at least one student visibly involved in a public
campus activity. Her efforts might work instrumentally (by the persuasive force of
what she says) and by example, directly showing the value of the kinds of engagement of which this is one instance. Such cases do seem intelligible, but notice that
in this kind of case, the part-whole relation between the agent’s activities and the
goal she is pursuing cannot transfer motivation. She is motivated to her outreach
activities because they will get other students involved (i.e., because of their instrumental value) and not because they constitute one instance of the sort of involvement she is generally seeking. So such a model cannot help explain how desire for
eudaimonia could be transferred into desire for other-regarding goals.
16. Alternatively, we can also see the part-whole relationship at the secondorder by-product level in some complex cases.
17. Since Cooper compares Aristotle’s view to Kant’s, which also refuses to
define the right in terms of any maximization of goods, it is worth noting that a
formal principle like Kant’s categorical imperative may occupy the Y place in a
process of reflective deliberation that identifies some particular maxim X as a specification of the categorical imperative. If this works, then the motive to do our duty
can be specified as the motive to select this specific maxim in the circumstances.
Thus Cooper’s model may work for a moral principle other than realizing the
agent’s own eudaimonia.
18. Gottlieb, ‘‘Aristotle’s Ethical Egoism,’’ 12.
19. Ibid., 13.
20. Ibid., 14. And Gottlieb supports this by reference to Aristotle’s De anima,
III.11, 434a16.
21. Later, the agent might think this second-order thought as part of reflection
on her own magnanimity. I believe Aristotle thinks that this potential could even
be part of her motive in acting for the sake of magnanimity (as one special species
of ‘‘the noble’’), for example, in rejecting some offer to speak at an exclusive club
with which she wants no association, whatever the stipend, because some of its
prominent members are corrupt. But this is a special case that presents special
problems not present in other, garden-variety virtuous motives.
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22. Gottlieb, ‘‘Aristotle’s Ethical Egoism,’’ 14.
23. Ibid., 13.
24. Ibid., 7, citing Kraut’s Aristotle on the Human Good, chap. 2.1.
25. Ibid., 10.
26. For example, say the agent has not or cannot decide which of these ends
he desires more or which of these desires he identifies with. But he sees that either
way, there is a particular action that will bring him closer to both ends (though it
will not actually bring about both ends—it could hardly do that, since we have
supposed that they are logically or causally incompatible states of affairs); for
example, I want both X (a Democrat) and Y (a Republican) to be elected president, so I do not want Z, who seems about to do well in a Democratic primary in
New Hampshire. So I leak some damaging information about Z, although my two
motives for doing so remain conflicted, ambiguous, inconsistent with themselves,
or otherwise irrational.
27. Gottlieb, ‘‘Aristotle’s Ethical Egoism,’’ 10.
28. Ibid., 11.
29. For purposes of this example, we can understand acting on the ‘‘motive of
duty’’ to mean choosing one’s act because it seems intrinsically right, fair, or just
according to some deontic standard distinct from the maximization of happiness
or well-being for the agent or for larger collectives. I investigate this idea in chapter 11.
30. It is important to emphasize that the defense of eudaimonism I consider
in this section does not derive from Derek Parfit himself but is entirely my own
creation. But I make it as robust as possible, not a mere straw man.
31. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 8.
32. Ibid., 19.
33. Ibid., 24.
34. Ibid., 27–28. Cf. R. M. Hare’s defense of such a prohibition against torture in Freedom and Reason (Oxford University Press, 1963), 44, his more general
defense of Mill-style indirect utilitarianism, 130–36.
35. Ibid., 28.
36. See Parfit’s discussion of principles G1, G2, and G4. I note that it is much
harder to accept Parfit’s theses for morality and blame than for rationality, for
moral praise and blame have been held to be level-transitive on virtually all traditional forms of deontological and virtue-based moral theories—something that
reflects their embodiment of a publicity principle as a requirement of fairness in
making moral judgments or in feeling moral emotions.
37. Ibid., 35.
38. Ibid., 37.
39. Ibid., 37.
40. Ibid., 47.
41. See Williams, ‘‘A Critique of Utilitarianism.’’
42. Ibid., 47.
43. Ibid., 48.
44. Frankfurt, ‘‘Faintest Passion,’’ 5–16.
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45. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, 15. On Aristotle’s own acceptance of the analogy between ethical philosophy and medicine, see 42, 48–50, and 59–60.
46. Ibid., 23.
47. Sherman, Fabric of Character, 138.
48. Ibid., 128.
49. Ibid., 132.
50. Ibid., 134.
51. As Sherman puts it, ‘‘One takes on, if you like, the project of a shared
conception of eudaimonia’’ (133). And the eudaimonia so conceived is not only my
own: the decisions I make are affected by my sense of their implications for my
friend. So ‘‘what is relevant to the decision goes beyond the eudaimonia of a single,
isolated individual’’ (134). My motivation is thus not egoistic at bottom.
52. Ibid., 133.
53. Children sometimes encounter this problem when they set out too explicitly with the intention of making friends as a means to personal satisfaction, for
example, to alleviate loneliness. Approaching others in this needy fashion signals
to potential friends that this is a person who will not be committed to them purely
or simply in the joy of projecting such a commitment but who is instead moved
by a feeling of lack that he believes having a friend will fill. And this of course hinders
the child in developing real friendships.
54. MacIntyre, After Virtue.
55. Ibid., 187. Note that this is my own way of breaking down and partially
analyzing the definition of ‘‘practice’’ that MacIntyre presents in a more compact
form, but I believe it is true to his meaning.
56. Ibid., 193. MacIntyre refers to this reflexive feature to distinguish ‘‘practices’’ in his sense from technical skills ‘‘even when directed towards some unified
purpose and even if the exercise of those skills can on occasion be valued for their
own sake.’’ Taken by itself, the employment of skills to some fixed end is only part
of a practice; it lacks the historical sense of itself and reflexive ability to extend its
purposes in light of this self-awareness necessary to constitute a practice.
57. Ibid., 188.
58. David Miller, ‘‘Virtues, Practices, and Justice,’’ in After MacIntyre, 250. Miller’s primary concern is with the inadequacy of MacIntyre’s account of justice.
59. However, this difference does not run very deep, for games are also subject
to external critique, and practices retain standards of excellence as aretaic requirements
only if they are totally reduced to utilitarian criteria concerning ‘‘the needs and
purposes that predominate in a particular society’’ (Miller, ‘‘Virtues, Practices, and
Justice,’’ 252). In other words, to remain practices, they have to retain some autonomy in interaction with wider social concerns, criteria, and sources of critique.
60. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 190: ‘‘The standards are not themselves immune
from criticism, but nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards realized so far’’ [in the history of the
practice].
61. Ibid., 188.
62. Murdoch, Sovereignty of the Good, 90. This essay is also reprinted in part in
Crisp and Slote, Virtue Ethics, 99–117. In this anthology, see 108 for the quoted
passage.
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63. Ibid., 86 and 88; in Virtue Ethics, 105 and 106–7.
64. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 189.
65. Ibid., 189–90.
66. Ibid., 197.
67. Karl Marx, ‘‘The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,’’ in The
Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., ed. Robert Tucker (Norton, 1978), 76.
68. Ibid.
69. Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, 47.
70. Ibid., 79.
71. Gilbert, Democratic Individuality, chap. 7, 269.
72. Ibid., referring to NE, 1105a30-b4.
73. Ibid., 49.
74. Marx, ‘‘The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,’’ 91.
75. Ibid. One might usefully compare this point to MacIntyre’s emphasis on
the virtues of receiving care and generosity in Dependent Rational Animals.
76. Ibid., 93.
77. Rawls, Theory of Justice, sec. 65, 426.
78. Ibid., 427.
79. Ibid., 428.
80. I have said more about this point in Davenport, ‘‘The Ethical and Religious Significance of Taciturnus’s Letter.’’
81. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1999),
173.
82. Ibid., 180.
83. Ibid., 175.
84. More precisely, at a colloquium on his work at the University of Notre
Dame during (I believe) the spring semester of 1997, MacIntyre said that he hoped
and believed the chess-playing-child example and the related analysis of practices
would stand the test of time even if flaws were found in all the other historical
arguments in After Virtue.
85. Watson, ‘‘On the Primacy of Character,’’ 449–69, 455.
86. Ibid., 457.
87. Ibid., 450.
88. Ibid., 455.
89. Ibid., 456.
90. Ibid., 457.
91. Watson, ‘‘On the Primacy of Character,’’ 460–61.
92. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 167. Notably, Hursthouse attributes the claim
that the metaphysical thesis defines Aristotelian naturalism to Williams and Watson (169).
93. Watson, ‘‘On the Primacy of Character,’’ 456, 457.
94. Ibid., 458.
95. Ibid., 459. For example, ‘‘The benevolent person will be concerned that
others fare well. But the moral significance of this concern stems from the fact that
it is part of a virtue, not from the fact that misery and well-being are intrinsically
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or ultimately bad and good respectively’’ (459). On the radically aretaic view, then,
the benevolent person is concerned for the well-being of others simply because he
judges that this concern is normal or natural: he sees such caring as part of a
characteristically human life. Watson thinks that this radical view provides a ‘‘truly
naturalistic’’ grounding for moral virtue, while the eudaimonist view does not
(461). I disagree; the eudaimonist approach gives the virtuous person practical
reasons for caring about noble ends, while the radically aretaic approach gives her
only the descriptive judgment that she is exemplifying human nature or doing what
paradigm cases of virtuous persons do. Anyone who took this as their reason for
benevolent actions would, in my view, not really be acting on benevolent motives
at all but rather on perverse metaphysical aspirations.
96. Ibid., 459–60. This has the odd implication that the characteristic good
of humankind includes virtue, which in turn includes intrinsically valuing a characteristically human life, but not because it is good in some prior sense.
97. Ibid., 460.
98. Ibid., 460.
99. See Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 178–87. I strongly agree with Hursthouse,
against McDowell and Slote, that the thesis that virtues bring eudaimonia should
not be treated as simply analytic or necessarily true within the outlook of a person
reliably motivated by noble ends. The question remains significant, not automatically answered, and there is usually enough common ground with the egoist that
arguments concerning the likely results of virtue and vice can have some rational/
justificatory purchase. As I have argued in past work, something analogous to this
is crucial to Kierkegaard’s view that ethical criticism of aestheticism can have practical value, although ultimately a gestalt shift in the agent’s attitude is required to
make the transition.
100. Slote’s theory has been criticized along these lines by Murphy, Natural
Law and Practical Philosophy, 212–17. In a review essay on this book, I suggest that
Slote’s theory may be understood as analogous to a pure (ontological) divine command ethics, with the virtuous agent in place of God; see Davenport, ‘‘Review of
Murphy.’’ Watson also anticipates this criticism in a long note (n. 24).
101. Michael Slote, ‘‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics,’’ 240. However, Slote seems
to think that this is problematic, since Aristotle also considers virtuous activity to
be ‘‘the primary component in eudaimonia’’ (240, n. 2). Watson recognizes that
there is no inconsistency in such view and builds it into his first version of virtue
ethics; but he does not clearly admit how un-Aristotelian his second version of
virtue ethics is.
102. I note that Watson apparently assumes that a teleological virtue ethics
founded on a conception of eudaimonia, welfare, or (in general) good outcomes
for human agents would necessarily be maximizing in its normative deliverances. I
do not believe this is correct; without automatic inconsistency, one could argue
that virtues involve non-maximizing moral attitudes and still say that their value
comes from being essential to eudaimonia as the highest intrinsically good outcome. To achieve this, such a theory need only say that eudaimonia consists in part
of holding to certain nonconsequentialist standards of action and therefore is a
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good we can only strive to achieve as a holistic union of parts rather than something that comes in degrees with a maximum point that we could directly seek.
This is not the same as construing eudaimonia merely as a threshold concept,
which I think is foreign to the eudaimonist project (see Kierkegaard After MacIntyre,
292).
103. Watson, ‘‘On the Primacy of Character,’’ 463.
104. See Davenport, ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics.’’
105. For Nietzsche’s theory as a species of non-eudaimonistic virtue ethics, see
Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics.
106. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 113.
107. Ibid., 119.
108. Ibid., 114.
109. Ibid., 108.
110. Ibid., 108.
111. Ibid., 120. This conception of ‘‘just generosity’’ seems to be simply a
nontheological version of agapē or pure neighbor-love, although MacIntyre relates
it to pity, or misericordia, as ‘‘one of the effects of charity’’ and distinguishes it from
charity as a state that requires grace (124–26). However, MacIntyre’s analysis of
just generosity does, in fact, provide a model for understanding agapē that is superior to others on the philosophical market today, including the model proposed
by Emmanuel Levinas, which I criticize in past work.
112. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 109.
113. Ibid., 112.
114. MacIntyre says that practical reasoning sometimes has to make reference
to flourishing and thus bring explicitly into view the further end to which virtuous
actions are also a means (ibid., 112). But if this means reasoning from the joint
flourishing of a community, this cannot become an individual practical reasoner’s
goal without projective motivation.
115. Ibid., 99. It also fits the role MacIntyre gives to Marx’s conception of
justice, with its emphasis on desert and need, in defining the common good; see
130.
116. Ibid., 101. This idea of historically conditioned responsibilities is the
central theme of a lecture series I gave in January 2002 titled ‘‘Time and Responsibility,’’ which I hope to publish in the future.
117. Ibid., 140.
118. As MacIntyre puts it, the individual ‘‘must make’’ the goods of the community ‘‘her own’’ (ibid., 109). This is not something that follows passively from
desire for one’s own eudaimonia. Thus the state in which we are ‘‘neither egoists
nor altruists’’ but committed to joint goods essential to shared flourishing (160)
is an achievement of the will.
119. See Rawls, Theory of Justice, sec. 1, 5. One could also consider Thomas
Scanlon’s notion of the moral motive as directly aiming at reciprocity, or ‘‘aiming
to find principles that others, insofar as they too have this aim, could not reasonably
reject’’; see Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 191 (emphasis added). It is a
common error to imagine that all contract theories conceive joint willingness as
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relevant only when it can factor into self-interested motives, i.e., when joint consent
can produce a good that adds to each party’s material well-being.
120. Notice that major fund-raising campaigns for charitable causes or college
reunion class gifts tend to employ this kind of dynamic: a number of persons (N)
are willing to contribute or sign on, but only if they think that a sufficient number
of other alumni (hopefully less than N) are likewise willing, and thus leading gifts
may help attract a critical mass of others. It is especially noteworthy that in such
cases, it is precisely the fact that others have already been generous or are willing
to be if enough members of the group are that grounds the agent’s commitment
to participate in realizing a good that cannot be attained without such cooperation.
In such cases, I believe, projective motivation is at work, since the goal lies beyond
most of the participants’ own simple well-being; however, the grounds for projecting the goal include not only its inherent value but also the existence of others
who are willing to strive for this goal either independently or if others are. This
may be in part because our belief that some goal has significant enough value to
be worth projecting it depends on others not only validating this value but making
it their goal along with us.
121. Drummond, ‘‘Agency, Agents, and (Sometimes) Patients,’’ 148.
122. Ibid., 154.
123. Ibid., 150.
124. David O. Brink, ‘‘Rational Egoism, Self, and Others,’’ 349.
125. Ibid., 352–53.
126. Ibid., 354.
127. See J. Baird Callicott, ‘‘The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic’’;
and Arne Naess, ‘‘Ecosophy T.’’ I do not agree with Callicott that metaphysical
holism is part of Aldo Leopold’s argument for his land ethic.
128. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, x.
129. U2, ‘‘One,’’ from The Joshua Tree album.
130. We cannot, therefore, equate the rejection of social holism in favor of a
metaphysics recognizing the existence of distinct individual persons with endorsement of a much more specific ‘‘liberal’’ version of individualism of the kind that
Michael Sandel critiques as ‘‘dispossed selves’’ or atoms in a social void; see Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, esp. 54–65. Even much weaker conceptions of the individuality of personal selves are sufficient to entail the falsehood of social holism.
131. Raymond Belliotti, Happiness Is Overrated, 87–88.
132. Ibid., 86.
133. Ibid., 85.
134. What about rejecting WET instead? As I suggest in sketching the existential core argument (chap. 4, sec. 1.2), WET probably oversimplifies the diversity
of our prepurposive motives, but non-erosiac PPMs are unlikely to have the complexity or responsiveness to rational grounds that we find in purposive motives
involved in virtues, friendship, the practices, and so on. Thus WET is an acceptable simplifying assumption for our task; it allows us to avoid surveying every type
of prepurposive motive before looking at the primary candidates for projective
motivation.
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9. Divine and Human Creativity: From Plato to Levinas
1. Audi, The Good in the Right, 124.
2. Ibid.
3. Bradley, ‘‘Definition of Will,’’ no. II, 149.
4. Ibid., 150.
5. Pink, Psychology of Freedom, 15.
6. See Goetz, ‘‘Libertarian Choice,’’ 202.
7. Mele, Autonomous Agents, 37. The representational component of this definition may need refining, for it seems as though I could want to eat an apple simply
by wanting the apple and believing that I could eat it (without, say, visualizing
myself eating it). However, I still have to represent something as the object of
desire.
8. In this, even if ‘‘choice’’ or prohairesis is limited to deliberation about means
to ends already set, boulēsis is part of reason. But I would follow Eugene Garver’s
insightful argument that in Topics III, Aristotle gives us a way to think of deliberation as extending to all ends subordinate to happiness itself (see Garver, ‘‘Choosing
the Good in Aristotle’s Topics’’).
9. See my article, ‘‘The Essence of Eschatology.’’
10. A discussion of Plato’s use of eschatological myths in the Phaedo, Republic,
Laws, and elsewhere is beyond the scope of this book, but there is some evidence
for a personalization of the Divine in the figure of Aphrodite in the Seventh Letter
(335b). Plato seems to use this goddess symbol for the form of Beauty (see also
Phaedrus 265b).
11. McPherran, ‘‘Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro,’’ 296. McPherran paraphrases
this argument from L. Versenji, Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro (University Press of
America, 1982). He does not actually agree with it but protests that ‘‘Socrates
clearly believes that the gods act and have given men good things’’ (296). I think
McPherran is correct about this, but it only goes to show why Plato is forced to
envision a different form of motivation for the Divine. As McPherran emphasizes,
for Socrates in the Euthyphro, we cannot know what the chief ergon (function, work)
of the gods is (298); but apparently by the Timaeus, Plato thought something could
be said about this, as did Aristotle by the end of his Metaphysics.
12. Republic II, 381B. Paul Shorey’s translation in Plato: Collected Dialogues, reads:
‘‘But God, surely, and everything that belongs to God, is in every way in the best
possible state’’ (628).
13. Republic II, 381B–C.
14. This gloss explains why I am ignoring traditional objections that premise
2 is a false dilemma, since God could change in some value-neutral way that makes
him neither better nor worse; see, e.g., Hasker, ‘‘Philosophical Perspective,’’ 132.
Although this objection has much force against my first reconstruction of the
argument, it is less plausible for agent-caused change that is motivated in the way
required by the erosiac model, as in my second reconstruction.
15. For the defender of a process conception of perfection can insist that even
for God, there are goods that are not directly actualizable without going through
states in which one is moving toward them but still lacking them. To lack such
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goods is not to lack a good that one could possibly have now, instantly, without
change. This should lead the process theologian to reject premise 7.
16. Nygren, Agape and Eros, 175.
17. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 49.
18. The motivational paradox I am emphasizing here is closely related to the
metaphysical problem that Thomas Morris calls the ‘‘dilemma of created goodness.’’ This dilemma says that either the created universe has no ontological value,
in which case it was pointless to create it, or if it does have such value, then ‘‘God
plus the universe is greater than God alone’’; see Morris, Our Idea of God, 142. Morris
tries to resolve this problem by arguing that the Anselmian requires only that God
is the greatest possible individual being, and this is consistent with the thesis that
‘‘the state of affairs consisting in God’s sharing existence with our created universe
is greater than the state of affairs consisting in God’s existing in pristine isolation
or solitude’’ (143). But while Leibniz would certainly accept both these theses, I
doubt that either Plato or Anselm would have accepted the second, since (pace
Morris) it probably entails that a perfectly good God would have to create whatever
other beings would add value to the total state. Morris also adds that God and the
world cannot constitute a single entity, which would then be greater in metaphysical perfection than God, because ‘‘it is just conceptually precluded by perfect being
theology that God ever be considered a part of a larger and more valuable whole,
an entity distinct from, but partially composed by God’’ (143). But either this
directly begs the question or the Spinozist can say that the Divine must consist in
the entire Chain of Being, and not just its highest member, because the totality of
the Chain is the most valuable substance. So there is no evident escape for the
Anselmian in either of these moves. It may help Morris’s case if we believe Robert
Adams’s argument that since a morally perfect being can act on the motive of
grace, then such a being need not create only the objectively best possible universe;
see Robert M. Adams, ‘‘Must God Create the Best?’’ But then the motive of grace
must by its nature be one kind of projective or essentially volitional motive in my
sense.
19. This is the main reason for the defense of an ‘‘open’’ rather than ‘‘impassible’’ notion of divine perfection in Pinnock, Rice, Sanders, Hasker, and Basinger,
The Openness of God. See, in particular, Richard Rice’s discussion of divine agapē,
and William Hasker’s discussion of God as active in time.
20. To see that this is a valid inference, it can be symbolized as a syllogistic
deduction: (1) Agē, (2) Ame, (3) Aēm̄ [contrapositive of 2]; (4) Agm̄ [by 1, 3,
Barbara].
21. I am not, of course, attributing to Plato the notion of creation ex nihilo.
The point also applies if the Demiurge’s function is only to form a world out of
undifferentiated stuff, aperion plethos, or prime matter. I agree with Levinas that properly understood, the very idea of creation ex nihilo requires giving being to things
radically other than oneself (not mere extensions or reflections of one’s mind or parts
of one’s substance), and this in turn requires projective motivation, which alone
can aim at ends alterior to one’s own being.
22. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology, 117.
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23. Ibid., 115.
24. Plato, Philebus 33b.
25. Ibid., 34e.
26. Ibid., 35a.
27. Ibid., 35b–b.
28. Ibid., 60c.
29. Ibid., 61a.
30. Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, 256.
31. Lewis, Problem of Pain, chap. 3, 50–51.
32. And this ambiguity remains, we should note, in Plato’s attempt to show
that a perfect soul would necessarily have to will the existence of every form of
value outside itself.
33. They are superfluous only in the sense that they are not erosiacally desired,
not in the sense that they have no value at all. God could perhaps recognize forms
of possible value that do not draw Him toward them unless He decides to make
them the object of His purpose (and something like this may be what Lewis meant).
This is the basic idea in projective motivation.
34. Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, 214 (emphasis added), citing Kretzmann, ‘‘General Problem of Creation,’’ and ‘‘Problem of Creation.’’
35. Ibid., 214–15.
36. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 24 (IV 193).
37. Ibid., 24–25 (IV 193–94).
38. Rice, ‘‘Biblical Support for a New Perspective,’’ 21–22.
39. Ibid., 39.
40. Nygren, Agape and Eros, 77, quoted from the selection in Soble, Eros, Agape,
and Philia, 87.
41. I do not say that Nygren intends to affirm this implication of his terminology; rather, he would probably affirm something close to Lewis’s own Thomistic
view that the creature’s very being involves its being loved by its creator (a formulation I owe to my colleague Astrid O’Brien). However, this creative love must be a
form of divine agapē rather than eros if we are to avoid reintroducing the paradox
of divine creativity.
42. Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, 218. Zagzebski also suggests that creating something X for the sake of manifesting love for X, while possibly not selfinterested, still treats X ‘‘as a means’’ in a morally objectionable way (219). As I
will make clear in the next chapter, this is an overbroad notion of what constitutes
treating something as a means. On this conception, the only way not to treat X as
a means would be to intend X for no reason at all, which is not what Kant demands.
43. Ibid., 217.
44. My distinction between grounding and motivating reasons, which is employed throughout the book, is indebted to Bond, Reason and Value, chap. 2. In
particular, I agree with Bond’s thesis that ‘‘grounds for action are internally tied,
not to desire, but to value or worth conceived quite independently of desire’’ (27).
However, I disagree with the way he ultimately ties value to human welfare.
45. If, as I argue throughout subsequent chapters, projective motivation still
requires some kind of ground or reason, then creation ex nihilo as a supreme expression of self-motivating resolve still requires a Why. I do not think it disrespectful
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to imagine that God has a purpose in creating the universe (or universes). An existential theology might suggest (tentatively and with appropriate humility) that precisely because the divine being lacks nothing, it is the one and only being capable
of creating alterity out of itself, generating something totally other than itself. That
some of these beings will be capable of valuing their own existence and the existence of their universe may be reason enough to create them for a being of perfect
love. It may also be that as a by-product, God gains something from the communion
with his creatures, from the encounter with alterity that his own creative love makes
possible. If we reject the Platonic conception of perfection in favor of the idea of
a perfection as a process of enrichment, then it is possible for God to gain something from the alterity of creatures.
46. The same is true of every kind of life, not just moral agents, according to
Paul Taylor in Respect for Nature, 75. Taylor says that any X has ‘‘inherent worth’’ if
it is intrinsically better for X’s good or flourishing to be realized than not, independently of any volitional being’s attitudes toward X; he distinguishes X’s inherent
worth in this sense from any evaluation of X’s merits according to criteria that
some Xs meet better than others (76).
47. Soble, Structure of Love, 9.
48. Ibid., 5.
49. Ibid., 6.
50. Ibid., 9.
51. Ibid., 11.
52. Ibid., 13.
53. Niebuhr, Human Nature, 28.
54. Kahn, ‘‘Discovering the Will,’’ 235.
55. Dihle, Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity.
56. Kahn, ‘‘Discovering the Will,’’ 236–37.
57. Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life, 15.
58. Buber, I and Thou, 60–61.
59. Tolkien, ‘‘On Fairy-Stories,’’ in The Monsters and the Critics and Other Essays,
145.
60. Hofstadter, Metamagical Themas, 528, 530.
61. Ibid., 533, 535.
62. Larmore, Morals of Modernity, 84.
63. Solomon, ‘‘Virtues of a Passionate Life,’’ 97. Solomon makes the simple
error of assuming that only erosiac states of motivation have any kind of ‘‘energy’’
or ‘‘enthusiasm’’ or dynamism, and so on. Thus he fails to see that even for Nietzsche, the will isn’t reducible to eros.
64. That Plato is the ultimate source of both traditions only goes to confirm
Lovejoy’s recognition of the tension in his views and to confirm the old maxim
that Western philosophy is but a series of footnotes to Plato’s dialogues.
65. Of course, the borderlines between these groups are somewhat unclear,
since some of the phenomenological realists were influenced by Christian existentialists, and Levinas’s ethics is in some respects simply a radicalization of Martin
Buber’s conception of human and divine agapē.
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66. Arendt, Life of the Mind, pt. 2, ‘‘Willing.’’
67. Ibid., pt. 2, 13–14.
68. Ibid., 14.
69. Ibid., 15.
70. This is the absence that Bernard Williams, in Shame and Necessity, attributes
to the creation of artificial expectations in modern moral philosophy.
71. Arendt, Life of the Mind, pt. 2, 16.
72. Ibid., 18.
73. Ibid., 19–20.
74. Ibid., 20–22.
75. And there would be much to say about this; see her discussions of Hobbes,
Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Ryle, Wittgenstein, Kant, and Descartes, which I will not
try to summarize here (ibid., 23–28). I find Arendt very convincing, especially
regarding the motives for the continual evasion of the will.
76. Arendt, Life of the Mind, pt. 2, 29.
77. Ibid., 30.
78. Ibid., 31.
79. Ibid., 36.
80. Someone trying to rebuild a shattered life may project seemingly modest
goals such as getting up the next morning on time, getting to work on time, eventually being able to buy a home, ‘‘settle down’’ (whatever that may mean to her), and
live a halfway normal life—and she may have very good grounds for such projects.
For her, this is courage. Similarly, someone joining a monastery might devote himself to attaining a series of little steps designed to build a lifestyle of peace. Someone else might be trying to fit in better with the alien culture in which they now
live. But there are bad reasons for setting small goals as well: the agent could be
trying to prove to himself that he is too inferior or worthless to attempt anything
great.
81. One might compare these two aspects in her account to the objective and
subjective points of view in Thomas Nagel’s account in The View from Nowhere.
82. Arendt, Life of the Mind, pt. 2, 30.
83. Ibid., 31. She approvingly cites Duns Scotus as anticipating Bergson on
this point.
84. Ibid., 34.
85. Ibid., 37–38.
86. Ibid., 37. Note Arendt’s allusion to Heidegger’s notion of ‘‘care’’ (Sorge) as
the being of Dasein.
87. Ibid., 44.
88. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 104–5.
89. See my article, ‘‘Levinas’s Agapeistic Metaphysics of Morals.’’
90. See Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pt. 3, chap. 1, sec. 4 (‘‘The Look’’) and
chap. 3 (‘‘Concrete Relations with Others’’), esp. 482 (the comparison to Hegel’s
Master-Slave dialectic).
91. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 47.
92. Ibid., 49.
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93. Lingis, Deathbound Subjectivity, 142.
94. This position developed in particular through Levinas’s reaction to the
account of our experience of the Other in Husserl’s fifth Cartesian Meditation and its
descendent in Sartre’s discussion of ‘‘The Look’’ in Being and Nothingness.
95. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 96–97.
96. Ibid.
97. Compare this to Levinas’s commentary on a Talmudic passage discussing
how we can have any relation to God as the Infinite or unnamable En-Sof. We
cannot say that we ‘‘think’’ the Absolute God, since:
Does not this word conjure up, if not vision, then at least aim, which in its
way posits another end or sets it as its target? The text we have just quoted
suggests a beginning that does not move towards an end, but traces, as it
were, a relation without correlate. (Levinas, Beyond the Verse, 165)
This is typical of his hyperbolic style; to emphasize how different this relation is
from those of classical intentionality, Levinas suggests that it cannot be described
as a relation to an end or content of intentionality at all. Whether this hyperbole
makes literal sense is another question, though.
98. Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 10. Note again the similarity to Kant’s notion of
the primacy of a practical reason, the core of which is given in an absolute faktum.
99. Levinas, In the Time of Nations, 158.
100. Levinas, Beyond the Verse, 161.
101. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 197.
102. Kant’s emphasis on the moral law as the faktum of pure reason through
which alone we know freedom and on the primacy of practical reason is passed
along through Herman Cohen’s philosophy to Martin Buber and thence to Levinas
and Jean-Luc Nancy. Hence Levinas compares the transcendent ‘‘infinity’’ of the
Face whose Otherness I cannot contain to the infinity of ideas in Kant’s thought
(Totality and Infinity, 196). Of course, Kant still insisted that our fundamental duty
is autonomous or arises as an implicit commitment of our will that, although
inescapable, can still be regarded as self-authored. Levinas departs from this view
in describing our original duty as heteronomous, or absolutely external to us in
origin. Yet insofar as Levinas agrees with Kant that this calling to justice and love
is already presupposed by the exercise of any free agency at all, he should also
accept that its authority for us is implicit in the very structure of our agency. What
he adds to Kant’s picture is the insight that plurality, or the presence of others, is
already presupposed by the structure and exercise of free agency.
103. Westphal, ‘‘Levinas and the Immediacy of the Face,’’ 494.
104. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 218–19.
105. Jeffrey Kosky, ‘‘After the Death of God,’’ 243. However, Kosky confuses
matters by concluding that for Levinas, ‘‘Responsibility . . . is not what ordinary
morality means when it uses this term: it is not an active engagement or commitment that an autonomous I undertakes at its own free initiative’’ (239). For, aside
from Hobbesian contractualism, all theories that give objective significance to
moral demands (including Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s) regard our basic responsibilities as prior to the choice of individual agents among alternative possibilities.
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Kosky’s phrasing also misleadingly suggests that Levinas recognizes no autonomy
in the agent’s response to the call of the Face.
106. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 196. To signal the distinctive meaning of this
concept, I usually capitalize ‘‘Desire’’ in this sense.
107. Ibid., 33.
108. See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 254–66. On this point, I am indebted to
Meredith Gunning’s dissertation, ‘‘About Face.’’
109. Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 9: ‘‘The violent man does not move out of himself. He takes, he possesses. Possession denies independent existence.’’
110. Desmond, Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness, 19.
111. For example, in the same passage, Desmond suggests that a person sometimes ‘‘paradoxically purposes to be without purposes and makes it his aim to be
aimless’’ (19). But he does not recognize that such an aesthetic will to wantonness
must be projective, since it cannot be explained in erosiac terms (see chap. 12, sec.
7). He also suggests that despair wills ‘‘to annihilate desire totally’’ (19) but does
not draw the conclusion that despair is therefore a movement of nonerosiac
motivation.
112. Ibid., 20.
113. Ibid., 21.
114. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 80. Levinas thinks that Plato’s description of
the Form of the Good as ‘‘beyond Being’’ suggests a transcendence that exceeds
the structuring power of our cognition, that can never be our object.
115. Levinas here cites Plato’s Philebus 50e ff and Republic 584b ff. Earlier in
this chapter, I discussed the idea of pure pleasures in relation to divine motivation
and found at least some warrant for Levinas’s claim that the idea of ‘‘metaphysical
desire’’ is found in the Philebus. However, the claim that it is found in the Symposium,
Phaedrus, or Republic I find much more debatable. For instance, Levinas is too optimistic in suggesting that Eros as presented in the Symposium could be interpreted as
a superabundant being, ‘‘as the desire not of what one has lost, but absolute Desire.
. . . Has not Plato, in rejecting the myth of Aristophanes, caught sight of the nonnostalgic character of Desire and of philosophy?’’ (63). Unfortunately not: for
Aristophanes’ story is rejected only in favor of a more subtle erosiac analysis, and
philosophy remains a longing for wisdom. Only the perfectly wise being would be
at rest for Plato.
116. Levinas, ‘‘Meaning and Sense,’’ 94.
117. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 103. While I agree that Plato did catch sight
of this idea in his later dialogues, I cannot see this in the notion of the Good as
transcending all other essences in the Republic. However, if Plato meant the Good
to be a form that even gods could intelligibly pursue for its own sake, then Levinas
was right.
118. Levinas, ‘‘Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,’’ 56. Note that by ‘‘love’’
here Levinas is referring to erosiac love.
119. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 63.
120. Sleszynski, Exploring the Self in Action, 109.
121. Vedder, ‘‘Heidegger on Desire,’’ 357.
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122. Ibid.
123. Ibid., 358–59.
124. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34.
125. Ibid.
126. See Davenport, ‘‘Schindler’s List.’’ Kosky also notes that ‘‘For Levinas, infinity signifies in my unending and ever-increasing response to the face of the other’’
(249).
127. This is how Desmond’s description of infinite desire sounds: after repletion of some particular desire, ‘‘The gnawing sense of my nothingness returns, with
redoubled hunger of ever dissatisfied desire: lack again, only endless now’’ (Desire,
Dialectic, and Otherness, 24). And he acknowledges that infinite desire in this sense
correlates to the ‘‘absorbing god’’ of pantheism as the end to its suffering (29).
128. What I suspect makes Levinas hesitate to say this—and thus confuses his
account—is that he recognizes that ‘‘metaphysical Desire’’ in his sense still shares
something of the structure of ordinary appetites. I make clear both the similarity and
difference in the direction-of-fit analysis in the last section of this chapter.
129. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 50.
130. Compare this to Levinas’s remark in his essay, ‘‘God and Philosophy,’’
163:
But this desire is of another order than the desire involved in hedonist or
eudaimonist affectivity and activity, where the desirable is invested, reached,
and identified as an objective of need. . . . It is a desire that is beyond
satisfaction, and, unlike a need, does not identify a term or an end. This
endless desire for what is beyond being is dis-interestedness, transcendence—
desire for the Good.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 96.
Levinas, ‘‘God and Philosophy,’’ 164–65.
Levinas, Time and the Other, 116.
Levinas, ‘‘Ethics as First Philosophy,’’ 85; In the Time of Nations, 160.
Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 140–50.
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 77.
Levinas, ‘‘Ethics as First Philosophy,’’ 85.
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34.
I am indebted to Merold Westphal for this important point.
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 257.
Ibid., 63.
Ibid., 226–47.
Ibid., 237.
Ibid., 229.
Ibid., 230.
Ibid., 227–28.
Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas, 103.
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 226.
Ibid., 239.
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 88, 303.
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151. Ibid., 218. He adds, in Kierkegaardian fashion and against Sartre, that:
If the subjectivity were but a deficient mode of being, the distinguishing
between will and reason would indeed result in conceiving the will as arbitrary, as a pure and simple negation of an embryonic or virtual reason dormant in an I. . . . If on the contrary, the subjectivity is fixed as a separated
being in relation with an other absolutely other, . . . then the will is distinguished fundamentally from the intelligible, which it must not comprehend,
and into which it must not disappear, for the intelligibility of the intelligible
resides precisely in ethical behavior, that is, in the responsibility to which it
invites the will’’ (218).
152. Ibid., 166.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid., 227. The closest that Levinas comes to Buber’s insight about art is
in recognizing that the will can respond to mortality by aiming at ‘‘the founding
of institutions’’ that may endure beyond its own death (236). But this art is nonegoistic only because its motive is purely moral again; it is not an instance of
projective and nonmoral motivation in Levinas’s anthropology.
155. Ibid., 217.
156. Ibid., 65.
157. Ibid., 236.
158. Ibid., 79.
159. Ibid., 219.
160. Ibid., 240. This is in part because infinity is only fully experienced in the
effort to respond positively to alterity: ‘‘The infinity of responsibility’’ is defined precisely as ‘‘a responsibility increasing in the measure that it is assumed ’’ (244, emphasis in
original). Passing beyond need by election, the will discovers that the resources of
its interiority are ‘‘infinite—in the incessant overflowing of duty accomplished by
ever broader responsibilities’’ (246). Note the metaphor of superabundance here
again. This analysis agrees with Meredith Gunning’s argument in her dissertation,
‘‘About Face,’’ chaps. 2 and 3.
161. Clarke, ‘‘Is the Ethical Eudaimonism of St. Thomas Too Self-Centered?’’
201. Father Clarke tries to articulate a way of expanding Aquinas’s account of the
will to accommodate the idea of taking direct ‘‘delight in the intrinsic goodness or
fullness of the perfection present intrinsically in the beings known’’ (204). But this
seems to require acknowledging that the will can be projective and thus rejecting
the formal egoism implied in ‘‘the desire to share this good, [or] be united with it’’
(204).
162. Marcel, Creative Fidelity, 49.
163. Ibid., 53.
164. See Crosby, Selfhood of the Human Person.
165. In particular, Scheler’s complex and often problematic discussion of ‘‘Eudaemonism’’ in his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, chap. 5, requires
more space for response than I could afford here.
166. My inspiration for this term is Heideggerian: I use ‘‘projection’’ because
it connotes throwing something out ahead of ourselves, or putting something in
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the functional position of being our goal or end, instead of simply finding it in
that position because of its inherent qualities. As noted in chapter 1, projection in
my sense—as self-motivation through setting ends and supplementing one’s given
motivation to pursue ends already set—has nothing to do with projection in the
Freudian or Feuerbachian sense of attributing one’s own traits to others.
167. Bertocci, Person and Primary Emotions, 5.
168. Ibid., 7.
169. Pink, Psychology of Freedom, 19. Pink also notes that whereas ‘‘intention is
always directed at agency,’’ ‘‘I can want E without wanting E to be brought about
by my agency’’ (18). So desires are not as closely related to agency as our intentions, which are both formed by and aim at our actions.
170. This might seem at odds with Thomas Nagel’s argument that there are
both ‘‘motivated and unmotivated desires,’’ or appetites that ‘‘simply assail us’’ as
well as desires motivated by other more basic desires and possibly other considerations (The Possibility of Altruism, 29). But in response, we could simply say that the
motivation produced in projection is a motivated desire that is not formed on the
basis of any unmotivated desires, and this would be perfectly compatible with
Nagel’s model.
171. McDowell, ‘‘Virtue and Reason,’’ 335.
172. On this topic, see John Hick’s work on the cognitive significance or factual claim-making functions of religious belief and in particular his work on ‘‘eschatological verification’’ in The John Hick Reader.
173. We need, but do not appear to possess, a term for individual or plural
cognitive faith-states that would be analogous to ‘‘belief ’’ and ‘‘beliefs’’ as referring
not to the general types of state but rather to particular instances thereof. One
cannot talk about ‘‘faiths’’ as one talks about ‘‘beliefs,’’ and I have no better suggestion than ‘‘faith beliefs.’’
174. I defend this thesis in more detail in chapters 12 and 14.
175. I might also be motivated to pursue it, for example, by the desire for
employment, but this would be an additional motive rather than an exclusive alternative. Projective motivation and orektic desire often overdetermine pursuit of a
single goal, though their relation remains contingent, so they can come apart in
different circumstances.
176. As for the other main premise 6, the weak erosiac thesis is obviously true
if Plato or Aristotle have correctly analyzed our prepurposive motives (which is
quite possible even if their eudaimonist claims about the erosiac nature of all motivation are false).
10. Radical Evil and Projective Strength of Will
1. Kent, Virtues of the Will, 204.
2. This model also implies inadequate conceptions of ‘‘weakness of will’’ and
of autonomy, but these are not my focus in the present book.
3. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 80.
4. Aristotle, NE, III.5, 1114b2–5 (Ross, 1759).
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5. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 78.
6. Ibid., 81. It would be better here to refer to ‘‘refraining’’ from action rather
than simply ‘‘failing’’ to act. We might also think that Aristotle’s view is too demanding, that it is not always the agent’s fault if she is not in the emotional
condition necessary for her to choose well.
7. Ibid., 82.
8. Ibid., 101.
9. Urmson, ‘‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean,’’ 160.
10. Ibid., 161.
11. Urmson, 162.
12. Although he is not quite this explicit, I take this to be the point of Urmson’s analysis, 163–64.
13. Foot, ‘‘Virtues and Vices,’’ 169.
14. Urmson, ‘‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean,’’ 164–65.
15. Foot, ‘‘Virtues and Vices,’’ 169. Foot, however, does not as readily admit
how deep a problem this is for Aristotle’s theory.
16. Urmson, ‘‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean,’’ 166–67.
17. Cooper describes the state of moral virtue as the extension of rational
control: ‘‘A person whose reasoned view about what is worth caring about, doing,
and experiencing [the noble] was fully reflected in the way she experienced nonrational desires’’ is virtuous if her reason itself is practically wise or properly judges
the noble (Cooper, ‘‘Reason, Moral Virtue,’’ 83). Thus, as we see in chapter 7,
moral virtue is the disposition to desire for its own sake whatever reason judges as
noble.
18. Ibid., 158.
19. Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will, 78, 80.
20. Reeve, Practices of Reason, 89. I include ‘‘fully’’ here to indicate a corrupt
conception of the noble, because the term ‘‘vicious’’ by itself is ambiguous: the
akratic’s action can be vicious, although her bouletic wish is not, and akratic agents
either do not act on their prohairetic choice (Reeve, 90) or act without any prohairesis (Kenny, 70, 74, 84).
21. Joseph Butler, Sermon II, ‘‘Upon Human Nature,’’ in Five Sermons, 40.
22. See, e.g., Hick, ‘‘An Irenaen Theodicy.’’ In his soul-making theodicy, Hick
admits to ‘‘assuming that the essence of moral evil is selfishness, the sacrificing of
others to one’s own interests. It consists, in Kantian terminology, in treating others,
not as ends in themselves, but as means to one’s own ends’’ (95). The problem
with this initial assumption is that there are ways of failing to respect persons as
ends that are not motivated by a desire for one’s own happiness or good.
23. Foot, ‘‘Virtues and Vices,’’ 170.
24. These are the medieval equivalents for Aristotle’s three forms of orexis:
‘‘volition, appetite, and temper,’’ as Kenny says, citing NE, 1225b21–26 (Aristotle’s
Theory of the Will, 69).
25. Taylor, Good and Evil, 192.
26. In Kant’s sense, ‘‘radical evil’’ is a freely chosen yet contingently universal
version of original sin; no human being has a holy will. It is similar to Alvin
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Plantinga’s notion that all possible human persons might be such that their counterfactuals of freedom include some wrongdoing; like Kant, Plantinga exaggerates
by calling such a person ‘‘transworld depraved ’’ (The Nature of Necessity, 186). I agree
with Richard Bernstein that Kant’s theory explains nothing but ‘‘simply reiterates
the fact that human beings who are conscious of the moral law sometimes (freely)
deviate from it’’ (Radical Evil, 33; also see Arendt, Life of the Mind, ‘‘Willing,’’ 118).
However, Pablo Muchnik argues convincingly that Kant’s notion of ‘‘diabolic evil’’
refers to ‘‘doing evil for evil’s sake’’ rather than for the sake of happiness (Muchnik,
‘‘Radical Evil,’’ 46).
27. Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, xii.
28. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, Postscript, 287. Arendt’s evidence for
this claim is clear in the trial record, despite the severe personal attacks she suffered
for it. However, I am less sympathetic with Arendt’s implications that Eichmann
was ‘‘perfectly incapable of telling right from wrong’’ (26). For his repeated horror
on visiting death camps to my mind suggests a clear sense of the barbarity of the
slaughter that he was facilitating. On this question, see Jacob Rogozinski’s
thoughtful response to Arendt in ‘‘Hell on Earth.’’
29. Ibid., 289.
30. Richard Bernstein, Radical Evil, 218. Most of what needs to be said about
Arendt on evil has been clearly set out in Bernstein’s masterful treatment, to which
I am indebted.
31. Ibid., 208.
32. Ibid., 210. Compare Augustine’s Neoplatonic view that ‘‘not a leaf on a
tree is created without a purpose, and no human being of any kind could be superfluous’’ (Free Choice of the Will, Book III, Sec. 23, 116).
33. The term ‘‘radical evil’’ is often used for large-scale atrocities, ‘‘offenses
against human dignity so widespread, persistent, and organized that normal moral
assessment seems inappropriate’’ (Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, vii). This consequentialist sense of radicality differs markedly from my volitionalist sense.
34. In holding this to be possible, I am following the view that an action’s
overall moral worth is a function of both the intrinsic moral legitimacy (or broadly
ethical value) of the intended act itself (including its intended consequences and
the intended mode of bringing them about) and the moral value of the motive for
choosing this intention. This view is shared by Kantians and Aristotelians (see
Foot, Natural Goodness, 72–73). Thus an act that aims to bring about some minor
harm might be fairly low in negative moral worth, even if its motive was utterly
malicious (e.g., to harm a person just because she was morally good). However,
such a perverse motive would certainly make the act more evil than if it aimed to
bring about the same undeserved minor harm out of simple avarice or lust. The
reason, according to the existential model, is that in the former case, the agent
actively works up her motivation to pursue the harm rather than simply being
attracted toward it by some prior inclination.
35. Taylor, Good and Evil, 208. This also suggests that it is difficult for any
simple form of utilitarianism to account for the distinctively negative moral status
of radically evil motives.
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36. Feinberg, ‘‘Psychological Egoism,’’ 550–51. However, the term ‘‘disinterested’’ is potentially misleading in this context, for although it correctly suggests
the lack of material self-interest in the motive, its negative form suggests detachment
or abstraction rather than the positive earnestness, projective pathos, or energetic
commitment of self involved in volitional striving or caring.
37. For example, Jonathan Dancy argues that there are no people who are
‘‘attracted by evil for its own sake’’ (see Moral Reasons, 4). He suggests that those
who pursue another person’s suffering as a final end see it as a good and are
therefore ‘‘no counter-example to the maxim that to desire something is always to
desire it sub specie boni ’’ (ibid., 6). But this maxim is a tautology when desire is
conceived substantively as orexis or when it is conceived formally as any intentional
purpose. Dancy ignores the crucial distinction between purposive and prepurposive
motives; certainly the radically evil person sees the victim’s suffering as a ‘‘good’’
once he wills it but not prior to that (i.e., he does not first apprehend it as a good
that prepurposively attracts him).
38. Colin McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 83.
39. Usage is fluid here, and several of these labels might have been applied to
any of these six categories. So my use of them is somewhat stipulative.
40. In this case, contra McGinn, we are talking about someone whose brute
preference for witnessing or causing pain involves a ‘‘primitive fascination’’ with
the ‘‘quale of pain’’ in others (Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 81).
41. See Taylor’s discussion of these cases in Good and Evil, 193. Feinberg seems
to make a similar error in conflating ‘‘pure evil’’ with finding it ‘‘great fun’’ to see
another person in agony (see Feinberg, ‘‘Evil,’’ in Problems at the Roots of Law, 128).
42. Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, pt. 2, Book V, chap. 4, 286.
43. Ibid., 290.
44. This was presumably the case for most Roman spectators, anyway. We can
also easily imagine a small minority who were activated by far more vicious motives
in watching these brutalities. For example, the Emperor Commodus, as fictionally
portrayed in the film Gladiator (dir. Ridley Scott, Universal Studios, 2000), is a
person actively striving to spite his opponents, not merely a blood-sport addict.
45. Taylor, Good and Evil, 207.
46. Fromm, Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, chaps. 12, 13.
47. Arguably, such agents are distinguished not only by having such perverse
desires but by being willing to act on them (and thus developing or even refining
these tastes). They are certainly more culpable if the movement from motivation
to intention is voluntary, but this does not distinguish radically evil motives.
48. Such existential emptiness seems to be the main problem with Ray, a patient with a violent personality disorder treated by Carl Goldberg (Speaking with the
Devil, 130), though Goldberg tries to trace Ray’s motives to shame caused by his
mother keeping her fatal illness secret from him.
49. Kekes, ‘‘The Reflexivity of Evil,’’ 218–19.
50. Ibid., 220. It is not so clear that such agents never had any alternative to
their corrupt moral worldviews. But I am not concerned here with Kekes’ main
thesis that such nonautonomous agents can be held responsible for their actions
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because they are not relevantly different from autonomous agents, since ‘‘ultimately
no agents have control over the possession of the capacities and opportunities on
which their autonomy depends’’ (221). His strong claim that autonomy ultimately
depends on constitutive moral luck is one that existentialists must reject.
51. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil, 31–32.
52. Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, pt. 2, Book V, chap. 4, 286.
53. This kind of breakdown in normal moral and psychological barriers to
violence and disregard for others is often thought to be crucial to explaining atrocities. For example, Adam Morton hypothesizes that there is an evolved ‘‘violence
inhibiting mechanism’’ in normal human agents that makes us ‘‘reluctant to cause
distress’’ to others. This ‘‘barrier’’ is reduced in individuals who have been ‘‘violentized’’ by past experience and it completely fails to operate in sociopaths, who feel
no inhibition against harming others when it serves their interests (see Morton, On
Evil, chap. 2, ‘‘The Barrier Theory of Evil,’’ 34–50). Note that such a prepurposive
inhibition could also be present to greater or lesser degrees in agents who project
radically evil ends. However, Morton clearly assumes that the motives normally
held in check by the relevant barriers are simply egoistic. For example, he says that
violent people imagine they can get their way by inspiring fear: ‘‘the sociopath has
difficulty understanding that many human acts are performed either for the sake
of the interaction itself or in order to benefit others’’ (51); and the psychopath
thinks that all moral norms limiting pursuit of one’s own advantage are merely
‘‘conventional’’ (52). Given this analysis, it is not surprising that Morton regards
traditional ‘‘virtues’’ as the antidote to evil because they strengthen the barrier (or
conform our appetites to it), whereas ‘‘evil motivation is the failure to block action
that ought not even to have been considered’’ (55–56). There is a category error
here: the barrier failure that Morton describes may indeed be common in decisions
to perform harmful, violent, or cruel actions (moving from motive to intention),
but it does not give us a distinctive type of evil motive. What is missing becomes
apparent when we ask how normal agents can muster the ‘‘willpower’’ to overcome
inhibitions against causing distress (45), or what it means for agents to adopt a
‘‘strategy’’ to avoid being inhibited (57) rather than being passively desensitized to
distress by extreme conditions or frequent violence in their surroundings (see the
discussion in the next section).
54. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil, 65.
55. Ibid., 69.
56. Goldberg, Speaking with the Devil, 4 (citing Gustave Gilbert’s interviews with
Nazis on trial at Nuremberg).
57. Kekes, ‘‘The Reflexivity of Evil,’’ 219.
58. Directed by Jean-Jacques Annaud (Cristaldifilm, 1986); based on the novel
by Umberto Eco.
59. Katz describes how Hess strove persistently to bring his feelings into line
with the grim necessity to obey, how he willed to become indifferent to sufferings
or incapable of sympathy (Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil, 69–71). Katz quotes
Hess’s memory of steeling himself to exterminate the Gypsies, as Hitler ordered:
‘‘Nothing surely is harder than to grit one’s teeth and go through with such a
thing, coldly, pitilessly, and without mercy’’ (70).
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60. See Stump, ‘‘Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt’s Concept of Free Will.’’ However, I note that Stump does not analyze the agent’s
higher-order will to pitilessness, or volitional identification with anti-compassion,
as a process of projective motivation. My argument that volitional identification
should be understood as projective willing will be given in the sequel to this work,
Autonomy and Authenticity.
61. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil, 13. Compare Goldberg, Speaking
with the Devil, 13.
62. Ibid., 25–26.
63. They should really say that they ‘‘found the point of it all’’ along the way,
but they do not wholeheartedly embrace this point right away.
64. For example, it may be easier to find meaning in the regime’s ideology than
in the martyrdom required by refusal, which seems so much more abstract or
apparently tenuous. Or, for those who have already profited from injustice or participated in collective crimes, going forward with total abandon may seem easier
to will than repentance, public remorse, and trying to make amends. For religious
fanatics, it may be much easier to believe that dying to destroy the infidel will be
a sure ticket into heaven than it is to face the task of trying to build a worthwhile
life in this world under conditions of hardship, sorrow, and grievance due to loss,
injustice, social chaos, and lack of opportunities to engage in the practices or build
stable family relationships (as in Palestinian territories today). This is what is commonly meant by saying that people in such circumstances may seize on ‘‘simple
answers.’’
65. Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 7, 29–31, in Complete Works of William Shakespeare, 1026.
66. I developed these ideas further in my comments on Gerard Bradley’s ‘‘Retribution: The Forgotten End of Punishment,’’ presented at the Natural Law Colloquium hosted by the Fordham University School of Law, April 29, 2003.
67. Henrich von Kleist, The Marquise of O and Other Stories, 66–67. The butchery
begins when Rugera is killed by his own father, which shows how intense religious
fanaticism can be.
68. See Elster, Alchemies of the Mind, 219, on the psychology of revenge in ancient
Greece—a culture that did not clearly distinguish accidental from intentional
harms. Without this distinction, of course, just redress of wrongs can never be
distinguished from vengeance against anyone who has harmed us or our family—
and so the pure retributive motive cannot be separated from the will to revenge.
This is chief among the problems Plato finds in the timocratic honor code of
archaic Greek society.
69. McGinn also recognizes this tendency of ‘‘stern and lofty judiciousness’’ to
turn corrupt: ‘‘the person becomes obsessed with visiting sufferings on the original
villains’’ (Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 70). This is presumably also what Jean-Luc Marion
has in mind when he argues that retributive justice only perpetuates evil: ‘‘our
desire for justice’’ turns into ‘‘desire for our justice’’ (Prolegomena to Charity, 11). But
Marion appears to deny that a pure motivation to just punishment is possible,
which is an exaggeration.
70. Dickens, Tale of Two Cities, Book III, chap. 12, 335.
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71. Ibid., Book III, chap. 14, 354.
72. Ibid., 356.
73. Ibid., 363.
74. Tolkien, Lord of the Rings, pt. I, ‘‘The Fellowship of the Ring,’’ chap. 2.
75. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 80, ‘‘The Problem of Envy,’’ 530–34.
76. Properly speaking, irascible anger refers only to a sudden and strong D2
desire that is not tightly connected to judgments of injustice. Such rage can motivate terrible acts. For example, it appears that in at least two incidents, American
servicemen in Iraq have gone ‘‘berserk’’ and slaughtered innocent civilians after
friends were killed by roadside bombs. When suppressed anger and frustration
explode under inhuman pressure in this way, the resulting act may be inexcusable
but its culpability is mitigated in comparison to ‘‘premeditated’’ malice.
77. Marion, Prolegomena to Charity, 12.
78. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 532. He notes that he is following Kant’s definition in The Metaphysics of Morals, II, sec. 36.
79. Ibid., 533.
80. In principle, we could conceive of a third attitude that would aim at comparative inferiority rather than comparative superiority or equality. An agent motivated by such a desire for comparative inferiority would be willing to sacrifice firstorder goods in order to widen the difference between his holdings and the holdings
of his comparison target. The fact that this third attitude is rare seems to reflect
the egoistic structure of interest in comparative differences in holdings; the envious
or superior agents see their goal as a (complex) part of their own well-being, and
this is not possible for comparative inferiority. When inferiority is willed, it is
usually as a means to a more fundamental rejection of one’s agency or personal
value (see chap. 12, sec. 9).
81. Rousseau, ‘‘Second Discourse on Human Inequality,’’ pt. II, in Basic Political
Writings, 78. This reveals a similar ambiguity in the German word Schadenfreude,
which is usually translated as malicious gloating over another’s misfortune. For
such gloating can be motivated by simple envy, desire for superiority, social envyenjoyment, or volitional spite—four quite distinct motive states.
82. Ibid., 68.
83. Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Essay III, ‘‘Of the Principles of Action,’’ pt. II, sec. 5, 162.
84. Ibid., 167. This tracks my distinction between irascible anger as a sudden
D2 desire and moral indignation that grounds a will to retributive justice.
85. For Reid emphasizes that ‘‘the very idea of justice which enters into cool
and deliberate resentment,’’ as opposed to animal thumos, ‘‘tends to restrain its exercise’’ (ibid., 173).
86. Ibid., 162.
87. Ibid., 163.
88. Ibid., 164.
89. McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, 79–80.
90. Shakespeare, King Richard the Third, Act 1, Scene 1, ll. 28–30 (The Complete
Works of William Shakespeare, 701).

................. 16406$

NOTE

05-23-07 10:55:29

PS

PAGE 613

614

Notes to Pages 354–360

91. Ibid., Act 5, Scene 3, l. 183 (744).
92. Ibid., Act 4, Scene 2, ll. 65–66 (732).
93. Cape Fear, directed by Martin Scorsese (Universal Studios, 1991); based on
the novel by John McDonald. Another interesting example of spite is found in the
film Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, directed by Nicholas Meyer (Paramount, 1982).
Khan wants to avenge what he sees as Captain Kirk’s unfair punishment of him
years before. But this becomes a spiteful obsession that blinds him to every other
possible good that he might pursue. Eventually, out of total hatred for Kirk, Khan
risks everything in his unyielding quest to destroy the Enterprise. When beaten, he
resolves to destroy himself and the remainder of his crew as a final means to take
Kirk down with him. Fittingly, he quotes Captain Ahab in Melville’s Moby Dick:
‘‘To the last I will grapple with thee’’; ‘‘From hell’s heart, I stab at thee! For hate’s
sake, I spit my last breath at thee!’’
94. Amadeus, directed by Milton Forman, screenplay Peter Shaffer (Republic
Pictures, 1984). Based on the play by Shaffer.
95. Similarly, if we think of ‘‘meanness’’ as an emotional state (the inverse of
affection) that is open to suffering and enjoys it but waits passively for opportunities to enjoy it rather than actively pursuing or creating them, then spite would be
distinct from ‘‘meanness’’ as well.
96. In the discussion of Sherman’s account in chapter 8, sec. 4, I suggested
that something like this may also be true in noble friendship, in which not only
the good of the other but also the activity of being a friend to the other (i.e.,
pursuing the other’s good in a reciprocal relationship) is cultivated as an end-initself. Thus we will first and second order final ends in willing friendship.
97. See Foot, Natural Goodness, 78. In Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis notes
that in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right to be free from
torture is included among a small number of such rights that are unqualified by
limitations that apply to other rights in order to meet the ‘‘just requirements of
morality, public order, and the general welfare in a democratic society’’ (Art. 29).
Finnis thinks the UN Declaration is right on this point (212–13). The UN Convention Against Torture (adopted 1975, entered into force in 1987, and ratified
by the United States just in 1999) also states that ‘‘No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture’’ (Art.
2, sec. 2). Yet our government seems to have violated this law several times during
the Iraq war.
98. On this point, see Elster’s discussion of the perverse illocutionary attitude
of Stalin’s regime, seen in commands that can only be followed unwillingly rather
than obeyed for the sake of willing loyalty (Sour Grapes, 63).
99. See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘‘Lordship and Bondage,’’ sec. 191.
100. A point that needs special emphasis in an age when new technologies for
selection among or even alteration of reproductive cells will soon make selection
of particular physical and mental attributes in our children increasingly feasible as
time goes on.
101. This limit is perhaps explored most fully in Mary Shelley’s classic dark
Romance novel, Frankenstein, which addresses the human dream of ‘‘playing God’’
by making a being with genuine alterity.
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102. Such a theology of making has radical implications that remain little explored; for instance, all human property rights are rendered merely provisional and
temporary, and all artwork belongs ultimately to God, not only to the human
artist, for our creative powers themselves are given by God. See the discussion of
subcreation in Tolkien, ‘‘On Fairy Stories.’’
103. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 724. The phrase is misleading, because Sartre
follows Plato in assuming that motivation is erosiac (see the discussion of lack,
135) and in positing his own version of the Transcendent Principle, according to
which all projects really aim at the unifying goal of the for-itself, whose original
project ‘‘can only aim at its own being’’ (721). Thus our willing is always ultimately focused on our self, though not necessarily on our eudaimonia.
104. Ibid., pt. III, chap. 3. Yet one of the main ways in which human beings try
to achieve this paradoxical combination is through their works, including artistic
creations. This is the direction from which Tolkien takes up what is otherwise the
same problem of the ultimate limit on the human projective will: it cannot rightfully project the creation of absolute alterity (or what Levinas calls creation ex
nihilo).
105. Still, while Augustine recognizes our ‘‘perverse imitation of God’’ or aspiration to master all other beings, in the same chapter he argues that no human
being can be so corrupted as not to desire any kind of peace (City of God, Book
XIX, chap. 12, 868). Thus his recognition of radical evil is limited by his eudaimonist theory of human nature.
106. See Tolkien, Lord of the Rings, Appendix A.
107. See Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Book III, sec. 125, 122.
108. See Tolkien, Silmarillion, chap. 1: ‘‘Ainulindaë’’ or ‘‘The Music of the
Ainur.’’ Marion makes an interesting argument that suicide’s deepest aim is demonic autonomy: ‘‘absolute independence that renders me master of myself and
the universe’’ (Prolegomena to Charity, 15). But he conflates this will to absolute disposal over oneself with ‘‘egoism.’’
109. Bernstein, Radical Evil, 218, citing Arendt’s letter in reply to Gershom
Scholem’s critique of Eichmann in Jerusalem. However, this is my interpretation of
Jaspers’s references to mythic greatness.
110. Ibid., 218, citing Jaspers’s 1946 letter to Arendt (in Hannah Arendt/Karl
Jaspers: Correspondence 1929–69).
111. Ibid., citing Arendt’s reply to Jaspers.
112. Milton, Paradise Lost, Book IV, 110. Hence Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the
distinction between ‘‘not being able to understand and not willing to understand’’
(Sickness Unto Death, 95).
113. I mention this issue in ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics,’’ 302–3.
114. See MacIntyre, ‘‘Once More on Kierkegaard,’’ 353–54, citing Aquinas,
Summa Theologica, I–II, Qu. 78, Art. 1.
115. Compare Augustine’s dogma from I Timothy 6:10: ‘‘the root of all evil
is greed, that is, willing to have more than enough’’ (Augustine, Free Choice of the
Will, Book III, sec. 16, 104). Foot points out that Aquinas believes one can act ‘‘as
one thinks one should not,’’ which she calls ‘‘a very radical form of badness in the
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will.’’ But for Aquinas, this occurs only in the form of akrasia, giving in to emotions
or appetites that pull toward lower goods. He admits neither demonic autonomy
nor the kind of spiritual self-destruction or ‘‘spitefulness to oneself that Dostoyevsky unforgettably described in the Notes from the Underground ’’ (Foot, Natural Goodness,
74).
116. Steele, ‘‘Does Evil Have a Cause?’’ 266.
117. Ibid., 267.
118. Ibid., 269.
119. Ibid., 272.
120. Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, 68.
121. Ibid., 69. Kierkegaard actually thinks there is one more type of radical evil
beyond what I have called demonic autonomy, namely, religious despair. Taking the
theological problem of evil as his ground, the agent rebels ‘‘against all existence’’
out of hatred of God for creating him and the world (73–74). I have left religious
despair out of my catalog because the existential account in this book is (at least
provisionally) independent of faith.
122. Ibid., 98. However, I think we can recognize this without appealing to
revelation.
123. See my analysis in ‘‘Aquinas’s Teleological Libertarianism.’’
124. See Williams, ‘‘Internal and External Reasons,’’ 102.
125. Although these may be apparent only by grace or personal revelation in
entering the religious stage and therefore be incommunicable directly to others.
126. As we’ll see in chapter 11, this reflects Kant’s idea that to act on a maxim
is always to give motive force to some previously felt impulse or rational
consideration.
127. See ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics,’’ 271–79.
128. Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, preface, 5.
129. Ibid., pt. 1, 13.
130. Kupperman, Character, 14.
131. Ibid., 13.
132. Ibid., 14.
133. There is still an asymmetry between evil and good on the existential account, since a radically evil will is weakened by an inability to be entirely wholehearted (see Davenport, ‘‘Kierkegaard, Anxiety, and the Will,’’ 178–81).
134. Robert C. Roberts, ‘‘Will Power and the Virtues,’’ 123.
135. Ibid., 124–25.
136. Ibid., 124. See the discussion of maintaining intrinsic motivation in chap.
12, sec. 3.
137. Ibid., 122.
138. Ibid., 124.
139. Ibid., 126.
140. Randell Helms, ‘‘Tolkien’s World,’’ 104.
141. This is the truth behind Luc Bovens’s amusing argument that total selfcontrol makes him numb, or, in Elster’s words, kills one’s sense of adventure (see
‘‘Two Faces of Akratics Anonymous,’’ 232). Projective strength of will necessarily
cultivates such a sense rather than destroying it.
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142. Roberts, ‘‘Will Power and the Virtues,’’ 126.
143. Here I agree with Margaret Holmgren’s argument against George Harris
that strength of will involves not only depth of caring but also not falling apart
when disaster strikes, and the resilience to find some positive way to continue expressing or developing one’s cares: ‘‘Ultimately an integral breakdown . . . is not
caused by caring about others, but by self-absorption. True caring about others leads
to a focus on others rather than on oneself ’’ (Holmgren, ‘‘Strength of Character,’’
397). As my mother says, a strong person tries to ‘‘cope.’’ However, this requires a
sense of one’s intrinsic value as a caring agent (see chap. 13, sec. 2). Also, sometimes
profound and lasting grief is the only authentic response to the circumstances; being
temporarily paralyzed by it need not imply giving up forever. Holmgren’s compelling account is missing only a projective understanding of the virtuous motivation
she describes as ‘‘steadfastness of purpose’’ (407), which is compatible with (and
may even require) strong emotional responses. The projective conception would also
clarify the important sense in which a strong will is not tranquil (406).
144. The closest Roberts comes to this idea is in his notion of virtues of
willpower as ‘‘skills of self-management,’’ which are more than Brandt’s patterns
of relative strength and weakness among desires (128). Anger management, for
example, is certainly something more active than simply having other desires
stronger than one’s anger whose ends happen to be frustrated by feeling or expressing anger. Rather, self-management is something actively initiated by the agent,
something willed. As Barrett said long ago, ‘‘will-strength’’ is distinct both from
virtue and from the ability to control one’s passions. It is an ability to persevere
consistently and earnestly in one’s tasks (Strength of Will, 19–20).
145. For example, Mark Pestana, ‘‘Second Order Desires.’’
11. Scotus and Kant: The Moral Will and Its Limits
1. Kent, Virtues of the Will, 200.
2. Ibid., 209. As I have suggested, this is partly because of Augustine’s perception of the possibility of radical evil, which cannot be just a disorder of the sense
appetite.
3. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Book I, sec. 13, 22.
4. Ibid., 213.
5. Ibid., 202, n. 4.
6. Ibid., 215.
7. Ibid., 216.
8. Ibid., 219, referring to the Summa Theologica, I–II, Qu. 56, Art. 4.
9. Ibid., 219–20.
10. Ibid., 222.
11. Ibid., 223.
12. Ibid., 227.
13. Ibid., 230.
14. Ibid., 231.
15. On this idea, see Cooper, ‘‘Unity of Virtue,’’ 265. See also Irwin’s discussion of the ‘‘supremacy thesis’’ in his essay, ‘‘The Virtues,’’ 40.
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16. As Kent puts it, for Walter, ‘‘the virtues of the sense appetite can be said
to depend on the virtues of the will’’ (Virtues of the Will, 229). And ‘‘Henry argues
that the will moves itself to willing before it commands the sense appetite. The
will accordingly acquires virtues before the sense appetite.’’ (229–30).
17. Ibid., 230.
18. Ibid., 234.
19. Ibid., 234.
20. Ibid., 235–36 (emphasis added).
21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.8, 1117a1–2.
22. Plato, Republic IV. Also see Meno, 78c–e.
23. O’Connell, Plato on the Human Paradox, 20. O’Connell points to the passages
in the Apology where Socrates argues that it would be wrong to cease practicing
philosophy to avoid banishment or death. Similar deontological attitudes are found
in the Crito.
24. Ibid., 19. O’Connell describes this as the thesis of ‘‘teleologism’’: ‘‘the (eudaemonistic) happiness we ineradicably long for will inevitably be attained by our
fulfilling our (deontological) duty’’ (18). This is part of the broader thesis that I
call ‘‘external eudaimonism’’ (EE; see chap. 8), and the same reply is appropriate:
even if O’Connell’s teleological reconciliation is accurate, this cannot function as
part of the agent’s motive in fulfilling her duty or acting on deontological obligation (or justice).
25. Kent, Virtues of the Will, 239–40.
26. Ibid., 240, referring to Ordinatio III, suppl. dist. 33 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on
the Will and Morality, 330).
27. Scotus, Oxford Commentary on the Four Books, Book II, d.25, 35, ‘‘Principal
Arguments.’’ I discuss this point from the De Anima in chapter 5. Notice that a
deterministic relation between prepurposive motives and intentions entails TP, but
TP by itself does not entail such a deterministic relation.
28. Ibid., Reply to the First Position (a), 36.
29. Ibid., Reply to the First Position (c), 37. He adds that it explains nothing
to say that the phantasm presented to the intellect has negative and positive aspects,
either of which can move the will depending on which it focuses on, because if
these two external motives are equal in force, the will is paralyzed, and if not, then
it is determined to go one way rather than the other (Reply to the First Position (e)).
30. Ibid., Reply to the Second Position (b), 38. Compare Augustine, On Free
Choice of the Will, Book I, sec. 12, 19–20: ‘‘For what is so much in the power of the
will as the will itself?’’
31. Ibid., ‘‘The Principal Arguments Are Resolved’’ (d), 39.
32. Wolter in Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Introduction, 31; also
see 39 on Ordinatio II, dist. 37, q.2.
33. See Bernardine Bonansea, ‘‘Duns Scotus’s Voluntarism,’’ 105–8. I am uncertain of the history here, since Wolter describes the origin of the text inserted in
later editions of the Oxford Commentary somewhat differently from Bonansea. See
Wolter in Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Introduction, 38.
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34. Bonansea, ‘‘Duns Scotus’s Voluntarism,’’ 109.
35. Ibid., 110–11. On practical knowledge as inclining the will, see Scotus,
Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 33. This seems to bring Scotus’s view closer to
Randolph Clarke’s theory of agent causation, in which reasons exercise a causal
influence on intentions.
36. In the Wadding reprint of Scotus’s Opera omnia, tome VII, this work is
entitled Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis.
37. Actually Scotus, being overly charitable, denies that Aristotle really intended any such principle.
38. Wolter in Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Introduction, 36.
39. Ibid. On this topic, see my discussion of existential freedom in ‘‘Towards
an Existential Virtue Ethics,’’ 280–81.
40. Kent, ‘‘Happiness and the Willing Agent,’’ 61.
41. Bonansea, ‘‘Duns Scotus’s Voluntarism,’’ 86. However, Kent denies that
Scotus really understands the will as ‘‘rational appetite:’’ see Kent, ‘‘Happiness and
the Willing Agent,’’ 61.
42. Bonansea, ‘‘Duns Scotus’s Voluntarism,’’ 87.
43. Ibid., 89, referring to the Ordinatio, Book One of the Opus Oxoniense, I, d.1,
nn.16–17; II, 10–11; and Opus Oxoniense, II, d.43, qu.2, n.2; XIII, 493b–94a.
However, Bonansea also notes Scotus’s doubts about radical evil; on this point, see
Arendt, Life of the Mind, pt. 2, 131.
44. Arendt, Life of the Mind, pt. 2, 143. Arendt adds that the will can sustain its
own inherent delight since it is not a ‘‘mere desire to possess,’’ which must cease
‘‘once the object is possessed’’ (143).
45. Bonansea, ‘‘Duns Scotus’s Voluntarism,’’ 90.
46. Ibid., 90–91.
47. Ibid., 91. For the relevant text, see Ordinatio IV, suppl. d.49, qq.9–10, Art.2
(Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 187–89). Scotus’s arguments on these
points seem conclusive to me.
48. Wolter in Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Introduction, 39.
49. Ordinatio IV, suppl. d.49, qq.9–10, Art.2 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and
Morality, 189).
50. Wolter in ibid., Introduction, 39–40.
51. Boler, ‘‘Transcending the Natural,’’ 110.
52. Ordinatio III, suppl. d.26 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 179).
53. Ordinatio IV, suppl. d.49, qq.9–10, Art.1 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and
Morality, 185).
54. Ordinatio III, d.17 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 183).
55. Ordinatio IV, suppl. d.49, qq.9–10 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 183).
56. Boler, ‘‘Transcending the Natural,’’ 112.
57. Ibid., 113.
58. Ibid., 117. Although Boler finds Scotus’s sense of ‘‘reason’’ somewhat paradoxical, what Scotus has in mind is apparently a reason that can discern intrinsic
values unrelated to its own being or to the realization of its nature. Reason is
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neither the slave of the appetites nor just the guide to happiness but the capacity
to reach beyond oneself to values with the kind of radical alterity that Frankl’s will
to meaning requires (see chap. 12, sec. 5).
59. Ibid., 116. This is a clearer expression of Arendt’s point that for Scotus, a
human person can transcend his given nature or ‘‘factuality’’ (Arendt, Life of the
Mind, pt. 2, 129).
60. Arendt, Life of the Mind, pt. 2, 131.
61. Boler, ‘‘Transcending the Natural,’’ 122. As Boler points out, for Scotus,
the motive of justice means loving something in itself, or for its own intrinsic value
(118–19, quoting from Ordinatio II, d.6, q.2, n.11 [Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will
and Morality, 472–77]). Although Scotus and Anselm may not conceive the criteria
of ‘‘rightness’’ for such proper love in terms of any formal universalizability test,
they do not conceive it in eudaimonist terms either.
62. Arendt, Life of the Mind, pt. 2, 136. In a related passage, Arendt recognizes
that for Aquinas, free choice is merely prohairetic: ‘‘liberum arbitrium’’ is only ‘‘free
to select the means to a pre-designed end.’’ By contrast, Scotus holds that the will
‘‘freely designs ends that are chosen for their own sakes.’’ (132). What Arendt
means is that such projected goals are pure rather than selected to promote the
agent’s well-being, but her terminology does not sufficiently reflect the key distinction between the purity and finality of ends. For example, she says that Aquinas never
considers that ‘‘there could be an activity that has its end in itself ’’ (123), which
seems false; but what she means is that an activity such as a process of loving
devotion could have an agent-transcending value for which the agent wills it.
63. Boler, ‘‘Transcending the Natural,’’ 120.
64. Ordinatio III, suppl. d.27, Art.1 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality,
425).
65. Ibid., Art.3, 435.
66. Scotus does distinguish between ‘‘the will itself in a purely natural state,’’
including its freedom and two basic inclinations, and ‘‘the same will as informed
by gifts of grace’’: Ordinatio IV, suppl. d.49, qq.9–10 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will
and Morality, 183). But its natural inclination to justice enables the will to posit
ends that would have required infused grace in Aquinas’s account.
67. Wolter in ibid., Introduction, 40.
68. Ibid., 179.
69. Ibid., Art.2 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 195). However,
Scotus does not go so far as to say that we can will misery or evil per se. His
position is subtle because he holds in this section both that one cannot positively
will to be miserable or nill being happy (since the appetite for eudaimonia remains
natural and inevitable in all human agents) and yet that this does not imply that in
every action, one wills happiness or nills misery necessarily. This is possible because
the will can take a neutral attitude instead: when the intellect shows the will the
possibility of happiness, ‘‘I grant that in most cases it will have volition, but it
does not necessarily have any act,’’ since it ‘‘can suspend itself from eliciting any
act in particular with regard to this or that’’ (195). Scotus is picking up here on
Aquinas’s idea that the will can actively refrain from inner action or from making
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any definite decision, but he adds that the will can posit and seek ends that are
contrary to happiness, knowing that they are destructive, but not specifically because
they are evil (e.g., fornication, 197). Thus the thesis that we do not will misery for
its own sake involves denying radically evil volition; yet Scotus undermines the
analysis of evil as a mere privation of the good.
70. Ibid., Art.1, 427.
71. Ibid., Art.2, 429.
72. Ibid. He adds that ‘‘they speak most improperly who claim that God is the
object of charity insofar as he is the beatific object,’’ if by this they mean the object
of an act motivated by desire for beatitude (431), which is the goal of ‘‘the affection for the advantageous’’ (Art.3, 435).
73. Ordinatio II, d.39 (Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 201–3).
74. Ibid., Art.3, 437. Scotus describes our agapic regard for human neighbors
as part of agapic love for God, because the latter must be nonjealous, willing that
all other persons capable of it also love God in the agapic sense (suppl. d.28, Art.
1, 449–51). I think this account is inadequate, for it seems to allow only for
indirect neighbor love and it overemphasizes jealousy as the root of all radical evil.
75. Wolter in ibid., Introduction, 93.
76. Ibid., Introduction, 92.
77. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II, Qu. III, Art. 4, Obj. 5 (Oesterle, 32).
78. See my discussion of Augustine’s conception of the good higher-order will
in ‘‘Liberty of the Higher-Order Will,’’ 441. Arendt simply says that for Augustine, the last end and happiness of human beings is love. She correctly recognizes
that Aquinas cannot accept this theory because ‘‘For him, a love without desire is
unthinkable’’ (Life of the Mind, pt. 2, 122).
79. For Aquinas’s reply to Objection 5 seems to miss the point; he acknowledges only that ‘‘a good will, inasmuch as it is an inclination of the will, is posited
among the good things that make a man happy,’’ not that we can form a will to
such a good first-order will as an end-in-itself (Oesterle, 33).
80. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II, Qu. III, Art. 4, Respondo (Oesterle, 32).
81. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Book III, sec. 3. When Augustine says
that ‘‘if we will, and yet the will remains absent, then we are not really willing
at all’’ (77), he is best understood as arguing that decision is immediately selfimplementing: to will in the sense of deciding is to form an intention; hence if no
action-guiding purpose arises, then one has not decided.
82. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II, Qu. II, Art. 8, Respondo (Oesterle, 25).
83. Ibid., Qu. II, Art. 6, Obj. 2 (Oesterle, 22). Here Aquinas is discussing the
thesis that happiness consists in pleasure, which he rejects, but his statement about
the nature of ends is perfectly general and not rejected in his response.
84. Ibid., Qu. III, Art. 4, Rep. 5 (Oesterle, 33).
85. Ibid., Qu. IV, Art. 4, Respondo (Oesterle, 45). Notice that this distinction
also applies to Kierkegaard’s similar thesis that purity of heart (which is another
term for rectitude) consists in placing God above all temporal goods. See Kierkegaard, ‘‘On the Occasion of a Confession.’’
86. Kant, Groundwork I, 395 (Paton, 62).
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87. Ibid., 396 (Paton, 64).
88. Ibid., 396 (Paton, 64).
89. Ibid., 396 (Paton, 63).
90. Ibid.
91. This qualifier is necessary because, given any account of our formal telos
whatsoever, it is always possible to define some sense of ‘‘good for the agent’’ as
‘‘fulfilling her formal telos.’’ For example, Spaemann simply defines a life ‘‘turning
out well’’ as a life that realizes whatever it is that is common to all intentional
action (Happiness and Benevolence, 8). But as I have argued, the eudaimonia thesis has
more content than this; it is not an empty tautology. For a life to turn out well in
the Franciscan or Kantian sense is for the agent to achieve volitional rectitude,
which is not a possible variant of eudaimonia as a motivating end.
92. The thesis that individual happiness is not our formal telos is not unique
to deontological thinkers, of course. It is also found in Mill’s acceptance of Carlyle’s point that nobility requires ‘‘Entsagen,’’ or willingness to ‘‘do without happiness’’ (Utilitarianism, chap. 2, 12). Mill’s own conception of moral motivation
implies that ‘‘it is possible to do without happiness’’ in sacrificing oneself for the
greater good of a larger community (ibid., 15). But although Mill stands in basic
agreement with Kant against Aristotle on this point, he still defines our highest
end in terms of joint eudaimonia or maximal shared happiness. Nor does he recognize that positing such an end requires projective motivation; like Hume and Rousseau, he thinks that this motive can be developed out of natural prepurposive
sympathetic emotions, ‘‘the social feelings of mankind—the desire to be in unity
with our fellow creatures’’ (ibid., chap. 3, 30).
93. Groundwork I, 398 (Paton, 66).
94. Ibid., 399 (Paton, 67).
95. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality, 169.
96. Korsgaard, Introduction to Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr.
Mary Gregor, xiv. The four examples are the prudent shopkeeper, the despairing
man who rejects suicide on principle, the philanthropist (who comes in sympathetic and unsympathetic versions), and the gout sufferer who rejects indulgence
on principle rather than prudence.
97. Kant, Groundwork I, 399–400 (Paton 67–68) (emphasis in original). The
four examples are the prudent shopkeeper, the despairing man who rejects suicide
on principle, the philanthropist (who comes in sympathetic and unsympathetic
versions), and the gout sufferer who rejects indulgence on principle rather than
prudence.
98. Ibid., 400 (Paton, 68). A somewhat less awkward translation of this passage is found in the newer Cambridge edition by Mary Gregor (13).
99. In Part II, in the note defining inclination and interest, Kant contrasts
‘‘taking an interest in something’’ with ‘‘acting from interest’’ in it: ‘‘The first expression signifies practical interest in the action; the second pathological interest in
the object of the action’’ (Groundwork II, 414, note; Paton 81). Note that only the
second, desiderative kind of ‘‘interest’’ focuses exclusively on the object of the
intention or purpose, since moral motivation is presumed to evaluate both the end
and the means we intend to use in pursuing it.
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100. Kant develops this idea in the preface to the Groundwork, where he argues
that:
Every one must admit that a law has to carry with it absolute necessity if it
is to be valid morally—valid, that is, as a ground of obligation; that the
command, ‘‘Thou shalt not lie’’ could not hold merely for men, other rational beings having no obligation to abide by it—and similarly with all other
genuine moral laws. (Groundwork I, 389, Paton 57)
101. While this principle remains controversial, it has been well defended by
Haji, who also provides a useful interpretation of the ‘‘can’’ clause; see Deontic
Morality and Control, chap. 3.
102. I discuss Korsgaard’s defense of this thesis, which I call the Kantian principle of action, in chap. 3, sec. 3.3. Note how it contrasts with Aristotle’s view,
according to which something like a maxim is involved only in deliberative choice
(prohairesis), following from boulēsis or D3 desire.
103. This, of course, is the third proposition at Groundwork I, 400 (Paton 68;
italics omitted).
104. This helps resolve the problem discussed by Palmquist in his essay, ‘‘Is
Duty Kant’s ‘Motive’ for Moral Action?’’ 171.
105. See Vedder, ‘‘Heidegger on Desire,’’ 355.
106. Groundwork I, 400 (Paton 68).
107. Kant’s point obviously cannot apply to states of affairs that include relational properties mentioning an agent-causal genesis, such as the property of ‘‘being
produced by the intentional action of Hegel.’’ The product-value of our realized
purposes is assumed to be separable from this kind of relation to an agent’s will;
it does not supervene on such agent-related properties.
108. Groundwork I, 401 (Paton, 69) (emphasis added).
109. Ameriks offers a valuable summary of the recent literature in his essay,
‘‘Kant on the Good Will.’’ My reading corresponds to what Ameriks calls Paton’s
‘‘particular intention view’’ (193): when Kant says that only the good will is ‘‘good
without qualification,’’ he means that natural goods, including nonmorally admirable character traits such as cleverness, can all be misused (a point that comes from
Plato through the Stoics). Thus his thesis is that only the good will is a morally
unqualified good. There are contexts in which a good will is combined with qualities that have a negative natural value, such as stupidity (195); but though the
moral motivation of the stupid man is not an unqualified good simpliciter, it remains
a morally unqualified good. So interpreted, Kant’s thesis is not quite a tautology,
because it still tells us something important about the status of the second-order
will to justice or fairness (see note 127 below).
110. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant, Hume, and the Problem of Moral Motivation,’’ 97. A
German version of this essay has appeared as ‘‘Kant und das Problem der moralischen Motivation.’’
111. In ‘‘The Ongoing Relevance of the Franciscan Tradition,’’ Kent argues
that Scotus understands this motive more broadly than Kant as including forms of
agapic love (65).
112. Kant, Groundwork I, 401 (Paton, 68).
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113. Ibid., 401, n. ** (Paton, 69) (emphasis in original).
114. Ibid.
115. Groundwork II, 418 (Paton, 85). Happiness is presented here not only as
a maximizing ideal for well-being but as a totality of the kind that leads to antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the practical realm, the antinomy of the eudaimonist ideal is such that no ‘‘determinate concept’’ of this blessed state can even
be formed, let alone regulate the will. This is because ‘‘happiness is an Ideal, not
of Reason, but of imagination—an Ideal resting on merely empirical grounds, of
which it is vain to expect that they should determine an action by which we could
attain the totality of a series of consequences which is in fact infinite’’ (418–19;
Paton, 86). Kant’s point is closely related to my claim that there may be no single
best combination of the final ends worth pursuing but rather a plurality of incommensurable combinations with sufficient practical coherence (see chap. 7, sec. 8,
and ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics’’). Yet Rawls and others have shown
that a good number of things that are at least general in content and empirically
universal in application can be said about both happiness and the sort of rational
agent capable of forming a conception of its good. The transcendental-pragmatic
study of happiness is still vital for normative ethics and theories of justice, even if
it is not determinate enough to pick out a single best type of life.
116. See Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Lecture 3.
117. Kant, Groundwork I, 402–3 (Paton, 69–70).
118. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant, Hume, and the Problem of Moral Motivation,’’ 92. See
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, chap. 1, Theorem II, Corollary.
119. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Theorem II, Remark I, Ak. 22–24, 21–22.
Kant’s claim seems to be that these more refined or ‘‘cultured’’ desires are still
commensurable with lower ‘‘sensual’’ appetites and appetites for entertainment,
which can often prevail over the former. But my analysis of practices in chapter 8
shows that in some of the cases Kant considers, projective motivation is more likely
than refined but still formally egoistic desire.
120. Ibid., Theorem I, Ak. 21, 19–20.
121. Kent notes that Scotus’s conception of the appetite for happiness is
broader than Kant’s, since it includes desires that are not hedonistic: see ‘‘Ongoing
Relevance of the Franciscan Tradition,’’ 64–65.
122. Ibid., Theorem III, Remark II, Ak. 27, 26.
123. Ibid., sec. 8, Theorem IV, Remark I, Ak. 35, 35 (italics omitted).
124. Ibid., ‘‘Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason,’’ Ak. 109, 115.
125. Watson, Tradition(s), 107.
126. Thus Watson is not quite right to infer from Kant’s remark that happiness is necessarily the desire of every finite rational being that ‘‘Willing per se is
necessarily involved with happiness’’ (Tradition(s), 106). This conflates the ubiquity
thesis with the eudaimonia thesis. Kant identifies volition with an executive agency
that forms and enacts intentions and he holds that this agency can intend ends
irrespective of their product-value for the agent’s well-being (even when the agent
believes that they have such value). Nor does the inevitable reference to ends in our
intentions imply that all our ends are chosen because of their perceived relation to
our own happiness, although it does imply that even decisions to form intentions
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on moral grounds must have some discernible end or goal with reference to which
we can define a non-eudaimonistic notion of the ‘‘Good’’ that is dependent on and
limited by (though not reducible to) the prior ideal of the ‘‘Right.’’
127. This resistance is apparent in the opening claim of the Groundwork which,
as Otfried Höffe argues, implies that ‘‘In contrast to traditional moral philosophy,
absolute goodness does not consist in a supreme object of the will . . . such as
Aristotle’s happiness, but in the good will itself ’’ (Höffe, Immanuel Kant, 142).
128. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant, Hume, and the Problem of Moral Motivation,’’ 99.
129. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, sec. 7, ‘‘The Fundamental Law of Pure
Practical Reason,’’ Ak. 32, 32. This is what I called the Kantian principle of action
(chap. 3, sec. 3).
130. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Lecture 3, 94.
131. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ‘‘The Principles of Pure Practical Reason,’’
Remark II, Ak. 36, 37.
132. Ibid., ‘‘The Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason,’’ Ak. 60, 62.
133. Of course, some Kant scholars use ‘‘laws’’ rather than ‘‘rules’’ for relating
ends and means in maxims. Thus Höffe says that for Kant, ‘‘The capacity to act
according to representations of laws is also called the will, so practical reason is
simply the capacity to will’’ (Höffe, Immanuel Kant, 139).
134. Allison, ‘‘Spontaneity and Autonomy in Kant’s Conception of the
Self,’’ 11.
135. As Allison says, according to Kant’s incorporation principle, which covers
‘‘actions motivated by inclination as well as purely moral considerations,’’ ‘‘although a finite rational agent is still sensuously or ‘pathologically’ affected, that is
to say, it finds itself with a set of given inclinations and desires, which provide
possible motives or reasons to act, it is not causally necessitated to act on the basis
of any of them’’ (ibid., 13).
136. See Allison’s discussion of the incorporation thesis in Kant’s Theory of Freedom, chap. 2, 29–53; and in ‘‘Spontaneity and Autonomy in Kant’s Conception of
the Self.’’
137. Guyer, Review of Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, 406.
138. This follows unless the conditions for motivation are different in lower
animals, which might be a possible Kantian response. Then Kant’s thesis would be
that in any rational being, her practical freedom or power of spontaneously determining motives by the incorporation of reasons into maxims prevents unincorporated incentives that would count as motivating animals from motivating such a
rational being. This position, which begins a line of thought leading all the way to
Sartre, implies that we can never be unfreely motivated, or moved against our will; but
this view runs up against difficult counterexamples in psychology. Such a view
probably results from linking motivation very strongly with action, so that having
a motive entails an attempt to act on it. If combined with the idea that a rational
being cannot act on a motive without freely ‘‘consenting,’’ it follows that a ground
must have consent to become a motive. But it is more plausible to hold that we
can acquire motives without consent, though action on them may always require
some type of consent by the agent.
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139. Herman, ‘‘On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,’’ 11–12
(emphasis in original).
140. C. Nussbaum, ‘‘Kant’s Changing Conception of the Causality of the
Will,’’ 269. Nussbaum emphasizes that the problem of understanding how the
will can be noumenally free and yet initiate causal sequences in a closed and determined physical order arises both for the empirical will and for the pure will on
Kant’s account.
141. Allison, ‘‘Kant on Freedom,’’ 126. Allison’s use here of the term ‘‘projection’’ is convenient and suggestive for my purposes.
142. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
143. Höffe, Immanuel Kant, 139.
144. Its projective structure entails that a motive is ‘‘weakly independent’’ in
this sense, which Kant extends to all human motivation. It also entails that the
motivation is ‘‘strongly independent’’ of desire or inclination in Kant’s sense, and in
this sense projective motivation is psychologically autonomous. But, pace Kant, it
does not entail impartial moral concern, because the considerations that ground
projections may be contingent to the person or not motivated by the universalizability of these reasons—even if she thinks that they are universalizable.
145. As Allison has argued, autonomy means ‘‘independence’’ not only in the
sense represented by ‘‘the capacity of the will to determine itself to act on the basis
of self-imposed principles (which would include heteronomous principles)’’ but
also in the sense that the will ‘‘recogniz[es] sufficient reasons to act that do not
stem (even indirectly) from its needs as a sensuous being,’’ as do the reasons made
sufficient in heteronomous maxims or intentions (see Allison, ‘‘Spontaneity and
Autonomy,’’ 18).
146. Rauscher, ‘‘Kant’s Conflation of Pure Practical Reason and Will,’’ 579.
Rauscher here cites the first Critique A802/B831.
147. As Allison notes, ‘‘heteronomy’’ is frequently misunderstood as ‘‘as simple
lack of agency, a complete subjection of the will to the ‘causality of nature’ ’’ (Allison, ‘‘Spontaneity and Autonomy,’’ 17). Ameriks also cites Allison’s point that it
seems to be logically possible that motivational independence from desires ‘‘could
take a non-moral form’’ (Ameriks, ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 227).
148. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Lecture 3, 98. Alternatively, Korsgaard may mean that the will is always autonomous in the sense that it is always
under the moral law, although it does not always live up to this obligation or act
according to the law of its own freedom. Korsgaard also risks reinforcing this
misunderstanding when she writes that for Kant, ‘‘The free will must be entirely
self-determining’’ ( 97). For this is true only in the sense that prepurposive desires
cannot by themselves determine the will for Kant, any more than they can for Scotus.
Still, in many cases, without such prepurposive desires, the will would have no
natural inclinations to adopt or incorporate; so the will often depends on the
experience of natural and learned inclinations for Kant.
149. Ameriks argues that Kant’s strongest conception of autonomy actually
combines both these two conditions: our intention incorporates a ‘‘formal’’ or pure
moral content not derivable from the lower faculty of desire, and our willing is the
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‘‘ultimate’’ efficient cause of our intention (Ameriks, ‘‘ ‘Pure Reason of Itself
Alone,’ ’’ 252–53). On this view, an autonomous will is both projectively motivated and spontaneous in the sense of transcendental freedom. For the sake of
clarity, I have separated these two aspects and use ‘‘autonomy’’ for the former, that
is for projective willing that does not ‘‘borrow’’ its motive from prepurposive desires. This entails that an autonomous intention is efficiently caused by the will
rather than by prior desires, but not that willing itself is an ultimate cause.
150. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 98.
151. On this topic, see my paper, ‘‘From Autonomy to Morality: A Gap in
Kant’s Deduction of the Categorical Imperative’’ (unpublished).
152. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, sec. 6, Problem II, Ak. 30, 29.
153. For example, deontic projection may figure prominently in citizens’ having a ‘‘sense of justice’’ in Rawls’s sense. For citizens must project the end of
building basic political institutions that fellow citizens should count as substantively equal and fair from an impartial perspective, if they are to be committed to
‘‘justice’’ in the deontological sense.
154. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Lecture 3, 101 and 120–21.
155. Ibid., 101.
156. Ibid., Reply to Critics, 240.
157. Ibid., 119.
158. Ibid., 120.
159. Ibid., 121.
160. Gowans, ‘‘Practical Identities and Autonomy,’’ 550.
161. Ibid., 551.
162. Ibid., 554–55.
163. Ibid., 557.
164. Ibid., 561.
165. Throughout I use the term ‘‘libertarianism’’ here to include both sourceincompatibilist conceptions according to which responsibility requires agent-causation, and leeway-incompatibilist positions according to which responsibility requires the power, starting from a single state of affairs, to bring about any one of
a morally significant range of alternative possible intentions. Leeway-liberty implies
that the person is an uncaused source of intentions (though not necessarily an
agent-cause), but being a spontaneous source of intentions may not entail leeway
(at least some source-incompatibilists do not think leeway is required for responsibility). However, Kant, like Aristotle, does not seem to distinguish these two types
of incompatibilist freedom in the efficient causation of intention.
166. Pink, Psychology of Freedom, 15–16.
167. Ibid., 6.
168. Ibid., 29.
169. Ibid., 23. Keep in mind that Pink uses ‘‘desire’’ in a generic, formally open
sense. He does not offer a theory of motivation distinguishing between ‘‘desire’’ in
various substantive senses and other types of motivation. So for him, acting against
your most rational ‘‘desire’’ can only be akratic. On my account, by contrast, projections come in both akratic and nonakratic varieties.
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170. Ibid., 30–31.
171. Steiner, The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity, 42 (emphasis in original).
172. As Steiner’s quote from Robert Hamerling indicates, this worry about
arbitrariness has led philosophers who conceive volition as executive agency to
reject libertarian freedom:
Should freedom of the will consist in being able to will something without
reason, without a motive? But what does it mean to will something, other
than to have a reason to do or strive for this rather than that? To will something without a reason, without a motive, would mean to will something
without willing it. The concept of will is inseparable from that of motive.
Without a motive to determine it, the will is an empty ability. (see Steiner,
41, quoting Hamerling’s Atomistik des Willens [Hamburg, 1891], 2 vols., 213)
(emphasis in original).
173. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 221.
174. Rauscher, ‘‘Kant’s Conflation of Pure Practical Reason and Will,’’ 579.
175. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 220. Ameriks’s skepticism here
depends in part on his view that the approach Kant takes in the Critique of Practical
Reason after his ‘‘great reversal’’ is ‘‘vulnerable to charges of dogmatism’’ since the
epistemic possibility remains that the connection between moral motivation and
liberty is illusory. See Ameriks, ‘‘Pure Reason of Itself Alone,’’ 254.
176. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 224. The citation within the
extract is to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (emphasis in original).
177. Ibid., 40.
178. This need not imply, however, that the agent identifies with these reasons
or the motives they sanction in the stronger Frankfurtian sense of a wholehearted
commitment to them. But it does force us to reconceive ‘‘wanton’’ personal agents
(or wantons who can be held responsible) as still acting on maxims, rather than
moved brutum.
179. Rauscher, ‘‘Kant’s Conflation of Pure Practical Reason and Will,’’ 583.
180. Allison, ‘‘Spontaneity and Autonomy,’’ 16.
181. Allison, ‘‘Kant on Freedom,’’ 127.
182. Ibid., 126.
183. Ibid., 127.
184. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 226. In particular, Ameriks
thinks Kant fails to respond adequately to the Leibnizian, Wolffian, and Spinozistic compatibilisms of his day.
185. A simple symbolic reconstruction of this argument may be helpful.
Where S  our seeing ourselves as moral agents (the standpoint of agency); D 
‘‘we can see ourselves as projecting ends for deontic reasons’’; M  ‘‘the concept
of moral necessity is intelligible to us’’; C  ‘‘we can understand the concept of
possible but nonactual actions, decisions, intentions, and motives of ours’’; and L
 ‘‘we enjoy leeway-libertarian freedom,’’ the argument is:
1. S → D
2. D → M
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3. M → C
4. ¬L → ¬C
5. C → L [4, MT]
6. S → L [1, 2, 3, 5, HS]
186. Note that the argument does not require that agents who see themselves
as responsible must have a reflective articulation of the relevant modal concepts; a
person may employ these concepts without naming them or having any theory of
them. Also note that a stronger conclusion would follow if we could defend premise 4 as a thesis about the intelligibility of modal concepts in general. Premise 4
would then say that we possess the concept of nonactual possibilities only because
of our leeway-libertarian freedom. This is not to suggest that we learn that things
could be otherwise than they actually are from the experience of making choices
(for, obviously, we never experience choosing otherwise than we actually do). Rather,
the idea is that the concept of nonactual possibilities is innate in our repertoire
(and brought to the interpretation of experience) precisely because it is required
for our exercise of leeway-libertarian power. This strong version of premise 4
claims that the libertarian hypothesis is the best explanation of why we have modal
beliefs and knowledge. It could be defended on the grounds that empirical explanations of our modal concepts fail and other a priori explanations remain ad hoc,
whereas the power to bring about alternative decisions (starting from the same
initial state) would clearly have to involve the ability to think of these options as
possibilities that might not be actualized. Thus having such a power would explain why we
have to have the basic concept of nonactual but possible states of affairs from
which all other modal concepts are built. However, this stronger argument would
probably not be compatible with Kant’s epistemology (see Ameriks, ‘‘Pure Reason
of Itself Alone,’’ 259).
187. I still consider this a transcendental deduction, though it starts from moral
experience rather than just experience. But its experiential premises do not include
the ‘‘efficient’’ causal spontaneity of the agent. Contrast Ameriks, ‘‘Pure Reason of
Itself Alone,’’ 257.
188. Ibid., 222.
189. Ibid., 222. Allison also uses the term ‘‘two-aspect view’’ for his interpretation, but he means by this only that there are two epistemic perspectives, ‘‘two
‘points of view’ or ‘ways of considering’ ’’ things (Allison, ‘‘Kant on Freedom,’’
128), rather than two real aspects in the metaphysical sense (which is still distinct,
as Ameriks insists, from a full two-worlds or double-entity metaphysics).
190. Ameriks, ‘‘Reinhold’s Challenge: Systematic Philosophy for the Public,’’
msp. 22 (emphasis in original). It is difficult to say exactly how Kant thought
agent-causation at the noumenal level and deterministic physical causation at the
phenomenal level would mesh. I suggest that his proposal is an overdetermination
model in which free decisions agent-cause physical events (D events) that also have
natural event-causes. It is then nomologically possible for a given D event to happen with only its natural cause, since the agent-cause can be absent.
191. This may be where several post-Kantian German idealists depart radically
from Kant. They are followed in recent Continental philosophy by a line of thinkers from Buber and Levinas to Nancy and Derrida who accept our liberty as justified by its necessary connection to our ‘‘conception of ourselves as moral agents’’
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(Ameriks, ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 221). Unlike both Allison and Ameriks,
these thinkers avoid the problem of a noumenal basis for libertarian freedom by
taking the practical perspective opened by the ‘‘faktum’’ of moral responsibility to the
Other as the sole ultimate perspective for our reason—the basis of a new, purely
practical ‘‘metaphysics’’ in which interhuman relations and the moral unsubsumability of individual difference replace all theoretical judgments and ego-based apprehensions as the root of ‘‘knowledge.’’ This move radicalizes Kant’s notion of the
primacy of the practical; for these writers, the ‘‘faktum’’ of the Other and our responsibility for her functions like an ‘‘intellectual intuition,’’ but it is not a theoretical intuition of the ego at all (instead, this egological model of knowledge as
cognitive appropriation in which our noetic acts construct our noemata is transcended). Ameriks follows Kant in rejecting such an absolute primacy of the practical, but this issue remains open and disputable.
192. This in turn requires either that we reject the closed, deterministic picture
of physical nature or that we accept a dual-aspect view in which a nonphysical and
potentially nondetermined aspect underlies the physical aspect of persons.
193. It is interesting to compare Kant’s view with that of John Fischer and
Mark Ravizza, who argue that ‘‘our status as morally responsible agents’’ should
not be vulnerable to possible future scientific discovery that causal determinism is
true (Responsibility and Control, 254). They think that libertarians cannot avoid this
problem, whereas Kant thinks we can. I deny that a viable libertarian conception
of moral freedom has to be insulated from potential empirical disconfirmation;
rather, in his own time, Kant should have inferred from his faktum of obligation
that Newtonian mechanics must be mistaken.
194. At least, Ameriks’s argument here seems to obscure the difference between
these two issues.
195. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 225–26, quoting Allison, Kant’s
Theory of Freedom, 51 (emphasis in original). In addition to the non sequitur described here, Ameriks thinks that Kant’s mature position also suffers from assuming too uncritically that the conditions of moral responsibility require alternate
possibilities of action. See Ameriks, ‘‘Reinhold’s Challenge,’’ 23–24.
196. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 226.
197. Ibid., 227.
198. Hence while Ameriks reads Kant’s distinction between ends and grounds
of an action to mean that ‘‘whatever the ends are which make up the overt content
of our intentions, our actions can also have hidden grounds of a different form’’
(228), I instead read this distinction in terms of the two orders of agency and
intention. The end, as Kant uses the term, concerns the intended goal of a firstorder action, whereas the ground refers to the goal intended in the second-order
intention on which the agent acts in deciding to form the first-order intention and
adopt its first-order maxim.
199. As Ameriks notes, Kant would say that if acts with moral content arise
because ‘‘our minds are made to operate as they do by something outside of (and
unknown to) them, then in doing them we do not have a moral character at all’’
(‘‘Pure Reason of Itself Alone,’’ 253).

................. 16406$

NOTE

05-23-07 10:55:40

PS

PAGE 630

Notes to Pages 415–421

631

200. See the novel argument for such a libertarian alternative to agent causation
in Goetz’s ‘‘Libertarian Choice.’’ Goetz defends the thesis that ‘‘choice is essentially
an uncaused mental action done for a reason, purpose, or telos’’ (195). He relies
in part on Frankfurt’s point in a famous critique of causal models of action that
‘‘It is an epistemological feature of an agent who knows that he is making a choice
that he knows this while he is choosing’’; yet on causal accounts, he ‘‘cannot possess
this knowledge in virtue of his awareness of the choice itself,’’ but only by virtue
of his awareness of its causes could he tell that it is a choice rather than another
kind of event (these being distinguished only causally on such accounts) (198;
emphasis in original). Goetz also incisively defends the idea that choices can be
actions with reasons that underdetermine rather than cause them, without this making
choices ‘‘random’’ in any relevant sense (199–200).
201. The problem with this is that the ‘‘self ’’ of the agent who motivates
herself in projecting ends is being formed precisely by these volitional efforts. Accounts of agent causation in contemporary debates about moral freedom tend to
avoid dealing with this feedback loop by sticking with a thin notion of the agent
rather than equating the agent who agent-causes her decisions with a psychologically thick character-self. An existential version of agent-causation would not
equate the agent with a pure substance but rather with a self-forming practical
identity.
202. Allison, ‘‘Kant on Freedom,’’ 127 (emphasis added).
203. However, for a sketch, see my essay, ‘‘Liberty of the Higher-Order Will.’’
204. Ameriks mentions the argument from ‘‘the claim that moral demands
have an unconditional form which cannot be grounded in any feature of our contingent ‘natural constitution,’ ’’ and he objects that this argument does not show
that acting on such an autonomous principle requires ‘‘efficiently and freely determining’’ one’s intention in the libertarian sense (‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 227).
But I portray this argument only as establishing that projective motivation is essential to the standpoint of moral agency, not that this in turn entails libertarian
freedom.
205. Ameriks, ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom,’’ 225 (emphasis added). In another essay, Ameriks briefly considers this ‘‘kind of phenomenological approach’’
to freedom implicit in the fact of pure reason (see ‘‘Pure Reason of Itself Alone,’’
254–55).
12. Existential Psychology and Intrinsic Motivation: Deci, Maslow, and Frankl
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, 7.
Ibid., 5–18.
Ibid., 14.
Ibid., 12.
Mook, Motivation: The Organization of Action, chaps. 3–10.
Ibid., chaps. 12–14.
Kupperman, Character, 160–62.
Frederick and McNeal, Inner Strengths, 136.

................. 16406$

NOTE

05-23-07 10:55:41

PS

PAGE 631

632

Notes to Pages 421–424

9. Ibid., 140.
10. Ibid., 141.
11. Ibid., 142, ellipses in original. I worry in particular about the suggestion
that inner strength all by itself should be sufficient to take the agent to her goals;
this idea may produce undue self-recrimination if failure occurs. It would be better
if the authors were clearer about what we can do by our willpower and what we
require additional resources to accomplish. Nevertheless, this and similar recent
work on ‘‘ego-strengthening’’ raise interesting questions about how in practice people can be encouraged to recognize and exercise their power of projective motivation and change their volitional habits. In this regard, I put more faith in the
logotherapeutic methods described by Frankl’s school (discussed below).
12. The same goes for popular works such as Parinello, The Power of Will. He
starts with clear examples of setting ‘‘your sights on the goal’’ and following
through with tenacity (1–2) that illustrate projective motivation. He also associates
volitional strength with wholeheartedness or motivational unity (4); he uses Deci’s
language of ‘‘self-determination’’ to refer to being ‘‘filled with purpose, resolve,
intention’’ (22); and he recognizes that materialistic values can block awareness of
goals to which we can authentically devote ourselves (30–32). But much of his
book emphasizes learning about our own cognitive styles and finding our heart’s
desires, which is likely to produce obsessive self-monitoring and an inward focus.
Parinello also emphasizes ways to alter our beliefs for empowerment, which obscures the fundamental relation between projective motivation and its rational
grounds; while it is crucial to believe in potential, it is also important that our
goals not be set on the basis of manipulated beliefs: conviction about values is not
a means to volitional strength.
13. Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, 26–27.
14. Ibid., 29, citing White (1959).
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 33.
17. Wallach and Wallach, Psychology’s Sanction for Selfishness, 61.
18. Ibid., 62. On Allport’s idea that an activity initiated because of an extrinsic
motive ‘‘can become intrinsically interesting,’’ see also Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, 25,
and Cavalier, Personal Motivation, chap. 1.
19. Wallach and Wallach, Psychology’s Sanction for Selfishness, 64.
20. Ibid., 66.
21. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, vol. I, ‘‘The Rotation of Crops,’’ 285.
22. As noted earlier, the goals internal to playing certain games or sports may
lack this extra value feature because they are set by the arbitrary conventions of the
game. This explains why games or sport-like practices are closer to the infant’s
play, and much of their value lies in preparing us to engage in practices and relationships whose defining ends have non-arbitrary values set by nature rather than
convention.
23. Gilbert, Democratic Individuality, 273.
24. Ibid., 275.
25. Wallach and Wallach, Psychology’s Sanction for Selfishness, 69–75.
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26. Ibid., 72.
27. Mook, Motivation, 574–75. Note that here, Mook also conflates secondorder pleasure as a side effect of intrinsic interest in the car with the agent’s motivating goal, which in this case has to be something like the car’s beauty, its place in
history, the excellent functioning of its parts, and so on (not his own pleasure).
Mook also seems to take it for granted that ‘‘jobs’’ are always motivated solely as
a means to external goods such as money.
28. Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, 23.
29. Ibid., 83.
30. Ryan and Deci, ‘‘Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being,’’ 68, col. 1.
31. Ibid., 73, col. 2.
32. Ibid., 74, col. 1.
33. Ibid., 69, col. 2.
34. Ibid., 74, col. 1.
35. Ibid., 70, col. 2.
36. Ibid., 69, col. 2.
37. Ibid., 71, col. 2, where intrinsic motivation is defined as ‘‘doing an activity
for the inherent satisfaction of the activity itself ’’ rather than for some separate
result.
38. Ibid., 70, col. 1.
39. Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, 23.
40. Ibid., 30–54.
41. Ibid., 77–89. See Salvatore Maddi, ‘‘Existential Psychotherapy.’’ Also see
Maddi’s more recent work on existential courage and hardiness.
42. Ibid., 55. See Robert White, ‘‘Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of
Competence.’’ Psychological Review, 66.5 (1959): 297–331.
43. Ibid., 56. See Jerome Kagan, ‘‘Motives and Development.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 22 (1972): 51–66.
44. Ibid., 57.
45. Ryan and Deci, ‘‘Self-Determination Theory,’’ 68, col. 2.
46. Ibid., 74, col. 2, 75, col. 1.
47. Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, 101.
48. Deci and Ryan, ‘‘The ‘What’ and the ‘Why’ of Goal Pursuits,’’ 229, col. 2.
49. Ibid., 229, col. 1.
50. Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, 61 (emphasis added). Another version of the same
formula is: ‘‘Intrinsically motivated behavior is behavior which is motivated by a
person’s need for feeling competent and self-determining in dealing with his environment’’ (100; emphasis added). In both versions, the agent’s own psychic development, integration, and fulfillment are explicitly made the aim (though the agent
might not be conscious of intending such goals).
51. Deci and Ryan, ‘‘The ‘What’ and the ‘Why’ of Goal Pursuits,’’ 230, cols.
1–2.
52. Ibid., 230, col. 1.
53. Badhwar, ‘‘Friends as Ends in Themselves,’’ 168. In fact, she wants to make
the stronger claim that self-benefit is ‘‘an essential element’’ in end-love and not
merely an unintended result (ibid.).
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54. Ibid., 173.
55. Korsgaard, ‘‘Two Distinctions in Goodness,’’ 172.
56. Badhwar says, ‘‘Hence pleasure or delight is intrinsic to perceiving and
responding to someone as loveable by her very nature—to contemplating the person loved. Happiness is related to end-love not as goal to means, but rather, as
element to complex whole’’ (174).
57. Bandura and Schunk, ‘‘Cultivating Competence,’’ 586, col. 2.
58. Ibid., 587, col. 2. Bandura and Shunk argue in detail that setting smaller
and more attainable subgoals is an effective way of helping agents to develop intrinsic motivation to pursue larger or more distant ends. Among a group of elementary
school students with poor performance and low interest in math, they found that
mastery of some simple skills built a sense of ‘‘self-efficacy’’ that reinforced the
students’ motivation. ‘‘Children who set themselves attainable subgoals progressed
rapidly in self-directed learning’’ (595, col. 1). This seems to confirm Barrett’s old
hypothesis that ‘‘one of the best exercises for the will is to put before itself a clear,
well-defined task which is not too difficult and to set itself in all earnestness to
accomplish it’’ (Strength of Will, 27).
59. Deci and Ryan, 227, col. 2 (emphasis added).
60. Ibid., 228, col. 1.
61. Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, 55.
62. Ibid. The distinction between satiable inclinations and constant drives itself is plausible enough and has a long pedigree. Thomas Reid recognizes it in
distinguishing between ‘‘appetites’’ that involve an ‘‘uneasy sensation’’ that can be
‘‘sated by their objects for a time,’’ and ‘‘desires’’ that are constant, among which
he includes ‘‘the desire of power, the desire of esteem, and the desire of knowledge’’
(Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Essay III: The Principles of Action,
chap. 2, 128). The similarity to Deci’s drive for competence is intriguing.
63. Deci and Ryan, ‘‘The ‘What’ and the ‘Why’ of Goal Pursuits,’’ 230, col. 1.
64. Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, 84.
65. Maslow has influenced a whole generation of humanistic psychotherapists,
some of whom adopt an Eastern interpretation of ‘‘self-actualization’’ as a religious
ascent beyond individual selfhood. A good example is Dr. Roberto Assagioli, who
takes Maslow’s ‘‘Theory Z’’ to imply that the highest type of self-actualization
involves ‘‘Transpersonal Will’’ or mystical transport outside one’s individual identity (The Act of Will, 119 [22]). Assagioli infers that humanitarian motives must
have this character because he follows the paradigmatically Eastern assumption that
‘‘personal will’’ is egoistic and exhibits ‘‘the drive to personal self-assertion’’ (117).
His book illustrates the tendency in humanistic psychotherapy to recognize many
salient functions of the striving will (he lists ‘‘intensity,’’ ‘‘concentration,’’ ‘‘determination,’’ ‘‘resoluteness,’’ ‘‘persistence,’’ ‘‘initiative,’’ and ‘‘integration’’ among other
aspects (19) without any rigorous philosophical framework for their explanation.
66. I paraphrase this list from Mook, Motivation, 559–61. See also Deci, Intrinsic
Motivation, 83. The original source is Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality,
2nd. ed. (Harper & Row, 1970).
67. Mook rightly criticizes this idea that lower ends are lexically prior to higher
ends on the scale and must be fully satisfied as a precondition to devoting any
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attention to the latter. For ‘‘People have starved themselves to make a political
point. . . . [and] Young men and women may literally risk their lives to avoid or
avenge being ‘dissed’ . . . they are putting esteem before safety needs—a clear
inversion of Maslow’s order’’ (Mook, Motivation, 571–72).
68. Mook, Motivation, 572. Mook also raises important questions about autonomy and independence from others as criteria for self-actualized persons: Are these
criteria objectively grounded or do they just reflect Maslow’s personal biases in
determining who counts as paradigm cases of ‘‘self-actualized’’ persons? Could they
also reflect cultural biases of Western individualism? (572–73).
69. On the Frankfurtian reading of Kierkegaardian aestheticism, see my essay
‘‘The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice between the Aesthetic and the Ethical,’’
reprinted in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, chap. 4.
70. Consider Ivan Goncharov’s character Oblomov, who Gabrielle Taylor describes as being opposed to making any kind of effort since this ‘‘interferes with
enjoyment’’ of his riches (‘‘Deadly Vices?’’ 162).
71. Ryan and Deci, ‘‘Self-Determination Theory,’’ 71, col. 1.
72. Mook, Motivation, 569.
73. Ibid., 574. On this point, Ryan and Deci summarize the empirical research
by saying, ‘‘all expected tangible rewards made contingent on task performance do
reliably undermine intrinsic motivation’’ for the task; see Ryan and Deci, ‘‘SelfDetermination Theory,’’ 70, col. 2.
74. Cavalier, Personal Motivation, 8.
75. Mook, 583. The original sources are David McClelland, The Achieving Society
(Van Nostrand, 1961) and The Roots of Consciousness (Van Nostrand, 1964). It could
be asked whether the high value placed on achievement is a cause of such economic
development or, rather, its cultural effect (if a higher standard of living encourages
achievement motives). But this correlation does agree with the positive appreciation
of the striving will in paradigmatically Western cultural values (though not always
in actual Western philosophy), as I argue in chapter 2.
76. Mook notes that McClelland really focuses on ‘‘a particular kind of
achievement orientation’’ (Motivation, 543) in which the agent ‘‘tends to set moderate goals’’ and ‘‘wants concrete, rapid knowledge of how well she is doing’’ (ibid.,
544). Note that an agent projectively willing his goals might appear instead as
achievement-driven if he simply had a low tolerance for lack of agent-related byproduct benefits, such as pride or recognition from others.
77. See Greene, The Elegant Universe, 185–87.
78. Ibid., 197–98.
79. Thus Robert Cavalier says that true artists and scholars ‘‘do not live their
lives for approbation or applause,’’ but live in the ‘‘flow’’ of their activity (Personal
Motivation, 8).
80. Frankl, From Death Camp to Existentialism.
81. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning.
82. See Frankl, Unheard Cry for Meaning, 29.
83. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 79.
84. Ibid., 107.
85. Ibid., 111.
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86. Ibid., 113–14.
87. Ibid., 118–20.
88. See Mook, Motivation, 556–61. For more detail, see Seligman and Abramson, ‘‘Learned Helplessness in Humans.’’
89. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 121. Of course, the agent may need to see
some real prospect of pursuing a worthwhile goal in order to avoid the sense of
helplessness.
90. Ibid., 122.
91. Ibid., 164.
92. Ibid., 164.
93. Ibid., 164.
94. Senator John McCain frequently used this refrain in stump speeches during
his presidential campaign in 2000.
95. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 31.
96. Ibid., 32, quoting Allport, Becoming (Yale University Press, 1955).
97. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 166. The last sentence in this key passage,
it should be noted, corresponds almost exactly to Martin Buber’s description of
creative activity and meaningful work as an I-Thou experience; see Buber, I and
Thou, 91.
98. Ibid., 179. Frankl’s existentialism is surely informed on this point by
Dostoyevsky’s.
99. Ibid., 180–81.
100. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 41. Yet Frankl agrees with Bassis in finding the
will to meaning operative even in the creative explorations of the infant (42, n.
19), just as Buber finds the infant reaching out for encounter with alterity in his
theory of an innate ‘‘drive to pan-relation’’ (Buber, I and Thou, 78).
101. Ibid., 52.
102. Lewis, Screwtape Letters, Letter 19, 83.
103. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 156.
104. Frankl, Unheard Cry for Meaning, 33.
105. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 175.
106. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 38. Likewise, Frankl says that ‘‘the pleasure
principle is self-defeating’’ because the most significant pleasures are by-products
(33), and that Adler’s ‘‘status drive . . . also proves to be self-defeating, insofar as
a person who displays and exhibits his status drive will sooner or later be dismissed
as a status-seeker’’ (34).
107. Ibid., 38, quoting Maslow’s Eupsychian Management, 136.
108. Frankl, Unheard Cry for Meaning, 35–36 (emphasis added). Note the similarity to Marcel’s description of ‘‘self-donation.’’ A similar paradox is encountered
in religious faith, as I argue in a recent article on ‘‘Eschatological Ultimacy and the
Best Possible Hereafter,’’ 36–67. I describe this paradox as part of the complex
relationship between ethical and eschatological meaning: the hope for a final or
ultimate validation of ethical endeavor cannot be the motivating purpose of religious faith or fidelity to God, or it becomes egoistic and thus fails as ethical endeavor (37–42). Since eschatological hope is closely related to the problem of
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existential meaningfulness in a human life, the similarity between these paradoxes
is not accidental. However, although I follow Kierkegaard in the belief that the
religious dimension is essential to a fully meaningful life achieving its existential telos,
I do not explore that ultimate level of existential meaning in this book.
109. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 153.
110. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ in The Importance
of What We Care About, 89.
111. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 156.
112. Ibid., 157. Frankl says here that values ‘‘pull’’ us, but he does not mean
that they appeal to us only via erosiac desire. Rather, he means to contrast projective motivation with psychodynamic drives that ‘‘push’’ us by way of instinctive
inclinations. For example, he says that moral and religious motivation are not
‘‘drives’’ but are, rather, freely created in response to the appearance of moral and
religious values outside us: ‘‘Man is never driven to moral behavior; in each case
he decides to behave morally . . . he does so for the sake of a cause to which he
commits himself, or for a person whom he loves, or for the sake of his God.’’
(158). He also distinguishes these pure moral motives from the by-product result
of moral sainthood to which they can lead: ‘‘I think that even the saints did not
care for anything other than simply to serve God, and I doubt that they ever had
it in mind to become saints. If that were the case, they would have become only
perfectionists rather than saints’’ (158). We find the same distinction between
‘‘being driven to something on the one hand and striving for something on the
other’’ in The Will to Meaning, 43.
113. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 44.
114. Ibid., 52.
115. Ibid., 8.
116. Noddings, Caring, 14.
117. Ibid., 12.
118. Ibid., 14.
119. Ibid., 16.
120. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 89.
121. Noddings, Caring, 17.
122. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 175.
123. As we will see when this concept is applied to the theory of autonomy, it
is also possible in special cases to project ends or goals that involve or mention
oneself and even one’s own psychic states. For example, I can will not to be moved
by envy, or will to become a more sympathetic person, etc. In accordance with the
requirement of formal non-narcissism, this will be because these psychic states
toward which we can projectively direct ourselves in different ways have in themselves (or in their raw form) a certain fundamental alienness from the self that
forms and defines itself through projective willing. This is why we can volitionally
identify ourselves with them or volitionally alienate ourselves from them through
projective commitment to them or to their opposites, respectively.
124. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 55.
125. At least not, so existential theology would add, without the miraculous
aid of divine grace or a miracle in which God supplies the missing color of alterity.
For example, this is what the blue fairy provides in the tale of Pinocchio.
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126. On this point, see my paper on ‘‘Eschatological Ultimacy and the Best
Possible Hereafter,’’ 63–64.
127. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 63 (emphasis added).
128. Noddings, Caring, 23.
129. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 29.
130. Frankl himself does not emphasize this point and he seems to assume
that authentic commitment to self-transcending ends will generally be aimed at
positive values rather than at harm and destruction. For example, he suggests at one
point that logotherapy ‘‘would define good and bad in terms of what promotes, or
blocks, the fulfillment of meaning, irrespective of whether it is one’s own meaning
or that of someone else’’ (Frankl, The Will to Meaning, 68). But this would imply
either that no evil project could be fulfilling or meaningful to the agent (which is
false), or that radically evil projects are really good (which Frankl does not mean
to assert). Kierkegaard avoided this error of moralizing volitional authenticity, and
I follow him on this point.
131. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 62.
132. Noddings, Caring, 7 (italics omitted).
133. Ibid., 6.
134. Ibid., 19.
135. Ibid., 27.
136. Ibid., 5.
137. Frankfurt, ‘‘On the Usefulness of Final Ends.’’
138. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love. This book is a much-developed version of
Frankfurt’s earlier essay ‘‘On Caring,’’ with about twice as much text as that essay.
Some passages are largely repeated from the earlier essay, but there are important
changes and much new material.
139. Ibid., 7.
140. Ibid., 7. Moreover, neither Frankfurt nor I contend that it is only in virtue
of projects and purposes that an agent’s life acquires a first-personal sense of meaning. I take up this point in the concluding chapter.
141. Ibid., 8.
142. Frankfurt, Reasons of Love, 58.
143. Frankfurt, ‘‘On the Usefulness of Final Ends,’’ 4.
144. Ibid., 5.
145. Ibid., 6.
146. Ibid., 8–9 (emphasis in original).
147. Ibid., 9. Frankfurt offers as an example that the highly noble end happens
to require only pressing a button. Here is a variation: imagine someone who has
inherited (or found or won) an enormous fortune, who could do great good with
it by simply donating most of it to well-established charities but who decides
instead to reserve some of it for more complex forms of philanthropy or for starting new businesses. This agent finds more meaning in the challenge of making
something unique out of this opportunity, applying their creative powers to these
resources. Someone else whose life was already full of projects she did not want to
put aside for new ventures using this fortune might choose the donation option.
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148. Like ‘‘existential meaningfulness,’’ the terminology of ‘‘existential value’’
is also mine rather than Frankfurt’s.
149. Ibid., 14.
150. Frankfurt, Reasons of Love, 59.
151. Ibid., 60.
152. Ibid., 61 (emphasis added).
153. The same goes for the construal of indirect ‘‘self-love’’ in Frankfurt’s
third lecture in Reasons of Love.
154. Frankfurt, ‘‘On the Usefulness of Final Ends,’’ 13.
155. Ibid., 14.
156. Frankfurt, Reasons of Love, 58.
157. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 61, 400. See also sec. 67.
158. Honneth, Struggle for Recognition, Introduction by Joel Anderson, xi.
159. Ibid., xvi.
160. This is the kind of self-respect that Thomas Hill, Jr., defends in explaining Kant’s view that ‘‘the avoidance of servility is a duty to oneself ’’ (‘‘Servility and
Self-Respect,’’ 16).
161. This is the attitude that Honneth describes as basic self-confidence, which
begins with security and attentive nurturing in early childhood (Struggle for Recognition, xiii).
162. This is the kind of distinctiveness that G. H. Mead emphasized in his
analysis of specialization in the division of labor in Mind, Self, and Society (ibid., xvi).
163. Erica Goode, ‘‘Deflating Self-Esteem’s Role in Society’s Ills,’’ New York
Times, October 1, 2002, F5–6. It is apparent from this article, however, that psychologists studying self-esteem do not make clear distinctions between the four
kinds of positive self-regarding attitudes that I distinguish here. Compare Goode’s
results to Jean Twenge’s argument in Generation Me that obsession with self-esteem
is making teens unhappy.
164. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 67, 440 (emphasis added).
165. Ibid. Note that while confidence in our potential can be directly encouraged to an extent by significant others (and this is obviously crucial for young
children), its full development also depends on experiencing some level of success
in intrinsically worthwhile and challenging endeavors. As we have seen, this is how
by-product satisfaction can play a role as a necessary condition for sustaining devotion to an endeavor. It follows that neither component of Rawlsian self-esteem can
be fully guaranteed by the political or educational system.
166. Ibid., 441–42.
167. Hill, ‘‘Self-Respect Reconsidered,’’ 21.
168. Ibid., 22.
169. Ibid., 21 n. 5; 23. Hill does not enumerate these ways of failing to achieve
this kind of self-respect, but the distinctions are suggested in his discussion. In
particular, his examples of the artist who sells out, the actress turned prostitute,
and the teacher in The Blue Angel all fail in the second way by violating their own
ideals (23), whereas his neighbor who has no ‘‘personal standards’’ or ‘‘high ideals
of self-improvement’’ is worse, since he is ethically wanton (19). Thus Hill is mistaken in suggesting that their problem is not weakness of will because they made
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deliberate changes in their life plans (20). They may not have been overcome by
violent pathos, but they still failed to will their higher ends with sufficient resolve
or to commit themselves strongly enough to their values and ideals; their adaptive
preferences are the result of their volitional weakness.
170. Gordon, ‘‘Book of Days.’’
171. Ibid., 19.
172. Bratman, ‘‘Responsibility and Planning,’’ 166, 170.
173. Gordon, ‘‘Book of Days,’’ 20.
174. Ibid., 21.
175. Ibid., 22. The story of defacing Marcy’s calendar is so poignantly written
that it would be difficult to doubt its authenticity as a public confession, and I
even suspect Gordon of what Kierkegaard called ‘‘indirect communication,’’ that
is, sending a private message of serious apology, concealed in this public document,
to Marcy. But since this essay is also reflective and self-deprecating in a sense, it is
hard to be sure of its authenticity. It would be worthwhile trying to identify marks
that distinguish authentic apology from merely aesthetic self-deprecation (with
morose pleasure in one’s lowness). I think a sense of poignance is one of these
marks, and Gordon’s analysis of why she defaced Marcy’s calendar is strikingly
poignant. The trouble is that almost any emotion can be faked, even to oneself.
176. Ibid., 23.
177. Ibid., 22.
178. Ibid., 30.
179. Which shows that writing about the self-defeating nature of self-obsession is no sure antidote to the problem. Indeed, it may only take speculative detachment from oneself to an even higher order.
180. Ibid., 31.
181. Ibid., 31. There is an interesting connection between this and Michael
Stocker’s dictum that ‘‘the unfelt life’’ is not worth living (‘‘How Emotions Reveal
Value,’’ 182). See my discussion of noninstrumental emotional expression (which
volitional engagement supports) in ‘‘The Binding Value of Earnest Emotional
Valuation.’’
182. This sort of move is not unknown in literary history. Kierkegaard found
himself unable authentically to ‘‘engage’’ his beloved Regine because he was ultimately more interested in reflecting on being engaged than in Regine. He did at least
get off the fence by rescinding the engagement to spare her the trouble of living
with his self-absorption and family curse. But then he spent the rest of his life
reflecting on what had gone wrong and recommending projective investment in life
as the way to avoid his mistake—something he himself managed only by passionate
engagement in writing about the virtues of existential willing. Perhaps the reason
things did not work out was that Regine was too much like Marcy. If she had
been more like Emily Gordon, Kierkegaard might have found his kindred spirit.
183. Of course, I do not say this to imply that Gordon really remains narcissistic or self-absorbed, despite her regrets. Rather, I want only to warn us away from
the misconception that regret—and its literary expression—is sufficient to reveal
devotions of the striving will. Unlike remorse, which is a volitional state involving
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a commitment to reject the wrong done, regret is a sub-volitional emotion that
may not motivate any action.
184. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pt. IV, chap. 1, 607.
185. Ibid., 607–8 (emphasis in original). Sartre might very well be thinking of
the underground man’s insistence that even a toothache can be used for spite, since
a person can ‘‘find pleasure in the consciousness of his own degradation’’ (Notes
from Underground, 25).
186. Izenberg, The Existentialist Critique of Freud, 8. In Sartre, the (futile) will not
to be free, or to be a thing, is the more general concept, and the will to inferiority
is only one species of it.
187. In this thought, I believe we find the beginning of a neo-Kantian ground
not only for an ethics of duties to persons but also for an agapē ethics. For what such
an ethics principally requires (if it is to have any rational foundation outside of
arbitrary divine command) is that the existential will is eo ipso or ‘‘always-already’’
committed to the absolute intrinsic value of any person or any agent-self capable
of such willing as something it is always more important to care about than anything
else. The idea is to show that if anything can be worth caring about it, then individual persons whose essence consists in a will capable of forming cares must themselves be of overriding importance or more deserving of care than anything else.
The paradox is that this yields a universal requirement to devote essentially particularistic care to each person, and the apparent impossibility of this demand must
somehow be resolved.
13. Caring, Aretaic Commitment, and Existential Resolve
1. I believe this is true whether happiness is understood as involving a subjective element (a sense of overall contentment or feeling that everything is as it
should be, that one’s life is on course) or as an objective flourishing that applies to
any human being who has all she needs and has fully developed her natural potential. I have argued for this distinction between the happiness and meaningfulness
of a life in ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics.’’
2. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 82.
3. Ibid., 83.
4. Williams, ‘‘Persons, Character, and Morality,’’ in Moral Luck, 11. One potential problem with this characterization of ground projects is that it implies that a
person who finds his ground projects frustrated or unpursuable, given contingencies of fortune (e.g., the people he loves die), would have no strong motive to go
on living. Williams says that hope for other things may keep him going and he
may have more than one ground project (13). But a person who finds his entire
‘‘nexus’’ of projects void might try to discover or form new ground projects—a
process that makes sense on the existential account of the striving will but not on
Williams’s own moral psychology.
5. Ibid., 13. A similar answer to Parfit’s arguments that identity between earlier
and later selves is a matter of degree is given by MacIntyre in After Virtue, 2nd ed.,
chap. 15: ‘‘The self inhabits a character whose unity is given as the unity of a
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character’’ (217). The difference is that MacIntyre is clearer than Williams or
Frankfurt that the self ’s experience of its practical unity in memory, present action,
and future prospects has a narrative structure with interpersonal conditions such as
a shared language game. But then, in MacIntyre’s analysis, the role of cares and
ground projects is played by the less helpful notion of ‘‘longer and longest-term
intentions’’ (208). One needs to put insights from Frankfurt, Williams, and MacIntyre together to get a complete picture.
6. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 83–84.
7. Noddings, Caring, 16.
8. Ibid., 10.
9. Ibid., 5.
10. Frankfurt, ‘‘On Caring,’’ 156.
11. Ibid., 157. However, I doubt the close link between happiness and caring
that Frankfurt suggests here. In my view, which is closer to Kant’s, a person who
cares about something and achieves the goals this requires will experience his life
as valuable and worthwhile as well as meaningful, but not necessarily as happier in
the eudaimonistic sense of lacking nothing. And even where happiness does follow
from successfully pursuing that which we care about, it is at first primarily a byproduct and not the motive of the caring agent, though the resulting sense of
effectiveness can help sustain the agent’s commitment over the long term (see
chap. 12).
12. Ibid., 158.
13. Ibid., 160.
14. Ibid., 160–61.
15. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 83.
16. Ibid., 87. Note that in referring to motives that are ‘‘not merely his own’’
Frankfurt must mean ‘‘not merely consciously experienced by him.’’ This fits with
his view that the experience of some psychic state by the agent as conscious subject
does not necessarily make that psychic state autonomous or entail that it belongs
to his deeper volitional self, which is narrower than his field of consciousness.
17. Frankfurt, ‘‘Identification and Wholeheartedness,’’ 166–72.
18. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Faintest Passion.’’
19. Frankfurt, ‘‘Reply to Gary Watson,’’ 161.
20. I disagree with this conclusion and the model from which it follows since,
unlike Frankfurt, I hold that identification involves as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition a kind evaluation of desires that is always linked to caring about
some final end, so I hold that identification is always rooted in caring. However,
the analysis of volitional identification as part of the theory of personal autonomy
is the task of the sequel to the present book.
21. Ibid., 161.
22. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 16 (emphasis added).
23. Frankfurt, ‘‘On Caring,’’ 161–62.
24. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 85.
25. Ibid., 88.
26. This was the Hobbesian definition of the will, or of what Kane would call
appetitive willing, that Frankfurt offered in his essay, ‘‘Freedom of the Will and
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the Concept of the Person,’’ 14. But Frankfurt’s later essays clearly move away
from this conception of willing toward distinctively volitional states in the higherorder will.
27. This is the sense of ‘‘decision’’ that Frankfurt discusses in analyzing Descartes’s argument that our will’s power is unlimited in its own nature; see Frankfurt,
‘‘Concerning the Freedom and Limits of the Will,’’ 78–79. Will as the capacity
for decision in this sense is similar to the notion of second-order executive agency
discussed in chapter 3.
28. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 84.
29. Ibid., 85.
30. On this point, see Blustein’s useful discussion in Caring and Commitment,
62–65 and 79.
31. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 84 (first emphasis
added). I would add that when these remarks about decision are taken in the
context of Frankfurt’s other essays, ‘‘Identification and Externality’’ and ‘‘Identification and Wholeheartedness,’’ the implied relationship between caring and decision seems to me rather more complex than Frankfurt suggests in ‘‘The Importance
of What We Care About.’’
32. Ibid., 87 (emphasis added).
33. Ibid., 90.
34. Frankfurt, ‘‘On the Usefulness of Final Ends,’’ 10.
35. And this is doubtless why Robert Kane describes the striving will as operative in making decisions involving libertarian freedom or ‘‘self-formed willings.’’
36. Tombstone, directed by George Cosmatos (Walt Disney, 1993).
37. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 10:
This notion is rampantly ubiquitous. It is also heavily overburdened and a
bit limp. People routinely deploy it in a number of different roles, to refer
to a disparate and unruly assortment of psychic conditions and events.
Moreover, its various meanings are rarely distinguished; nor is there much
effort to clarify how they are related.
I strongly agree with this complaint about contemporary analytic moral psychology: we need to work with distinct substantive senses of ‘‘desire.’’
38. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 85.
39. Frankfurt, ‘‘Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,’’ 443–44.
40. Ibid., 434.
41. Ibid., 436. See Kant’s Groundwork, Ak. 432–33, 99–100.
42. In the Groundwork, Kant says that an autonomous will must be ‘‘a law unto
itself (independently of every property belonging to the objects of volitions)’’ (Ak.
440, 108). But not all these properties are objects of erosiac desire; some of them
ground the formation of projects that define individual identities. Such practical
identities need not be universal requirements for all responsible beings. So Frankfurt is correct in his reply to Kant, but existentialists will not concede that an
individual has an innate ‘‘personal essence’’ of the kind that Frankfurt imagines as
defining the true self.
43. Frankfurt, ‘‘Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,’’ 437.
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44. Ibid., 437.
45. Ibid., 438.
46. Ibid., 439. This is Frankfurt’s phrasing for a goal that is distinct from the
agent’s simple being (her embodied mind before extension by volitional
projection).
47. Frankfurt, ‘‘On Caring,’’ 167.
48. Although the striving will has no essential relationship to the emotions of
anger or brave habits of action, it was associated with these dispositions in classical
Greece because it was primarily in these contexts that striving will was most clearly
recognized by that culture. This is similar to the sense of personal ‘‘passion’’ that
Kierkegaard employs in connection with the will in his pseudonymous works,
which I discuss in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre.
49. Frankfurt, ‘‘On Caring,’’ 168.
50. This help explains the sense in which Kant held that proper self-love could
be a duty and the sense in which at least some theologians have held that selfdirected agapē is required by the love commandments.
51. Frankfurt, ‘‘Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,’’ 442 (emphasis added). I
note that Frankfurt’s phrasing in this section suggests what I have called ‘‘liberty
of the higher-order will’’ with respect to these inherently neutral raw materials of
the psyche: ‘‘Whether a person identifies himself with these passions, or whether
they occur as alien forces that remain outside the boundaries of his volitional
authority, depends upon what he himself want his will to be.’’ This seems to imply
that the agent has the power to bring about either higher-order attitude toward a
given passion.
52. Ibid., 443.
53. Ibid., 440.
54. Frankfurt provides this argument in other papers, such as ‘‘Rationality and
the Unthinkable’’ and ‘‘The Necessity of Ideals.’’ I hope to address it more fully
in my later book on an existential theory of autonomy.
55. Frankfurt, ‘‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’’ 12.
56. Ross, The Right and the Good, chap. 2, 37.
57. Hence, in my existential account, commitment is the more fundamental
notion in terms of which promising should be defined, and making a promise is
only one kind of commitment. Contracts as legally or conventionally defined are
commitments only in a derivative sense, not in the most fundamental volitional
sense.
58. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 53.
59. By a first-order state of affairs, I simply mean one that includes no mention
of any motivational state of persons. I use the term ‘‘consequence-transcending’’ to
indicate that although the value includes the goodness of certain kinds of first-order
states of affairs, it has further content that cannot be reduced to the value of states
of affairs (as opposed to the intrinsic value of certain types of action).
60. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 198.
61. Williams, ‘‘A Critique of Utilitarianism,’’ 116.
62. Ibid., 113–114.
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63. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way, 410. See my essay, ‘‘The Ethical and Religious Significance.’’
64. Williams, ‘‘A Critique of Utilitarianism,’’ 115.
65. Ibid., 116.
66. Ibid., 116.
67. Such an agent, whose ground projects are completely unresponsive to reasons (including considerations about consequences), would be a fanatic in one
serious sense of that term. Fanatics are a proper subset of those who display infinite
passion in Kierkegaard’s sense, but it is possible to display such passion without
being fanatical as well (displaying such passion does not entail fanaticism). On this
issue, see Annette Baier, ‘‘Caring about Caring: A Reply to Frankfurt.’’
68. On the contrary, ground projects and other existentially less central cares
or commitments almost always guide action in part through determining the relevance and importance that different kinds of consequences should have in our
considerations or through guiding our sense of how to make this determination.
And as Williams points out, principles can be nonconsequentialist without requiring us to do certain things or pursue certain causes ‘‘whatever the consequences,’’
however extreme; instead, such principles can be limited in scope such that they do
not apply in highly bizarre situations where the consequences of following the
principles would be too extreme (Williams, ‘‘A Critique of Utilitarianism,’’
90–91).
69. Ibid., 89.
70. Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality, 70.
71. Ibid., 76.
72. Ibid., 77.
73. This point is analogous to the inherent importance of responding emotionally to how things really stand in one’s view, whether or not this maximizes the
satisfaction of our own desires or collective utility. On this idea, see Davenport,
‘‘Binding Value of Earnest Emotional Valuation.’’
74. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way, 411.
75. It so happens that Abraham Lincoln fits Kierkegaard’s description of a
politician who foresees the social costs of his early death. Imagine that Lincoln
had been unwilling to risk assassination by issuing the Emancipation Proclamation
because he could foresee that his absence might let extremists prevent a lasting
peace. Or imagine that Nelson Mandela had been unwilling to risk ending his life
in obscurity in a forgotten prison because he feared that then no one else would
be able to lead the resistance to apartheid. This kind of calculation is the perversion
of every pure motive. We cannot remain true to our commitments if we try to
factor in accommodations for every possible turn of chance. This does not mean
that we should be careless with our lives, fear nothing, or throw them away needlessly (as Alexander Hamilton did in his duel). But to be willing to die for something
means being willing, past a point, not to consider some of the possible consequences of dying for it; in other words, it means principled restrictions on probable
consequences to which we will be sensitive in deciding how to act.
76. Elizabeth Anderson, ‘‘Reasons, Attitudes, and Values,’’ 541.
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77. Ibid., 542.
78. Ibid., 544. For this point, Anderson cites Scheffler, ‘‘Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues.’’
79. Ibid., 544.
80. Ibid., 543. This principle was suggested by Nicholas Sturgeon as an alternative formulation of Anderson’s own neo-Kantian principle of respect for persons.
81. Ibid., 545.
82. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 35.
83. Compare this to Kierkegaard’s young lad in Fear and Trembling, who has to
give up pursuing his princess even though he remains infinitely devoted to her. See
my discussion of infinite resignation in ‘‘Faith as Eschatological Trust in Fear and
Trembling.’’
84. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 59. This interpretation helps align Frankfurt’s
view with the conclusions reached in chap. 12, sec. 6: the agent-related by-product
benefits must not initially motivate the kind of care or love that can generate these
benefits. As a result, at least up to some point, caring devotion can continue and
be expressed in ways that do not happen to generate these benefits to the agent.
85. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 27.
86. Ibid., 28.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., 30.
89. Ibid., 31.
90. Ibid. One problem with this terminology is that ‘‘disinterested’’ care can
suggest aloofness or emotional detachment, but the kind of caring Blustein has in
mind can be energetically focused in its concern for the target and is also compatible with caring for the target and other types of emotional bond with the target.
91. Ibid., 38.
92. Ibid., 39. But the example that Blustein gives here is a self-interested caring
about becoming slim.
93. Ibid., 46.
94. Ibid., 46–47.
95. If what is usually a hobby—e.g., building Lego models or collecting rare
coins—becomes a deep commitment central to one’s life-narrative, or even a
ground project, then it is no longer properly called a hobby. One now builds Lego
structures as fine art or makes a profession of coin collecting, etc.
96. Ibid., 49–50.
97. Blustein explores the notions of integration, coherence, and stability at
58–59.
98. Ibid., 70.
99. Ibid., 71.
100. As Blustein recognizes on 77.
101. For example, in her ‘‘Two Distinctions in Goodness,’’ Korsgaard limits
‘‘intrinsic’’ value to value that something has in all possible circumstances (170)
and holds that some ‘‘extrinsic’’ or context-dependent value is final or valued ‘‘as
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an end’’ (172). I have been concerned primarily with the difference between final
and instrumental value but without conceiving all final value as targetable or as a
potential ‘‘end’’ of intention.
102. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 94.
103. Ibid., 98.
104. See also ibid., 88.
105. See ibid., 96.
106. See ibid., 102–3.
107. Ibid., 103.
14. An Existential Objectivist Account of What Is Worth Caring About
1. Ordinarily, the cognitive and projective sides may form a whole experience
and seem inseparable, although they can be distinguished in philosophical
abstraction.
2. There is much discussion of list theories these days. For example, see Derek
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 4; Shelly Kagan, ‘‘Limits of Well-Being,’’ 170; Nicholas
Rescher, Objectivity, chap. 11.
3. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pt. I, chap. 1, sec. 5, 77.
4. Of course, in his famous essay on ‘‘Existentialism and Humanism,’’ Sartre
ends up in what is really an unstable position intermediate between objectivism
and subjectivism: like Kant, he affirms that we make some kind of universal validity
claim in choosing any value as a basis for our decision; but he denies that such an
evaluative validity claim has any objective truth-makers. It is no wonder, then, that
this essay confuses the brightest undergraduates.
5. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 33.
6. Ibid., 40–41.
7. Ibid., 40.
8. Ibid., 24.
9. Ibid., 64–65.
10. See Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 10.
11. See Anscombe, ‘‘Modern Moral Philosophy.’’
12. As Alex Voorhoeve calls it in his interview with Harry Frankfurt, ‘‘Harry
Frankfurt on the Necessity of Love,’’ http://www.ucl.ac.uk/⬃uctyaev/
frankfurt1.pdf.
13. Habermas, ‘‘Are There Postmetaphysical Answers to the Question: What
Is the ‘Correct Life?’ ’’ Habermas moderates his phasing somewhat in the published
version of the essay included in his book, The Future of Human Nature.
14. As a brief sample of such works, consider John Drummond’s ‘‘Moral Encounters’’ and ‘‘Moral Objectivity: Husserl’s Sentiments of the Understanding.’’
15. Kupperman, Character, 117.
16. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 91.
17. Frankfurt, ‘‘Comments on MacIntyre,’’ 321. Note that this response was
published in the same volume as Frankfurt’s essay, ‘‘The Importance of What We
Care About’’ and serves as a kind of addendum to that essay.
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18. Frankfurt still appears to accept that a person’s character can fairly be
judged on the basis of what they care about. For he says in The Reasons of Love that
‘‘What a person loves, or what he does not love, may be counted to his credit. Or
it may discredit him: it may be taken to show that he has a bad moral character’’
(67). Other non-moral forms of praise and blame may surely also apply (as
Thomas Hill argues; see chap. 11). Yet Frankfurt seems to think this is compatible
with holding that ‘‘love need not be grounded in any judgment or perception
concerning the value of its object’’ (67). There is a prima facie contradiction here.
19. Saving Private Ryan, directed by Steven Spielberg, written by Robert Rodat
(Dreamworks, 1998).
20. I have addressed historical conditioning of our duties in four unpublished
talks on agapē, ‘‘Time and Responsibility.’’
21. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 91.
22. Ibid., 93.
23. Frankfurt, ‘‘Rationality and the Unthinkable,’’ 185.
24. Ibid., 186.
25. C. Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 33.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 34.
28. Ibid., 35.
29. J. Anderson, ‘‘A Social Conception of Personal Autonomy: Volitional
Identity, Strong Evaluation, and Intersubjective Accountability,’’ sec. 4.4, 89. Anderson’s dissertation discusses in detail the prospects for an intersubjective approach to norms governing cares and life plans and defends an extension of
Habermasian discourse theory to ‘‘ethical-existential’’ evaluation. I regard this project as a close cousin of existential objectivism.
30. Ibid., 91. See also J. Anderson, ‘‘The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators:
Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor’s Value Theory.’’
31. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 14.
32. J. Anderson rightly notes, against Flanagan, that Taylor recognizes some
broadly aesthetic or non-moral evaluative judgments as strongly evaluative (ibid.,
95). Yet strong evaluation is fundamentally anticonsequentialist, since it invokes
contrasts between items that are ordinally higher or lower and hence not subject to
balancing against one another or to trade-off. In that sense, a broadly ethical affirmation of values that cannot be treated in consequentialist fashion is built into
the idea of strong evaluation, which is therefore closely tied to what I call aretaic
commitment.
33. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 15.
34. Ibid., 23.
35. Except in the case of sport practices, in which the end is conventional,
but its pursuit is challenging in beneficial ways, affording opportunities for the
development of excellences.
36. From the song ‘‘Climb Every Mountain,’’ by Rodgers and Hammerstein,
in The Sound of Music, directed by Robert Wise (Twentieth Century Fox, 1965). Of
course, in using this example I do not mean to endorse the sexism in this movie.
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37. As Taylor says, one criterion for the worth of my life concerns ‘‘what kind
of life would fulfill the promise implicit in my particular talents, or the demands
incumbent on someone with my endowment’’ (Sources of the Self, 14). The criticism
that someone has ‘‘wasted’’ his talents or ‘‘missed’’ his calling is usually made in
the illocutionary mode of a validity claim about relevant grounds for caring. See
the further discussion of ‘‘personal fit’’ in sec. 4.3.
38. Tate and Harris, ‘‘Persons, Free Will, and the Problem of Evil,’’ conference
manuscript, 12–13.
39. Ibid., 14.
40. Emphasis added. As fate would have it, I wrote this example on October
10, 2004, before learning that Reeve had died that very day.
41. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 92.
42. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 43.
43. Ibid.; we ‘‘derive personal value from the impersonal pursuit.’’ This is also
the view that Blustein finds in Loren Lomasky’s work (45).
44. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 93.
45. Ibid., 93.
46. Note that this disjunctive pair of diagnoses leaps to mind for a case such
as the person obsessed with not stepping on cracks in the pavement. He is either
in the grip of some delusion about the effects or symbolic importance of stepping
on a crack or recognizes the unimportance of his goal yet finds himself unable to
break the habit.
47. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 47, citing Lomasky, 241.
48. Ibid., 47.
49. Ibid., 61. One explanation for this may be that the agent’s doubts about
his judgments or sensitivities to values worth caring about undermine his trust in
any apparent reasons to project new ends. Precisely because earnest conviction
about objective grounds for caring is necessary for volitional commitment, selfdoubt and value-skepticism sap the will’s strength.
50. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 91.
51. See my ‘‘The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice.’’
52. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 92–93.
53. Ibid., 93.
54. In his latest book, The Reasons of Love, Frankfurt seems to drop the caveat
from this claim and assert the stronger thesis that for all genuine cares, the only
valid justification is ultimately this process-focused agent-relative existential value
of caring itself (23–26).
55. Frankfurt, ‘‘On Caring,’’ 162.
56. Frankfurt, ‘‘Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,’’ 438. This passage is immediately followed by the analysis of active love as pure of ulterior motives, including
even enjoyment of activities involved in loving (see chap. 13, sec. 2.4).
57. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 94, see n. 4. If
anyone imagines that this reference to reasonless divine creativity was meant lightheartedly, they should consult Frankfurt’s essay ‘‘On God’s Creation.’’ In this innovative reading of Genesis, Frankfurt argues that in His original speech-acts, God
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forms Himself by first defining His own volitions without any prior reason for
causing order to arise in chaos (136).
58. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 63.
59. Ibid., 38.
60. Frankfurt, ‘‘Reply to Gary Watson,’’ 161.
61. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 44.
62. Ibid., 65.
63. Wolf, ‘‘The True, the Good, and the Loveable,’’ 229.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., 230. This rejection is obviously linked to Wolf ’s well-known critique of ‘‘moral saints’’ (which unfortunately caricatures sainthood as involving
moral monomania and inflexibility).
66. Ibid., 231. Indeed, everyone is familiar with parents who make this error,
often with disastrous results.
67. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 39.
68. Ibid., 43. He actually refers here to the love of infants and small children
whose personal qualities cannot yet be a very significant criterion.
69. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 90–91 (emphasis added).
70. Wolf, ‘‘The True, the Good, and the Loveable,’’ 231.
71. Thus Wolf ’s version is more reasonable than Madonna’s more assertive
conception of self-respect: ‘‘Don’t go for second-best, baby; put yourself to the
test!’’ from the song ‘‘Express Yourself,’’ by Madonna and Stephen Bray, on the
album Like A Prayer (Sire Records, 1989).
72. Wolf, ‘‘The True, the Good, and the Loveable,’’ 232. This is not to be
equated with Nietzsche’s claim that what makes something worthy of care is the
potential for caring about it to give us distinction, greatness in comparison with
peers, or ascendance over the puerile masses of the world. There are perhaps contexts in which distinctiveness can be a valid ground for forming some project, but
this cannot be generalized. Nietzsche’s conception of the proper grounds for caring
replaces ethics with the imperatives of the conatus ascendi, which limits the will to a
complex kind of egoism, reducing projective motivation to libido dominandi.
73. Ibid. This way of construing Augustine’s doctrine of ordo amoris saves it
from being read as requiring strict proportionality between the value of final ends
and the care we devote to them.
74. Ibid., 233.
75. Bend It Like Beckham, directed by Gurinder Chadha (Twentieth Century Fox,
2002).
76. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 12. The same point is made in each of Frankfurt’s other essays on caring.
77. Frankfurt, ‘‘On Caring,’’ 158.
78. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 21.
79. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 90.
80. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 56.
81. Frankfurt, ‘‘On Caring,’’ 164.
82. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 13, my emphasis.
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83. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 51.
84. Tracey Ullmann, ‘‘They Don’t Know,’’ on the album You Broke My Heart in
Seventeen Places (Stiff Records, 1983).
85. I recognize that personal appropriation of some values by the will, taking
them as initial grounds for projective motivation, often results in clearer or more
nuanced understanding of these values themselves (this effect is especially clear
when loving particular persons results in ‘‘getting to know them’’ better). In other
words, although an evaluative attitude of some kind precedes and grounds every
project, cognitive changes follow from the projective motivation. On this idea, see
my essay, ‘‘Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics,’’ 304–9. What I say there about
moral sensitivity I would now say about sensitivity to all the values that can rationally ground volitional caring of all kinds.
86. Unless the question is one of faith, but that is a different question from
love.
87. Stocker, ‘‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,’’ reprinted in
Virtue Ethics.
88. Noddings, Caring, 5.
89. Ibid., 25.
90. Ibid., 18.
91. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 38.
92. Ibid., 43.
93. Ibid., 44.
94. Blustein believes it is possible to care universally about all persons, but he
also contrasts agapē with essentially particularistic care: ‘‘such love is not concerned
with others as particular and unique persons’’ (Care and Commitment, 37). By contrast, I think that true agapic regard is distinguished from universal benevolence
precisely by taking the uniqueness that makes essentially particularistic care possible as the ultimate ground for loving persons qua their individuality as persons.
95. Herman, ‘‘Bootstrapping,’’ 261.
96. Ibid., 257.
97. Ibid., 256.
98. See Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment. Closely related themes are found in
Raz’s earlier book, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action.
99. Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment, 3.
100. Ibid., 8.
101. Ibid., 16.
102. Ibid., 17, n. 5.
103. Ibid., 18.
104. Ibid., 19.
105. Ibid., 20–21. Clearly, here Raz regards ‘‘attachment’’ as actively generated
by the agent. He also distinguishes ‘‘meaning’’ from eudaimonia, as the existential
approach requires, for ‘‘There is value in sadness and disappointment. They have
value because they too can be meaningful elements of one’s life’’ (15). This insight
is overlooked by Frankfurt when he argues that we have to be careful never to be
frustrated by our cares.
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106. Ibid., 20.
107. A striking parallel is found in Blustein, who also affirms both these components as necessary for existential meaning:
The values that govern our lives can endow our lives with meaning only if
they are personal ones. Impersonal value alone cannot give my life meaning.
. . . On the other hand, if something that has value for me does not point
beyond itself to self-transcendent value, if something that I care about is not
believed by me to warrant my care because it has genuine worth and importance, then it cannot give meaning to my life. (Care and Commitment, 48)
108. In Saving Private Ryan, for example, Private Ryan is partially individuated
as an appropriate object of special attention for Chief of Staff George Marshall
because his brothers have already all died in combat. Though logically this scenario
could be repeated, it was (what Raz calls) ‘‘de facto’’ unique. It is also among
General Marshall’s grounds for devoting extraordinary effort and cost to saving
Ryan that President Lincoln recorded such profound grief and collective indebtedness of all future Americans to the mother of five brothers, all of whom were killed
serving the Union army in the Civil War. Marshall’s projection of the goal ‘‘that
James Ryan be saved’’ is partially due to conceiving that goal as including the
historically singularizing specification, ‘‘so that what happened to this mother during the Civil War shall not be repeated.’’ And that in turn reflects his own sense
of indebtedness, on behalf of all Americans, to that particular mother who ‘‘laid
so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom.’’ Thus collective indebtedness can
also single out new ends as uniquely significant as history unfolds, and one strand
of the web of responsibility is woven to others in ways that we could never completely unravel.
109. Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment, 14–15.
110. Ibid., 23.
111. Ibid., 20.
112. I also make reference to this dynamic, for example, in explaining how
certain types of radically evil will can be seen by their agents as grounded in agentrelative reasons (see chap. 10, sec. 2.2).
113. Ibid., 24.
114. Ibid., 26.
115. Ibid., 33.
116. Cindy Lauper, ‘‘True Colors,’’ from the album True Colors (Sony Records,
1990).
117. Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment, 31.
118. Most of the rest of Raz’s analysis in Value, Respect, and Attachment focuses
on how to understand the universality of values that is a key aspect of their intelligibility, the social dependence of many values, and the status of moral values demanding respect for persons.
119. In her recent Presidential Address to the Central Division of the APA
(March 2006), Eleonore Stump offered a Thomistic solution to this problem that
involves two conditions for love: (1) desiring the good of the other, which does
not depend on their intrinsic or relational properties; and (2) desiring some kind of
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union with the other, which is sensitive to their intrinsic and relational properties.
Although this is an interesting way of trying to avoid both extremes, the problem
is that condition 2 presupposes a eudaimonist conception of motivation, whereas
condition 1 requires projective motivation. The existential model of striving will
thus provide a more adequate basis for analyzing different forms of love, including
not only agapē (as I argue in chap. 9) but also romantic love, in which a kind of
emotional union is intended. However, an existential account of romantic love
must await a full existential theory of emotions that builds on the conception of
striving will developed in this book.
120. J. Anderson, ‘‘Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators,’’ 18. As Anderson
notes, the problem with Taylor’s account lies in his tight link ‘‘between endorsing a
good and being moved by it’’ (33); his eudaimonist model of motivation leaves no
room for projective motivation to take general value grounds and particularize
them in personal projects.
121. Raz’s model also comes closer to what Anderson calls a ‘‘realist approach
based on properties of situations,’’ which can include individuating histories of
agents and their self-interpretations (ibid., 34).
122. Wolf, ‘‘The True, the Good, and the Loveable,’’ 234.
123. Ibid., 236.
124. See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 42–43.
125. See Frankfurt, On Bullshit.
126. Frankfurt, ‘‘On the Necessity of Ideals,’’ 25.
127. Ibid., 26.
128. Ibid.
129. Frankfurt, Reasons of Love, 24.
130. Ibid.
131. Frankfurt, ‘‘The Importance of What We Care About,’’ 93 (emphasis
added).
132. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 595. Nozick may have learned this from
Viktor Frankl (see 579–80).
133. Frankfurt, ‘‘On the Necessity of Ideals,’’ 25. However, he footnotes papers by Blasi, Rorty, Tugendhat, Wren, Haste, and Nunner-Winkler in The Moral
Self as fruitfully addressing these questions.
134. Frankfurt, Reasons of Love, 23.
135. See O’Connor’s critique of the demand for uniquely rational options in
Persons and Causes, 90–93.
136. Frankfurt, Reasons of Love, 40, n. 4.
137. Ibid., 25.
138. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There, ‘‘Wisconsin,’’
96.
139. For this reason, I am not convinced by Frankfurt’s argument that because
our confident love of our children is not based on rational arguments, it must not
be grounded in objective values (Reasons of Love, 29). The intrinsic value of the
child, his or her potential, and his or her historical relation to us are all good
reasons for our love, although these values are not first revealed to us by reasoning
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about the implicit commitments of agency; the existential objectivist position is
not a kind of Kantian rationalism extended to nonmoral values. In addition to the
rationalist, subjectivist, and existential accounts I have mentioned, a fourth approach inspired by Aquinas is offered by Eleonore Stump in her recent Presidential
Address to the Central Division meeting of the APA (Chicago, April 2006).
140. Frankfurt, Reasons of Love, 26.
141. Of course, volitional devotion to such an end makes an art form of it,
which is something quite distinct from ordinary appetites for various first-order
pleasures (sensual, entertaining, etc.).
142. The qualifier ‘‘almost’’ is important here, given my suspicion of volitional
necessity.
143. Wolf, ‘‘The True, the Good, and the Loveable,’’ 236.
144. I believe this also to be an implication of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein
in Being and Time.
145. Larmore, The Morals of Modernity, 87.
146. See Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, esp. chaps. 3–7; Audi, The Good in the
Right; Dancy, Practical Reality; Kupperman, Values . . . and What Follows; Gewirth, SelfFulfillment; Grünberg, The Mystery of Values; von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness; Harman and Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity; Lemos, Intrinsic Value; the
essays from Social Philosophy and Policy reprinted in Paul, Miller, and Paul, The Good
Life and the Human Good; Ryn, Will, Imagination, and Reason; Rescher, Human Interests,
esp. chaps. 13, 14, and 16; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other; Tiberius, Deliberation
about the Good, esp. chap. 7. Of course expressive antinaturalist theories still abound
in contemporary metaethics, especially concerning moral norms; see, e.g., Blackburn, ‘‘Supervenience Revisited’’; Brandt, Facts, Values, and Morality; Gibbard, Wise
Choices, Apt Feelings; and Railton, ‘‘Nonfactualism about Normative Discourse.’’
However, many others now argue that emotions themselves involve a kind of axiological evaluation of objects in the world in terms of which they can be judged
adequate or not; see, e.g., de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, chap. 12 (although de
Sousa eventually denies the contrast between subjective appropriation and objective
apprehension of values, 319). Partially cognitive conceptions of emotion fit well
with the Aristotelian idea that emotional tendencies to some extent reflect one’s
value-judgmental dispositions.
147. Liberman, Commitment, Values, and Moral Realism, 1–2.
148. See Chulef, Read, and Walsh, ‘‘A Hierarchical Taxonomy of Human
Goals.’’
149. I emphasize that my list includes most of the goods one finds in recent
natural-law theories, such as the list of goods basic to well-being in Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality; but my list includes goods that range outside human
well-being altogether, such as environmental goods and abstract values. In that
respect, my list is more like the ones found in the ‘‘phenomenological realist’’
school of Dietrich von Hildebrande.
150. Since I have said little about this kind of reason until now, an example is
in order. In All Creatures Great and Small, James Herriot does not start out with the
intention of working as a vet in Yorkshire, but he seizes a lucky opportunity and
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becomes ever more deeply engaged in Farnon’s lively practice, the troubles and joys
of the Yorkshire folk, and the beauty of this land. This whole gestalt of values
worth caring about is crystallized or held together for this one individual by the
initial prospect or opportunity, which is a historically unique prospective
consideration.
151. I include this kind of individual ground to accommodate Frankfurt’s idea
of volitional necessities, although I do not endorse this idea.
152. Bugbee, The Inward Morning, October 8 entry, 69.
153. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 24.
154. See Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.
155. See Seligman and Abramson, ‘‘Learned Helplessness in Humans’’; and
Peterson and Seligman, ‘‘Causal Explanations and Depression.’’
156. Blustein, Care and Commitment, 25.
157. Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism, 11; see also Kekes, Moral Wisdom and Good
Lives.
158. Ibid., 14.
159. Ibid., 15.
160. Ibid., 19.
161. See Flanagan’s responses to Bernard Williams’s contention that personal
projects can trump impartial moral requirements; The Varieties of Moral Personality,
chaps. 3 and 4.
Conclusion: The Danger of Willfulness Revisited
1. Here I want to acknowledge serious questions recently raised by John Lippitt about what work the notion of narrative unity can do in an existential account
of virtue and whether it might not overvalorize planning relative to surprise or
openness to being changed through encounters and unanticipatable events. See
Lippitt’s review of Kierkegaard after MacIntyre in Faith and Philosophy and his essay on
this topic forthcoming in Inquiry.
2. Schalow, ‘‘Beyond Decisionism and Anarchy,’’ 360.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 363. This is why, in his debate with an adversary bent on immortality,
Captain Picard says that ‘‘our mortality defines us.’’ See Star Trek Generations, directed
by David Carson, written by Rick Berman (Paramount Pictures, 1994).
5. Ibid., 364. Unfortunately, though, Schalow seems to infer from this that we
should move beyond the idea of ‘‘a will’’ as ‘‘the centralization of [freedom’s]
power’’ (ibid., 366). I hope to have shown instead that the idea of willing itself
need not be rejected to overcome the dangers of pure voluntarism.
6. Noddings, Caring, 24.
7. Ehman, The Authentic Self, 12–13.
8. Ibid., 13.
9. Gabrielle Taylor, ‘‘Deadly Vices?’’ 168.
10. Ehman, The Authentic Self, 14.
11. Ibid., 14–15.
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12. Ibid., 15.
13. Ibid., 16.
14. Ibid., 17.
15. Ibid., 18.
16. Ibid., 21–23.
17. Ibid., 31.
18. Ibid., 32.
19. Ibid., 33.
20. Ibid., 34.
21. This is also true for Kant on my reading of his theory of the foundation
of moral norms. For I understand Kant as saying that in willing anything, we are
in part responding to and thus implicitly affirming our own infinite noninstrumental
value as agents capable of liberty and projective motivation (and in particular, the
motive of duty). This value is not itself something created by the will; rather, the will
is always already implicitly committed to it and, willy-nilly, expresses it, whatever it
wills. Hence the pragmatic contradiction in maxims that deny this value.
22. Ibid., 38.
23. Ibid., 44.
24. Ibid., 61.
25. Heidegger, ‘‘Question Concerning Technology,’’ in Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 32.
26. Oliver, ‘‘Yes! No!’’ in Owls and Other Fantasies, 27.
27. Edward Mooney, Selves in Discord and Resolve, 19. Mooney’s analysis also
raises questions about the role of leeway-libertarian freedom in identity-formation
that must be postponed for future work on autonomy.
28. Ibid., 39–40. Mooney makes this point in his unsurpassed commentary on
Kierkegaard’s discussion of Job in Repetition.
29. For this objection, I am indebted to Steve Watson; see also his Traditions(s),
141. Heidegger’s notion of the ‘‘will to will’’ is found in ‘‘Word of Nietzsche’’ in
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays.
30. This idea of a balance between ‘‘self-choice’’ and ‘‘self-reception’’ comes
from Mooney, Selves in Discord and Resolve, chap. 2.
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Agent-transcending product-goods definitive of a practice: those goods that a
practice distinctively produces for the community, which an agent must value
intrinsically and take as (among) her final ends in order to count as authentically
engaged in the practice.
Agent-relative process-goods internal to a practice: goods that arise for the agent
as by-products of his engaging in the practice, or from his pursuing and/or realizing the goods definitive of the practice for their own sake.
Aristotelian principle (AP): John Rawls’s hypothesis that human agents naturally
tend to enjoy the development and exercise of their talents and capacities, and this
enjoyment increases as the challenges become more complex and draw on a more
diverse array of abilities.
Complexity caveat: this concerns the relation between formed cares and rational
grounds for caring; some objective grounds for caring about a given goal may be
relevant to an agent or rational for him to consider only if he has, or has not,
already formed other cares and purposes of particular kinds.
Egoism:
Abstract egoism: the self-defeating doctrine that we ought to aim only at second-order (or by-product) fulfillment as our sole final end.
Formal egoism (FE):
1. Thin definition: every end that an agent pursues she chooses as part of her selfrealization or self-perfection; or
2. Thick definition: every motive on which an agent acts aims at some end apprehended as part of his self-realization because it is something the lack of which
657
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has become salient to him by brute attraction or evaluative judgment. Thus
every final end is agent-relative in the sense that it is pursued for appropriation or
experience by the agent.
Material psychological egoism (MPE) or ‘‘simple material egoism’’: all our
actions are ultimately motivated by desires for self-interested first-order intrinsic goods. All our actions are conceived either as constituting such goods or as
instrumental to them.
Complex material egoism: expands the list of psychologically possible goals to
include higher-order self-interested goods (such as comparative advantages or
changes in interpersonal differences).
Moral egoism (short for ‘‘material moral egoism’’ or MME): this is one type
of the Self-interest conception of practical reason that Parfit calls ‘‘S.’’ It holds
that we ought to do only what we think will maximize our material advantages
(simple or complex).
Ends: goals intentionally pursued by human agents; purposes that explain human
action as voluntary; objects of desire (goods) when pursued in action.
Comprehensive end/good: the one second-order fully final end that holistically
includes all objectively desirable first-order final ends as its proper parts, such
that its intrinsic value embraces theirs; the ideal relationship among first-order
goods, whose full intrinsic value is realized only within the ordered whole that
is the comprehensive good.
Dominant end/good: the uniquely highest end/good among a list of fully final
ends, which does not include all other objectively valuable goods (holistically or
nonholistically): there are other final ends that are not desired for the sake of
this highest end (i.e., not desired as means to or as parts of this highest good).
Yet it is the most important or valuable of all fully final ends.
Final ends/intrinsic goods: goals pursued for their own sake, or goods desired
for their terminal value (whether or not they are also valued as means to other
distinct ends). Finality equals ‘‘completeness’’ in the simplest Aristotelian sense
of this term. (Note: this definition does not try to capture Korsgaard’s further
distinction between relational and nonrelational types of terminal value).
Fully final ends/unconditionally complete goods: final ends that are not desired as means to any other ends; goods desired only for their terminal value,
not for their instrumental value in producing other distinct goods.
Highest end/highest good: a fully final end or unconditionally complete good
(willed only for its own sake) that, given our nature, we should recognize as
having the greatest possible level of intrinsic value or importance for human
life. (A highest end is not ultimate if there is more than one good of this highest
order; and even a uniquely highest end might not be comprehensive but only
dominant.)
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Sufficient end: a fully final goal whose attainment is sufficient to make our life
lack nothing objectively desirable, or sufficient to satisfy all orektic desire.
Ultimate end/ultimate good: the end that is uniquely highest because it is
comprehensive and thus sufficient. A-eudaimonism adds further conditions to
this definition to supply a priori reasons for thinking that there must be such an
ultimate end.
Erosiac desire: motives having the structure of ‘‘lack seeking satisfaction,’’ in which
the agent is passively pulled or attracted toward an intentional content that promises to get her closer to completeness, which is a state unperturbed by any prepurposively felt absence of goods. Thus the intentional object of an erosiac desire by
definition includes the agent experiencing, appropriating, possessing, or enjoying
some good; it aims at the agent’s well-being through this pictured relationship.
Sexual appetite for bodily contact (‘‘erotic’’ desire in the narrow sense) is only one
paradigm species of the general class of erosiac desire. (See Egoism: formal egoism;
contrasts with Projective motivation).
Erosiac theses:
Strong erosiac thesis (SET): all motives on which we act are erosiac in form.
Weak erosiac thesis (WET): all prepurposive human motives (PPMs) are erosiac
in form.
Eudaimonia thesis: a human agent’s formal telos F is eudaimonia (the agent’s happiness in its maximally holistic sense), and thus her embracing motive (which is the
jointure of all her other motives) is orektic desire for eudaimonia.
Eudaimonia: happiness in the holistic sense; a life lacking no good that could make
it better, more valuable, or more worth living; flourishing in a sense that includes
the agent’s settled recognition of his blessed state (a substantive psychological condition beyond the formal requirement of performing one’s natural function).
Eudaimonism
External eudaimonism (EEu): the conjunction of REu with the denial of PE:
our eudaimonia as a by-product can rationally justify a set of dispositions and
activities, yet our desire for eudaimonia will not enter into all those dispositions
or motivate all those activities.
Indirect eudaimonism (IEu): a consequentialist version of EEu that tells us to
do whatever will maximize our eudaimonia, including cultivating whatever motives, beliefs, actions, and practices of ethical judgment are most likely to allow
us to flourish and to appreciate this flourishing.
Psychological eudaimonism (PE): the thesis that all our motives, including
moral motives, are unified in the desire for eudaimonia as the holistic end that
embraces all other final ends as its proper parts (PE equals the conjunction of
the Jointure and Eudaimonia theses; implies Egoism: formal egoism).
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A-eudaimonism: an idealized reconstruction of the versions of PE attributable
to Aristotle and Aquinas.
Rational eudaimonism (REu): the thesis that an agent’s practical reasons for
action are all unified (in the justificatory sense) in considerations concerning the
agent’s flourishing and its necessary conditions. Thus motives and dispositions
contributing to the agent’s eudaimonia as a by-product are rationally justified
according to REu.
Existential objectivism (EO): the goal-setting and goal-pursuing activity of the
striving will is always performed in light of values or goods that (appear to the
agent to) ground or provide objective reasons for this volitional activity. Projective
motivation thus includes an implicit claim of intersubjective validity for the reasons
that ground ways of life, modes of caring, or different types of personal ethos. See
also Grounding thesis and Complexity caveat.
Existential subjectivism (ES): the denial of EO. ES holds that cares and volitional
commitments in general are inscrutably personal in origin or even essential to the
agent’s subjective motivational set and make no validity-claim upon others that
could be rationally criticizable on the basis of independent criteria.
Grounding thesis: any end E that is willed in the projective sense is set on the
basis of grounds for valuing E or reasons for valuing the process of pursuing E (or
both), where these considerations are neither (1) chosen by the agent, nor (2)
constituted simply by desires for E in the erosiac sense. In other words, in order
to project E, the agent must see some kind of agent-transcending value either in the
realization of E or in the process or activity of her pursuing E (or both). See also
Existential objectivism.
Inclusion in a goal:
Holistic inclusion: state of affairs A is included holistically in goal B if, whenever A is pursued as final, it is pursued as a constituent part of B (where the
part-whole relation is non-mereological). A’s finality is an aspect of the finality
of B; A is pursued as an expression of B or way of participating in B, and in
such a way that it fits with the other parts of B.
Nonholistic inclusion: state of affairs A is included nonholistically in goal B if
A is always pursued partly or wholly as a means to B (nonholistic inclusion is
mereological in the sense that A is simply added to a list of other means to B,
without necessarily having any intrinsic relation to these other means).
Independence relation between motives of different orders: M1 and M2 are motivationally independent if and only if M2 does not psychologically explain the existence
of M1 by motivating the agent to acquire, develop, or foster M1 as a means to
satisfying M2 or as part of M2.
Insufficiency principle (IP): (1) factual and evaluative judgments by themselves
do not necessarily generate a corresponding motivation to pursue the relevant good
or avoid the relevant harm; the agent can make such judgments seriously without
necessarily being moved to act on them; (2) even when they do motivate, such
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judgments are always insufficient to cause a corresponding intention to act as the
judgment indicates, until they are taken up in decision.
Joint goods: values that can be realized only by the joint action of more than one
human agent, in which each intends his or her act partly or wholly because others
are willing to do likewise on the same understanding that this will be a joint action.
Such goods can be produced or enjoyed only together as common goods.
Jointure thesis: there is exactly one unified formal telos F such that our motivation
to pursue F embraces all our motives, in the sense that they are parts of, or expressions or instantiations of, the motivation to pursue F.
Kantian principle of action (KPA): any voluntary action A involves the agent’s
implicit endorsement of some practical reason for A-ing in such circumstances, which
he must then regard as a consideration with normative force in favor of A-ing in any
similar circumstance.
Naturalistic thesis: human flourishing will be realized by whatever activities and
states completely develop, exploit, and express the full potential of our natural kind
or are required as necessary conditions of this complete expression of the full
potential defined by our natural kind.
Nontransferability of desire to by-product satisfaction: if the desire for and pursuit of some end X produces some by-product satisfaction S, the same desire for
X cannot transfer to S or include S among its objects.
Normative worth (NW): the intersubjectively accessible, rationally evaluable value
in some potential object of care or process of caring that makes it objectively worth
caring about (contrasts with Personal importance).
Nygren’s fallacy (as a false conditional): If agent S loves X because of X’s objective
value V, then S’s love must be an erosiac appetite for V; (as a false dichotomy):
all love is either groundless or erosiac.
Orexis: Aristotle’s general term for all forms of erosiac desire, including lower
appetites (epithumia), passions such as sudden anger (thumos); and rational wishes
(boulēsis). Orexis originally signified reaching out one’s hand for something.
Paradox of material egoism: a type of pragmatic self-defeat in motivation. Following
material egoism as a normative doctrine, an agent fails to pursue any agent-transcending first-order goods for their own sake and thereby makes his life worse or
lowers his overall well-being, thus frustrating his primary self-regarding aim.
Paradox of eudaimonism: the pure motive of virtue conflicts with the formal egoism involved in the Eudaimonia thesis. Since virtuous acts aim at ‘‘the noble’’
rather than at the agent’s eudaimonia, the latter can be at most an unintended byproduct of virtuous motivation and action.
Paradox of utilitarianism: the collective happiness of all relevant agents may be
maximized only if some (or most) of these agents act on nonutilitarian motives or
subscribe to practical principles that conflict with the direct application of the
greatest happiness principle.
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Personal importance (PI): the kind of agent-relative importance or value-to-anagent that something or someone derives from the agent’s caring about it or them,
rather than operating as a prior agent-neutral ground for his caring. Personal importance is thus agent-relative and not universalizable (contrasts with Normative
worth).
Platonic principle (positive formulation): in every action, we intend an end perceived as an apparent good for us or for our group; we choose this end as adding
materially to our well-being or to the well-being of our community in some way.
(Negative formulation): we never act with harm to ourselves or our community as
our final end, since that would be to create some lack or want in ourselves for its
own sake.
Projective motivation: an essentially volitional type of purposive motivation that does
not derive from prepurposive motives but is generated by the agent in the process
of setting new goals, forming new projects, or supplementing existing motives for
carrying out already formed purposes. The intentional content of a projective motive is actively established rather than drawing the mind toward it, and therefore
this content can be pure of perceived relation to the agent’s well-being (contrasts
with Erosiac desire.) (This volitional sense of ‘‘projective’’ is unrelated to ‘‘projection’’ in the psychoanalytic sense of mistaking subjective qualities of one’s own
thought for real properties of objects outside one’s mind.)
Prepurposive motives (PPMs): conative psychic states, such as desires and some
emotions, that motivate or incline us to act without necessarily entailing an intention to act on them or a formed purpose (contrasts with Purposive motivation).
Proportionalism: a version of objectivism about values that holds that an ethical
will must care about each thing strictly in proportion to its objective importance
in a rigid hierarchy of normative worth. (This usage is unrelated to ‘‘proportionalism’’ as a normative doctrine concerning when negative side effects of a contemplated action are acceptable).
Purposive motivation: the motivation to act that guides or directs a standing intention, purpose, or plan of action; the motivation guiding or directing the agent when
she acts on purpose (contrasts with Prepurposive motivation).
Self-interest conception of practical reason (S): Derek Parfit’s maximally generalized formulation of moral egoism as the doctrine that we should cultivate whatever
habits, motives, beliefs, and practices of ethical judgment are most likely to maximize our individual welfare.
Pure aretaic naturalism: a human life regulated by virtuous dispositions of character will tend to be a flourishing life, where this consists of objective goods by which
we realize the good of our natural kind, whether or not this involves subjective recognition of happiness. As with external eudaimonism, on this model, the virtuous agent
may not be motivated by a desire for the flourishing that virtue tends to produce.
Pure motives: motives involving no self-interest; motives that are pure of both formal
and material egoism because they aim at some agent-transcending goal (not formally or materially connected to the agent’s well-being) as a final end.
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Subsumption of motives:
General principle of subsumption (GPS): (1) subsumption of a first-order
motive M1 under a second-order motive M2 entails the motivational independence of the M1 from M2; (2) and entails the metaphysical dependence of M2
on M1.
Special principle of subsumption (SPS): if first-order motive M1 is pure, and
M2 is the second-order desire for eudaimonia as a whole, then if M1 is subsumed under M2, it follows necessarily that M1 is motivationally independent
of M2.
Subsumption relation between motives: a first-order motive M1 (for end X,
which is not a motive-state of the agent) is subsumed by a second-order motive
M2 (for end Y) when Y is either: (1) the mere existence of M1, or (2) the
satisfaction of M1 by the realization of X.
Telos, erosiac:
Formal telos (F): F holistically embraces all the goods that we can rationally
pursue, and desire for F thus underlies all our other motives, such that whatever
we are motivated to pursue, we pursue either as a means to, as part of, or under
the aspect of F (whether reflectively or only tacitly).
Material telos (M): that in which our formal telos F actually consists or that
which constitutes or causes F to be realized for us. The content of M may not
be apparent to us even if we understand our desires as pointing to some embracing good (F) that would be completely fulfilling. M is thus ontologically constitutive of F but epistemically distinct from F.
Telos, existential
Natural telos: a normative concept of our natural design or function, including
the types of motives we are meant to develop, or volitional activities we are
meant to engage in. The agent’s realizing her natural telos or performing well
this natural function is not equivalent to her flourishing (in prior, substantive
senses of that concept) or to her experiencing her life as eudaimon, or filled with
well-being. Eudaimonia and flourishing may be contingent by-products of fulfilling our natural function.
Motivational telos: the set of ends E that it is our function to care about for
their own sake or that we care about when we are fulfilling our design plan or
performing our natural function. ‘‘Living according to our nature’’ and ‘‘realizing our natural telos’’ are not included in E. Rather, these results follow from
willing the ends included in our motivational telos.
Material existential telos: a substantive conception or list of ends included in
our motivational telos, which may also specify the relationships among these
ends, higher-order regulative goals, and the kinds of value-insight or practical
reasons that are required to will these ends for their own sake.
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Transcendent principle (Trans):
Strong Transcendent principle (Plato): if an end e is pursued for its own sake
(or as final), then it is pursued as comprehensive (Fe → Ce). We may think of
this as a conjunction of two simpler theses: if e is final, then it is complete/
fully final; and if e is fully final, then it is comprehensive [(Fe → FFe) & (FFe
→ Ce)]. If we combine this with the plausible premise that finite, earthly goods
are not comprehensively good, it follows that they are not truly pursued as final:
we really desire the goods of this life for their resemblance to or participation
in a transcendent good that is comprehensive; through them, we hope to get to
this all-embracing transcendent good.
Weak Transcendent principle (Aristotle): if end e is fully final, then it is comprehensive (FFe → Ce). Only the comprehensive good is pursued solely for its
own sake; all noncomprehensive final ends are either (a) also pursued as a means
to other ends or (b) pursued as constitutive components of the comprehensive
good.
Transmission principle (TP): All the motivation present in the formation of intentions and the carrying out of intentions derives both its (1) all its strength and
(2) all its intentional direction and content immediately from prior prepurposive
psychological states (PPMs) that are either (a) already motivating in their own
right (such as desires) or (b) motivating when combined with these (such as
beliefs).
Tutelage thesis: no one can ever voluntarily enter into a practice (or similarly complex activity) in such a way as to realize its internal agent-related goods; to realize
these internal process-goods always requires that the agent be induced by external
influence and persuasion appealing to prior motives to engage in the relevant activity and then switch to the requisite pure motives later on.
Ubiquity thesis (UT): Every morally responsible agent desires his or her own
happiness, flourishing, or self-realization (in addition to whatever other motives
she may have).
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1. Generally, if more than one chapter in an edited book or one essay
in a collection of essays is cited, then the edited volume or collection has its own separate entry here, and each of the chapters or
essays cited has its own entry with abbreviated information on the
book in which it is found.
2. When only one chapter or essay from an edited volume is referenced, the entry for the chapter or essay usually includes full information on the book in which it is found.
3. The entries for most articles reprinted in such collections include
only the information on the reprinted version; a few include information on the original publication of the article, followed by the
book in which the article is reprinted.
4. Unless otherwise noted in the entry for a given work, chapter
notes always refer to the latest version or reprint of an article in
the bibliography entry.
5. I generally refer to the primary name of the publisher for each
work listed here rather than to different imprints (Clarendon, Belknap, etc.), except where the imprint helps identify the edition
cited. Unless the publisher is obscure, I also generally omit the
place of publication, since most publishers now publish in many
cities.
6. Every scholarly or literary source referenced in the chapter notes
should have a full entry here, excluding a few Web sites, popular
movies, musical records, newspapers, popular periodicals, and references to another work within a primary citation.
7. A few sources used as general background but not explicitly cited
in any note are also included here for convenience.
Ackrill, J. L. ‘‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia.’’ Proceedings of the British Academy 60
(1974):339–59. Reprinted in Rorty, Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 15–33; and in
Sherman, Aristotle: Critical Essays, 57–78.
665

................. 16406$

BIBL

05-23-07 10:55:05

PS

PAGE 665

666

Bibliography

Adams, Robert M. Finite and Infinite Goods. Oxford University Press, 1999.
———. ‘‘Must God Create the Best?’’ In The Concept of God, edited by Thomas V.
Morris, 91–106. Oxford University Press, 1987.
Allison, Henry. Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy.
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
———. ‘‘Kant on Freedom: A Reply to My Critics.’’ Inquiry 36 (1993). Reprinted
in Allison, Idealism and Freedom.
———. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
———. ‘‘Spontaneity and Autonomy in Kant’s Conception of the Self.’’ In Ameriks and Sturma, The Modern Subject, 11–30. Reprinted in Allison, Idealism and
Freedom. The original version of this paper was presented at the Conference on
German Idealism, University of Notre Dame, April 8, 1994.
American Heritage Dictionary. 2nd ed. Houghton Mifflin, 1982.
Ameriks, Karl. ‘‘From Kant to Frank: The Ineliminable Subject.’’ In Ameriks and
Sturma, The Modern Subject, 217–30.
———. Interpreting Kant’s Critiques. Oxford University Press, 2003.
———. ‘‘Kant and Hegel on Freedom: Two New Interpretations.’’ Inquiry 35.2
(June 1992):219–32. Reprinted in Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques, 212–25.
Citations are to the original version.
———. Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation. Oxford University Press, 2006.
———. ‘‘Kant and Motivational Externalism.’’ In Moralische Motivation. Kant und die
Alternativen, edited by H. Klemme, M. Kühn, and D. Schönecker. Hamburg:
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and Faber, 1964.
Hampshire, Stuart. Freedom of the Individual. Expanded ed. Princeton University Press,
1975.
Hampton, Cynthia. Pleasure, Knowledge, and Being: An Analysis of Plato’s Philebus. SUNY
Press, 1990.
Hardie, W. F. R. Aristotle’s Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press, 1968.
———. ‘‘The Final Good in Aristotle’s Ethics.’’ Philosophy 40 (1965):277–95.
Harkavy, Allan. Human Will: The Search for Its Physical Basis. Peter Lang, 1995.
Harman, Gilbert, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.
Blackwell, 1996.
Hasker, William. ‘‘A Philosophical Perspective.’’ In Pinnock, Rice, Sanders,
Hasker, and Basinger, The Openness of God, 126–54.
Hauerwas, Stanley. Character and the Christian Life. 2nd ed. University of Notre Dame
Press, 1984.
Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller, introduction by
J. N. Findlay. Oxford University Press, 1977.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. 7th ed., translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper & Row, 1962.
———. Poetry, Language, Thought. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. Harper & Row,
1971.
———. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Translated by William
Lovitt. Harper and Row, 1977.
Hekman, Susan J. Moral Voices/Moral Selves. Penn State University Press, 1995.
Helms, Randall. Tolkien’s World. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974.
Henrich, Dieter. ‘‘Fichte’s Original Insight.’’ Translated David Lachterman. In Contemporary German Philosophy, vol. 1, 15–54. Penn State University Press, 1982.
———. ‘‘Self-Consciousness, A Critical Introduction to a Theory.’’ Man and World
4.1 (February 1971):3–28.
———. The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy. Edited by Richard Velkley.
Harvard University Press, 1994.
Herman, Barbara. ‘‘Bootstrapping.’’ In Buss and Overton, Contours of Agency,
253–73.
———. ‘‘On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty.’’ In The Practice of
Moral Judgment. Harvard University Press, 1993.
Herriot, James. All Creatures Great and Small. St. Martin’s Press, 1972.

................. 16406$

BIBL

05-23-07 10:55:12

PS

PAGE 676

Bibliography

677

Hick, John. ‘‘An Irenaen Theodicy.’’ In A John Hick Reader, edited by Paul Badham,
88–105. Trinity Press International, 1990.
Hill, Susanne. ‘‘Two Perspectives on the Ultimate End.’’ In The Crossroads of Norm
and Nature, edited by May Sim, 99–114. Roman and Littlefield, 1995.
Hill, Thomas Jr. Autonomy and Self-Respect. Cambridge University Press, 1991.
———. ‘‘Self-Respect Reconsidered.’’ In Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, 19–24.
———. ‘‘Servility and Self-Respect.’’ In Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, 4–18.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by C. B. Macpherson. Penguin Classics, 1985.
———. Man and Citizen. Edited by Bernard Gert, translated C. Wood, T. S. K.
Scott-Craig, and B. Gert. Hackett, 1991.
Hobbs, Angela. Plato and the Hero. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
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